Vistra
An American power producer: it runs gas, coal and nuclear plants, sells the electricity to 5 million homes and businesses, and uses each side to hedge the other.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Ongoing Operations Adjusted EBITDA is up over 30% YoY, but a material part is Energy Harbor/Lotus/Cogentrix M&A and hedge/price timing, not pure organic volume growth.
Business quality3/4 →
Irreplaceable licensed nuclear/coal plus an integrated retail hedge command real premiums, but untested by the emerging behind-the-meter substitution wave.
Financial position3/4 →
Investment-grade at two of three agencies with $6.3B of liquidity, but net debt rose about $3B in six months as acquisitions and buybacks ran together.
Execution record3/4 →
Guidance held through an ERCOT pullback and the buyback target was hit early, but the post-2021 restructured entity's clean record is still short.
Per share capture4/4 →
171 million shares retired against one small Cogentrix-related issuance - buybacks dominate the share-count trend by a wide margin.
Potential3/4 ↑
A large upside on observable steps - Batch Zero, Cogentrix, uprates - with one piece, the Meta PPA, already committed and in progress.
Risk profile3/4 →
A real regulatory dependency (Batch Zero, PJM tariff filings) and hedge-driven earnings volatility, but diversified across ERCOT/PJM/other ISOs and survivable if either resolves unfavorably.
Valuation3/4 →
EV/TTM Adjusted EBITDA near 10.0x sits below VST's own five-year median and only modestly above the peer GAAP-basis reading, once distortion is accounted for.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Central claims are mostly primary filings and transcript, cross-checked externally, but the cohort is thin and the TTM EBITDA figure is hand-computed, not filed.
The Verdict
We rate Vistra attractive. It runs gas, coal and nuclear plants that nobody can build again soon, and sells their power both wholesale and to its own retail customers, a solid business. Its reported profit swings because hedging contracts are revalued every quarter, but the cash business underneath grew over 30% last quarter. On that underlying profit the shares cost less than their own five-year norm, so the price is fair, needing only the forecast, with the AI demand close to free. The view hinges on management holding its 2027 profit aim as Texas power prices soften.
The long caseAI data centres, factories and a growing population are raising power demand in Texas and the eastern grid faster than in decades, and Vistra's existing plants sell into it.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
ERCOT day-ahead prices have run near half of the prior year's level for parts of 2026 per management's own commentary, and the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load Vistra is banking on (C29) is itself a management estimate rather than a filed figure.
The comparison leans on a vendor-reported five-year prior-period median (11.51x) that the pack itself does not fully audit the way it audits current-period figures, and on a hand-computed TTM Adjusted EBITDA (C09) rather than a single disclosed number.
The vendor's separate top-level market-tier EV/EBITDA of 10.07x (S16) is close to the hand-computed Adjusted figure (C11), so not every vendor EBITDA field is equally distorted - the cohort-specific 21.1x figure appears to draw on a different, more GAAP-exposed quarter mix than the smoothed top-level ratio.
The company
Vistra's fleet is 62% gas, 20% coal, 15% nuclear and 3% solar and batteries, selling into six American wholesale power markets, mainly Texas's grid, ERCOT, and PJM in the mid-Atlantic and Midwest.
It also sells electricity and gas directly to about 5 million homes and businesses in 18 states and Washington, DC. A buyer who does not use Vistra buys from a rival generator on the same grid, or builds its own plant.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
How it makes money
It earns the gap between what it costs to run its plants and what power sells for. Owning both the plants and the customers lets it lock in prices years ahead: when wholesale prices fall, retail margins cushion the blow. The contracts that do that are revalued every quarter, which is why reported profit jumps around while cash does not.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Retail electricity in Texas (ERCOT) | 50.5% | Energy charges billed to homes and businesses through TXU Energy and other brands, per kilowatt-hour delivered. |
| Retail electricity in the Northeast and Midwest | 22.9% | The same retail service sold under several brands in the deregulated states outside Texas. |
| Wholesale generation sold into grid markets | 18.0% | Power from its gas, coal, nuclear and solar plants sold to grid operators such as ERCOT and PJM at market prices. |
| Other wholesale contracts | 6.5% | Ancillary services, auction revenue and sales to other retailers, municipalities and wholesale buyers. |
| Capacity payments | 1.3% | Net payments from grid operators, mostly PJM, for keeping plants available, after capacity Vistra buys. |
| Hedging, tax credits and other | 0.9% | Realized hedge gains and transferable nuclear tax credits, offset in 2025 by unrealized hedge losses. |
Who runs it
Jim Burke has run Vistra since 2022, after years as its finance and operations chief; Kris Moldovan, a company veteran, has run the money since the same year. On their watch Vistra bought more power plants, signed long nuclear contracts with big tech buyers and beat its own profit forecast. Insiders own under 1% of the company. Bonuses ride on adjusted profit and cash flow; long-term shares on cash flow per share and the stock against the market.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Both bonus profit metrics exclude unrealized hedge losses and were targeted at the guidance midpoint, which Vistra beat; nothing pays on the return earned on acquisitions, the main use of growth capital.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Its six nuclear reactors, 6,448 MW licensed to run into the 2030s and beyond, cannot be copied: no large reactor is under construction anywhere in the United States, and only two were finished in the past decade.
That scarcity is why a technology company wanting steady, carbon-free power for decades came to Vistra's existing plants, at a price the finance chief called above market, instead of waiting for someone to build new ones.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
This is the only publicly quantified large signed data-center commitment across Vistra's entire ERCOT/PJM footprint; there is no comparably sized signed PPA disclosed in ERCOT specifically.
The threat
Data-centre owners are starting to build their own power. About 2 GW of off-grid generation was running by mid-2026, most of it gas turbines at xAI's sites, and Microsoft and Oracle are pursuing on-site power too. Every data centre powered that way is demand that never reaches Vistra's grid.
The evidence under this - 1 claim
Behind-the-meter capacity (about 3 GW by year-end 2026) remains a small fraction of the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load alone (C29), and cannot serve Vistra's 5-million-customer retail book or offer investment-grade counterparty risk transfer the way a PPA does (machine.threat.not_substituted).
The rivals: SPCX, BE, MSFT, NRG, CEG, TLN.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| SPCX | xAI (Colossus 1 and 2 gas-turbine sites near Memphis)Priced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
| BE | Bloom Energy (fuel-cell systems; 2.8 GW master agreement with Oracle within $7.65B of 2026 data-center contracts)Priced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
| MSFT | Microsoft (announced gas-turbine-powered data-center sites)Priced against it: Different product | Announced | Different product |
| NRG | NRG EnergyPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| CEG | Constellation EnergyPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| TLN | Talen EnergyPriced against it: No usable figure | On sale | No usable figure |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Demand is rising after decades of flat growth. Texas's grid peaked at 83.7 GW in 2025 and above 91 GW in July 2026, and its planners point to about 152 GW by 2030.
The queue of requests to connect large new users there is reported near 410 GW, mostly data centres. Vistra's own chief executive thinks only 12 GW to 15 GW of that is realistic by 2030.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
This 12-15 GW figure is Vistra's own filtering of the queue and is not independently verifiable; ERCOT and the Public Utility Commission of Texas's own Batch Zero audit (C32) exists precisely because nobody outside the generators has published a verified conversion rate from queue to real load (see machine.prize.composed_route).
Who has signed
One large buyer. Meta signed 20-year agreements for 2,609 MW from Vistra's nuclear plants in the PJM region, starting late 2026. Everything else in the data-centre story, including all of Texas, is still in negotiation.
The evidence under this - 1 claim
This is the only publicly quantified large signed data-center commitment across Vistra's entire ERCOT/PJM footprint; there is no comparably sized signed PPA disclosed in ERCOT specifically.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 3.8% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, about the same pace as the 3.0% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 19%, about where it was (18%) in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +3.0% to +17% over the last 5 years.
Each dollar put into the business earns 12% a year after tax, about where it was (11%) in the year to Dec 2023.
It turned 12% of sales into free cash, $2.25B over the last twelve months.
It owes $19.2B more than the cash it holds, about 3.7 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count fell 30% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 0.7% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $12.1B | $13.7B | $14.8B | $17.2B | $17.7B | $19.2B |
| Sales growth | +5.5% | +14% | +7.7% | +17% | +3.0% | +3.8% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | −13% | −8.6% | 18% | 24% | 11% | 19% |
| Net margin | −11% | −8.9% | 10% | 15% | 5.3% | 12% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Selling, general and admin | 8.6% | 8.7% | 8.9% | 9.3% | 9.7% | 9.0% |
| Pay in shares | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.7% |
| Capital spending | 8.6% | 9.5% | 11% | 12% | 16% | 15% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$206M | $485M | $5.45B | $4.56B | $4.07B | $5.12B |
| Free cash flow | −$1.24B | −$816M | $3.78B | $2.48B | $1.32B | $2.25B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $1.32B | $455M | $3.48B | $1.19B | $785M | $435M |
| Debt | $10.7B | $12.6B | $14.4B | $16.3B | $18.8B | $19.6B |
| Net cash | −$9.41B | −$12.2B | −$10.9B | −$15.1B | −$18.1B | −$19.2B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | 11% | 16% | 7.0% | 12% |
| Shares (diluted) | 482M | 422M | 375M | 353M | 346M | 339M |
What growth costs
Running Vistra gets no cheaper as it grows: office and selling costs rise in step with sales. Growth costs capital instead, buying plants and spending more each year upgrading them, so whether growing makes it more profitable depends on what those plants earn, which the reported figures, swung by hedging gains and losses, do not yet show.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Revenue carries unrealized hedge marks, a $766M loss in 2025 against a $1,013M gain in 2024 (C07, C42), so every per-sales-dollar ratio moves with commodity prices as well as with costs.
- The 2025 pay plan's total-cost metric missed its threshold, on growth projects, the Martin Lake 1 repair and integration costs (S20), so costs outside SG&A did rise faster than planned.
The last report (7 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
The June 2026 quarter looked like a miss: earnings per share of $0.76 against the $1.61 analysts expected, and revenue well short. It was not an operating miss.
A $472M paper loss on contracts protecting future prices went through the accounts. Underlying profit, the company's own measure without those swings, rose to $1,767M from $1,349M, over 30%. Management kept its 2026 forecast of $6.8B to $7.6B and its $7.4B to $7.8B aim for 2027, even as Texas power prices for future delivery fell.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the Attractive case: the earnings miss came from paper losses on hedges, while the company's own measure of underlying profit grew strongly and both forecasts held. What it left open is whether those forecasts survive weaker Texas power prices.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.76 against $1.61 expected; $0.76 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
2026 guidance is management's own forward range, reaffirmed on the same call it could have been cut on; the honest test is whether it is delivered at Q3 2026, not whether it was restated in August.
ERCOT day-ahead prices have run near half of the prior year's level for parts of 2026 per management's own commentary, and the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load Vistra is banking on (C29) is itself a management estimate rather than a filed figure.
What management did with the money
It has bought back about 30% of its shares since November 2021, at an average of about $38, and has $1.2B of authority left. It is also buying: Cogentrix's 10 gas plants for about $2.3B in cash plus shares. Debt rose to $19.6B from $17.0B in six months.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Management's own language - 'we expect to exhaust that no later than end of 2027' - is itself a target, not a commitment, and the same capital could instead go to additional debt paydown if the investment-grade ratings push takes priority, which management named as a live alternative use of cash.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. Cheap on the profit the business actually makes, as long as the forecast holds; the AI demand comes close to free.
Most coverage calls Vistra an AI-power play, and the standard price-to-earnings figure makes it look expensive. That figure is struck on the distorted reported profit. On the underlying profit the shares are cheaper than their own history.
The next test is the November 5 results: whether management holds its 2027 aim with Texas power prices softer.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The vendor's separate top-level market-tier EV/EBITDA of 10.07x (S16) is close to the hand-computed Adjusted figure (C11), so not every vendor EBITDA field is equally distorted - the cohort-specific 21.1x figure appears to draw on a different, more GAAP-exposed quarter mix than the smoothed top-level ratio.
The comparison leans on a vendor-reported five-year prior-period median (11.51x) that the pack itself does not fully audit the way it audits current-period figures, and on a hand-computed TTM Adjusted EBITDA (C09) rather than a single disclosed number.
ERCOT day-ahead prices have run near half of the prior year's level for parts of 2026 per management's own commentary, and the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load Vistra is banking on (C29) is itself a management estimate rather than a filed figure.
How we read the multiple
Counting its debt, the whole company costs about $66B, roughly 10 times last year's underlying profit before interest, tax and depreciation of about $6.6B, and about 9.2 times this year's forecast.
On reported profit, which paper losses on hedges pull down, it is about 21 times. So the price mainly asks that the forecast arrives. It pays little for signed data-centre demand beyond Meta, which is where the upside sits.
Against its own history. Below its own normal on underlying profit. The reported figure makes it look dear, but that comes from paper losses on hedges, not the business.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Net debt is a snapshot at 2026-06-30 and has already risen roughly $3B in six months (C16); using a post-Cogentrix-close balance sheet instead would show meaningfully more leverage against the same EBITDA base, making the multiple look more expensive than this snapshot does.
This is a hand-computed TTM figure, not a single filed number - it depends on H1 2025/H1 2026 Ongoing Operations figures being genuinely comparable across two different guidance vintages and any quarterly restatement between them would move it without a corresponding filing to flag it.
The comparison leans on a vendor-reported five-year prior-period median (11.51x) that the pack itself does not fully audit the way it audits current-period figures, and on a hand-computed TTM Adjusted EBITDA (C09) rather than a single disclosed number.
The vendor's separate top-level market-tier EV/EBITDA of 10.07x (S16) is close to the hand-computed Adjusted figure (C11), so not every vendor EBITDA field is equally distorted - the cohort-specific 21.1x figure appears to draw on a different, more GAAP-exposed quarter mix than the smoothed top-level ratio.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of cash profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of cash profit |
|---|---|---|
| NRG | NRG Energy | 11.3× |
| CEG | Constellation Energy | 16.8× |
| VST | Vistra | 21.1× |
| TLN | Talen Energy held out | not priced |
The middle of the other 2 is 14.1. Vistra Corp. is dearest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
The rivals' figures are struck on reported profit, which the hedges distort, so the comparison proves little either way and cannot move our view.
Where we disagree with the market
An AI-power story, with a high price-to-earnings figure showing the market has already paid up for it.
The reported swings are mostly hedge accounting. On what the business actually earns, the market has not paid for the AI story at all.
The gap sits in a reconciliation table few people read, and even the data vendor's comparison with rivals uses the distorted figure.
The case against us: most AI demand is unsigned, Texas power prices for future delivery have softened, and data centres can build their own plants. A cut to the 2027 aim, rather than softer words, would prove us wrong.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The vendor's separate top-level market-tier EV/EBITDA of 10.07x (S16) is close to the hand-computed Adjusted figure (C11), so not every vendor EBITDA field is equally distorted - the cohort-specific 21.1x figure appears to draw on a different, more GAAP-exposed quarter mix than the smoothed top-level ratio.
ERCOT day-ahead prices have run near half of the prior year's level for parts of 2026 per management's own commentary, and the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load Vistra is banking on (C29) is itself a management estimate rather than a filed figure.
Behind-the-meter capacity (about 3 GW by year-end 2026) remains a small fraction of the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load alone (C29), and cannot serve Vistra's 5-million-customer retail book or offer investment-grade counterparty risk transfer the way a PPA does (machine.threat.not_substituted).
This is the only publicly quantified large signed data-center commitment across Vistra's entire ERCOT/PJM footprint; there is no comparably sized signed PPA disclosed in ERCOT specifically.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Demand that routes around it. Data-centre owners building their own gas turbines or fuel cells never need to buy from Vistra's grid.
- Softer Texas prices. Battery buildout and a market redesign have lowered Texas power prices, and forecasts for 2026 demand growth were cut.
- Debt and buybacks together. Borrowing rose $2.6B in six months while buybacks and a $2.3B acquisition continue.
- A paused connection queue. A Texas audit has paused reviews of large new users, and it has already run longer than management expected.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
Behind-the-meter capacity (about 3 GW by year-end 2026) remains a small fraction of the 12-15 GW of realistic new ERCOT load alone (C29), and cannot serve Vistra's 5-million-customer retail book or offer investment-grade counterparty risk transfer the way a PPA does (machine.threat.not_substituted).
Management's own language - 'we expect to exhaust that no later than end of 2027' - is itself a target, not a commitment, and the same capital could instead go to additional debt paydown if the investment-grade ratings push takes priority, which management named as a live alternative use of cash.
Management's own framing is self-interested - no company facing a queue audit would forecast material harm to its own timeline on the call announcing it - and the audit's scope and duration were still undefined at the time of the call.
What we still do not know
- How much Texas data-centre demand gets signed. There is no signed Texas deal of Meta's size yet.
- What Cogentrix's existing power contracts carry. They are private and not separately disclosed.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
This is the only publicly quantified large signed data-center commitment across Vistra's entire ERCOT/PJM footprint; there is no comparably sized signed PPA disclosed in ERCOT specifically.
What would change our view
- Neutral→NeutralThe discount to its own history closes
It needs:
- ○The whole company is priced at about 11.5 times underlying profit, its own five-year norm, so the discount is gone.about ≈$162.76 today, 19% above the last close
- Neutral→NeutralThe load that justifies more than guidance never signs
It needs any of:
- ○Signed data-centre demand is still little more than the Meta deal by 2028, rather than several gigawatts.watched as it happens
- ○The 2027 profit aim is actually cut, not just talked down, because realised power prices fell.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
- ○Building power on site becomes the normal way to supply a new data centre, bypassing the grid.watched as it happens
We would also be wrong if
- The Cogentrix purchase or the nuclear upgrades for Meta slip or are repriced.
- Debt grows faster than profit as buybacks and borrowing-funded growth continue together.
What is coming
- 5 October 2026 Reported Energy Department loan for nuclear uprates, expected to be announced: Whether federal debt funds the PJM uprates behind the Meta contracts, at what size and rate, and how much it adds to debt against EBITDA.
Every dated event ahead
- 5 October 2026 Reported Energy Department loan for nuclear uprates, expected to be announced: Whether federal debt funds the PJM uprates behind the Meta contracts, at what size and rate, and how much it adds to debt against EBITDA.
- 15 October 2026 Series A preferred first reset date: Whether Vistra redeems the 8.0% preferred with the new junior notes as signalled, or lets it reset at Treasury plus 6.93%.
- 6 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether the 2027 Adjusted EBITDA midpoint opportunity of $7.4-7.8B holds, with Cogentrix nearer close, Batch Zero timing, and signed load beyond Meta.
- December 2026 Cogentrix acquisition closes: Whether the 5,500 MW deal closes on its terms in 2026 as guided; a slip past 2026 is a named pressure in the next test.
- 15 December 2026 Series B preferred first reset date: Whether the second $1.0B of preferred is redeemed, completing the swap of preferred for junior notes.
Since we wrote this
- 15 OctNewsVistra redeems its $1.0B 8.0% Series A preferred stock, as the September notes signalled. View heldVistra redeems all $1.0B of its 8.0% Series A preferred stock on the 15 October reset date.
- 12 OctThesis reviewView moved from Attractive to NeutralThe price discount that made up most of the case has nearly gone and the business has not changed.
- 6 OctNewsEnergy Department offers Vistra a conditional loan of up to $4.2B for nuclear plants. View heldEnergy Department said to offer Vistra a conditional loan commitment of up to $4.2B for nuclear uprates.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 15 SepThesis reviewTwo open questions turned out stale. View heldThe grid rule filings had been made months earlier, and the Texas queue audit ran past its expected two months. Nothing was read to a primary source, so no claim moved.
- 24 AugThesis writtenAttractive, medium convictionTwo weeks after a quarter whose reported earnings missed by 52.8% on paper hedge losses while underlying profit grew over 30%.
Also checked 18 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 22
Sources - 22
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-27fleet composition, segments, nuclear PTC, Meta PPA, Cogentrix and Lotus transaction terms, competition section, risk factorsbacksC01C02C07C08C18C19C20C21C22C26C27C42C43C48C49
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-10balance sheet, debt schedule, share count, EPS, liquidity as of 2026-06-30backsC16C17C43
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-07Adjusted EBITDA by segment, guidance ranges, hedging loss detail, buyback and liquidity figures, Cogentrix FERC approval, Helix announcementbacksC03C04C05C06C13C14C15C21C24C39
- S04primarytranscript2026-08-07Vistra Q2 2026 earnings call transcriptmanagement's ERCOT/PJM load-growth framing, Batch Zero audit color, Helix detail, capital allocation and leverage targets, RTC+B/battery commentary
we put out a load forecast a little over two years ago in May of 2024 with an expectation of 115 to 120 gigawatts of load in ERCOT in 2030 ... we think is somewhere in the 12 GW to 15 GW by 2030. When you have numbers overstated by more than 20x, it causes problems for policy makers.
backsC04C05C13C14C17C20C23C24C25C26C27C29C32C34C37C38 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-24confirmation of integrated generation-plus-retail model as a cohort peerbacksC41
- S06primarycompany filing2026-02-26confirmation of pure-play PJM merchant generation as a cohort peerbacksC41
- S07primarycompany filing2026-02-24confirmation of generation-plus-retail model as a cohort peer, nuclear-heavy asset mixbacksC41
- S08secondarynews2026-08-24Utility Dive - EIA cuts 2026 power generation forecast, ERCOT/PJM demand growth EIA (via Utility Dive)independent EIA-sourced ERCOT and PJM electricity demand growth rates
the EIA revised its forecast of ERCOT growth rates, shrinking its projections from 6% to 5% growth in 2025 and 15.7% to 9.6% growth in 2026
backsC30 - S09secondarynews2026-08-24Latitude Media / RTO Insider / Utility Dive - ERCOT large-load interconnection queue ERCOT (via trade press)independent size of the ERCOT large-load speculative queue
ERCOT's large load interconnection queue sits at 410 GW, about 87% of which are data centers
backsC28 - S10secondarynews2026-08-24Utility Dive - ERCOT 2030 load growth planning projections ERCOT (via trade press)independent ERCOT-sourced systemwide 2030 peak demand estimate
ERCOT anticipates about 152 GW of new load on its system by 2030
backsC31 - S11secondaryindustry data2026Cleanview - Bypassing the Grid: How Data Center Developers Are Building Their Own Power Plants Cleanviewindependent tracking of behind-the-meter/off-grid data-center generation capacity
approximately 2 GW of behind-the-meter generation capacity is online across four projects, with the vast majority belonging to xAI
backsC35 - S12secondarygovernment data2025-12-05ERCOT RTC+B go-live market notices and trade coverage (GridBeyond, ercot.com) ERCOTconfirmation and date of ERCOT's scarcity-pricing market redesign
Under the RTC+B regime, the ORDC adder to the energy prices is removed, and replaced by adders to real time ancillary service prices, known as ASDC
backsC33 - S13secondarygovernment data2026EIA - Plant Vogtle Unit 4 begins commercial operation / US nuclear construction status EIAindependent confirmation that no new large nuclear capacity is being added, supporting the scarcity of Vistra's existing licensed fleet
No nuclear reactors are under construction now in the United States.
backsC36 - S14secondarynews2026-08-23The Motley Fool - Vistra Is the Quietest Big Winner of the AI Power Boomevidence of the consensus AI-power framing of the stockread, but no claim rests on it
- S15secondarynews2026-08-07Reuters - Vistra quarterly profit slips on hedging losses despite strong power demandindependent read on the Q2 2026 GAAP miss and its hedging-loss driverread, but no claim rests on it
- S16secondaryvendor data2026-08-24Portfolio-management research pack (market tier: price, insiders, analysts, congressional, peer valuation)content/VST/research-pack.jsonprice/volatility snapshot, insider Form 4 aggregation, analyst consensus, congressional disclosures, cohort valuation multiplesbacksC39C40
- S17primarycompany filing2026-08-24data/reference/competitors.json - VST filed-competitor-class cohort reviewdata/reference/competitors.jsonthe research-tier cohort build (NRG, TLN, CEG) and each peer's confirming quotebacksC41
- S18primarycompany filing2026-02-26the original 2026 guidance ranges and the agreements announced alongside full-year 2025 resultsbacksC04C05
- S19primarycompany filing2026-05-07Q1 2026 buyback pace and Adjusted EBITDA progress, corroborating the full-year buyback and guidance trendbacksC13C14
- S20primarycompany filing2026-03-18executive officer and director biographies, beneficial ownership as of March 3, 2026, the 2025 annual incentive scorecard and payout, the PSU design and the 2023 PSU resultbacksC45C46C47
- S21primarycompany filing2026-09-24$850M 7.000% Series A and $650M 7.250% Series B junior subordinated notes due 2057, issued by Vistra Operations and guaranteed by VistrabacksC49
- S22primarycompany filing2026-09-10use of proceeds: general corporate purposes including redeeming some or all of the Series A and Series B preferred stock at or after their October and December 2026 reset datesbacksC49