Zoom Communications
The video-meeting company that became a household name in 2020, now selling business phone systems and AI customer-service agents, with a large stake in Anthropic on the side.
The scores
Growth2/4 →
Revenue grew 3.1%, 3.1% and 4.4% in three years and is guided near 4%; Enterprise grows 7.8% but Online is flat.
Business quality2/4 →
Enterprise retention below 100% and a Teams seat bundled in Office leave meetings substitutable; phone and contact-centre switching costs are real but unreported.
Financial position4/4 →
$7.25B of cash and securities, no debt, and about $1.9B of free cash flow a year; nothing needs outside money.
Execution record3/4 →
Beat seven of eight quarters and raised the FY2027 guide, but Q4 FY2026 missed and growth has not left 3-5% in three years.
Per share capture3/4 →
Shares fell 4.4% in 18 months, but share pay near 15% of revenue absorbs about 38% of free cash flow before any buyback.
Potential2/4 →
Contact-centre and AI growth is expected, not contracted; the US phone base has mostly moved already and management's seat counts are unverified.
Risk profile3/4 →
No customer above 10%, but Microsoft controls the suite Zoom competes against and the interoperability it needs; the founder holds voting control.
Valuation3/4 →
About 12 times operating profit after cash and stakes, 15.4 times after cash alone: fair for 4% growth with 3% yearly buybacks.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Central figures are filed and the phone base is the FCC's, but product growth rates and seat counts are management's word alone.
If it works 1.1× · if it fails you keep about 98%.
The Verdict
We rate Zoom neutral. It still makes a lot of money but barely grows: big-company customers buying its phone and contact-centre software are growing, while small self-serve customers are flat, so the business is mixed. Almost half the market value is cash, bonds and a stake in Anthropic, the AI lab. Take those away and the business costs about twelve times its yearly operating profit, a sensible price for slow growth, so it is fair. As a bet it is safe with little upside: if its contact-centre and AI products grow as hoped the shares gain little, and if they fail shareholders keep nearly everything.
The long caseIf customer service moves to software agents, a vendor already holding a company's phones and meetings can sell it the contact centre and the AI that answers.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- The stakes are carried at a private round price and cannot be sold today; valued at nothing, the multiple is 15.4 times, not 12.2.
- The vendor's enterprise value subtracts only cash and equivalents, not the $6.3B of securities, and prints 21.0 times on the same line.
- Zoom reports one segment and files no revenue for Phone, Contact Center or Virtual Agent, so none of these rates can be checked.
- The CFO declined on the call to update the Contact Center milestone beyond the $100M given five quarters earlier.
The company
Zoom sells businesses software they pay for per person each month: video meetings, chat, and a phone system that replaces the old office switchboard. It also sells contact-centre software, where AI agents answer customers' calls and chats before a person has to.
About 62% of revenue comes from larger companies served by its sales team; the rest comes from small buyers signing up on its website. The alternative is Microsoft Teams, which many firms already own, or phone rivals like RingCentral and 8x8.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
No source for the seat counts was given, and the FCC's US count (C28) shows the internet-phone pool shrinking, not growing.
How it makes money
Money arrives as subscriptions, mostly per seat, paid monthly or yearly. Larger customers sign contracts: $4.5B of future revenue was already signed in July, 57% of it due within a year. Small customers can leave any month, and about 2.9% of their spending does leave each month. Zoom pays staff heavily in shares, about 15% of revenue.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 FY2027) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | 61.7% | Seat and usage subscriptions for Workplace, Phone, Contact Center and AI agents, sold by Zoom's sales force and partners to businesses, usually on annual contracts. |
| Online | 38.3% | Monthly or annual self-serve subscriptions, mostly Meetings, bought by card on the website by individuals and small businesses. |
Who runs it
Eric Yuan founded Zoom and has run it since 2011; Michelle Chang, ex-Microsoft, has been finance chief since 2024. Insiders own about 9% of the shares but, through ten-vote shares, nearly half the votes, most of them Yuan's. Their bonus rides mostly on sales, a little on profit; their long-term shares vest just for staying. Nothing in their pay rewards buybacks or cash.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Nothing in the plan pays on per-share results, free cash flow or net dollar expansion, so the buyback and retention that the case rests on cost the plan nothing.
- The FY2027 goals are not yet disclosed, so the FY2026 weights may not carry over.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
A phone system or a contact centre is hard to move: numbers must be transferred, call routing rebuilt and staff retrained. A meeting link is not, because it opens in any app.
The numbers show a thin hold. A year later, existing big customers spend 99 cents for every dollar they spent before, and have been below a dollar for two years. So growth comes from new customers and new products, not from existing ones buying more.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Enterprise net dollar expansion has been below 100% for over two years (C06), so even the enterprise base shrinks slightly each year.
- Zoom Phone's own peering lets a customer keep its carrier and numbers, which lowers the switching cost Zoom itself relies on.
The threat
Microsoft includes Teams in the Office package most companies already pay for, and its business seats grew 6% last year. Since September 2025 European buyers can take Office without Teams for about 8 euros less a month. In contact centres, Five9 sells the same kind of AI agent to the same buyers.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The rivals: MSFT, RNG, FIVN, EGHT.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSFT | Microsoft Teams, inside Microsoft 365Priced against it: One segment only | Zoom Workplace | On sale | One segment only |
| RNG | RingCentral RingEXPriced against it: Yes | Zoom Workplace | On sale | Yes |
| FIVN | Five9 AI AgentsPriced against it: One segment only | Zoom CX and paid AI | On sale | One segment only |
| EGHT | 8x8Priced against it: Yes | - | On sale | Yes |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The US phone regulator counts 53 million business phone lines, 83.7% already running over the internet, so most of the move off old switchboards has happened. There are about 2.7 million customer-service jobs in the US, the work AI agents compete for. Zoom's own worldwide seat counts cannot be checked.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
No source for the seat counts was given, and the FCC's US count (C28) shows the internet-phone pool shrinking, not growing.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 5.0% over the twelve months to Jul 2026, about the same pace as the 4.4% in the year to Jan 2026.
Operating margin is 24%, up from 12% in the year to Jan 2024.
Running costs take 54¢ of each sales dollar, up from 48¢ in the year to Jan 2022.
Each dollar put into the business earns 9.1% a year after tax, down from 22% in the year to Jan 2022.
It turned 39% of sales into free cash, $1.93B over the last twelve months.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +3.1% to +55% over the last 5 years.
The share count fell 2.0% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 15% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in January.
| Jan 2022 | Jan 2023 | Jan 2024 | Jan 2025 | Jan 2026 | 12 mo to Jul 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $4.10B | $4.39B | $4.53B | $4.67B | $4.87B | $4.99B |
| Sales growth | +55% | +7.1% | +3.1% | +3.1% | +4.4% | +5.0% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 74% | 75% | 76% | 76% | 77% | 77% |
| Operating margin | 26% | 5.6% | 12% | 17% | 23% | 24% |
| Net margin | 34% | 2.4% | 14% | 22% | 39% | 65% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 8.9% | 18% | 18% | 18% | 17% | 18% |
| Sales and marketing | 28% | 39% | 34% | 31% | 29% | 27% |
| General and admin | 12% | 13% | 13% | 9.5% | 8.1% | 8.2% |
| Pay in shares | 12% | 29% | 23% | 20% | 16% | 15% |
| Capital spending | 3.2% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 2.9% | 1.3% | 1.5% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $1.61B | $1.29B | $1.60B | $1.95B | $1.99B | $2.00B |
| Free cash flow | $1.47B | $1.19B | $1.47B | $1.81B | $1.92B | $1.93B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $5.42B | $5.41B | $6.96B | $7.79B | $7.82B | $7.25B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 22% | - | 5.7% | 7.4% | 9.4% | 9.1% |
| Shares (diluted) | 306M | 304M | 309M | 315M | 307M | 300M |
What growth costs
Zoom's profit margin has widened sharply since its post-pandemic low, but by cutting selling, office and stock-pay costs, not by growing fast. Research spending holds steady per dollar of sales. The cost now rising faster than sales is computing for its AI features.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Cost of revenue rose faster than revenue in Q2 FY2027 on AI hosting (C12), so the cost that tracks usage is now the one growing.
- Part of FY2027's sales and marketing fall is accounting: the 10-K says a longer commission amortisation period cuts the line by $90.0M to $95.0M that year.
The last report (25 Aug)
Quarter ended July 2026, filed figures.
In the quarter to 31 July 2026, revenue grew 4.9%, a little above the company's forecast. Big-company revenue grew 7.8%, its fastest in three years; small-customer revenue grew 0.6%.
Two things took the shine off. The forecast for the next quarter is 3.9% growth, and running the new AI products cost more, so costs grew faster than sales. Reported profit jumped, but almost all of it was a $1.6B paper gain on the Anthropic stake, not the business.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the view that the big-customer half is growing while the small-customer half stays flat. It did not make the business faster: next quarter's forecast is slower, AI costs are rising, and the profit jump was a paper gain on the Anthropic stake, so the view stays Neutral.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $1.55 against $1.48 expected; $5.15 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The FY2027 revenue guide has already been raised once, from $5.065-5.075B in February (C47), so the company has guided below its outcome this year.
- The CFO says a white-label customer's churn costs about 40 basis points of total growth in the second half (C40), which the guide already absorbs.
What management did with the money
It bought back shares: the count fell 4.4% in eighteen months, using most of the cash the business produced. In July it paid $266.8M for Common Room, a sales-prospecting tool, its largest purchase yet.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 27 purchases and 85 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. A sensible price for a slow-growing, very profitable business, with cash and an Anthropic stake that help but cannot be spent today.
The shares have swung hard this year. They fell 11.6% on disappointing results in February, then rose more than half by June, twice on Anthropic news rather than anything Zoom did. After the August results they fell again.
The next check is the November results, where the company promises about 3.9% growth. Separately, Anthropic's plans to list its shares could one day turn Zoom's stake into cash.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The FY2027 revenue guide has already been raised once, from $5.065-5.075B in February (C47), so the company has guided below its outcome this year.
- The CFO says a white-label customer's churn costs about 40 basis points of total growth in the second half (C40), which the guide already absorbs.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about $25.5B for Zoom. Of that, $7.25B is cash and bonds and $3.79B is stakes in private companies, mostly Anthropic.
Take those away and about $14.5B buys a business earning about $1.19B a year in operating profit, about 12 times. That asks for little more than today's business continuing, and buybacks shrinking the share count about 3% a year add to each owner's slice.
Against its own history. The profit rows look cheap only because paper gains on the Anthropic stake inflate profit; on sales it sits just under its normal, which fits slower growth.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The stakes are carried at a private round price and cannot be sold today; valued at nothing, the multiple is 15.4 times, not 12.2.
- The vendor's enterprise value subtracts only cash and equivalents, not the $6.3B of securities, and prints 21.0 times on the same line.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of operating profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of operating profit |
|---|---|---|
| ZM | Zoom Communications | 21.0× |
| EGHT | 8x8 | 21.7× |
| RNG | RingCentral | 42.1× |
The middle of the other 2 is 31.9. Zoom Communications, Inc. is cheapest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Cheapest of the three on this measure while earning far wider margins than either rival, so the gap is Zoom's own, not the whole group's.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: GoTo, Avaya, Genesys.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on Zoom's contact-centre software and the AI products it charges for, which Zoom does not report on their own. Its meetings and phone business, cash and stakes are counted apart, at the price this thesis already calls fair.
If these products keep growing fast, the shares gain only a little, because they are small next to the rest of Zoom. If they never earn, shareholders keep nearly all of today's value. Today's price asks little of them, so the option is fairly priced.
| Zoom CX and paid AI revenue in two to three years | Customers spending $100,000 a year on CX and paid AI needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $250.00M | about 2.5K at 100% kept | 1.0× |
| $400.00M (the big win) | about 4.0K at 100% kept | 1.1× |
| $600.00M | about 6.0K at 100% kept | 1.1× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $5.25B of Zoom CX and paid AI revenue (about 52.5K customers spending $100,000 a year on CX and paid AI); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $20.69B of Zoom CX and paid AI revenue (about 206.9K customers spending $100,000 a year on CX and paid AI), at the same multiple.
Each row is Zoom CX and paid AI alone, plus the rest of the company (Zoom Workplace, with the cash, securities and stakes) counted at about $25.20B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Zoom CX passes $100M of recurring revenue
- Done ZoomMate launched for Workplace users
- Not started Zoom states a new CX milestone or files CX revenue due 2027-03
- Not started Enterprise revenue growth reaches 10% due 2027-07
- Not started CX and paid AI reach about $400M a year due 2029-01
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- Zoom reports one segment and files no revenue for Phone, Contact Center or Virtual Agent, so none of these rates can be checked.
- The CFO declined on the call to update the Contact Center milestone beyond the $100M given five quarters earlier.
- No CX or AI revenue is filed: Zoom reports one segment and revenue only by customer type and region (C50).
- AI Companion itself is included in paid seats at no extra charge (C01), so much of the AI on offer earns nothing on its own.
- The stakes are carried at a private round price and cannot be sold today; valued at nothing, the multiple is 15.4 times, not 12.2.
- The vendor's enterprise value subtracts only cash and equivalents, not the $6.3B of securities, and prints 21.0 times on the same line.
Where we disagree with the market
A stalled pandemic winner, worth owning mainly for its cash and as a cheap way into Anthropic.
The stake is real, but the business matters more: a growing big-customer half against a flat small-customer half.
Most analysts rate it a hold, and the biggest price jumps this year came on Anthropic headlines. The market is pricing the stake and each forecast, one at a time.
Where we could be wrong: if big-customer growth climbs above 10% and existing customers start spending more each year, today's price would be cheap, not fair.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The stakes are carried at a private round price and cannot be sold today; valued at nothing, the multiple is 15.4 times, not 12.2.
- The vendor's enterprise value subtracts only cash and equivalents, not the $6.3B of securities, and prints 21.0 times on the same line.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Teams comes free. Microsoft bundles Teams with Office, so a meeting seat on its own struggles to hold its price.
- Small customers stalling. Self-serve revenue slowed from 2.6% growth to 0.6% in two quarters, and the company now expects it flat.
- Existing customers shrinking. Big customers spend 99 cents a year later for each dollar before, so growth needs constant new wins.
- AI costs money to run. Hosting costs for the new AI products pushed costs up faster than sales last quarter.
- A paper stake. The Anthropic stake is valued at a private funding round and cannot be sold today.
- The founder controls votes. Special shares with ten votes each hold 51.8% of the voting power.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- Online growth has slowed quarter by quarter, from 2.6% in Q4 FY2026 (C47) to 0.6% in Q2 FY2027 (C02), which reads as a trend rather than a one-quarter search effect.
- Management has not quantified the search effect, and churn at 2.9% a month (C07) is not falling.
What we still do not know
- How much Zoom Phone, the contact centre and the AI agents each earn. Zoom reports none of them separately.
- Why the forecast implies second-half cash flow about 13% below last year when the first half was flat.
- What the Anthropic stake would fetch in cash, and when Zoom could sell it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Zoom reports one segment and files no revenue for Phone, Contact Center or Virtual Agent, so none of these rates can be checked.
- The CFO declined on the call to update the Contact Center milestone beyond the $100M given five quarters earlier.
- Zoom has guided below its outcome this year (C42), so the implied slowdown may be conservatism.
- Free cash flow is lumpy: the CFO says an extended data-centre life added about $40M to this year's guide.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveA cheaper price on an unchanged business
It needs all of:
- ○The business, after cash, falls to 12 times its yearly operating profit.about ≈$76.16 today, 13% below the last close
- ○Revenue keeps growing at 3.5% a year or more.checked at the next results, due by 23 Nov
- Neutral→AttractiveThe enterprise half accelerates and retention turns positive
It needs all of:
- ○Big-customer revenue grows 10% or more.checked at the next results, due by 23 Nov
- ○Existing big customers spend at least $1.01 a year later for each dollar before.checked at the next results, due by 23 Nov
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe self-serve half starts shrinking
It needs any of:
- ○Small-customer revenue falls 3% or more from a year earlier.checked at the next results, due by 23 Nov
- ○Existing big customers fall to 96 cents a year later for each dollar before.checked at the next results, due by 23 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Big-customer revenue grows less than 5% for two quarters running.
- Operating profit falls below 20 cents per dollar of sales for a full year.
What is coming
- 23 November 2026 Q3 FY2027 results: Enterprise growth against 7.5% and Online against zero, net dollar expansion against 99%, and why the guide implies second-half free cash flow about 13% lower.
Every dated event ahead
- 23 November 2026 Q3 FY2027 results: Enterprise growth against 7.5% and Online against zero, net dollar expansion against 99%, and why the guide implies second-half free cash flow about 13% lower.
- February 2027 Q4 FY2027 results and the FY2028 guide: Whether growth holds near 4% into FY2028 and whether selling costs keep falling per sales dollar beyond the commission accounting change.
- April 2027 2027 proxy statement: Which goals the first all-cash bonus paid on, and whether any pay now rides on per-share results or free cash flow.
Since we wrote this
- 11 OctThesis reviewZoom CX and paid AI declared early, with a bet on themThe owner asked every thesis to name its product lines; Zoom files no revenue for CX or its AI products.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 29 SepThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionThe business grows about 4% with a flat self-serve half and a bundled rival; after removing cash and stakes the price is fair, not cheap.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 23
Sources - 23
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-27Item 1 products and named competitors, risk factors, key metrics (net dollar expansion, online churn, $100K customers), statements, share pay, buybacks, strategic investments, dual-class voting, customer concentrationbacksC01C03C06C07C13C14C15C16C19C21C36C39C40C47C48C49
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-26statements, Anthropic stake and its unrealised gain, remaining performance obligations, Enterprise and Online revenue, cost of revenue drivers, Common Room purchase, buybacks, share countsbacksC01C02C04C06C07C09C10C12C13C14C15C16C17C18C19C41C47C50
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-25Enterprise and Online revenue, raised FY2027 guide, Q3 guide, non-GAAP reconciliation, free cash flow, CEO quote on Virtual Agent customer growthbacksC02C04C05C09C11C15C42
- S04primarytranscript2026-08-25Q2 FY2027 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/ZM-2027Q2.jsonmanagement answers on Phone, Contact Center, Virtual Agent, Online outlook, pricing, AI costs and the white-label churn; region growth rates; 22 analyst turns from 14 analysts, one on OpenAI and CRM vendors entering contact-centre voice
there is about, I think, 130-some-odd cloud seats and about 150 million equivalent on-prem
backsC05C08C10C11C12C24C30C31C38C41C51 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-25Q4 FY2026 and FY2026 Enterprise and Online revenue, the first FY2027 guidebacksC42
- S06primarycompany filing2026-07-29Teams sold inside Microsoft 365 Commercial; Microsoft 365 Commercial seat and cloud revenue growthbacksC22
- S07primarycompany release2025-09-12the commitments: suites without Teams at a set price gap, interoperability APIs, data export, and their duration
Microsoft has committed to make available APIs that enable access to customer data from Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft Exchange Online, Microsoft SharePoint Online, and Microsoft OneDrive.
backsC23 - S08secondaryother2025-09-17Slaughter and May competition newsletter: Commission accepts commitments in respect of Microsoft Teams Slaughter and Maythe Commission's stated concern (tying Teams, a distribution advantage, interoperability limits), quoting its 2024 press release
abused its dominant position in the market for Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) productivity applications
backsC23 - S09primarycompany filing2026-02-27the same cloud phone and contact-centre product; names Zoom Communications as a competitorbacksC25
- S10primarycompany filing2026-05-22the same cloud phone and contact-centre product; names Zoom among cloud-native competitorsbacksC25
- S11primarycompany filing2026-02-20AI agents inside a cloud contact centre; Zoom listed as a communications vendor it integrates withbacksC26
- S12primarygovernment data2026-09-29US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Customer Service Representatives US Bureau of Labor Statisticsjobs in 2025 (2,666,000) and the 2025-2035 projection
Employment of customer service representatives is projected to decline 5 percent from 2025 to 2035.
backsC27 - S13primarygovernment data2026-09-29US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Customer Service Representatives, pay US Bureau of Labor Statisticsmedian hourly wage, May 2025
The median hourly wage for customer service representatives was $21.53 in May 2025.
backsC27 - S14primaryregulator2026-05-01FCC, Voice Telephone Services: Status as of June 30, 2025 Federal Communications Commissionretail voice connections by type and their three-year growth rates
interconnected VoIP subscriptions declined at a compound annual growth rate of 2.3%, mobile voice subscriptions increased at a compound annual growth rate of 2.5%, and retail switched access lines declined at a compound annual growth rate of 17.9% per year
backsC28 - S15primaryregulator2026-05-01FCC, Voice Telephone Services: Status as of June 30, 2025, business connections Federal Communications Commissionthe business wireline connection count and its mix
the 53 million wireline business connections were: 11.8% ILEC switched access lines, 81.5% non-ILEC interconnected VoIP subscriptions, 2.2% ILEC interconnected VoIP subscriptions, and 4.6% non-ILEC switched access
backsC28 - S16secondaryvendor data2026-09-29ZM research pack (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest, headcount), frozen 2026-09-29content/ZM/research-pack.jsonclose of $87.30 on 2026-09-28, daily bars, analyst split and its history, earnings beats, cohort multiples for RingCentral and 8x8, headcount from 10-K filings, short interestbacksC33C34C35C36C42
- S17primarycompany filing2026-09-10169 open-market sales and no purchases; the Rule 10b5-1 flag on eachbacksC37
- S18tertiarynews2026-01-26the coverage on the day of the 11.3% risebacksC34
- S19tertiarynews2026-06-01the coverage on the day of the 9.9% risebacksC34
- S20secondarynews2026-02-25the stated objection after the Q4 FY2026 printbacksC35
- S21primarycompany filing2026-09-29every filing since the Q2 FY2027 10-Q: Forms 4 and 144 and one 8-K on a board changeread, but no claim rests on it
- S22primarycompany filing2026-04-30beneficial ownership and voting power at 31 March 2026, executive officers and tenures, the FY2026 bonus and performance-vesting RSU metrics, weights and payouts, the FY2027 move to an all-cash bonus and annual refresh grantsbacksC44C45C46
- S23primarycompany filing2024-03-04FY2022 to FY2024 income statements, stock pay by line and costs as a share of revenuebacksC47C48