A10 Networks
A10 Networks sells the boxes and software that spread internet traffic across servers and block flooding attacks, to phone companies, cloud operators and large businesses.
The scores
Growth2/4 →
Revenue grew 11.0% in 2025 and 14.5% in H1 2026, all from one customer's rollout; sales to everyone else fell about 3% and 8%.
Business quality2/4 →
Installed boxes keep an 80% gross margin, but the largest customer runs its own version and Cloudflare sells protection with no box at all.
Financial position4/4 →
$357.3M of cash and securities against a $225.0M convertible due 2030 with no covenants, and about $61M of free cash flow a year.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Eight straight quarterly beats and a raised 2026 guide, but revenue fell 10.2% in 2023 and today's growth hangs on one buyer.
Per share capture2/4 ↓
Buybacks cut shares to 72.6M, but the convertible sits above its $23.46 price and Microsoft's warrant adds up to 800,000 shares.
Potential2/4 →
Growth needs Microsoft to keep buying past secret thresholds and carriers to recover while IPv4 demand slowly shrinks; nothing is contracted.
Risk profile2/4 ↓
One customer is 38% of revenue and one distributor 40%; Microsoft's ordering decision is external and resolves in a single step.
Valuation2/4 →
About 35 times trailing operating profit: the price needs that profit 2.6 times larger, which sales outside Microsoft are not growing toward.
Evidence quality3/4 →
The customer table, warrant and statements are filed; that Customer A is Microsoft, and its future orders, rest on inference and management.
The Verdict
We rate A10 Networks unattractive. It sells equipment and software that keep networks running under heavy traffic and attack, and its sales are growing again, but the growth is one customer, almost certainly Microsoft, while sales to everyone else fall, so the business is mixed. Microsoft already writes its own version of the product, and A10 now pays it in shares for buying more. The price assumes that one relationship keeps growing for years, so it is full, not cheap. The view would change if sales to other customers grow again, or the big customer's share falls while growth holds.
The long caseMuch of the internet still runs on an old address system, so carriers keep buying A10's address-sharing boxes; the slow move to the newer system must stay slow.
The evidence under this - 9 claims
- A10 never names Customer A in a filing; the 10-Q calls it only 'Customer A'.
- The CEO said Microsoft's newer business is booked as enterprise and its older business as service provider, so it could in principle be two customers of the same size rather than one.
- The CEO said on the Q2 2026 call that the business excluding Microsoft and one or two countries with macro problems is 'growing close to double digits'.
- Q2 2026 alone shows sales outside Customer A up about 2%, so the fall is concentrated in Q1 2026, when Customer A pulled a project forward.
- The vendor's enterprise value leaves out $302.7M of marketable securities and prints 40.0 times on the same line.
- Counting the convertible at its $247.5M share value rather than its $225.0M principal raises the multiple to about 35.2.
- 2026 guidance (C09) would lift operating income, so a forward multiple is lower than a trailing one.
- Management's non-GAAP margin is already 25.5% (C13); if share pay stayed at 7% of revenue, GAAP margin would reach 25% only with further operating leverage.
- At management's 12-14% growth (C09), revenue compounds faster than 11% for as long as the guide holds.
The company
When millions of people hit a website or a phone network at once, something has to decide which server answers each one, share scarce internet addresses among subscribers, and throw away floods of fake traffic sent to knock the service over. A10 sells boxes, and the same software for a customer's own servers, that do those jobs.
Its buyers are phone and internet carriers, cloud operators and large companies. The alternatives are rivals such as F5 and Radware, a router's built-in feature, or a cloud service with no box.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- A10 never names Customer A in a filing; the 10-Q calls it only 'Customer A'.
- The CEO said Microsoft's newer business is booked as enterprise and its older business as service provider, so it could in principle be two customers of the same size rather than one.
How it makes money
A10 earns most of its money when a customer buys a box: products were $49.0M of the $80.1M it took in during Q2 2026. Each box comes with a maintenance contract, paid upfront and lasting about 21 months on average, which renews while the box stays in the network. That maintenance, $31.1M in the quarter, is the steady part of the business, and it grew only 3.0%.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Products | 57.5% | Hardware appliances running A10's ACOS software under a perpetual licence, plus a small share of term and subscription licences, sold mostly through distributors. |
| Services | 42.5% | Maintenance and support contracts invoiced with each box and renewed, plus professional services, training and software-as-a-service. |
Who runs it
Dhrupad Trivedi has run A10 since late 2019 and also chairs its board; the finance chief and the sales chief both arrived in 2025. Insiders own about 1% of the company, so their fortunes ride more on pay than on shares they already hold. The yearly bonus pays half on sales and half on a profit measure that leaves out stock pay; the share awards pay when the stock price clears set levels. Nothing rewards winning customers beyond Microsoft.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Once one of these boxes sits in a carrier's network, loaded with thousands of rules and carrying live traffic, replacing it means re-testing everything. So customers tend to renew rather than shop around.
The evidence is that A10 keeps about 80 cents of every sales dollar after the cost of making the product, and has done so for three years even as one giant customer grew. The company does not publish how many customers renew, so the strength of this is inferred, not measured.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The threat
The biggest threat is the biggest customer. Microsoft runs its own traffic-balancing service for its cloud and its own attack protection, so it buys from A10 only where A10 is better or cheaper. Cloudflare, meanwhile, sells attack protection from its own network, with no box in the customer's building.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Microsoft expanded its A10 purchases from about $39M to about $76M in a year while running its own services (C06), so its own build did not stop it buying.
- A multi-year warrant also ties Microsoft's roadmap to A10's, which the CEO calls mutual performance commitments.
The rivals: MSFT, NET, FFIV, RDWR, NTCT, AKAM, FTNT.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| MSFT | Microsoft Azure Load Balancer and Azure DDoS ProtectionPriced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
| NET | Cloudflare Magic TransitPriced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
| FFIV · RDWR | F5 BIG-IP and Radware DefenseProPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| NTCT | NetScout SystemsPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| AKAM | Akamai TechnologiesPriced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
| FTNT | FortinetPriced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
One of A10's jobs exists because the old system of internet addresses ran short, so carriers share each address among many subscribers. About 56% of the world's internet users still depend on that old system, a share falling 2.4 to 3.5 points a year as the newer system spreads.
Nobody publicly counts how many of these boxes are bought each year, so the market cannot be sized honestly beyond that.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The CEO said on the Q2 2026 call that the business excluding Microsoft and one or two countries with macro problems is 'growing close to double digits'.
- Q2 2026 alone shows sales outside Customer A up about 2%, so the fall is concentrated in Q1 2026, when Customer A pulled a project forward.
Who has signed
Microsoft holds a warrant for up to 800,000 A10 shares at a penny each. Half vests if its purchases pass a threshold in the year to June 2027, half in the year to June 2028. The thresholds are blacked out in the filing, and Microsoft is not obliged to buy anything.
The evidence under this - 1 claim
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Product | 61% | +25.1% | +23.8% | +19.1% |
| Service | 39% | +3.0% | +2.9% | +3.4% |
| Whole company | 100% | +15.5% | +14.5% | +12.2% |
The filed split through 2026-06-30. These rates are not carried forward: the reading below says why.
How we read it: The blend. Product and Service are revenue types in one segment, not businesses; Product's 24% is Customer A's rollout, while sales to everyone else fell about 8% in the half. One buyer's orders, not a mix shift.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 12% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, about the same pace as the 11% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 16%, about where it was (15%) in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 63¢ of each sales dollar, down from 65¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Shareholders' money earned 19% a year, down from 58% in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 20% of sales into free cash, $60.9M over the last twelve months.
It holds $357M of cash against $0 of debt, $357M more cash than it owes.
The share count fell 5.5% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 7.5% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $250M | $280M | $252M | $262M | $291M | $310M |
| Sales growth | +11% | +12% | −10% | +4.0% | +11% | +12% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 79% | 80% | 81% | 80% | 79% | 79% |
| Operating margin | 13% | 19% | 15% | 17% | 16% | 16% |
| Net margin | 38% | 17% | 16% | 19% | 15% | 14% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 22% | 21% | 22% | 22% | 24% | 25% |
| Sales and marketing | 34% | 32% | 34% | 32% | 29% | 28% |
| General and admin | 9.4% | 8.4% | 9.5% | 9.7% | 10% | 11% |
| Pay in shares | 5.8% | 4.8% | 5.6% | 6.5% | 6.9% | 7.5% |
| Capital spending | 2.1% | 3.9% | 4.3% | 4.7% | 6.9% | 5.1% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $50.1M | $66.1M | $44.5M | $90.5M | $84.9M | $76.9M |
| Free cash flow | $44.9M | $55.3M | $33.6M | $78.2M | $64.8M | $60.9M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $185M | $151M | $154M | $196M | $378M | $357M |
| Debt | - | - | - | $0 | $219M | $0 |
| Net cash | - | - | - | $196M | $159M | $357M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 21% | 24% | 18% | 17% | 11% | - |
| Shares (diluted) | 80.0M | 77.8M | 75.5M | 75.3M | 73.6M | 75.7M |
What growth costs
Growing has not made A10 more profitable. It now spends less to win each sale, but more on research, administration and pay in shares, so the profit kept from each dollar of sales has barely moved in three years, and it fell in the latest quarter even as sales jumped.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Non-GAAP operating margin, which excludes stock pay and acquisition costs, was 25.5% in Q2 2026 (C13), so part of the GAAP squeeze is share pay and TrojAI deal costs rather than the cost of selling.
- Operating margin did rise from 15.4% in 2023 to 16.8% in 2024 on 4.0% growth (C43).
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
Q2 2026 looked like a strong quarter: revenue up 15.5% and the full-year outlook raised to 12-14% growth. The mix told a different story. Sales to large companies jumped 72.9% while sales to carriers fell 22.8%, and Customer A alone paid 38% of revenue.
Take that customer out and sales to everyone else rose only about 2% in the quarter, after falling in Q1 2026. Profit also went the wrong way: operating profit fell to $9.0M from $10.3M as share-based pay doubled.
What it did to the thesisIt confirmed the Unattractive view: the growth came almost entirely from one large customer, while sales to everyone else barely moved and carrier sales fell. Profit fell too as share pay doubled. The raised outlook depends on that customer's rollout continuing, and the company itself says its share will change.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.25 against $0.24 expected; $0.12 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- The CEO said on the Q2 2026 call that the business excluding Microsoft and one or two countries with macro problems is 'growing close to double digits'.
- Q2 2026 alone shows sales outside Customer A up about 2%, so the fall is concentrated in Q1 2026, when Customer A pulled a project forward.
- First-half growth was 14.5%, so 12-14% for the year implies second-half growth of about 10-13.5%, a slowdown.
- The CEO said Customer A's share is 'linked to kind of completing the rollout' and 'will change probably in the future'.
What management did with the money
A10 bought back 3.67M shares in 2025 for $68.9M and pays a quarterly dividend of 6 cents. In June 2026 it spent $34.7M in cash and $5.0M in stock on TrojAI, a small company that tests and guards AI software.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 15 purchases and 19 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price pays for years of growth that so far comes from one buyer who could build the product itself.
The shares nearly doubled from February to a high in July on the hope that A10 is an AI winner, then fell by a third, including 10.5% the day after a report that raised the outlook.
Two new facts arrived with that report: the Microsoft warrant, and convertible bonds that holders may now swap for shares because the price passed their trigger. About 13.7% of the shares available to trade are sold short, a sign many investors doubt the story.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about 40 times A10's yearly operating profit for the business, after counting its cash and debt. Each dollar paid earns about 2 cents a year after tax.
To earn 6 cents a year after tax on each dollar, a common yardstick, A10 must:
- Grow operating profit about 2.6 times.
- Reach sales near $530M, against $310M today: about 11% growth a year for five years.
- Keep 25 cents of profit from each dollar of sales, against 16 cents today.
- Find that growth well beyond its one large buyer.
Against its own history. Buyers pay far more than their usual price for each dollar of A10's sales and profit, and that rise came from enthusiasm more than from sales.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The vendor's enterprise value leaves out $302.7M of marketable securities and prints 40.0 times on the same line.
- Counting the convertible at its $247.5M share value rather than its $225.0M principal raises the multiple to about 35.2.
- 2026 guidance (C09) would lift operating income, so a forward multiple is lower than a trailing one.
- Management's non-GAAP margin is already 25.5% (C13); if share pay stayed at 7% of revenue, GAAP margin would reach 25% only with further operating leverage.
- At management's 12-14% growth (C09), revenue compounds faster than 11% for as long as the guide holds.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of operating profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of operating profit |
|---|---|---|
| NTCT | NetScout Systems | 17.7× |
| FFIV | F5 | 28.8× |
| ATEN | A10 Networks | 40.0× |
| RDWR | Radware | 82.7× |
The middle of the other 3 is 28.8. A10 Networks, Inc. is 2nd dearest of 4.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Buyers pay more per dollar of operating profit than at F5 or NetScout, which sell similar products, and less only than at Radware; the premium is A10's own.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: NetScaler (Cloud Software Group), Imperva (Thales).
Where we disagree with the market
A profitable, cash-returning networking company whose growth turned double-digit on AI data-centre demand.
The growth is one customer's rollout, partly paid for with a warrant, while sales to everyone else shrink.
The customer table that shows this sits in a note deep in the quarterly filing; the results announcement talks about growth from large companies, not the one buyer behind it.
We would be wrong if sales outside Customer A grew more than 5% for two quarters, or if its share fell while total growth stayed above 10%.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The CEO said on the Q2 2026 call that the business excluding Microsoft and one or two countries with macro problems is 'growing close to double digits'.
- Q2 2026 alone shows sales outside Customer A up about 2%, so the fall is concentrated in Q1 2026, when Customer A pulled a project forward.
- Management's non-GAAP margin is already 25.5% (C13); if share pay stayed at 7% of revenue, GAAP margin would reach 25% only with further operating leverage.
- At management's 12-14% growth (C09), revenue compounds faster than 11% for as long as the guide holds.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- One customer, 38% of sales If Microsoft slows its orders once its current rollout ends, about a third of revenue is at risk in a single decision.
- The customer can build it Microsoft already runs its own traffic-balancing and attack-protection services, so it holds the bargaining power over price.
- Carriers are spending less Sales to phone and internet carriers fell 22.8% in Q2 2026, with Europe and Asia weak.
- Shareholders pay the partner The warrant and convertible bonds could add about 2.3% more shares, taking a slice of any rise.
- One distributor A single reseller carried 40% of Q2 2026 sales and 57% of money owed to A10.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Microsoft expanded its A10 purchases from about $39M to about $76M in a year while running its own services (C06), so its own build did not stop it buying.
- A multi-year warrant also ties Microsoft's roadmap to A10's, which the CEO calls mutual performance commitments.
- A10 may settle entirely in cash, and below $23.46 the notes issue no shares at all.
- Buybacks retired 3.67M shares in 2025, which would outrun this dilution at the same pace.
What we still do not know
- How much Microsoft must buy for each half of its warrant to vest: the figures are blacked out.
- How the warrant will be booked, and how much it will reduce reported sales or profit.
- Whether Customer A is only Microsoft, and which of its products run on A10's equipment.
- How many of these boxes the world buys each year, and A10's share of them.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- A10 never names Customer A in a filing; the 10-Q calls it only 'Customer A'.
- The CEO said Microsoft's newer business is booked as enterprise and its older business as service provider, so it could in principle be two customers of the same size rather than one.
- The CEO said on the Q2 2026 call that the business excluding Microsoft and one or two countries with macro problems is 'growing close to double digits'.
- Q2 2026 alone shows sales outside Customer A up about 2%, so the fall is concentrated in Q1 2026, when Customer A pulled a project forward.
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralA cheaper price on an unchanged business
It needs:
- ○The business, after cash and debt, falls to 20 times its yearly operating profit.about ≈$15.58 today, 40% below the last close
- Unattractive→NeutralThe rest of the business grows again
It needs all of:
- ○Sales to everyone other than Customer A grow 5% or more on a year earlier.checked at the next results, due by 3 Nov
- ○Customer A falls to 30% of sales or less.checked at the next results, due by 3 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Microsoft earns both halves of its warrant by buying more through June 2028.
- Operating profit reaches 20 cents per dollar of sales for a year while sales grow over 10%.
- Customer A's purchases fall on a year earlier in any quarter of 2027.
What is coming
- 3 November 2026 Q3 2026 results and 10-Q: Whether Customer A stays at 35% of revenue or more, whether sales outside it grow on Q3 2025, and whether the 12-14% 2026 outlook holds.
Every dated event ahead
- 3 November 2026 Q3 2026 results and 10-Q: Whether Customer A stays at 35% of revenue or more, whether sales outside it grow on Q3 2025, and whether the 12-14% 2026 outlook holds.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the FY2026 10-K: Customer A's full-year share, the year's growth against the raised outlook, the first 2027 outlook, and whether buybacks resume beyond the first half's token amount.
- 30 June 2027 Microsoft warrant's first purchase period ends: Whether Microsoft bought past the redacted first threshold, vesting 400,000 shares; a vest says the rollout held, a lapse that orders fell back.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 30 SepThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionAll of A10's growth is one customer, almost certainly Microsoft, that builds its own version; sales to everyone else shrank, and the price needs years more growth.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 22
Sources - 22
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-25Item 1 products, ACOS, maintenance terms, named competitors, Customer A at 26%, 15% and 14% of 2025, 2024 and 2023 revenue, ten largest customers, distribution channel shares, service provider and enterprise split, convertible terms, headcountbacksC01C04C11C14C19C23C28C29C33C38C42C43
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-06statements, Customer A at 38% of Q2 2026 revenue, ten largest at 58%, one distributor at 40% and 57% of receivables, enterprise and service provider revenue, geography, convertible reclassified to current, TrojAI purchase, share pay, remaining performance obligations, the Microsoft warrant as a subsequent eventbacksC01C02C03C04C07C12C14C16C19C28C29C30C32C43
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-05raised 2026 revenue and EPS growth outlook, non-GAAP reconciliation, buybacks and dividend, CEO statements on Microsoft and AI infrastructurebacksC02C09C13C33C36
- S04primarycompany filing2026-08-05quarterly revenue, margins and adjusted EBITDA back to Q1 2023, vertical and geographic split by quarter, GAAP to non-GAAP bridgesbacksC03C12C13C32
- S05primarytranscript2026-08-05Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-08-05data/cache/transcripts/ATEN-2026Q2.jsonmanagement answers on the Microsoft agreement, pre-buys, pull-forward, the enterprise and service provider split, memory costs and the 2026 outlook; 14 analyst turns from 5 analysts, two of them on the size of the largest customer
Historically, we characterize it as service provider. We have not recategorized that portion of the business.
backsC09C10C31 - S06primarycompany filing2026-05-07Customer A at 37% of Q1 2026 revenue against 15% a year earlier; one distributor at 38%; enterprise at 56%backsC04C19
- S07primarycompany filing2026-08-05800,000 shares at $0.01, two tranches vesting on Microsoft's purchases in periods ending 30 June 2027 and 2028, exercisable from 2028 and 2029; the vesting schedule and exercise conditions in Exhibits E and F are redactedbacksC07
- S08primarycompany filing2026-08-07153,962 shares issued on 15 June 2026 as part payment for TrojAI Inc.backsC30
- S09primarycompany filing2026-02-042025 revenue and profit, buybacks of 3.67M shares for $68.9M, the first 2026 outlook of 10-12% revenue growth and 12-14% EPS growthbacksC09C11C16
- S10primarytranscript2026-04-28Q1 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/ATEN-2026Q1.jsonguide held at 10-12%; an analyst question on whether large orders were pulled in ahead of memory shortages; management denies double bookingsread, but no claim rests on it
- S11primaryindustry data2013-04-01why carriers buy address-sharing equipment at all, and the behaviour a CGN must meet, from the standards body rather than a vendor
With the shortage of IPv4 addresses, it is expected that more Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may want to provide a service where a public IPv4 address would be shared by many subscribers.
backsC26 - S12primaryindustry data2026-09-29share of the world's internet users able to use IPv6: 43.70% on 2026-09-29, 41.29% on 2025-09-28, 38.82% on 2024-09-28, 35.28% on 2023-09-28
Use of IPv6 for World (XA) ... ['Date', 'IPv6 Capable', 'IPv6 Preference'], ... [new Date('2023-09-28'),35.28,34.23] ... [new Date('2024-09-28'),38.82,37.35] ... [new Date('2025-09-28'),41.29,39.95] ... [new Date('2026-09-29'),43.70,41.52]
backsC27 - S13primaryother2026-09-30Microsoft's own layer-4 load balancer, sold as a cloud service and run at scale in Azure
The service supports both inbound and outbound scenarios, provides low latency and high throughput, and scales up to millions of flows for all TCP and UDP applications.
backsC24 - S14primaryother2026-09-30DDoS protection for on-premises networks delivered from Cloudflare's network instead of a box on site
Instead of relying on local infrastructure that large DDoS attacks can overwhelm, Magic Transit uses the global Cloudflare Network to ingest and mitigate attacks
backsC25 - S15primarycompany filing2026-03-31Radware's competitor list, naming A10 in application deliverybacksC23
- S16primarycompany filing2026-05-14the Arbor DDoS competitor list, naming A10backsC23
- S17primarycompany filing2025-11-25the same application delivery and security product sold to the same buyers; F5 names no competitor by name, and warns of large cloud providers offering their own application deliveryread, but no claim rests on it
- S18secondaryvendor data2026-09-30ATEN research pack (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest, headcount), frozen 2026-09-30content/ATEN/research-pack.jsonclose of $25.81 on 2026-09-29, daily bars, the price move decomposition, analyst split and its history, forward estimates, earnings beats, short interest, cohort multiples for F5, Radware and NetScoutbacksC20C21C22C33
- S19primarycompany filing2026-09-30six open-market sales and no purchases in a year, five of them under Rule 10b5-1 plansbacksC35
- S20primaryother2026-09-30Microsoft's own network-layer DDoS protection service
protects at layer 3 and layer 4 network layers. For web applications protection at layer 7, you need to add protection at the application layer using a WAF offering.
backsC24 - S21primarycompany filing2026-08-05the warrant text: expiry, spend certification, change-of-control acceleration; Exhibits E (vesting schedule) and F (exercise conditions) redactedbacksC07
- S22primarycompany filing2026-03-10executive officers and their start dates, beneficial ownership at 26 February 2026, the 2025 cash incentive plan's metrics and payout, the 2025 and 2026 PSU price targets and RSU grants, the former CFO's resignationbacksC39C40C41