Sanmina
A contract manufacturer that builds other companies' electronics, now above all the rack-sized AI computers AMD designs, assembled and tested in Sanmina's own factories.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
A material part was bought, and what is left narrows to one end market while the diversified half grew 0.2%.
Business quality2/4 ↑
A third-party valuation found $140M of goodwill and know-how in $1.62B, and Celestica's own filing calls this work aggressively priced.
Financial position3/4 ↓
Net debt is trivial and nothing matures early, but management intends to lever to 1.0-2.0 times and cash is not covering the build.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Eight straight beats and two guidance raises, but the ZT range was cut below the level Q2 2026 implied and the deal's returns are unproven.
Per share capture3/4 →
Shares shrank and the deal was paid in cash, but up to $450M of earn-out leaves precisely when the acquired business works.
Potential2/4 ↑
The upside is somebody else's spending decision on a programme that has shipped nothing, and no order discloses a volume or a term.
Risk profile3/4 ↓
Two customers now pass a tenth of sales and one relationship carries the growth case, but the diversified business survives without it.
Valuation2/4 ↓
It assumes the fiscal 2027 step-up lands; at $13B instead of $16B the shares sit above their own six-year normal.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Central facts are filed and corroborated outside the company, but the margin question and the fiscal 2027 step-up rest on management claims only.
If it works 0.6× · if it fails you keep about 44%.
The Verdict
We rate Sanmina neutral. It builds other companies' electronics, a thin-margin trade, and is about to assemble AMD's AI server racks in factories it bought from AMD. The business is mixed: AI work is now most of its sales, but its best-ever margin leans on engineering fees paid before any rack has shipped. The price is full: it assumes a margin Sanmina has never earned for a full year, so falling short would hurt. As a bet it is priced for success: today's business covers under half the price, and AMD's racks arriving on plan add little. The view hinges on the 2 November forecast for next year.
The long caseIf AMD's rack wins buyers from NVIDIA's, someone in America must build and test thousands of them a year, and Sanmina owns the factories AMD used.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- The same quarter's improvement is also attributed to favourable mix from adding ZT Systems, which is recurring, so engineering fees are one of at least two causes and possibly the smaller.
- Sanmina's segment gross margins moved in the same direction independently: IMS adjusted gross margin rose 270 basis points year on year, which the addition of a whole business explains without any engineering fee.
- Management has guided Q4 adjusted operating margin at 7.5%-8.0%, barely below the record, which would be odd if the record depended heavily on a fee that stops.
- 8 times operating profit is a judgement, not a filed fact. Sanmina's own history is nearer six times cash profit, which would demand more; a market willing to pay for AI exposure may accept twelve, which would demand a 5.9% margin and is within reach.
- The 5.1% record is a GAAP figure and the 8.8% requirement is struck on the adjusted line management guides to, which runs roughly 130 basis points higher - so the true gap is smaller than the two numbers suggest.
- Fiscal 2026 is already guided at a 6.85%-7.25% adjusted operating margin, so most of the distance to 8.8% has been covered in one year.
- It is not a formal guide. Management said twice on the same call that the formal fiscal 2027 guidance comes in 90 days, and declined to give a share estimate for AMD volume.
- The target was raised before any of the volume it depends on had shipped, and the programme delivering it has since been pushed out of the fourth quarter.
- AMD's own commentary describes a measured ramp to make sure manufacturing partners are ready, which is a slower framing than the target implies.
- The ZT Systems half of the run rate was falling 24% a week into Q4 (C12), so the existing programmes may not hold the $12.8B, which would leave more of the $16B to the new one.
- Management names no customer, volume or term for the new programme's orders (C46), so the split of the step between it and other programmes is an inference.
The company
Sanmina builds electronics to other companies' designs in its own factories. For AI that means a whole rack-sized computer: it buys the parts, assembles the circuit boards, fits them into a rack with power and liquid cooling, runs it at full load and ships it to a data centre. AMD's Helios rack, which it is preparing for production, holds 72 AI chips.
It also makes circuit boards and other parts that go inside, which most assemblers buy in.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
How it makes money
It earns a thin cut on everything it builds: even June's record was 10.7 cents of adjusted gross profit per sales dollar. Before volume starts, customers also pay engineering fees to prepare their products for production. Because Sanmina buys the parts, much of its money sits in stock and unpaid customer bills: most of what it paid AMD bought exactly that.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The same quarter's improvement is also attributed to favourable mix from adding ZT Systems, which is recurring, so engineering fees are one of at least two causes and possibly the smaller.
- Sanmina's segment gross margins moved in the same direction independently: IMS adjusted gross margin rose 270 basis points year on year, which the addition of a whole business explains without any engineering fee.
- Management has guided Q4 adjusted operating margin at 7.5%-8.0%, barely below the record, which would be odd if the record depended heavily on a fee that stops.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (nine months to 2026-06-27) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Communications networks and cloud and AI infrastructure | 64.5% | Building servers, racks, network and storage gear for equipment makers and cloud companies, now including ZT Systems' data-centre racks. |
| Industrial, medical, defence and aerospace, and automotive | 35.5% | Building and testing other companies' industrial, medical, defence and vehicle electronics to order, on long-running programmes. |
Who runs it
Jure Sola co-founded Sanmina in 1980 and has run it for most of the time since; Jonathan Faust has run the finances since 2023. Insiders own about 3%, nearly all of it Sola's. Their bonus rides on sales and an adjusted profit margin, their shares on adjusted earnings per share over three years. Nothing pays on the return the money earns, and the adjusted figures leave out the cost of share pay and of the ZT earn-out.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The chief executive sold 118,368 shares in May 2026, after this table was struck (C32), so his stake is now smaller than the proxy states.
- The operating cash flow modifier does bear the working capital the growth consumes (C20), so one part of the bonus answers to cash.
- A three-year cumulative EPS goal still rewards the buybacks only if the earnings per share rise, so dilution is not wholly outside the plan.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Two kinds of lock-in, of different strength. In medical, defence and aerospace a factory line is certified to the product, and moving it means certifying again. In AI racks the cost is time: a customer that put a product through Sanmina's pre-production work would have to repeat it elsewhere mid-launch.
AMD's choice is the evidence. Having bought ZT Systems for $4.4B, it kept the designers, sold the factories to Sanmina and named Sanmina its preferred American partner for launching new AI racks.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The threat
Bigger rivals do the same work. Celestica's hardware business grew 81% to $5.0B in 2025, and Jabil's data-centre segment was 41% of its $29.8B of sales. And AMD kept ZT Systems' designers, so the higher-value half of the work stays with AMD, which decides where the volume goes.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLS | Celestica, through its Hardware Platform Solutions businessPriced against it: Same product | Today's manufacturing (IMS and CPS, ZT's current programmes included) | On sale | Same product |
| JBL | Jabil, through its Intelligent Infrastructure segmentPriced against it: Same product | Today's manufacturing (IMS and CPS, ZT's current programmes included) | On sale | Same product |
| AMD | AMD's own retained ZT Systems design organisationPriced against it: Different product | AMD Helios rack-scale systems | On sale | Different product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The market is rack-scale AI computers built by outside manufacturers, and nobody counts them. The spending behind them is visible: Amazon spent $173.0B on property and equipment in the year to June 2026, against $107.7B a year earlier. Celestica's $5.0B of hardware sales and Jabil's data-centre segment show what outside builders already earn from it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Who has signed
AMD signed a five-year manufacturing agreement with the ZT business when Sanmina bought it, and management says it holds orders from large cloud companies and equipment makers for the next AI programme. No volume, minimum or customer name has been disclosed for any of it.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- No order is quantified anywhere in the filings, and management declined an analyst's direct question on what share of AMD volume to assume, calling it tough to gauge.
- Customers are described as still finalising production schedules and operating models, which is not the language of a fixed order book.
- The 10-Q discloses no backlog figure and no remaining performance obligation, because the company elects not to disclose obligations with durations of a year or less.
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMS | 85% | +78.8% | +100.6% | +72.3% |
| CPS Third Party Revenue | 15% | +22.3% | +14.6% | +9.3% |
| Whole company | 100% | +67.3% | +83.0% | +59.4% |
The filed split through 2026-06-27. These rates are not carried forward: the reading below says why.
How we read it: The score reads neither figure as organic: IMS's rate is ZT Systems, bought October 2025 and supplying about $4B of the nine months' $4.6B rise, while the diversified end markets grew 0.2%.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 59% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, faster than the 7.4% in the year to Sep 2025.
Operating margin is 4.2%, about where it was (5.1%) in the year to Sep 2023.
Running costs take 5¢ of each sales dollar, about where it was (4¢) in the year to Oct 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 9.8% a year after tax, about where it was (11%) in the year to Oct 2021.
It turned 4.7% of sales into free cash, $594M over the last twelve months.
It owes $327M more than the cash it holds, about 0.4 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count fell 18% in 4.7 years, and pay in shares costs 0.7% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in September.
| Oct 2021 | Oct 2022 | Sep 2023 | Sep 2024 | Sep 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $6.74B | $7.92B | $8.94B | $7.57B | $8.13B | $12.8B |
| Sales growth | −3.0% | +18% | +13% | −15% | +7.4% | +59% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 7.8% | 7.9% | 8.3% | 8.5% | 8.8% | 9.0% |
| Operating margin | 3.8% | 4.4% | 5.1% | 4.4% | 4.4% | 4.2% |
| Net margin | 3.7% | 3.0% | 3.5% | 2.9% | 3.0% | 2.4% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.3% |
| Selling, general and admin | 3.5% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.5% | 3.6% | 3.2% |
| Pay in shares | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.7% |
| Capital spending | 1.1% | 1.8% | 2.1% | 1.5% | 1.8% | 2.4% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $338M | $331M | $235M | $340M | $621M | $901M |
| Free cash flow | $265M | $192M | $43.8M | $229M | $473M | $594M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $650M | $530M | $668M | $626M | $926M | $1.84B |
| Debt | $330M | $347M | $338M | $317M | $300M | $2.17B |
| Net cash | $320M | $183M | $329M | $309M | $626M | −$327M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 11% | 13% | 15% | 9.4% | 10% | 9.8% |
| Shares (diluted) | 67.1M | 63.1M | 59.8M | 57.0M | 55.2M | 55.1M |
What growth costs
Growing costs Sanmina little in overhead: office costs and share pay barely rise with sales. What does rise is materials and, since ZT Systems, spending on factories. So growth adds profit roughly in step with sales rather than faster, and the margin has not widened since the deal.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The trailing year carries three quarters of ZT Systems on a cost base not yet integrated and $72M of earn-out remeasurement in GAAP operating profit (C24), so the latest column understates what the combined overhead will be.
The last report (27 Jul)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
The third quarter of fiscal 2026 looked strong. Sales rose 69.7% on the ZT purchase, the adjusted operating margin reached a record 8.0%, and management raised its full-year earnings forecast 9% at the midpoint. The shares fell 17.5% the next day anyway.
The market was reading underneath. Sales fell 13.7% from the quarter before, and the next forecast, allowing for an extra week, implies a 7.5% fall per week. Adjusted earnings of $3.31 a share also left out $1.19 of costs, 36% of the figure.
What it did to the thesisIt confirmed record margins but showed sales falling from the quarter before, with the forecast hiding a further decline behind an extra week. That keeps the view Neutral: the price assumes AI sales that have not yet shipped.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $3.31 against $2.77 expected; $2.12 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- The extra week is disclosed rather than hidden: the chief financial officer names it in the first sentence of the fourth-quarter outlook, so any analyst modelling the quarter already has it.
- A fourteenth week does not add a proportionate thirteenth of revenue. The quarter ends 3 October and manufacturing weeks around a fiscal year end carry holidays and customer shutdowns, so treating the guide as fourteen equal weeks overstates the adjustment by an unknown amount.
- Sanmina has run 53-week years before under the same convention, so the comparison distortion is a recurring feature of its calendar rather than something new about this guide.
- Management attributes the ZT Systems decline entirely to a few legacy programmes whose timing moves between quarters, and those programmes were always expected to run down to zero.
- The next-generation programme is excluded from the quarter by revenue recognition, so the guide is not a measure of demand; the order book behind it is described as secured.
- Guidance has been beaten in each of the last eight quarters, and Q1 FY2026 came in above the top of both guided ranges, so a midpoint is a conservative baseline.
What management did with the money
It borrowed to pay for ZT, taking debt to $2.17B, though $1.84B of cash covers most of it. It bought back 1.59 million shares for $239.2M, more than the shares issued to AMD. Free cash flow is on course to be no higher than fiscal 2025's $478M, on nearly twice the sales.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Capital spending is the reason, and it is deliberate growth investment: $244.2M in nine months against $80.2M, with $135M more guided for Q4, on power, liquid cooling, test cells, metal fabrication and printed circuit board capacity.
- Management explicitly warns working capital will grow ahead of revenue, so the cash shortfall is the cost of the growth rather than a deterioration in the business.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. Fair only if the promised AI sales arrive, at a profit on each dollar Sanmina has never earned in a full year. Until then the price is ahead of the evidence.
Everything turns on 2 November, when Sanmina gives its first formal forecast for fiscal 2027. Management has said '$16 billion-plus'. Getting there needs weekly sales 24.9% above this quarter's forecast, from an AI programme not yet counted as revenue.
Meanwhile insiders have sold: the chief executive sold 118,368 shares in May, and 19 of 20 open-market insider trades in the past year were sales.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- It is not a formal guide. Management said twice on the same call that the formal fiscal 2027 guidance comes in 90 days, and declined to give a share estimate for AMD volume.
- The target was raised before any of the volume it depends on had shipped, and the programme delivering it has since been pushed out of the fourth quarter.
- AMD's own commentary describes a measured ramp to make sure manufacturing partners are ready, which is a slower framing than the target implies.
- The accelerated compute programme excluded from Q4 is expected to begin in Q1 FY2027 and ramp through the year, so the exit rate is not meant to be the starting point.
- Core Sanmina grew 12.6% in fiscal 2026 against an initial plan of high single digits, so the non-AI half is running ahead of its own plan.
- Management has said it can deliver more than it thought a year ago, and moved the $16B target forward from fiscal 2028 to fiscal 2027 rather than back.
- Management describes the programme as on track and says customer validation is going well, so the exclusion is presented as accounting timing rather than a delay.
- Pre-production work is already being paid for as engineering services, so the relationship is generating revenue even though the product is not.
- The chief executive retained 1,227,573 shares after that sale, so he sold under a tenth of his holding and remains by far the largest individual holder.
- The selling clustered in April and May 2026 at $207-$266, when the shares were near their high, which is consistent with routine diversification rather than a view.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about 35 times Sanmina's yearly profit, about 2.8 times its usual 12.
To be worth 8 times its operating profit, an ordinary price for a contract manufacturer, Sanmina must:
- Earn about $1.4B a year from operations, since the whole company, debt included, is valued at $11.2B.
- On the promised $16B of sales, that is 8.8 cents of profit on each dollar.
- Its best full year ever filed was 5.1 cents. So the price needs the AI sales and a margin it has never earned.
Against its own history. Far dearer than its own normal, because the market already prices the AI business as delivered while it has shipped nothing.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- 8 times operating profit is a judgement, not a filed fact. Sanmina's own history is nearer six times cash profit, which would demand more; a market willing to pay for AI exposure may accept twelve, which would demand a 5.9% margin and is within reach.
- The 5.1% record is a GAAP figure and the 8.8% requirement is struck on the adjusted line management guides to, which runs roughly 130 basis points higher - so the true gap is smaller than the two numbers suggest.
- Fiscal 2026 is already guided at a 6.85%-7.25% adjusted operating margin, so most of the distance to 8.8% has been covered in one year.
- The trailing figures are depressed by acquisition charges that will not repeat: $137.0M of acquisition and integration costs, $49M of inventory step-up and $72M of earn-out remeasurement in nine months.
- On management's own fiscal 2026 adjusted guidance the price is about $16.50 for each dollar of profit, and on the vendor panel's fiscal 2027 estimate about $14.20 - a re-rating still, but a far smaller one.
- The business is not the business the median was struck on: revenue is up 74% and adjusted operating margin is running roughly 130 basis points higher.
- The same quarter's improvement is also attributed to favourable mix from adding ZT Systems, which is recurring, so engineering fees are one of at least two causes and possibly the smaller.
- Sanmina's segment gross margins moved in the same direction independently: IMS adjusted gross margin rose 270 basis points year on year, which the addition of a whole business explains without any engineering fee.
- Management has guided Q4 adjusted operating margin at 7.5%-8.0%, barely below the record, which would be odd if the record depended heavily on a fee that stops.
Priced against its rivals
There is no group to price it against. No cohort was established, so nothing says whether this price is Sanmina's own finding or something the whole contract-manufacturing trade is carrying. The price is judged against its own history instead.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on AMD's Helios racks alone: complete AI server racks Sanmina is preparing to build in America, which have not shipped and carry no disclosed volume.
Today's business, valued at an ordinary contract manufacturer's price, covers under half of today's price, so buyers already pay a lot for the racks. Even if they bring the step in sales management promises for next year, the whole company would be worth less than today: an expensive bet.
If the racks never ship in volume, shareholders keep today's business.
| AMD Helios rack-scale systems operating profit in two to three years | Billion dollars a year of rack revenue needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $51.00M | about 1 at 5% kept | 0.5× |
| $163.00M (the big win) | about 3 at 5% kept | 0.6× |
| $255.00M | about 5 at 5% kept | 0.6× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $2.15B of AMD Helios rack-scale systems operating profit (about 42 billion dollars a year of rack revenue at 5% kept); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $6.36B of AMD Helios rack-scale systems operating profit (about 125 billion dollars a year of rack revenue at 5% kept), at the same multiple.
Each row is AMD Helios rack-scale systems alone, plus the rest of the company (Today's manufacturing (IMS and CPS, ZT's current programmes included)) counted at about $5.22B.
The steps it has to take
- Done AMD names Sanmina its US new-product-introduction partner; Helios pre-production under way
- Done Orders won from hyperscale and original equipment customers
- Not started Helios revenue recognised due 2027-01
- Not started Fiscal 2027 revenue at or above $16B due 2027-11
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- The ZT Systems half of the run rate was falling 24% a week into Q4 (C12), so the existing programmes may not hold the $12.8B, which would leave more of the $16B to the new one.
- Management names no customer, volume or term for the new programme's orders (C46), so the split of the step between it and other programmes is an inference.
- It is not a formal guide. Management said twice on the same call that the formal fiscal 2027 guidance comes in 90 days, and declined to give a share estimate for AMD volume.
- The target was raised before any of the volume it depends on had shipped, and the programme delivering it has since been pushed out of the fourth quarter.
- AMD's own commentary describes a measured ramp to make sure manufacturing partners are ready, which is a slower framing than the target implies.
- 8 times operating profit is a judgement, not a filed fact. Sanmina's own history is nearer six times cash profit, which would demand more; a market willing to pay for AI exposure may accept twelve, which would demand a 5.9% margin and is within reach.
- The 5.1% record is a GAAP figure and the 8.8% requirement is struck on the adjusted line management guides to, which runs roughly 130 basis points higher - so the true gap is smaller than the two numbers suggest.
- Fiscal 2026 is already guided at a 6.85%-7.25% adjusted operating margin, so most of the distance to 8.8% has been covered in one year.
- Management attributes the ZT Systems decline entirely to a few legacy programmes whose timing moves between quarters, and those programmes were always expected to run down to zero.
- The next-generation programme is excluded from the quarter by revenue recognition, so the guide is not a measure of demand; the order book behind it is described as secured.
- Guidance has been beaten in each of the last eight quarters, and Q1 FY2026 came in above the top of both guided ranges, so a midpoint is a conservative baseline.
- Management describes the programme as on track and says customer validation is going well, so the exclusion is presented as accounting timing rather than a delay.
- Pre-production work is already being paid for as engineering services, so the relationship is generating revenue even though the product is not.
Where we disagree with the market
The AI revenue will arrive, but an assembler deserves an assembler's price: thin margins and one large customer.
The market is right about the thin margin, and early to treat the fiscal 2027 jump as already banked.
An extra week in the current quarter hides a decline inside the forecast, and the AI programme everything rests on has shipped nothing.
We are wrong if the 2 November forecast puts fiscal 2027 at $16B or more, with the AI racks already counted as sales and the adjusted margin holding near 8%.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The extra week is disclosed rather than hidden: the chief financial officer names it in the first sentence of the fourth-quarter outlook, so any analyst modelling the quarter already has it.
- A fourteenth week does not add a proportionate thirteenth of revenue. The quarter ends 3 October and manufacturing weeks around a fiscal year end carry holidays and customer shutdowns, so treating the guide as fourteen equal weeks overstates the adjustment by an unknown amount.
- Sanmina has run 53-week years before under the same convention, so the comparison distortion is a recurring feature of its calendar rather than something new about this guide.
- Management attributes the ZT Systems decline entirely to a few legacy programmes whose timing moves between quarters, and those programmes were always expected to run down to zero.
- The next-generation programme is excluded from the quarter by revenue recognition, so the guide is not a measure of demand; the order book behind it is described as secured.
- Guidance has been beaten in each of the last eight quarters, and Q1 FY2026 came in above the top of both guided ranges, so a midpoint is a conservative baseline.
- Management describes the programme as on track and says customer validation is going well, so the exclusion is presented as accounting timing rather than a delay.
- Pre-production work is already being paid for as engineering services, so the relationship is generating revenue even though the product is not.
- It is not a formal guide. Management said twice on the same call that the formal fiscal 2027 guidance comes in 90 days, and declined to give a share estimate for AMD volume.
- The target was raised before any of the volume it depends on had shipped, and the programme delivering it has since been pushed out of the fourth quarter.
- AMD's own commentary describes a measured ramp to make sure manufacturing partners are ready, which is a slower framing than the target implies.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- One customer carries it. The ten largest customers were 67% of sales, up from 51% a year earlier, and one relationship carries most of the growth.
- AMD holds the volume. AMD kept the design team and has disclosed no minimum, so it could hand Helios volume to a second manufacturer.
- A heavier tax bill. The tax rate rose to 28.5% from 19.5% as production moved to the United States.
- An earn-out valued twice. AMD expects to receive $348M from the earn-out; Sanmina carries $183M for the same agreement, capped at $450M.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
What we still do not know
- How much of the record margin is engineering fees that will not repeat once racks ship in volume. Management has not said.
- How many Helios racks AMD will order, and when. No volume or minimum is disclosed.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The same quarter's improvement is also attributed to favourable mix from adding ZT Systems, which is recurring, so engineering fees are one of at least two causes and possibly the smaller.
- Sanmina's segment gross margins moved in the same direction independently: IMS adjusted gross margin rose 270 basis points year on year, which the addition of a whole business explains without any engineering fee.
- Management has guided Q4 adjusted operating margin at 7.5%-8.0%, barely below the record, which would be odd if the record depended heavily on a fee that stops.
- Management describes the programme as on track and says customer validation is going well, so the exclusion is presented as accounting timing rather than a delay.
- Pre-production work is already being paid for as engineering services, so the relationship is generating revenue even though the product is not.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe revenue and the margin both land
It needs all of:
- ○The fiscal 2027 sales forecast comes in at $15B or more, toward the $16B management has promised.checked at the next results, due by 2 Nov
- ○The adjusted margin stays above 6% once volume replaces engineering work, and free cash flow beats fiscal 2025's $478M.checked at the next results, due by 2 Nov
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe programme or the concentration turns
It needs any of:
- ○AMD names a second manufacturer for Helios volume, or Sanmina's share of the programme falls.watched as it happens
- ○The ten largest customers pass 75% of sales while total sales stop growing.checked at the next results, due by 2 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Free cash flow stays below fiscal 2025's $478M for a second full year.
What is coming
- November 2026 Fiscal 2026 annual report (10-K): Full-year customer concentration, the earn-out's year-end fair value against AMD's receivable, and whether the competition section names anyone.
Every dated event ahead
- November 2026 Fiscal 2026 annual report (10-K): Full-year customer concentration, the earn-out's year-end fair value against AMD's receivable, and whether the competition section names anyone.
- 2 November 2026 Q4 and fiscal 2026 results, with the first formal fiscal 2027 guide: Whether the fiscal 2027 guide reaches $16B and adjusted operating margin holds near 8% as engineering work gives way to volume.
- January 2027 Q1 fiscal 2027 results: Whether the next-generation accelerated compute programme starts contributing revenue in the quarter management said it would.
- January 2027 2027 proxy statement: What the fiscal 2026 bonus and the fiscal 2024 PSUs paid on a year of acquired growth, and how much the chief executive still owns.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 26 SepThesis reviewJournal completed from the written record; view heldThe opening entry lacked the view and conviction the thesis was written with, and what was read; both are filled from the original file and its commit. Nothing in the argument moved.
- 6 SepThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten six weeks after the June-quarter results, when the shares fell 17.5% despite a raised full-year earnings forecast.
Also checked 4 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 16
Sources - 16
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2025-11-13the business description and segment structure, the Competition section naming only classes, the fiscal calendar convention, the ZT acquisition subsequent-event note with the five-year manufacturing services agreement, and the strategic-transaction risk factorsbacksC01C02C25C36C49C53C54
- S02primarycompany filing2026-07-27the end-market and geographic split, the customer concentration table, the purchase price allocation and intangible detail, the segment gross profit table, the full cash flow statement, the tax provision and the AMD partner-of-choice languagebacksC01C02C04C05C06C47C07C17C18C20C22C23C24C36C38C48C53C54
- S03primarycompany release2026-07-27the balance sheet, the GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliation line by line, the fourth-quarter and full-year guidance including the raise, and the period end date that fixes the 14-week quarterbacksC05C08C14C15C16C18C20C21C22C24C30C31
- S04primarytranscript2026-07-27Sanmina Q3 fiscal 2026 earnings callthe core Sanmina and ZT Systems revenue split and the Q4 split by half, the segment adjusted margins, the non-recurring engineering attribution, the $16B fiscal 2027 statement, the leverage target, and four analyst questions on AMD share, the legacy run-off, the components margin and the India joint venture
Our core Sanmina business revenue of $2.4 billion grew 17% versus the same period a year ago... Our ZT Systems business revenue of $1.1 billion was at the midpoint of our outlook... we are more confident than ever in our ability to achieve revenue of $16 billion-plus in 2027
backsC08C09C10C14C19C35C38C46 - S05primarycompany release2025-11-03fiscal 2025 revenue, margins, adjusted earnings of $6.04 and free cash flow of $478M, and the Q1 fiscal 2026 guidance the company then beat at the top of both rangesbacksC21C33
- S06primarycompany filing2026-08-05the $4.4B AMD paid for all of ZT Systems, the sale of only the manufacturing business to Sanmina, and the $348M earn-out receivable AMD says is probable of being received - the counterparty's own view of the same contractbacksC03C23
- S07primarycompany filing2026-02-27a competitor's filed economics on the same demand - Hardware Platform Solutions at $5.0B and 41% of revenue, its diversified segment growing 1% - and its own risk factor describing aggressive pricing dynamicsbacksC26
- S08primarycompany filing2025-08-31the second competitor's scale in this end market - Intelligent Infrastructure at 41% of $29.8B against 32% - and group gross margin of 8.9%, which brackets what this work earnsbacksC27
- S09primarycompany filing2026-06-30a buyer's own capital spending, $173.0B of property and equipment purchased in twelve months against $107.7B - the demand rate measured by the party paying for itbacksC41
- S10primarycompany filing2026-03-31the second buyer's equipment build - computer equipment and software at cost up $58.0B in nine months, to $190.9BbacksC41
- S11primarygovernment data2026-05-19an independent measure of the scale of data centre load, and its projected path to 22%-33% of commercial building electricity by 2050
Across all cases, servers alone accounted for an estimated 7% of commercial sector electricity consumption in 2025.
backsC40 - S12primarygovernment data2026-01-13the rate behind the driver, measured outside the industry, and the EIA's own refusal to quantify the data centre share of it
EIA expects U.S. electricity use to grow by 1% this year and 3% in 2027. This increase would mark the first time since 2007 that power demand has risen for four years in a row and the strongest four-year growth period since 2000.
backsC40 - S13primarycompany release2026-07-23the physical configuration of the rack Sanmina is preparing for production - 72 accelerators in 18 Open Rack Wide four-GPU compute trays
Each rack integrates 18 open rack wide-aligned 4-GPU compute trays (72 total GPUs) that provide consistent building blocks for cluster deployment and expansion.
backsC42 - S14secondaryvendor data2026-09-06Research pack, SANM, 2026-09-06price and enterprise value, the ratio series against six-year medians, the analyst panel split, FINRA short interest at the 2026-08-14 settlement, the measured next-session reaction to the Q3 print, the eight-quarter earnings surprise history, and the Form 4 insider transactions by code and filerbacksC29C30C32C33C35
- S15primarycompany filing2026-01-23beneficial ownership as of 2025-12-31, the directors' tenure, the fiscal 2025 bonus plan and its payouts, the PSU design and the fiscal 2023 PSU vesting, and the request for 1.2M more plan sharesbacksC49C50C51
- S16primarycompany filing2023-11-16the fiscal 2021 to 2023 income statements and cash flow statements: the cost lines per sales dollar, the share repurchases, and the $215.8M received for a stake in the India businessbacksC53C54