Siebert Financial
A small discount brokerage, founded in 1967, whose biggest fee now comes from finding hard-to-borrow shares for short sellers.
The scores
Growth2/4 →
Revenue grew, but the growth reverses out: half the Q2 jump is a prior-year investment loss, and interest income has fallen every period.
Business quality1/4 ↓
A price-taker on all three revenue lines, and its largest fee is given away free by a much larger rival.
Financial position2/4 ↓
Capital behind a fast-growing share-lending business fell 23% in six months, leaving modest room over a bank covenant, with an unused equity shelf.
Execution record2/4 ↓
Operating income has fallen for two straight years while every new line added cost before revenue; the media segment was impaired inside a year.
Per share capture3/4 →
Share count rose 2.4% in eighteen months, no buyback and no at-the-market issuance, but a live $50 million shelf sits against a shrinking capital base.
Potential2/4 →
A $5.4 billion United States lending-fee pool the company holds 0.034% of, reachable only through announcements that state no fee, volume or term.
Risk profile2/4 →
One family holds 42%, nominates six directors and guarantees the bank line; no analyst, no earnings call and an unreadable disciplinary record.
Valuation2/4 →
Paying $1.24 for each dollar of tangible net worth needs the 2024 profit back, which the rate cycle delivered once in six years.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Every central figure is filed and the threat sourced outside the company, but no earnings call and no analyst tests any of it.
No upside the evidence defends · if it fails you keep about 82%.
The Verdict
We rate Siebert unattractive. It is a small discount broker whose biggest business is now finding shares that short sellers can borrow. The business is weak: staff pay has risen to about two thirds of revenue, so the lending growth goes to employees rather than owners, and the last year was a loss. The price is above the company's net worth, so it is full, not cheap. As a bet it is safe with little upside: its new media and crypto ventures show nothing we can value, and if they fail shareholders keep the broker, about four-fifths of today's price.
The long caseIf retail investors want crypto, tokenised assets and new funds from their broker, a self-clearing firm with its own licences could add fees without building a new business.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- Much of the increase is variable: the 10-Q attributes it to higher commission payouts driven by higher commission revenue, so part of the ratio rises and falls with the revenue it is paid on.
- Some of the 2025 and 2026 hiring is investment in lines that had no revenue when the people were hired - the investment banking division was staffed in Q1 2025 and produced $4,008,000 in the first half of 2026, so the ratio is being carried by build-out that may yet pay.
- The first half of 2025 is a flattered comparison: it carries a $2.4 million net investment gain in revenue with no matching pay, so the 2026 ratio is overstated relative to a clean base.
- $1.24 for each dollar of tangible net worth is not a demanding multiple for a broker in absolute terms - the pack's six-year median price to book for this company is above the current reading, so the shares are cheaper against their own history than they have typically been.
- Tangible net worth understates the franchise: 176,041 custodied retail accounts, a self-clearing licence and registrations in 50 states carry no balance-sheet value at all.
- FY2024's $13.3 million is itself flattered: FY2024 carried a full year of higher short-term interest rates on customer cash, and interest, marketing and distribution fees have fallen every period since.
- The trailing loss is small relative to the discrete charges inside it - $1,475,000 of arbitration settlement and $784,000 of impairments in the last two quarters alone.
The company
Siebert sells two things through one broker that clears its own trades. The familiar one is an ordinary brokerage account. The larger one is securities finance: a short seller must first find shares to borrow, Siebert charges a fee to locate them, and it earns the gap between the rates on shares it borrows and lends.
In the June quarter that desk brought in $10.8M of $31.2M of revenue, with locate fees alone $7.4M. Interactive Brokers' customers run the same search free.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- A free availability search inside a platform is not the same product as sourcing a locate for an outside broker-dealer or fund: Interactive Brokers is searching its own box for its own customers, and a customer must still hold an account there and pay its borrow rate.
- Interactive Brokers' filing describes the search as free; it does not say the borrow itself is free, and the borrow fee is where the economics of a hard-to-borrow name actually sit.
How it makes money
It has four streams: locate fees and the lending spread; commissions, now just $2.7M a quarter; interest on customers' cash and loans, set by the Federal Reserve and falling as rates fell; and a young investment banking arm, whose first-half revenue rose from $206,000 to $4.0M. None of it is under contract.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (H1 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Stock borrow / stock loan | 32.2% | Fees for locating borrowable shares for short sellers, plus rebates and spread on lending customers' and borrowed shares. |
| Interest, marketing and distribution fees | 22.1% | Interest on customer margin loans and on cash, plus fund marketing fees; it moves with the Federal Reserve's rate. |
| Principal transactions and proprietary trading | 18.3% | A markup on riskless principal trades with customers, mostly bonds and fixed income, net of a small own-account result. |
| Commissions and fees | 9.1% | Brokerage commissions, fund distribution fees and insurance commissions on customer business. |
| Investment banking | 7.3% | Underwriting and advisory fees from a division set up in early 2025. |
| Other income | 5.5% | Payment for order flow, administrative fees, and the media segment's music, artist and athlete-endorsement revenue. |
| Advisory fees | 3.7% | Fees on assets in managed advisory accounts. |
| Market making | 1.6% | Trading gains from making markets in securities. |
Who runs it
John J. Gebbia, a brokerage owner since the 1980s, has chaired and run Siebert since 2023; his sons run the broker-dealer, and one joined the board in September 2026. The family owns about two-fifths of the company and a Korean payments firm a fifth. Pay is salary plus a bonus the board sets by judgement, with nothing tied to profit or the share price: the chief executive's pay rose in the year profit fell by two-thirds.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The 25 September 2026 8-K is signed by Andrew H. Reich as 'principal executive, financial and accounting officer' and reports no change of chief executive under Item 5.02, while the 10-Q of 11 August 2026 is signed by John J. Gebbia as chief executive - so either a role changed without a filing or the signature block is loose wording.
Salary rose 16.1% and bonus 20.0% in the year operating income fell 68.1%, from $17,468,000 to $5,566,000 (C09), so nothing in the plan ties pay to returns, margin or the share price.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
There is no moat, and the thesis says so. Commissions are being competed to zero, interest income is set by the Federal Reserve, and locate fees depend on how scarce a share is, which Siebert does not control. Its licence to clear its own trades is a barrier to starting, not to competing.
It shows in the profit: operating income fell from $17.5M in 2024 to $5.6M in 2025, and to a loss in the first half of 2026.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- A free availability search inside a platform is not the same product as sourcing a locate for an outside broker-dealer or fund: Interactive Brokers is searching its own box for its own customers, and a customer must still hold an account there and pay its borrow rate.
- Interactive Brokers' filing describes the search as free; it does not say the borrow itself is free, and the borrow fee is where the economics of a hard-to-borrow name actually sit.
- The H1 2026 loss carries $2,259,000 of items the company describes as discrete: a $1,475,000 arbitration settlement accrued in Q2 and $784,000 of goodwill and intangible impairments in Q1. Excluding them the half is a $1,080,000 operating loss rather than $3,339,000.
- H1 2025's $4,664,000 profit includes a $2.4 million net gain on an equity-security investment, so the year-on-year swing is smaller than the headline.
- FY2024's $13.3 million is itself flattered: FY2024 carried a full year of higher short-term interest rates on customer cash, and interest, marketing and distribution fees have fallen every period since.
- The trailing loss is small relative to the discrete charges inside it - $1,475,000 of arbitration settlement and $784,000 of impairments in the last two quarters alone.
The threat
Interactive Brokers gives its customers free the locate search Siebert charges $7.4M a quarter for. Robinhood lends its customers' shares and has let them sell short since late 2025, taking both sides of the trade. And State Street, where lendable shares actually sit, runs the same business from the custody side; the SEC thinks a few such large programmes dominate.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- A free availability search inside a platform is not the same product as sourcing a locate for an outside broker-dealer or fund: Interactive Brokers is searching its own box for its own customers, and a customer must still hold an account there and pay its borrow rate.
- Interactive Brokers' filing describes the search as free; it does not say the borrow itself is free, and the borrow fee is where the economics of a hard-to-borrow name actually sit.
The rivals: IBKR, HOOD, HOOD, STT.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IBKR | Interactive Brokers Group, Inc.Priced against it: Different product | Financial Services | On sale | Different product |
| HOOD | Robinhood Markets, Inc.Priced against it: Different product | Financial Services | On sale | Different product |
| Robinhood Markets, Inc. (crypto trading and Stock Tokens) | New lines: media, digital assets and ETFs | On sale | ||
| STT | State Street Corporation (agency lending and prime services)Priced against it: One segment only | Financial Services | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The SEC's own arithmetic puts lending fees collected in the United States at about $5.4B a year, at an average fee of about 0.33% a year. Siebert's $609.8M of shares lent out is about 0.034% of the American shares on loan.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Both figures rest on the Office of Financial Research's 2015 pilot survey of seven lending agents across three days, so they are a decade old and drawn from a small sample; the Commission itself doubled the wholesale figure to reach the $5.4 billion estimate.
- The same release says lending supply significantly outstrips demand for most stocks, with median utilisation around 12%, so the average fee understates what is charged on the hard-to-borrow names a locate desk actually earns from and overstates the fee on everything else.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 22% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, faster than the 12% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −2.3%, down from 25% in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from −26% to +43% over the last 5 years, with sales falling in 1 of them.
Shareholders' money lost 1.3% a year, down from 12% in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 14% of sales into free cash, $14.8M over the last twelve months.
It holds $16.1M of cash against $4.96M of debt, $11.1M more cash than it owes.
The share count rose 31% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 1.7% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-16. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $67.5M | $50.1M | $71.5M | $83.9M | $94.2M | $105M |
| Sales growth | +23% | −26% | +43% | +17% | +12% | +22% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | 9.8% | 0.9% | 25% | 21% | 5.9% | −2.3% |
| Net margin | 7.5% | −6.0% | 11% | 16% | 5.4% | −1.1% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Pay in shares | - | 0.9% | - | 0.5% | 1.6% | 1.7% |
| Capital spending | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $5.54M | −$24.6M | −$4.80M | $10.1M | $10.2M | $15.4M |
| Free cash flow | $5.25M | −$24.9M | −$5.16M | $9.83M | $9.69M | $14.8M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $3.76M | $23.7M | $5.74M | $32.6M | $22.4M | $16.1M |
| Debt | $7.71M | $7.05M | $4.31M | $4.64M | $5.01M | $4.96M |
| Net cash | −$3.95M | $16.6M | $1.42M | $28.0M | $17.4M | $11.1M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 9.8% | - | 19% | 16% | 5.6% | - |
| Shares (diluted) | 31.3M | 32.4M | 37.1M | 40.0M | 40.4M | 41.0M |
What growth costs
Growth has been making Siebert less profitable. Its costs are mostly people and systems, and both have grown faster than sales as it added new lines, each of which spent money before it earned any. For now a bigger business means a thinner margin.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
Q2 2026 alone ran total expenses at 101.5% of revenue against 139.2% in Q2 2025, because the year-earlier quarter carried a $6.8 million investment loss in revenue (C36), so a single quarter can show operating leverage that the half and the full years do not.
- Much of the increase is variable: the 10-Q attributes it to higher commission payouts driven by higher commission revenue, so part of the ratio rises and falls with the revenue it is paid on.
- Some of the 2025 and 2026 hiring is investment in lines that had no revenue when the people were hired - the investment banking division was staffed in Q1 2025 and produced $4,008,000 in the first half of 2026, so the ratio is being carried by build-out that may yet pay.
- The first half of 2025 is a flattered comparison: it carries a $2.4 million net investment gain in revenue with no matching pay, so the 2026 ratio is overstated relative to a clean base.
The last report (11 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
Revenue more than doubled in the second quarter of 2026, to $31.2M, but a year earlier carried about $6.8M of investment losses, so the jump overstates the improvement. Locate fees grew 22.9% across the first half.
Costs grew faster. Staff pay took 64.8% of first-half revenue, and the half turned the previous half's operating profit of $4.7M into a loss of $3.3M. Meanwhile the capital the broker must hold fell 23.3%, to $47.3M, as its lending rose 49.7%.
What it did to the thesisIt backed our negative view. Lending fees grew, but staff pay grew faster and turned a profit into a loss, while the broker's capital shrank as lending rose. Nothing in it shows growth reaching owners rather than employees.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $-0.01; $-0.01 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Much of the increase is variable: the 10-Q attributes it to higher commission payouts driven by higher commission revenue, so part of the ratio rises and falls with the revenue it is paid on.
- Some of the 2025 and 2026 hiring is investment in lines that had no revenue when the people were hired - the investment banking division was staffed in Q1 2025 and produced $4,008,000 in the first half of 2026, so the ratio is being carried by build-out that may yet pay.
- The first half of 2025 is a flattered comparison: it carries a $2.4 million net investment gain in revenue with no matching pay, so the 2026 ratio is overstated relative to a clean base.
- The H1 2026 loss carries $2,259,000 of items the company describes as discrete: a $1,475,000 arbitration settlement accrued in Q2 and $784,000 of goodwill and intangible impairments in Q1. Excluding them the half is a $1,080,000 operating loss rather than $3,339,000.
- H1 2025's $4,664,000 profit includes a $2.4 million net gain on an equity-security investment, so the year-on-year swing is smaller than the headline.
- The regulatory minimum is trivially met: required net capital was $1.9 million and MSCO held $45.4 million of excess. The binding constraints are the bank covenants, not Rule 15c3-1.
- The company states it was in compliance with all covenants under both credit agreements at 30 June 2026.
- Net capital is struck after haircuts and non-allowable assets, so a fall can reflect the composition of a growing book rather than a loss of capital; consolidated equity fell only $509,000 over the same six months.
What management did with the money
Little was returned and little raised: shares outstanding rose 2.4% in eighteen months, and none were sold under its $50M share-sale programme this year. The Gebbia family owns 42% and personally guarantees one of the company's bank credit lines.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The at-the-market agreement is live and unused, so the constraint is a cap rather than a commitment not to issue: at the current price the baby-shelf rule still permits a raise of roughly a third of the non-affiliate float in any twelve months, and a securities-finance book that keeps growing is exactly the thing that would need it.
- Siebert also issued 100,000 shares in Q2 2026 to a media platform as part of a $1 million marketing arrangement, which is share-funded operating expense rather than dilution for capital.
- The recent Form 4 activity is gifts out of the Gebbia Living Trust - 22,500 shares on 26 August and 10,000 on 2 September - which reduce the family's holding without being sales, and estate planning executed into a 55.7% rally is not the same signal as holding.
- The 15,000-share purchase is $27,900 at the stated price, which is immaterial against a 17.1 million share family position.
- Control is also a risk rather than only an alignment: the FY2025 10-K says Gloria E. Gebbia and family have the power to nominate six directors.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. Buyers pay more than net worth for a business now losing money, and no lower price fixes its lack of a lasting edge over rivals.
Nothing makes it urgent. The shares rose 55.7% in twenty sessions to 8 September on partnership announcements, including one with Unusual Whales that names no fee, volume, term or launch date. None was filed with the SEC, which has had no current report from Siebert since November 2025. No analyst covers the company, and it holds no earnings call.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Fund launches genuinely do require regulatory filings before terms can be published, so silence on economics at announcement is normal for an exchange-traded-fund partnership rather than evidence of an empty one.
- The same release states Siebert brings 176,000 retail customer accounts to the arrangement, which is a real, filed distribution asset.
- A company is only required to file a Form 8-K for a material definitive agreement outside the ordinary course, so declining to file is a judgement that these are ordinary-course commercial arrangements - which, for a broker signing clearing and distribution agreements, is a defensible reading rather than a lapse.
- The tZERO clearing agreements, the Green Pier arrangement and the FusionIQ investment are all described in the Q2 2026 10-Q, so they are in the periodic filings even though no current report was filed.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about $1.20 for each $1 of Siebert's net worth, what it owns minus what it owes. Paying more than net worth makes sense only for a business that earns well on it. Siebert earned 15.8% on it in 2024 and 5.9% in 2025, and has lost money since.
So the price pays for the 2024 profit to come back.
Against its own history. A little cheaper than its own past on sales and net worth, but it now earns almost nothing on its capital, so the lower price reflects a smaller return.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- $1.24 for each dollar of tangible net worth is not a demanding multiple for a broker in absolute terms - the pack's six-year median price to book for this company is above the current reading, so the shares are cheaper against their own history than they have typically been.
- Tangible net worth understates the franchise: 176,041 custodied retail accounts, a self-clearing licence and registrations in 50 states carry no balance-sheet value at all.
- FY2024's $13.3 million is itself flattered: FY2024 carried a full year of higher short-term interest rates on customer cash, and interest, marketing and distribution fees have fallen every period since.
- The trailing loss is small relative to the discrete charges inside it - $1,475,000 of arbitration settlement and $784,000 of impairments in the last two quarters alone.
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Clear Street, State Street Corporation (securities finance), Wedbush Securities, StoneX and the other correspondent-clearing stock-loan desks.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on Siebert's new lines: its media and sports business, its planned crypto arm and the new funds it announced. The broker and its lending desk are counted apart, at what they own.
We can find no upside to defend. The media business lost money and was written down, the crypto arm has not started and the funds do not exist yet. If none of it ever earns, shareholders keep the broker, most of today's price.
The steps it has to take
- Done Media segment set up, with artists and athletes signed
- Not started Media segment reaches break-even due 2027-12
- Not started Siebert Crypto starts operating due 2027-06
- Not started The first Unusual Whales ETF launches with stated economics due 2027-06
- Not started The new lines' revenue is reported apart from brokerage due 2027-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Fund launches genuinely do require regulatory filings before terms can be published, so silence on economics at announcement is normal for an exchange-traded-fund partnership rather than evidence of an empty one.
- The same release states Siebert brings 176,000 retail customer accounts to the arrangement, which is a real, filed distribution asset.
- $1.24 for each dollar of tangible net worth is not a demanding multiple for a broker in absolute terms - the pack's six-year median price to book for this company is above the current reading, so the shares are cheaper against their own history than they have typically been.
- Tangible net worth understates the franchise: 176,041 custodied retail accounts, a self-clearing licence and registrations in 50 states carry no balance-sheet value at all.
Where we disagree with the market
No analyst covers it. The price rose on partnership news, as if the lending growth will turn back into profit.
The growth line is a fee short sellers pay, and every dollar of it is going to employees rather than to owners.
The announcements that moved the price state no terms and were never filed, and the pay ratio sits only in the quarterly filing, in no release.
We would be wrong if locate revenue keeps growing while staff pay falls back toward 2024's 52% of revenue and the broker's capital recovers.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- A company is only required to file a Form 8-K for a material definitive agreement outside the ordinary course, so declining to file is a judgement that these are ordinary-course commercial arrangements - which, for a broker signing clearing and distribution agreements, is a defensible reading rather than a lapse.
- The tZERO clearing agreements, the Green Pier arrangement and the FusionIQ investment are all described in the Q2 2026 10-Q, so they are in the periodic filings even though no current report was filed.
- Fund launches genuinely do require regulatory filings before terms can be published, so silence on economics at announcement is normal for an exchange-traded-fund partnership rather than evidence of an empty one.
- The same release states Siebert brings 176,000 retail customer accounts to the arrangement, which is a real, filed distribution asset.
- Much of the increase is variable: the 10-Q attributes it to higher commission payouts driven by higher commission revenue, so part of the ratio rises and falls with the revenue it is paid on.
- Some of the 2025 and 2026 hiring is investment in lines that had no revenue when the people were hired - the investment banking division was staffed in Q1 2025 and produced $4,008,000 in the first half of 2026, so the ratio is being carried by build-out that may yet pay.
- The first half of 2025 is a flattered comparison: it carries a $2.4 million net investment gain in revenue with no matching pay, so the 2026 ratio is overstated relative to a clean base.
- The regulatory minimum is trivially met: required net capital was $1.9 million and MSCO held $45.4 million of excess. The binding constraints are the bank covenants, not Rule 15c3-1.
- The company states it was in compliance with all covenants under both credit agreements at 30 June 2026.
- Net capital is struck after haircuts and non-allowable assets, so a fall can reflect the composition of a growing book rather than a loss of capital; consolidated equity fell only $509,000 over the same six months.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Capital running thin. The broker's net capital fell to $47.3M against a bank's required floor of $43M, and neither filing says why.
- Pay outrunning revenue. Staff pay rose $14.5M in 2025 on revenue up $10.3M.
- An undisclosed settlement. It paid about $1.48M to settle an arbitration after June and names neither the other party nor the subject.
- A market nobody can see. The rule that would publish stock-loan rates has been pushed to 2028, so the desk stays hard to check.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The regulatory minimum is trivially met: required net capital was $1.9 million and MSCO held $45.4 million of excess. The binding constraints are the bank covenants, not Rule 15c3-1.
- The company states it was in compliance with all covenants under both credit agreements at 30 June 2026.
- Net capital is struck after haircuts and non-allowable assets, so a fall can reflect the composition of a growing book rather than a loss of capital; consolidated equity fell only $509,000 over the same six months.
- The rule has already been delayed more than once - the original compliance date was January 2026 - so the 2028 date is itself a moving target and may move again, in either direction.
- Commercial data vendors already publish borrow rates to subscribers, so the market is less opaque in practice than the absence of a regulatory tape suggests.
What we still do not know
- Why the broker's net capital fell by $14.4M in six months.
- What the lending desk earns on its own. It is not a reported segment.
- Whether any 2026 partnership carries a fee, a volume or a term.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The regulatory minimum is trivially met: required net capital was $1.9 million and MSCO held $45.4 million of excess. The binding constraints are the bank covenants, not Rule 15c3-1.
- The company states it was in compliance with all covenants under both credit agreements at 30 June 2026.
- Net capital is struck after haircuts and non-allowable assets, so a fall can reflect the composition of a growing book rather than a loss of capital; consolidated equity fell only $509,000 over the same six months.
- A company is only required to file a Form 8-K for a material definitive agreement outside the ordinary course, so declining to file is a judgement that these are ordinary-course commercial arrangements - which, for a broker signing clearing and distribution agreements, is a defensible reading rather than a lapse.
- The tZERO clearing agreements, the Green Pier arrangement and the FusionIQ investment are all described in the Q2 2026 10-Q, so they are in the periodic filings even though no current report was filed.
- Fund launches genuinely do require regulatory filings before terms can be published, so silence on economics at announcement is normal for an exchange-traded-fund partnership rather than evidence of an empty one.
- The same release states Siebert brings 176,000 retail customer accounts to the arrangement, which is a real, filed distribution asset.
What would change our view
There is no mechanism here that would compound. The one thing that could make the case - the stock-lending desk - is not separately reported, so the thesis is not checkable from outside the company and would not become so by anything the company has said it will do. A small discount brokerage with no moat, earning below its cost of capital, is not a price problem waiting for a lower price: at any price the question of what it earns through a cycle cannot be answered from the filings.
- Reopens the researchThe desk is put on the record and earns through a cycle
It needs all of:
- ○Siebert reports the lending desk as its own segment, with revenue and margin, so the case can be checked from the filings.checked at the next results, due in Nov 2026
- ○Two straight years of operating profit across a full interest-rate cycle, with staff pay below 55% of revenue.checked at the next results, due in Nov 2026
We would also be wrong if
- The broker's net capital recovers above $60M while it keeps lending more shares.
- A 2026 partnership is filed with the SEC, stating volumes and a term.
- Locate revenue grows for four quarters in a row.
What is coming
- November 2026 Q3 2026 Form 10-Q (filing deadline for a smaller reporting company): Whether pay falls below 62% of revenue, other costs stop outrunning sales, stock locate revenue keeps growing and MSCO's net capital recovers from $47.3 million.
Every dated event ahead
- November 2026 Q3 2026 Form 10-Q (filing deadline for a smaller reporting company): Whether pay falls below 62% of revenue, other costs stop outrunning sales, stock locate revenue keeps growing and MSCO's net capital recovers from $47.3 million.
- March 2027 FY2026 Form 10-K with Part III (filed 2026-03-30 last year): Full-year pay against the operating result, the ownership table after John M. Gebbia's appointment, and whether locate economics get a segment of their own.
- 29 July 2027 East West Bank revolving credit facility matures: Whether the family-guaranteed line is renewed, and on what net capital covenant, as the lending book grows faster than capital.
- 28 September 2028 FINRA SLATE securities-lending tape launches: When borrow and locate pricing becomes public, testing whether a paid locate survives price transparency.
Since we wrote this
- 11 OctThesis reviewThe new lines declared an early business, with a bet on themThe owner asked every thesis to name its product lines; Siebert's media segment loses money and its digital-asset ventures have not started.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K.
- 8 SepThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionWritten as the shares rose 55.7% in twenty sessions on partnership announcements that were never filed.
Sources 13
Sources - 13
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-03-30Item 1 business description and the subsidiary list; the Competition section, which names classes only; risk factors including family control and the limited float; the segment revenue and expense tables for 2025 and 2024; the client account metrics; the credit agreements and their covenants; the shelf registration and at-the-market agreement; the related-party note; the net capital discussion.backsC02C07C09C19C21C30C32C34C35C38C39C40C41C42
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-11The balance sheet, income statement and statements of changes in equity for the quarter and half; the revenue disaggregation note splitting stock locate services from stock rebate revenue; the segment tables; MSCO's net capital at both dates; the bank covenants; the arbitration settlement; the tZERO, Green Pier, FusionIQ and Arqitech arrangements; the client account metrics; confirmation that no shares were sold under the at-the-market agreement.backsC01C02C03C04C06C09C10C11C19C21C25C28C30C33C35C36C37C38C40C42C43C44C45
- S03primaryregulator2023-11-03SEC, Reporting of Securities Loans (Rule 10c-1a adopting release), Federal Register, 3 November 2023 U.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionThe size of the pond Siebert's largest revenue line sells into, the average United States equity lending fee, the Commission's own estimate of annual lending fees collected, its finding that the market is dominated by a few large lending programs run by custodian banks, and the median utilisation of lendable supply.
the estimated value of securities on loan globally was $3.1 trillion at the end of September 2021 ... U.S. securities continue to account for the majority of global securities on loan, accounting for 58 percent of global securities on loan as of the end of September 2021 ... for U.S. equities the OFR Pilot Survey reports the average lending fee across the three days surveyed was approximately 33 basis points (bps) ... multiplying this estimate by two to, conservatively, account for fees collected in the Customer market yields an estimate of $5.4 billion in lending fees collected annually ... the market for lending services is likely dominated by a few large lending programs, including those run by the large custodian banks ... for most stocks the lending supply significantly outstrips demand with median utilization rates of approximately 12%
backsC22C23C24 - S04primaryregulator2026-08The industry-wide rate of the leverage cycle Siebert's securities-finance business rides, collected by the regulator from every member firm carrying margin accounts rather than estimated by a vendor.
Month/Year Debit Balances in Customers' Securities Margin Accounts Free Credit Balances in Customers' Cash Accounts Free Credit Balances in Customers' Securities Margin Accounts Jul-26 1,417,225 205,132 217,305 ... Jul-25 1,022,548 194,712 186,672
backsC20 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-27Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Interactive Brokers Group, Inc.A competitor's own statement that it gives customers the shortable-availability search at no cost, and its Securities Lending Dashboard - the external evidence that Siebert's largest fee is a free feature somewhere else.backsC12
- S06primarycompany filing2026-02-18Robinhood Markets, Inc. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Robinhood Markets, Inc.A competitor's own record of launching short selling in the fourth quarter of 2025 and of running a fully-paid securities lending programme - the two sides of Siebert's securities-finance business, attacked from a zero-commission platform.backsC26C46
- S07primarycompany filing2026-02-19State Street Corporation Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 State Street CorporationA custodian bank's own description of agency lending and a principal prime-services book, and the growth in its securities finance revenue - what the large end of Siebert's market looks like from inside it.backsC27
- S08primarycompany filing2026-08-28Schedule 13D/A (Amendment 31), Gebbia reporting group, filed 28 August 2026 Gloria E. Gebbia and the Gebbia reporting groupThe family group's aggregate holding of 17,060,603 shares, 42% of the class, the per-person breakdown, and the statement that the amendment reports gifts out of the Gebbia Living Trust and one family purchase.backsC16
- S09secondaryvendor data2026-09-08SIEB research pack, frozen 2026-09-08Price, market value, the twenty-day and 252-day returns, the twenty-day average high-to-low range, the 252-day range position, short interest from FINRA, the insider filing window, the measured reactions of eight news items, and the empty analyst-estimate and consensus fields.backsC15C16C29
- S10primarycompany release2026-08-18The announcement that moved the shares hardest, and what it does not say: no fee, no revenue share, no volume, no term, no launch date, and no fund in existence.
Additional information regarding individual ETF strategies, regulatory filings and anticipated launch dates will be announced separately.
backsC14 - S11primarycompany release2026-08-20The second announcement of the rally, and the same absence: custody and clearing infrastructure described, one tokenised gold security named, and no fee, volume or term disclosed.
Our relationship with tZERO gives us the infrastructure to enter this market while building for where financial markets are headed.
read, but no claim rests on it - S12primaryregulator2026-09-08When the securities-lending market gets a public tape - the date at which locate and borrow pricing stops being private information, and therefore how long the opacity Siebert's fee sits inside is protected.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has granted an extension of the SLATE launch date until September 28, 2028.
backsC31 - S13primarycompany filing2026-09-25Gloria E. Gebbia's resignation from the board and John M. Gebbia's appointment to fill the seat; the signature block naming Andrew H. Reich as principal executive, financial and accounting officer.backsC38