Guidewire Software
Guidewire sells the software that property and casualty insurers use to write policies, send bills and pay claims, and runs it for them in its cloud.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Revenue up about 23% two years running and ARR up 19%, much of it licence customers moving to cloud; 2027 guided near 16%.
Business quality4/4 →
In P&C core systems customers cannot leave cheaply: attrition under 1.5%, migrations of years, rivals gone private; Tier 1 insurers may build with AI.
Financial position4/4 ↑
About $525M of net cash after the 2029 notes, $358.7M of free cash flow and no need for outside money.
Execution record3/4 →
Beat revenue estimates four reports running and turned a loss into a profit, but Q3 deals slipped and the Q1 ARR guide disappointed.
Per share capture4/4 →
Shares down 3.0% in fiscal 2026 as $606.3M of buybacks outran $181.8M of stock pay; the 2029 convertible is capped.
Potential3/4 →
Bounded but largely committed: about $4.3B contracted and over half of next year's new ARR signed; the fee is 0.11% of U.S. premiums.
Risk profile3/4 →
No customer above 10%, but the cloud runs on one provider and the largest insurers hold real bargaining power.
Valuation2/4 ↑
At 79.7 times operating profit the price needs about 15.5% growth and a margin after stock pay near 28% by 2029, above today's adjusted margin.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Revenue, cash and contracts are filed and customers' filings back the switching cost; attrition and the AI threat rest on management's words.
The Verdict
We rate Guidewire neutral. It sells the core software that home, car and business insurers use to write policies, send bills and pay claims, and customers almost never leave because moving takes years, so the business is strong. The shares fell about a third in a year on fears that AI will make it easy to replace and on a softer outlook. Even so, the price needs its profit margin after share pay to nearly triple, so it is full, not cheap. The view hinges on the price falling or that margin rising. A sturdy business, but not a low price.
The long caseInsurers are moving their core systems onto vendors' clouds and rarely leave once moved; Guidewire must turn that shift into a much wider profit margin.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The 10-K says large customers have forced lower prices, lower ARR and slower ramps, so a customer can stay while paying less (S01).
The vendor's market value and enterprise multiples use a different share count and debt figure, so its 8.8 times revenue reads about 9% higher (S05).
Non-GAAP operating margin is already 23% and guided at 24%, so the gap is mostly stock pay, which could shrink as a share of revenue (S02, S01).
The company
Every insurer needs a system that holds its policies: who is covered, for what, at what price, what they owe and what claims they have made. Many still run old programs written in-house.
Guidewire sells a ready-made replacement. The insurer sets up its own products, prices and rules inside it, and Guidewire runs it on its cloud. Installing it takes months to years: Mercury General started in 2010 and was still moving across in 2021, and Donegal is moving its Guidewire systems to the cloud through early 2027.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
How it makes money
An insurer signs a subscription, usually for five years and then renewed yearly, priced on the premiums it runs through the system. As customers write more business, the fee grows with them.
Subscriptions were $915.8M of fiscal 2026's $1.48B revenue and grew 37%, as older customers who bought licences move to the cloud. Contracts already signed but not yet counted as revenue add up to about $4.3B.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
ARR is the company's own measure and differs from revenue, since part of a contract is allocated to licence or services revenue (S01).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Subscription | 62.1% | Guidewire Cloud: the core suite run for the insurer, priced on the premium it runs through the platform, mostly billed yearly in advance. |
| Services | 18.3% | Implementation and consulting to configure and move an insurer onto the platform, sold near cost. |
| Term licences | 15.9% | Software the insurer runs itself on multi-year licences, recognised mostly up front and shrinking as customers move to cloud. |
| Support | 3.7% | Maintenance and upgrades for self-managed licence customers. |
Who runs it
Mike Rosenbaum, who ran products at Salesforce, has been chief executive since 2019; John Mullen runs sales and delivery as president, and Jeff Cooper has run finance since 2020. Under them customers began moving to Guidewire's cloud and losses turned into profits. Insiders own under half a percent of the company, so they are hired managers, not owners. Their bonus and long-term shares ride mostly on recurring sales and on profit counted after share pay; nothing rides on cash or per-share results.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Insiders sold 324,801 shares in the year to October 2026 and bought none (C38), so the stake has shrunk since the record date.
- Fiscal 2026 ARR of $1,242M (C07) sits above the $1.235B maximum the fiscal 2025 grant set for that year, though struck at a different year's exchange rates, so the plan was set to pay near its cap.
- Nothing pays on free cash flow or a per-share figure, and part of each executive's equity vests on time alone.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Once an insurer's products, rules and data live inside Guidewire, leaving means repeating a project that takes one to three years and sometimes more, while the business keeps running. A rival, Duck Creek, wrote that this makes customers of a competitor hard to win.
So customers stay: fewer than 1.5% of recurring revenue was lost in fiscal 2026. The weak spot is the biggest insurers, which can bargain hard; Guidewire says some have forced lower prices.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The 10-K says large customers have forced lower prices, lower ARR and slower ramps, so a customer can stay while paying less (S01).
The survey is from 2010, before cloud delivery, so durations and the licence share may have changed (S11).
- Customers also write premiums outside the U.S., so the true share of premium is lower than 0.11% (S01).
- The fee understates what an insurer pays in all, since licences are about a quarter of a replacement project's cost (S11).
The threat
The old specialist rivals, Duck Creek and Sapiens, were bought by private-equity firms. The new threat is the insurers themselves: Guidewire's chief executive says the largest may build more of their own tools with AI model companies, and that his ready-made product matters less to them. That fear drove the February selloff.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
He added that Tier 1 insurers can build agents with Guidewire's tooling and that it is early in how this plays out (S03).
The rivals: DXC, SAP, CRM, NOW, and 3 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In-house | Insurers' own systems, built faster with AI coding tools and frontier model companiesPriced against it: In-house | Core systems for property and casualty insurers (InsuranceSuite, InsuranceNow and the cloud platform) | Announced | In-house |
| Private | Duck Creek TechnologiesPriced against it: Private | Core systems for property and casualty insurers (InsuranceSuite, InsuranceNow and the cloud platform) | On sale | Private |
| Private | Sapiens, Majesco and Origami RiskPriced against it: Private | Core systems for property and casualty insurers (InsuranceSuite, InsuranceNow and the cloud platform) | On sale | Private |
| DXC | DXC Technology's insurance softwarePriced against it: Small part of it | Core systems for property and casualty insurers (InsuranceSuite, InsuranceNow and the cloud platform) | On sale | Small part of it |
| SAP · CRM · NOW | SAP, Salesforce and ServiceNowPriced against it: Different product | Core systems for property and casualty insurers (InsuranceSuite, InsuranceNow and the cloud platform) | On sale | Different product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Nobody outside the vendors publishes what insurers spend on these systems. What can be measured is the base the fee is struck on: U.S. home, car and business insurers wrote $1.11T of premiums in 2025, about half of it by the ten largest.
Guidewire's recurring revenue is about 0.11% of that, before counting customers in 43 other countries. The room to grow is more premiums moving onto its system, not a higher share of each dollar.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Customers also write premiums outside the U.S., so the true share of premium is lower than 0.11% (S01).
- The fee understates what an insurer pays in all, since licences are about a quarter of a replacement project's cost (S11).
ARR is the company's own measure and differs from revenue, since part of a contract is allocated to licence or services revenue (S01).
Who has signed
About $4.3B of contracted revenue is still to come. Nationwide, a customer for over a decade, signed in fiscal 2026 to move to Guidewire's cloud, and Donegal's own annual report describes its move. Neither discloses the size.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Neither the value nor the term of the Nationwide agreement is disclosed (S03, S01).
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year | Share in 3 years at its half-year rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subscription | 62% | +37.8% | +36.8% | - | 74% |
| Service | 17% | +30.1% | +26.1% | - | 16% |
| Term License | 17% | -6.5% | +0.4% | - | 8% |
| Support | 4% | -10.5% | -11.6% | - | 1% |
| Whole company | 100% | +24.0% | +25.2% | - | 100% |
On the filed split through 2026-01-31, if each business keeps its last half-year's growth, the company grows about 27% next year and 30% in year 3, against 22.7% over the last twelve months. Subscription grows fastest: it grows 37% against 11% for the rest, and would be 74% of revenue by then. A scenario, not a forecast: no business holds its rate.
How we read it: Subscription grows faster mostly because licence customers convert to it, which moves revenue between lines rather than adding it, so the score believes the blend and ARR, not the subscription line.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 23% in the year to Jul 2026, about the same pace as the 23% in the year before.
Operating margin is 10%, up from −17% in the year to Jul 2023.
Running costs take 54¢ of each sales dollar, down from 71¢ in the year to Jul 2022.
Each dollar put into the business earns 9.6% a year after tax, up from 2.6% in the year to Jul 2025.
It turned 26% of sales into free cash, $378M over the year.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +8.3% to +23% over the last 5 years.
The share count rose 2.2% in 4.0 years, and pay in shares costs 12% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in July.
| Jul 2022 | Jul 2023 | Jul 2024 | Jul 2025 | Jul 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | |||||
| Sales | $813M | $905M | $980M | $1.20B | $1.48B |
| Sales growth | +9.3% | +11% | +8.3% | +23% | +23% |
| Profit | |||||
| Gross margin | 46% | 51% | 59% | 63% | 64% |
| Operating margin | −25% | −17% | −5.4% | 3.4% | 10% |
| Net margin | −22% | −12% | −0.6% | 5.8% | 9.4% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | |||||
| Research and development | 28% | 28% | 27% | 25% | 23% |
| Sales and marketing | 22% | 21% | 20% | 19% | 18% |
| General and admin | 20% | 19% | 17% | 15% | 13% |
| Pay in shares | 17% | 16% | 15% | 13% | 12% |
| Capital spending | 1.2% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.8% |
| Cash | |||||
| Cash from operations | −$37.9M | $38.4M | $196M | $301M | $390M |
| Free cash flow | −$47.5M | $32.6M | $189M | $295M | $378M |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $976M | $799M | $1.00B | $1.15B | $753M |
| Debt | $358M | $397M | $399M | - | - |
| Net cash | $618M | $402M | $605M | - | - |
| Returns and shares | |||||
| Return on capital | - | - | - | 2.6% | 9.6% |
| Shares (diluted) | 83.6M | 82.2M | 82.3M | 85.9M | 85.4M |
What growth costs
Growth has been making Guidewire more profitable. Since the costly early years of running customers' systems in its own cloud, every kind of cost has shrunk as a share of sales: running the cloud most, then admin, selling and research, even though research spending kept rising. Share pay is still a large cost and grows each year, but more slowly than sales.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Fiscal 2022 ran the other way: cost of revenue rose to 53.6 cents from 47.6 as cloud hosting was built ahead of its revenue, and operating margin fell to minus 24.5% from minus 14.2%.
- Stock pay still rose 58% in dollars from fiscal 2021 to 2026, to $181.8M (C14), and is guided to about $202M in fiscal 2027 (S03).
The last report (3 Sep)
Quarter ended July 2026, filed figures.
In the year to July 2026 revenue grew 23%, recurring revenue 19% and the value of signed contracts once fully stepped up 22%. Fewer customers left than in any year Guidewire has measured.
The outlook for fiscal 2027 disappointed. Recurring revenue is guided to grow 18%, the first quarter's figure came in below what analysts expected, and the plan assumes customer losses return to normal. Management says more than half of next year's new recurring revenue is already signed.
What it did to the thesisThe year showed the customer base holding through the AI scare: losses fell to a record low and the largest customers kept signing. It left open how fast new business arrives, since the next year's outlook assumes more customers leave and the first quarter came in soft.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.99 against $0.93 expected.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
ARR is the company's own measure and differs from revenue, since part of a contract is allocated to licence or services revenue (S01).
The 10-K says large customers have forced lower prices, lower ARR and slower ramps, so a customer can stay while paying less (S01).
- The guide assumes attrition returns to normal, so the record-low fiscal 2026 rate is not repeated (S03).
- Licence revenue is guided down about $46M, to about $189M, as customers move to cloud (S03).
Management attributed part of the gap to the currency reset of the ARR base (S03).
The contracted part is not disclosed in dollars; only the fully ramped total is (S02).
What management did with the money
Guidewire spent $606.3M buying back 4.1M of its own shares in fiscal 2026, more than the $181.8M it paid staff in shares, so the share count fell 3.0%.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 14 purchases and 34 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The business is sturdy, but the price needs profit after share pay to rise far above anything Guidewire has earned or guided.
The stock fell hard on three occasions in eight months: in February with a software selloff blamed on new AI tools, in June when some deals slipped, and by 19.9% in one day on 4 September on the new outlook. Over the year the price fell 34% while sales per share rose 27%.
The Q1 fiscal 2027 report on 3 December is the first test of that outlook, and an investor day on 27 October may set new profit targets.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Management attributed part of the gap to the currency reset of the ARR base (S03).
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about 80 times last year's operating profit, the profit left after paying staff, including in shares. Working back:
- Company value of about $11.95B, grown 10% a year, is about $15.9B in 2029.
- At 25 times profit, a common price for a mature software business, that needs about $636M of 2029 operating profit.
- Sales growing about 15.5% a year reach about $2.29B, so the margin needed is 27.8%.
- In fiscal 2026 that margin was 10.2%, and about 12% is guided for 2027.
Against its own history. Below where the shares usually traded, because the fear of AI cut what buyers pay for each dollar of sales even as sales kept growing.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The vendor's market value and enterprise multiples use a different share count and debt figure, so its 8.8 times revenue reads about 9% higher (S05).
Non-GAAP operating margin is already 23% and guided at 24%, so the gap is mostly stock pay, which could shrink as a share of revenue (S02, S01).
- The guide assumes attrition returns to normal, so the record-low fiscal 2026 rate is not repeated (S03).
- Licence revenue is guided down about $46M, to about $189M, as customers move to cloud (S03).
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. DXC Technology Company does too, but as a small part of a much bigger company, so its price says little about this one. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Duck Creek Technologies, Sapiens International, Majesco, Origami Risk, Insurers' in-house builds.
Where we disagree with the market
Software that AI will make easier to replace, now growing more slowly.
Insurers take years to move off it and AI so far sells on top of it, but the price is still not low.
The market sold the shares on AI and on the pace of growth, yet the customer record moved the other way: losses hit a record low and Nationwide, one of the largest, signed to move further onto it.
We would be wrong if a large customer replaced Guidewire with a system of its own, or if customer losses rose above 3% of recurring revenue in a year.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The 10-K says large customers have forced lower prices, lower ARR and slower ramps, so a customer can stay while paying less (S01).
He added that Tier 1 insurers can build agents with Guidewire's tooling and that it is early in how this plays out (S03).
Non-GAAP operating margin is already 23% and guided at 24%, so the gap is mostly stock pay, which could shrink as a share of revenue (S02, S01).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- The biggest insurers build. The chief executive says the largest may build more with AI model companies, and they can bargain prices down.
- Thin profit after share pay. Operating margin was 10.2% in fiscal 2026, with share pay at 12% of revenue.
- A soft start to 2027. The first quarter's recurring revenue guide came in below analysts' expectations, and the plan assumes more customers leave.
- One cloud supplier. Everything runs on Amazon Web Services, which Guidewire names as a risk.
- People are changing. A new sales chief joined from Capgemini and the chief accounting officer retires in November.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
He added that Tier 1 insurers can build agents with Guidewire's tooling and that it is early in how this plays out (S03).
Management attributed part of the gap to the currency reset of the ARR base (S03).
What we still do not know
- What insurers spend on systems like this per dollar of premium. The research firms that measure it sell the figure.
- Whether the largest insurers that build with AI will keep paying today's fees.
- What profit margin Guidewire will target at its investor day on 27 October.
- Why Mercury General's latest annual report no longer names Guidewire.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Customers also write premiums outside the U.S., so the true share of premium is lower than 0.11% (S01).
- The fee understates what an insurer pays in all, since licences are about a quarter of a replacement project's cost (S11).
He added that Tier 1 insurers can build agents with Guidewire's tooling and that it is early in how this plays out (S03).
Non-GAAP operating margin is already 23% and guided at 24%, so the gap is mostly stock pay, which could shrink as a share of revenue (S02, S01).
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveA price that survives a margin shortfall, with ARR still on guide
It needs all of:
- ○The shares fall until the company is valued at 58 times last year's operating profit, leaving room for the margin to fall short.about ≈$110.72 today, 27% below the last close
- ○Recurring revenue at the end of Q1 fiscal 2027 reaches the bottom of the guide, $1.253B.checked at the next results, due in Dec 2026
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe franchise cracks, or the price outruns the margin
It needs any of:
- ○Guidewire cuts its fiscal 2027 recurring revenue guide below $1.44B.checked at the next results, due in Dec 2026
- ○The shares rise until the company is valued at 110 times last year's operating profit, needing a margin near 38%.about ≈$209.99 today, 38% above the last close
We would also be wrong if
- Customers leaving rises above 3% of recurring revenue in a year.
- A large insurer replaces a Guidewire system with one of its own or one built with AI.
- The first fiscal 2028 outlook shows a lower operating margin than fiscal 2027.
What is coming
- 27 October 2026 Analyst Day at the Connections conference: Whether management sets a long-term margin target near the roughly 28% after stock pay the price needs, and what it says about AI and the largest insurers.
Every dated event ahead
- 27 October 2026 Analyst Day at the Connections conference: Whether management sets a long-term margin target near the roughly 28% after stock pay the price needs, and what it says about AI and the largest insurers.
- November 2026 2026 proxy statement: Fiscal 2026 bonus and RSU payouts against goals ARR already passed, any change to the metrics, and insider ownership after a year of sales.
- 3 December 2026 Q1 fiscal 2027 results: Ending ARR against the $1,253M to $1,259M guide, the fiscal 2027 ARR guide held or cut, and whether attrition stays near its record low.
- March 2027 Q2 fiscal 2027 results: Whether subscription keeps outgrowing the licence decline, the gross margin path toward 75% to 76%, and whether buybacks resume beyond the $31.9M left.
Since we wrote this
- 27 OctNewsGuidewire agrees to buy an AI underwriting software firm for $1.7 billion in cash. View heldGuidewire agrees to buy hyperexponential for $1.7B in cash plus up to $400M contingent.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 3 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten a month after the fiscal 2026 print and a 19.9% one-day fall on the 2027 guide.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 17
Sources - 17
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-09-11products, pricing on premiums, contract terms, customers and concentration, competition, risk factors, revenue by type and region, operating income, stock pay, cash, the convertible, buybacks, share count, RPObacksC01C02C03C04C05C06C13C14C15C16C17C18C19C20C33C42C44C45C46C49
- S02primarycompany release2026-09-03ARR and fully ramped ARR, Q4 revenue, free cash flow, the fiscal 2027 and Q1 guidesbacksC06C07C08C09C10C14C15C32C40
- S03primarytranscript2026-09-03Q4 fiscal 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/GWRE-2026Q4.json (FMP earning-call-transcript, quarter label 2026Q4, call held 2026-09-03)attrition, contracted share of next year's ARR, deal counts, Nationwide, the chief executive on Tier 1 insurers and frontier models; Baird's question on the Q1 guide
attrition rate of less than 1.5% for all ARR and less than 1% for core systems customers
backsC07C08C09C10C11C12C13C28C39C50 - S04primarytranscript2026-06-04Q3 fiscal 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/GWRE-2026Q3.json (FMP earning-call-transcript, quarter label 2026Q3, call held 2026-06-04)the deals that slipped, the productivity remark on Claude Code, the change of commercial chief
We anticipated a couple of more deals to close in the quarter
backsC29C31C39 - S05secondaryvendor data2026-10-03Research pack (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest, daily closes, SEC XBRL statements)the 2 October close and the price path, the price-move split, analyst split and drift, short interest, earnings surprises, theme co-movement, rivals' quote historiesbacksC05C30C31C32C33C36C37C40C41C43
- S06primarycompany filing2022-10-28Duck Creek Technologies Form 10-K, fiscal year ended August 31, 2022 Duck Creek Technologies, Inc.a rival's account of switching costs and its list of specialist competitors, Guidewire firstbacksC21C41
- S07primarycompany filing2026-03-06Donegal Group Form 10-K, fiscal year 2025 Donegal Group Inc.a customer's planned move of its Guidewire systems to Guidewire Cloud, its timeline, reasons and risksbacksC23
- S08primarycompany filing2010-02-26Mercury General Form 10-K, fiscal year 2009 Mercury General Corporationthe 2009 pilot and the start of the Guidewire implementation in 2010backsC22
- S09primarycompany filing2022-02-14Mercury General Form 10-K, fiscal year 2021 Mercury General Corporationthe migration to InsuranceSuite still under way, expected to finish in 2022backsC22
- S10primarycompany filing2026-02-27Horace Mann Educators Form 10-K, fiscal year 2025 Horace Mann Educators Corporationa customer naming its Guidewire property and casualty platformbacksC24
- S11secondarynews2010-05how long a core-system replacement takes and the licence share of its cost, from an insurance-technology research firm; old
Average project lengths are one to three years. P&C projects can be as short as six months, but also can be longer than four years.
backsC25 - S12primaryregulator2026-03NAIC, 2025 Property and Casualty Market Share report, Top 25 groups National Association of Insurance CommissionersU.S. P&C direct premiums written in 2025 ($1,109,793,590,383), the top-ten share and each group's premiums
Based on filings received by 03/18/2026, an estimated 98.25% of Property/Casualty filings have been received.
backsC26 - S13secondarynews2026-02-05the stated cause of the February 2026 software selloff
The latest selloff was triggered by a new legal tool from Anthropic's Claude large language model.
backsC30 - S14primarycompany filing2026-10-03Guidewire Form 4 filings, October 2025 to September 2026, read by insider_fetch.py91 open-market sales and no purchases; the Rule 10b5-1 flag on eachbacksC38
- S15primarycompany filing2026-05-08DXC Technology Form 10-K, fiscal year ended March 31, 2026 DXC Technology Companythe size and growth of DXC's insurance software and services segmentbacksC41
- S16primarycompany filing2025-10-30beneficial ownership as of October 20, 2025, the fiscal 2025 bonus and performance RSU metrics, weights, goals and payouts, the CEO and president stock-price kicker, executive officer biographiesbacksC47C48C50
- S17primarycompany filing2023-09-18fiscal 2021 to 2023 income statements and stock pay, the cost lines per sales dollar before the margin turnedbacksC46