PAR Technology
Software that runs the tills, loyalty apps and back offices of big restaurant chains such as McDonald's and Burger King, and of convenience-store chains.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
ARR up 17%, 12% organic, and revenue up 19%; but organic sites fell 2.6%, part of the rise was bought, and hardware leans on McDonald's.
Business quality3/4 →
Decades as an approved supplier at McDonald's and Yum and decade-long rollouts show chains stay; but they approve several suppliers and Toast is moving up.
Financial position3/4 ↑
$433M of low-coupon notes against $77M of cash; $53M falls due in 2027, the rest in 2030 and 2031, and cash use has nearly stopped.
Execution record2/4 ↑
2025 ARR missed even a lowered bonus target, and the ARR and site measures changed shape twice in 2026; the raised guide offsets it.
Per share capture2/4 →
Shares issued for Bridg and old notes, about $28M a year of stock pay, and 2031 notes that convert into a third more shares.
Potential2/4 →
The signed Burger King and Papa John's rollouts are in the guide; any speed-up beyond them and AI revenue are expected, not signed.
Risk profile3/4 ↓
One serious concentration: McDonald's was 27% of Q2 revenue, and with Yum and Dairy Queen over a third of 2025's.
Valuation3/4 ↑
About 2.1 times 2026 sales and 21 times guided EBITDA: fair for 10% growth with rising margins, with the acceleration and AI not paid for.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Statements, debt, customers and holders are filed; the acceleration, the rollouts' pace and AI rest on management's word.
If it works 1.1× · if it fails you keep about 79%.
The Verdict
We rate PAR Technology Neutral. The business is mixed: chains stay with it for decades, but McDonald's alone is over a quarter of sales, and growth without acquisitions is 12% while the number of its own sites shrinks. The price is fair: about 2.1 times this year's sales pays for the slower growth analysts expect next year, and nothing for the speed-up management promises. As a bet it is expensive but defensive: if its new AI tools and Bridg data business succeed, the shares gain little, and if they never earn, the core business still holds most of today's value.
The long caseA supplier already inside thousands of chain restaurants can sell them AI built on the data it holds.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Organic ARR fell from $317.2M in December to $315.7M in March when Punchh dropped customers on deeply discounted contracts (C13), so a year's growth includes that dip.
Management says the sites lost were low-priced Punchh contracts it chose to end (C13), and ARR per site rose.
- Adjusted EBITDA adds back $28M a year of stock pay (C24), so on a GAAP basis the business still loses money.
- The vendor's EV/sales reads 2.35, a little higher, on its own debt figure.
Management says monetisation may come through premium features and higher attach rather than a separate price, which would leave no add-on revenue to count.
The company
PAR Technology makes the software behind the counter of chain restaurants and convenience stores: the till that takes the order, the app that gives the regular a free coffee, online ordering, payments and the reports headquarters reads each morning. It also sells the terminals and installs them.
Its buyers are chains with hundreds or thousands of franchised stores that want every store on one system. McDonald's has approved PAR since 1980, Yum since 1983 and Dairy Queen since 2018, and more chains now buy several of its products at once.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The 10-K says many larger customers have approved several suppliers of similar software and hardware, so approval is not exclusivity.
Organic sites shrank (C05): selling more to each customer has not yet meant more customers.
How it makes money
Most of the money is a monthly fee for each store running PAR's software: about $1,940 a store a year on average, adding up to $338.0M of yearly recurring revenue in June 2026. Hardware and installation bring in the rest, with much thinner margins. Sales grew 30.2% to $455.5M in 2025, and one customer, McDonald's, paid 21% of it.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Part of the 2025 rise was acquired: the 2024 purchases of Stuzo and Delaget were in the base for only part of 2024.
Organic ARR fell from $317.2M in December to $315.7M in March when Punchh dropped customers on deeply discounted contracts (C13), so a year's growth includes that dip.
Management says the sites lost were low-priced Punchh contracts it chose to end (C13), and ARR per site rose.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Subscription software | 64% | Point of sale, loyalty, ordering, payments, back office and convenience-store loyalty, billed per site. |
| Hardware | 23% | Counter terminals, kiosks and tablets, lifted in 2026 by one large customer's refresh. |
| Professional services | 13% | Installation, repair, support and custom development. |
Who runs it
Savneet Singh has run PAR since 2019 and turned an old hardware and government contractor into a restaurant software company. Bryan Menar has been finance chief since 2017. Singh owns 1.6% counting options; directors and officers 2.3%.
His 2025 bonus paid 95% even though recurring revenue missed a target that had been lowered in mid-year. Voss Capital, the largest holder at 13.2%, kept buying shares on the open market down to $14.34, and two directors bought too.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Changing a chain's till system means retraining staff and rewiring the kitchen screens, delivery apps and loyalty program in every store, franchise by franchise. So chains choose rarely and sign for years: Papa John's chose PAR for a decade, and McDonald's has stayed since 1980.
Even its biggest rival agrees that large chains are easier to keep than small restaurants. The weak spot is price: in early 2026 PAR's loyalty arm dropped customers who were paying about 80% below its list price.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The 10-K says many larger customers have approved several suppliers of similar software and hardware, so approval is not exclusivity.
The $4,500 is an analyst's figure that management did not confirm, and no contract or term is filed.
A rise in revenue per site made by removing low-priced sites is arithmetic, not pricing power.
The threat
Toast, which runs about 164,000 mostly small restaurants, is moving up to bigger chains and has its own AI assistant. NCR Voyix's older Aloha system and Oracle's are the incumbents PAR replaces, and Olo, the main ordering rival, is now privately owned.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The rivals: TOST, TOST, VYX, ORCL, AGYS, and 5 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TOST | ToastPriced against it: Yes | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | Yes |
| Toast IQ | PAR Intelligence and Bridg | On sale | ||
| VYX | NCR Voyix (Aloha)Priced against it: Yes | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | Yes |
| ORCL | Oracle SimphonyPriced against it: One segment only | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | One segment only |
| Private | OloPriced against it: Private | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | Private |
| Private | QuPriced against it: Private | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | Private |
| Private | Paytronix and ThanxPriced against it: Private | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | Private |
| In-house | Chains' own systemsPriced against it: In-house | Restaurant and convenience-store software and hardware | On sale | In-house |
| In-house | Chains' own data and marketing teamsPriced against it: In-house | PAR Intelligence and Bridg | On sale | In-house |
| AGYS | AgilysysPriced against it: One segment only | - | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
There are 151,975 convenience stores in the US, and chains with 500 or more stores own 33,810 of them. Nobody counts how many US restaurants belong to big chains; Toast reckons it already serves about a fifth of all US restaurants.
PAR earns about $1,940 a store today, while Papa John's pays about $4,500 for the full system, so most of the room is selling more to the chains it already serves.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Organic ARR fell from $317.2M in December to $315.7M in March when Punchh dropped customers on deeply discounted contracts (C13), so a year's growth includes that dip.
The $4,500 is an analyst's figure that management did not confirm, and no contract or term is filed.
Who has signed
Burger King is moving its US restaurants onto PAR's till, more than 3,000 of them due in 2026. Papa John's signed a decade-long deal for its 3,200 stores, live by 2027. Two customers signed for Bridg through 2029. None of these contracts is filed.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The Burger King rollout had paused and only resumed in late 2025, on the Q4 call's own account, and franchisees set the pace store by store.
The $4,500 is an analyst's figure that management did not confirm, and no contract or term is filed.
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subscription Service | 63% | +16.0% | +15.4% | +25.9% |
| Hardware | 26% | +30.6% | +32.1% | +32.4% |
| Professional Service | 11% | +9.5% | +14.3% | +8.6% |
| Whole company | 100% | +18.7% | +19.0% | +25.0% |
The filed split through 2026-06-30. These rates are not carried forward: the reading below says why.
How we read it: The score reads the software line: hardware's 32% is McDonald's refresh, which management calls one-off, so it is not carried forward.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 19% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, slower than the 30% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −13%, up from −26% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 55¢ of each sales dollar, up from 42¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Shareholders' money lost 8.6% a year, up from −22% in the year to Dec 2021.
It used $15.7M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $77.9M it holds lasts about 5.0 years at that pace.
It owes $344M more than the cash it holds, and its operations bring in no cash to repay it.
The share count rose 65% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 5.9% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-23. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $283M | $262M | $277M | $350M | $456M | $497M |
| Sales growth | +32% | −7.3% | +5.5% | +26% | +30% | +19% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 20% | 31% | 32% | 42% | 43% | 42% |
| Operating margin | −23% | −26% | −26% | −23% | −15% | −13% |
| Net margin | −27% | −26% | −25% | −1.4% | −19% | −15% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 12% | 19% | 21% | 19% | 18% | 17% |
| Sales and marketing | 8.5% | 13% | 14% | 12% | 11% | 9.8% |
| General and admin | 23% | 27% | 26% | 31% | 27% | 24% |
| Pay in shares | 5.0% | 5.1% | 5.2% | 7.0% | 6.7% | 5.9% |
| Capital spending | 0.5% | 0.4% | 1.8% | 0.3% | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$53.2M | −$43.1M | −$17.1M | −$25.2M | −$27.2M | −$12.8M |
| Free cash flow | −$54.5M | −$44.2M | −$22.1M | −$26.2M | −$30.5M | −$15.7M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $188M | $110M | $74.4M | $109M | $80.1M | $77.9M |
| Debt | $307M | $389M | $378M | $368M | $394M | $422M |
| Net cash | −$118M | −$279M | −$303M | −$260M | −$314M | −$344M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | 25.1M | 27.2M | 27.6M | 34.2M | 40.5M | 41.3M |
What growth costs
Growth is getting cheaper. Adjusted profit rose from about 5 cents to 11 cents of each sales dollar in a year after PAR cut its running costs, while sales grew 19%. The reported loss barely narrowed, because stock pay and the cost of past acquisitions stay on the books.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Stock pay of about $7M a quarter (C24) sits outside every adjusted figure.
The last report (6 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
PAR's Q2 2026 sales rose 18.7% to $133.4M, and its adjusted profit, before interest, tax and stock pay, almost tripled to $14.3M. Part of that came from one big customer replacing its terminals, a job that will not repeat.
Underneath, recurring revenue grew 12.3% without Bridg, the slowest part of the story. The loss was still $16.9M, including a $5.4M write-off of an old brand name. Management raised its 2026 forecast and said growth would pick up through the rest of the year.
What it did to the thesisIt proved the cost cuts are working and profit is rising, but left the main question open: growth without the acquisition was the slowest yet, and the speed-up management promised has still to show.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures. The company has restated its own history, so a quarter either side of the restatement may describe a different business; n/c marks one that does not compare.
Earnings per share $0.18 against $0.12 expected; $-0.41 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Organic ARR fell from $317.2M in December to $315.7M in March when Punchh dropped customers on deeply discounted contracts (C13), so a year's growth includes that dip.
Q2's EBITDA carried $1.3M from one hardware project that will not repeat (C03).
Management says a fixed-profit contract bought in 2024 depresses subscription margin, and excluding it the adjusted margin was 71% in Q1 (C40).
Stock pay of about $7M a quarter (C24) sits outside every adjusted figure.
What management did with the money
In March PAR borrowed $265M through new convertible notes to buy back most of the notes due in 2027 and $33.1M of its own shares at about $15.85. It paid for Bridg with new shares, and stock pay runs at about $28M a year.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 1 purchases and 2 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price pays for the slower growth analysts expect next year and leaves management's promised speed-up and the AI tools unpaid.
The shares fell 50% in a year while sales per share rose 17%, so the whole fall was buyers paying less for each dollar of sales. They dropped 27% the day after the 2025 results and have recovered only part of it since the forecast was raised.
A quarter of the freely traded shares are sold short. Third-quarter results on 5 November are the first test of management's promise that growth speeds up.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Organic sites fell 2.6% in a year (C05), and nothing about PAR Intelligence is priced or reported yet.
Q2's EBITDA carried $1.3M from one hardware project that will not repeat (C03).
How we read the multiple
A buyer pays for PAR roughly as it is, with margins still rising. The speed-up and any AI revenue are not in the price, and neither is proven yet.
- Counting its $433M of notes and its cash, the business is valued at about $1.1B.
- That is about 2.1 times the $519.5M of sales management forecasts for 2026.
- It is also about 21 times the adjusted profit management forecasts for 2026.
- Analysts expect sales to grow about 10% in 2027, which is roughly what that price needs.
Against its own history. Buyers have usually paid far more for each dollar of PAR's sales; the gap is the market deciding growth has slowed, not the business shrinking.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Adjusted EBITDA adds back $28M a year of stock pay (C24), so on a GAAP basis the business still loses money.
- The vendor's EV/sales reads 2.35, a little higher, on its own debt figure.
Q2's EBITDA carried $1.3M from one hardware project that will not repeat (C03).
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of sales, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of sales |
|---|---|---|
| VYX | NCR Voyix | 0.8× |
| TOST | Toast | 2.4× |
| PAR | PAR Technology | 2.4× |
The middle of the other 2 is 1.6. PAR Technology Corporation is 2nd cheapest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Its rivals' sales include card payments that earn much less, so on what each keeps from a sale PAR is cheaper than Toast and dearer than NCR Voyix.
Also checked and set aside: Shift4 Payments (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Olo, Qu, Paytronix, Thanx.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is that PAR's AI tools and its Bridg data business become a paid add-on for the chains it already serves. Even if the sites live by the end of 2026 all pay, the whole company would be worth only a little more than today.
If the add-ons never earn, the core business at the price this thesis calls fair, less the notes, still holds most of today's market value.
| PAR Intelligence and Bridg revenue in two to three years | Sites paying for AI tools needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $30.00M | about 26.0K at 100% kept | 1.0× |
| $45.00M (the big win) | about 51.0K at 100% kept | 1.1× |
| $90.00M | about 126.0K at 100% kept | 1.3× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $221.32M of PAR Intelligence and Bridg revenue (about 344.9K sites paying for AI tools); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $805.80M of PAR Intelligence and Bridg revenue (about 1.3M sites paying for AI tools), at the same multiple.
Each row is PAR Intelligence and Bridg alone, plus the rest of the company (Point of sale, loyalty, ordering and hardware) counted at about $1.01B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Bridg bought and two new customers signed
- Done PAR Intelligence live at 20,000 sites
- In progress PAR Intelligence live at 50,000 sites due 2026-12
- Not started A price or revenue figure for PAR Intelligence due 2027-06
- Not started AI and Bridg revenue reported due 2027-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Organic sites fell 2.6% in a year (C05), and nothing about PAR Intelligence is priced or reported yet.
Organic ARR fell from $317.2M in December to $315.7M in March when Punchh dropped customers on deeply discounted contracts (C13), so a year's growth includes that dip.
Management says monetisation may come through premium features and higher attach rather than a separate price, which would leave no add-on revenue to count.
- Adjusted EBITDA adds back $28M a year of stock pay (C24), so on a GAAP basis the business still loses money.
- The vendor's EV/sales reads 2.35, a little higher, on its own debt figure.
Where we disagree with the market
A fallen software stock with big chain rollouts signed, rated a buy by most analysts while a quarter of the shares are sold short.
Fair at today's price: growth is real but slower than promised, and nothing yet shows the speed-up management expects.
Ten of twelve analysts rate it a buy, yet they expect growth to slow to about 10% in 2027, and short sellers expect worse. The filings show growth without acquisitions at 12% while PAR's own sites shrink, which supports neither the bulls' speed-up nor a collapse.
We would be wrong if growth without acquisitions passes 16% with sites growing again, or if a big chain leaves.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Organic ARR fell from $317.2M in December to $315.7M in March when Punchh dropped customers on deeply discounted contracts (C13), so a year's growth includes that dip.
Management says the sites lost were low-priced Punchh contracts it chose to end (C13), and ARR per site rose.
Organic sites fell 2.6% in a year (C05), and nothing about PAR Intelligence is priced or reported yet.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- One customer is a quarter. McDonald's paid 27% of Q2 2026 sales, and much of this year's hardware growth is its refresh, which will end.
- Toast moves up. Toast, with about 164,000 restaurants, is pushing into bigger chains and already has its own AI assistant.
- Notes share the upside. Above about $19 a share the 2031 notes are worth turning into about a third more shares.
- Its own sites shrink. Sites fell 2.6% without Bridg, so growth depends on selling more to the same chains.
- AI may never be priced. PAR Intelligence runs at about 20,000 sites with no price, and management may fold it into existing fees.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The company may settle conversions in cash or a mix, and at $18.17 the notes are still slightly below their conversion price.
Management says the sites lost were low-priced Punchh contracts it chose to end (C13), and ARR per site rose.
Management says monetisation may come through premium features and higher attach rather than a separate price, which would leave no add-on revenue to count.
What we still do not know
- What PAR will charge for PAR Intelligence, and whether it will be a separate price at all.
- How much of 2026's hardware growth is McDonald's refresh, and when it ends.
- How many of the lost sites went to rivals rather than being dropped on purpose.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management says monetisation may come through premium features and higher attach rather than a separate price, which would leave no add-on revenue to count.
Management says the sites lost were low-priced Punchh contracts it chose to end (C13), and ARR per site rose.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe acceleration shows up
It needs all of:
- ○Recurring revenue without acquisitions grows 16% or more in a year, reported at a quarterly print.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
- ○The number of PAR's own sites, without Bridg, grows year on year again.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
- Neutral→AttractiveA price that pays for today's growth alone
It needs:
- ○The business is valued at 1.5 times its last year's sales, down from about 2.2, with sales held.about ≈$12.39 today, 32% below the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe engine breaks
It needs any of:
- ○Recurring revenue without acquisitions grows less than 10% in a year.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
- ○McDonald's, Burger King or Papa John's moves to another till supplier.watched as it happens
We would also be wrong if
- Management cuts its 2026 sales or profit forecast.
- PAR's own sites fall again in 2027 while revenue per site stops rising.
What is coming
- 5 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether organic ARR growth rises above 12% and the raised guidance holds.
Every dated event ahead
- 5 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether organic ARR growth rises above 12% and the raised guidance holds.
- 31 December 2026 PAR Intelligence at 50,000 live sites: Whether the AI rollout lands on time ahead of any price.
- 26 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and 2027 guidance: Whether the second-half acceleration happened and what 2027 growth and AI revenue management expects.
Since we wrote this
- 23 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten two weeks before Q3 results, after the shares halved in a year and half-recovered on a raised guide.
Sources 16
Sources - 16
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-26what it sells, the one segment, staff, the approved-provider relationships, customer concentration, competition and the 2023 to 2025 statementsbacksC01C02C08C09C41
- S02primarycompany release2026-02-262025 revenue by type, adjusted EBITDA, year-end ARR and active sites, and the buyback authorisationbacksC02C33
- S03primarycompany release2026-08-06Q2 and first-half results, adjusted EBITDA, ARR and sites on the new total basis, and the raised 2026 outlookbacksC03C04C06C25C35C37C39
- S04primarycompany filing2026-08-06the statements, customer concentration, the convertible notes, the March refinancing and buyback, the Bridg purchase, the Stuzo impairment and the share countbacksC03C08C20C21C22C23C24C25C26C38
- S05primarycompany release2026-08-06ARR and active sites by quarter, organic and from BridgbacksC04C05C14C35C37
- S06primarytranscript2026-08-06PAR Technology Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 6 August 2026the second-half ARR outlook, PAR Intelligence's rollout, Bridg's first contracts and the cost run rate
This is going to allow us then to go from the 12% up to a higher percent in teens in regard to Q3 and Q4, but that will come steadily in Q3 and Q4.
backsC07C12C36C39 - S07primarytranscript2026-05-07PAR Technology Q1 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 7 May 2026the Burger King and Papa John's rollouts, the Punchh exits, multi-product deals and the fixed-profit contract
The PAR POS Burger King implementation is running at a sustained pace of over 400 sites per month, and we have a strong plan into more than 3,000 additional sites that will go live this year.
backsC10C12C13C40 - S08primarytranscript2026-02-26PAR Technology Q4 2025 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 26 February 2026the Papa John's win, its pricing and the 2025 bookings
We were selected by Papa Johns for a decade-long partnership and their 3,200 sites and we'll be rolling out PAR POS and PAR OPS to power their in-store tech stack.
backsC11 - S09primarycompany filing2026-04-16the leaders, the ownership table and how pay is setbacksC30C31C34
- S10primarycompany filing2026-02-18Toast's locations, its share of US restaurants, who it competes with and its push into enterprise chainsbacksC15C43
- S11primarycompany filing2026-02-26the Restaurants segment, its size and the buyers it servesbacksC16
- S12primaryindustry data2026-01-26the number of US convenience stores and how many sit with large chains
Overall, 95,672 stores are owned by a company that has 10 or fewer stores, 63% of the total store count. Companies operating 500-plus stores own 33,810 stores, or 22.2% of the overall total.
backsC19 - S13primaryother2025-09-12Olo's take-private, which leaves PAR Ordering's main rival unlisted
Thoma Bravo, a leading software investment firm, today announced that it has completed its acquisition of Olo Inc.
backsC17 - S14primaryvendor data2026-10-22Research pack for PAR (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest), fetched 23 October 2026the 22 October close, returns and the move split, daily bars, analyst ratings and estimates, earnings surprises, short interest and insider tradesbacksC26C27C28C29C32C42
- S15primarycompany filing2026-08-14Voss Capital's and two directors' open-market purchases, the one discretionary sale and the plan flagsbacksC32
- S16primarycompany filing2026-06-22that hospitality is one of about twenty industries its applications servebacksC18