Kratos Defense & Security Solutions
An American defence maker of jet target drones, the Valkyrie combat drone, small jet engines, hypersonic test rockets and satellite ground systems.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Sales grew 19% before acquisitions in Q2 2026 and 18.5% in 2025, but part is bought (Orbit, Nomad) and the fast record is short.
Business quality2/4 →
Sole-source target drones are protected, but they are a small part; elsewhere it lost the Air Force combat drone race and margins fell.
Financial position3/4 →
$1.44B of cash and no term debt, but operating cash flow is negative and the plan has needed two share sales.
Execution record3/4 →
Eight straight adjusted beats and revenue targets met, but 2025's cash target was missed by $42.6M and margins have not widened.
Per share capture2/4 →
Diluted shares rose 20.8% in a year on two offerings and a share-paid acquisition, while sales per share rose 3.9%.
Potential2/4 →
MACH-TB and funded backlog are committed, but hypersonics at $700M, the engine ramp and Valkyrie volume are expected, and depend on Congress.
Risk profile3/4 →
68% of revenue is the US government, a disclosed and survivable dependence; no contract exceeds 5%.
Valuation2/4 ↑
About 38 times guided adjusted EBITDA needs roughly 20% growth a year and a wider margin to 2030, the good case, not just the plan.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Results, cash and contracts are filed and the budget is official, but hypersonic and engine sizes are management's and unreported as lines.
If it works 0.6× · if it fails you keep about 62%.
The Verdict
We rate Kratos Neutral. The business is mixed: sales are growing about 20% a year before acquisitions, led by rockets, hypersonic tests and engines rather than drones, but margins are thin, cash flow is negative and the share count rose by a fifth in a year. The price is full: about 38 times this year's guided profit before interest, tax and non-cash charges. As a bet on the Valkyrie combat drone it is expensive and priced for success: if the drone works it adds little to a price that already asks for years of growth from the rest of Kratos. The view hinges on that growth turning into cash.
The long caseAir forces want cheap drone wingmen in numbers soon, and the Valkyrie is already flying and being built, so early orders can come to it.
The evidence under this - 10 claims
The release does not print these line rates; only the call does, and the lines' revenue is not disclosed.
- Adjusted EBITDA leaves out $60M to $64M of 2026 stock pay; on EBITDA after stock pay the multiple is about 59 times.
- The vendor's company value of $6.70B differs slightly; it uses a different cash and debt date.
Management's own path, hypersonics at $700M in 2027 and engines from 2027, would add about $450M of revenue in a year if delivered (C10, C11).
- Kratos does not report hypersonic revenue as a line; only defence rocket support's growth rate is given (C07).
- MACH-TB 2.0 is a $1.45B five-year contract only if all options are exercised (C17).
The Air Force chose Anduril and General Atomics for its first production drones and will not reopen that competition (C14).
It is a development agreement, not high-rate production; management says production comes next (C44).
The company
Navies and air forces need something realistic to shoot at when they test missiles. Kratos is the main maker of those jet target drones for the US Navy, Air Force and Army.
It also builds the Valkyrie, a cheap jet drone meant to fly beside fighters; small turbojet engines for drones and cruise missiles; rockets that carry hypersonic test payloads for the Pentagon's test office; and ground stations that control satellites. GE Aerospace is designing a drone engine with it for the Air Force.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- No engine production order is disclosed; the parts are bought ahead of orders.
- The FY 2027 request funds 1,000 affordable mass missiles, the same quantity as FY 2026 (C19).
How it makes money
Most sales are hardware made under fixed-price contracts, about 69% of the total, and 68% come from the US government. In 2025 the government products unit, engines, rockets and electronics, was 44% of sales, its services 34%, and drones 21%.
No contract is more than 5% of sales, and $1.57B of orders were already paid for at June 2026.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Government Solutions' 2025 growth includes $22.3M from the Norden assets bought in February 2025.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Government Solutions products | 44% | Microwave electronics, satellite ground hardware, small jet engines, rocket and hypersonic hardware, mostly fixed-price production. |
| Government Solutions services | 34% | Defence rocket support including hypersonic test flights, space and satellite services, training and cyber. |
| Unmanned Systems products | 21% | Jet target drones for the Navy, Air Force, Army and allies, and tactical drones including the Valkyrie. |
| Unmanned Systems services | 1% | Flight services and support for drone customers. |
Who runs it
Eric DeMarco has run Kratos since 2004, turning a services contractor into a maker of drones, rockets and engines by investing ahead of contracts. Deanna Lund has been finance chief for the same time. They have beaten forecasts eight quarters running, but missed their own cash target in 2025.
Insiders own about 1.5%. Bonuses and half the share awards pay on adjusted profit growth, with nothing tied to profit per share.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The beats are on adjusted figures; GAAP diluted EPS was a tenth of the adjusted figure in the latest quarter.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Each service has built a Kratos target drone into its test ranges for seven to twenty-one years. Switching means new trials and new range software, so the Navy re-bought the BQM-177 without a competition: one company asked, one offer, $238.8M.
The same logic helps the hypersonic test work, where Kratos already runs the flights. It does not protect the newer lines: the Air Force picked other makers for its first combat drones.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Increment 2 is open to other companies, and the Marine Corps buys separately (C13).
The threat
Anduril, a private company the chief executive calls an absolute peer, competes in jet drones and rocket motors and won the Air Force's combat drone race with General Atomics. New private makers want the cheap hypersonic and missile work the budget invites, and the big defence groups can keep engines and rockets in house.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Increment 2 is open to other companies, and the Marine Corps buys separately (C13).
Anduril is private, so no filed figure compares the two.
These are requests; Congress had not passed the FY 2027 appropriation by 10 October 2026.
The rivals: NOC, LMT, RTX, LHX, BA, MRCY, KRMN, VSAT, CACI, and 4 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Private | Anduril Industries, a private defence company with jet drones, solid rocket motors and hypersonic workPriced against it: Private | Valkyrie tactical jet drones | On sale | Private |
| Private | General Atomics, a private maker of military dronesPriced against it: Private | Valkyrie tactical jet drones | On sale | Private |
| Private | Castelion, Ursa Major and XBOW, private makers of low-cost hypersonic weapons and rocket motorsPriced against it: Private | Kratos Government Solutions: satellite ground systems, microwave electronics, rocket and hypersonic test systems, small jet engines and defence services | Announced | Private |
| NOC · LMT · RTX · LHX · BA | The primes: Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, RTX, L3Harris and BoeingPriced against it: One segment only | Kratos Government Solutions: satellite ground systems, microwave electronics, rocket and hypersonic test systems, small jet engines and defence services | On sale | One segment only |
| MRCY · KRMN | Mercury Systems and Karman, listed makers of microwave subsystems and missile and hypersonic subsystemsPriced against it: Yes | Kratos Government Solutions: satellite ground systems, microwave electronics, rocket and hypersonic test systems, small jet engines and defence services | On sale | Yes |
| QinetiQ, a London-listed defence group that also sells aerial targetsPriced against it: Listed abroad | Unmanned Systems: jet target drones and other tactical drones | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| VSAT | ViasatPriced against it: One segment only | - | On sale | One segment only |
| CACI | CACI InternationalPriced against it: One segment only | - | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The Pentagon has asked for $114B for missiles, munitions and hypersonic weapons for 2027, and $54.0B for drones and other uncrewed systems. Kratos's whole sales are about $1.8B.
Two cautions: these are requests, not law, and they cover every class of weapon. Nobody publishes how much is for target drones, test flights or small engines.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
These are requests; Congress had not passed the FY 2027 appropriation by 10 October 2026.
These are requests; the first increment's production goes to Anduril and General Atomics (C14).
Who has signed
Paid-for orders reached $1.57B in June 2026. The hypersonic test contract is worth up to $1.45B over five years if every option is taken up. The Navy's target drone contract runs to 2028, and GE reports an Air Force contract to design an engine with Kratos. The engine and Valkyrie volumes management talks about are not signed.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year | Share in 3 years at its half-year rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Product | 63% | +33.5% | +26.2% | +24.3% | 62% |
| Service | 37% | +25.8% | +28.0% | +24.2% | 38% |
| Whole company | 100% | +30.5% | +26.9% | +24.3% | 100% |
On the filed split through 2026-06-28, if each business keeps its last half-year's growth, the company grows about 27% next year and 27% in year 3, against 25.5% over the last twelve months. A scenario, not a forecast: no business holds its rate.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 26% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, faster than the 19% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 1.2%, about where it was (3.0%) in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 22¢ of each sales dollar, down from 24¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 0.5% a year after tax, about where it was (1.3%) in the year to Dec 2024.
It used $129M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $1.44B it holds lasts about 11.2 years at that pace.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +8.5% to +19% over the last 5 years.
The share count rose 49% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 3.3% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-10. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $812M | $898M | $1.04B | $1.14B | $1.35B | $1.52B |
| Sales growth | +8.5% | +11% | +15% | +9.6% | +19% | +26% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 28% | 25% | 26% | 25% | 23% | 23% |
| Operating margin | 3.4% | −0.3% | 3.0% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 1.2% |
| Net margin | −0.2% | −4.1% | −0.9% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 2.0% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 4.3% | 4.3% | 3.7% | 3.5% | 3.0% | 2.9% |
| Selling, general and admin | 20% | 20% | 19% | 19% | 18% | 19% |
| Pay in shares | 3.2% | 2.9% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.6% | 3.3% |
| Capital spending | 5.7% | 5.1% | 5.1% | 5.1% | 7.1% | 5.9% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $35.3M | −$25.7M | $65.2M | $49.7M | −$42.1M | −$39.6M |
| Free cash flow | −$11.2M | −$71.1M | $12.8M | −$8.50M | −$137M | −$129M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $349M | $81.3M | $72.8M | $329M | $561M | $1.44B |
| Debt | $297M | $250M | $219M | $175M | $0 | - |
| Net cash | $52.7M | −$169M | −$146M | $155M | $561M | - |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | - | 1.3% | 0.9% | 0.5% |
| Shares (diluted) | 128M | 127M | 130M | 151M | 165M | 190M |
What growth costs
Growth has been getting more expensive. From 2023 to 2025 sales rose 30% while the gross margin fell from 25.9% to 22.9% and operating margin to 1.9%. Kratos builds plants, engines and drones before it has orders, so capital spending is rising and cash flow has turned negative.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Investing ahead of awards is why operating cash flow is negative while the business grows (C25).
The last report (4 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
Q2 2026 beat forecasts. Sales rose 30.5% to $458.8M, 19.1% before acquisitions, with rocket support up about 50% and engines up 43%. Drones grew 8%.
Profit stayed thin: an operating loss of $1.6M, and net income of $4.4M only because of interest on cash. Management raised its growth outlook for the year to 19% to 23% before acquisitions.
What it did to the thesisIt confirmed the growth is real and led by rockets and engines rather than drones. It did nothing for the weak point: margins stayed thin and cash flow negative. It left open whether the raised year turns into cash.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.21 against $0.14 expected; $0.02 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The release does not print these line rates; only the call does, and the lines' revenue is not disclosed.
- In 2025 the company missed its own free cash flow target, using $125.4M against $82.8M planned (C35).
- Operating cash flow was negative in 2025 and in the twelve months to June 2026 (C25), so the guided positive figure rests on the second half.
What management did with the money
Insiders in 2026Q3: 0 purchases and 38 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price pays for management's growth plan working and for margins widening, so little is left if the plan only half happens.
The shares are down 68% from January, after a large share sale in February and the lost combat drone race in June. A strong August report lifted them for a week and the gains have gone.
The test is close. Kratos reports on 5 November and gives its first 2027 guidance, which is where the promised hypersonic and engine growth has to start showing.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Increment 2 is open to other companies, and the Marine Corps buys separately (C13).
- In 2025 the company missed its own free cash flow target, using $125.4M against $82.8M planned (C35).
- Operating cash flow was negative in 2025 and in the twelve months to June 2026 (C25), so the guided positive figure rests on the second half.
- Kratos does not report hypersonic revenue as a line; only defence rocket support's growth rate is given (C07).
- MACH-TB 2.0 is a $1.45B five-year contract only if all options are exercised (C17).
How we read the multiple
A buyer pays about 38 times the profit before interest, tax and non-cash charges guided for 2026. That profit leaves out about $62M of stock pay, so what shareholders keep is far smaller.
- The whole company, net of cash, is worth about $6.65B.
- At 15 times that profit, common for mature defence makers, Kratos would need about $443M.
- At a 12% margin, against about 8% today, that takes about $3.7B of sales.
- That is this year's guided sales growing about 20% a year to 2030.
Against its own history. The shares sit far below their own recent highs on sales, but the price paid for each dollar of sales was stretched then; lower is not yet cheap.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Adjusted EBITDA leaves out $60M to $64M of 2026 stock pay; on EBITDA after stock pay the multiple is about 59 times.
- The vendor's company value of $6.70B differs slightly; it uses a different cash and debt date.
Management's own path, hypersonics at $700M in 2027 and engines from 2027, would add about $450M of revenue in a year if delivered (C10, C11).
- In 2025 the company missed its own free cash flow target, using $125.4M against $82.8M planned (C35).
- Operating cash flow was negative in 2025 and in the twelve months to June 2026 (C25), so the guided positive figure rests on the second half.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of cash profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of cash profit |
|---|---|---|
| KRMN | Karman Holdings | 33.3× |
| MRCY | Mercury Systems | 65.1× |
| KTOS | Kratos Defense & Security Solutions | 69.1× |
The middle of the other 2 is 49.2. Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc. is dearest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Cheaper than its two filed rivals on sales but dearer on profit, because its margins are much thinner than theirs.
Also checked and set aside: AAR (a substitute, not the same product); AeroVironment (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Anduril Industries, Inc., XBOW Energetics, Shield AI, Inc., Castelion Corporation, Ursa Major Technologies, General Atomics, Peraton Inc., Cobham, QinetiQ Group plc.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is the Valkyrie, a cheap jet drone built to fly beside fighters. The Marines picked it with Northrop for a development programme, Airbus is testing a German version, and Kratos builds them before anyone orders.
If production reaches next year's plan, the drone adds only a small slice to today's price, which leans on the rest of Kratos rather than on the drone.
If it fails, the drone costs little, but at the rating its listed peers get, the rest of Kratos is worth well under today's price.
| Valkyrie tactical jet drones EBITDA in two to three years | Valkyries a year needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $10.00M | about 7 at 15% kept | 0.6× |
| $22.50M (the big win) | about 15 at 15% kept | 0.6× |
| $50.00M | about 33 at 15% kept | 0.7× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $466.59M of Valkyrie tactical jet drones EBITDA (about 311 Valkyries a year at 15% kept); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $1.43B of Valkyrie tactical jet drones EBITDA (about 952 Valkyries a year at 15% kept), at the same multiple.
Each row is Valkyrie tactical jet drones alone, plus the rest of the company (Government Solutions and the target drones) counted at about $3.65B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Marine Corps MUX TACAIR won with Northrop, Valkyrie as the aircraft
- Done First Valkyries shipped to Airbus for a German variant
- Not started Second Marine Corps Valkyrie order due 2026-12
- Not started First foreign Valkyrie production order announced due 2027-06
- In progress Output reaches 18 a year due 2027-12
- Not started Output reaches 35 to 40 a year due 2028-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 5 claims
It is a development agreement, not high-rate production; management says production comes next (C44).
No foreign Valkyrie order has been announced with a volume; the two other customers are unnamed (C44).
The Air Force chose Anduril and General Atomics for its first production drones and will not reopen that competition (C14).
- In 2025 the company missed its own free cash flow target, using $125.4M against $82.8M planned (C35).
- Operating cash flow was negative in 2025 and in the twelve months to June 2026 (C25), so the guided positive figure rests on the second half.
Where we disagree with the market
A defence technology winner that fell too far, with record orders and a Pentagon spending surge behind it.
The growth is real but led by rockets and engines, not drones, and it has not yet produced margin or cash.
Analysts see the fall as the chance: buy ratings rose even as their price targets fell. The filings show growth without profit or cash, paid for with new shares.
The evidence against us: if hypersonics reach $700M in 2027 and engine orders arrive, margins could widen fast and the price would look low.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The release does not print these line rates; only the call does, and the lines' revenue is not disclosed.
Management's own path, hypersonics at $700M in 2027 and engines from 2027, would add about $450M of revenue in a year if delivered (C10, C11).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Cash keeps going out. Operating cash flow was negative in 2025 and the past year, and the company missed its own cash target in 2025.
- More shares sold. Two offerings raised $1.96B in eight months; continued buying of companies and plants could need another.
- Engines without orders. Kratos is buying parts for 3,000 engines while the 2027 budget asks for the same 1,000 cheap missiles as 2026.
- Combat drones go elsewhere. The Air Force chose Anduril and General Atomics and will not reopen that round, leaving the Valkyrie with the Marines and abroad.
- The budget arrives late. The 2027 requests are not law, and a long stopgap would delay new programmes.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Increment 2 is open to other companies, and the Marine Corps buys separately (C13).
- No engine production order is disclosed; the parts are bought ahead of orders.
- The FY 2027 request funds 1,000 affordable mass missiles, the same quantity as FY 2026 (C19).
These are requests; Congress had not passed the FY 2027 appropriation by 10 October 2026.
What we still do not know
- How much hypersonic revenue Kratos books each quarter; it publishes only a growth rate.
- Which missile programmes have ordered engines, and how many.
- What a target drone or a hypersonic test flight costs the buyer, against a rival's.
- Whether the Marine Corps places the Valkyrie order management expects by the end of 2026.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Kratos does not report hypersonic revenue as a line; only defence rocket support's growth rate is given (C07).
- MACH-TB 2.0 is a $1.45B five-year contract only if all options are exercised (C17).
- No engine production order is disclosed; the parts are bought ahead of orders.
- The FY 2027 request funds 1,000 affordable mass missiles, the same quantity as FY 2026 (C19).
The Air Force chose Anduril and General Atomics for its first production drones and will not reopen that competition (C14).
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveA price that pays for 2028, not 2030
It needs:
- ○The company's value falls to 25 times this year's guided profit before interest, tax and non-cash charges.about ≈$27.01 today, 36% below the last close
- Neutral→AttractiveGrowth turns into cash
It needs all of:
- ○Operating cash flow for 2026 comes in positive, within the $30M to $50M guided.watched as it happens
- ○The profit margin before interest, tax and non-cash charges reaches 11% in a quarter.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe ramp breaks
It needs any of:
- ○The 2026 sales guide is cut below $1,750M.watched as it happens
- ○The government products and services unit grows less than 10% before acquisitions in a quarter.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Management cuts its $700M hypersonic target for 2027.
- Kratos sells more shares before cash flow turns positive.
- Engine production orders for 2027 would strengthen the case.
What is coming
- 5 November 2026 Q3 2026 results and first 2027 guidance: Whether revenue keeps to the guide, whether operating cash flow turns positive, and whether 2027 is guided at 15% or more organic growth with a wider margin.
Every dated event ahead
- 5 November 2026 Q3 2026 results and first 2027 guidance: Whether revenue keeps to the guide, whether operating cash flow turns positive, and whether 2027 is guided at 15% or more organic growth with a wider margin.
- 31 December 2026 Marine Corps Valkyrie production order: Whether the Valkyrie has a production customer after the Air Force's choice.
- March 2027 FY 2027 defence appropriation: How much of the $114B missile and hypersonic and $54.0B autonomous requests becomes law.
Since we wrote this
- 28 OctNewsQ3 report dated 5 November; a small NASA award changes nothingThe company set its call for 5 November. A $33.6M NASA space-power award bears on no test the thesis turns on.
- 11 OctThesis reviewValkyrie bet addedA line a Futures theory names that has shown no revenue is an early business, and it owes a bet.
- 10 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionReal growth led by rockets and engines, with thin margins and heavy dilution, at a price that needs the plan and more.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 19
Sources - 19
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-23business, segments, target drone sole-source positions, MACH-TB 2.0, the Valkyrie and MUX TACAIR, the GE engine work, competitors, contract types, customers, revenue by segment and type, investments ahead of awards, employeesbacksC01C02C04C13C16C17C21C37C39C40C41
- S02primarycompany filing2026-02-23full-year 2025 adjusted EBITDA, backlog at year end and the bid pipelinebacksC08
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-04second-quarter revenue and profit by segment, the GAAP to adjusted reconciliation, bookings, backlog, the pipeline and 2026 guidancebacksC05C06C08C09C24C28C38C40
- S04primarycompany filing2026-08-04cash and debt, the February 2026 and June 2025 share offerings, the Orbit and Nomad acquisitions and the Prometheus joint venturebacksC22C23C26C27C42
- S05primarytranscript2026-08-04Second quarter 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-08-04data/cache/transcripts/KTOS-2026Q2.jsonmanagement on hypersonics, engines, the Valkyrie, Anduril, organic growth by line and the 2026 outlook
Kratos' hypersonic business, which generated approximately $200 million in revenue in 2025, and we are currently tracking for $400 million in '26, increasing to at least $700 million in 2027
backsC07C09C10C11C12C16C18C36C45 - S06primarycompany filing2026-10-10annual and trailing revenue, margins, R&D, selling and admin cost, cash flow, capital spending, stock pay and diluted shares (frozen in content/KTOS/financials.json)backsC04C24C25C39
- S07primarycompany filing2026-04-02share ownership, executive pay design and the 2025 bonus targets and resultsbacksC34C35
- S08primarygovernment data2026-10-10USAspending.gov: Navy award N0001923C0021, BQM-177A subsonic aerial target full-rate production US Department of the Treasury, USAspending.gov (Federal Procurement Data System record of the Department of the Navy)the award's value, that it was not competed, the single offer, the pricing type and the period
SUBSONIC AERIAL TARGET (SSAT) BQM-177A FULL RATE PRODUCTION
backsC03 - S09primarycompany filing2026-04-21the Air Force contract to design the GEK1500 engine with KratosbacksC15
- S10secondarynews2026-06-17DefenseScoop: Air Force picks Anduril, General Atomics to build first operational CCA drones DefenseScoop (Scoop News Group)the Air Force's Increment 1 production choice, the 2027 request and that Increment 1 will not reopen
The service does plan to purchase additional CCA Increment 1 drones in future aircraft lots, but will not open the competition back up to vendors other than Anduril and General Atomics, he added.
backsC14 - S11primaryregulator2026-05-01Overview: FY 2027 Department of War budget request (Pentagon comptroller) US Department of War, Office of the Under Secretary (Comptroller)the request for missiles, munitions and hypersonic weapons, procurement quantities by missile, the autonomous systems request and the collaborative combat aircraft line
$114 billion for missiles, munitions, and hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons are essential to counter the rapid advancement and proliferation of adversary hypersonic capability
backsC19C20 - S12primaryregulator2026-05-01Overview: FY 2027 Department of War budget request, Air Force section US Department of War, Office of the Under Secretary (Comptroller)the collaborative combat aircraft funding line
revolutionizing the force structure with a massive investment in the Collaborative Combat Aircraft program ($2.7 billion) funding the first increment while beginning development on the second.
backsC14C20 - S13primaryregulator2026-05-01Overview: FY 2027 Department of War budget request, critical munitions US Department of War, Office of the Under Secretary (Comptroller)the critical munitions request and its aim of new entrants and multi-year contracts
$52.9 billion for Critical Munitions - one of the top priorities of the FY 2027 budget is to rapidly scale procurement of 12 critical munitions and encourage new entrants
backsC19 - S14secondaryvendor data2026-10-10Research pack frozen beside this thesis, 2026-10-10content/KTOS/research-pack.jsonthe 9 October close, the 252-day return and its split, the rating split and its history, price-target drift, earnings history and FINRA short interestbacksC28C29C30C38
- S15secondaryvendor data2026-10-10daily closes around the February offering, the June CCA decision and the August resultsbacksC28
- S16primarycompany filing2026-09-23every open-market insider sale with the Rule 10b5-1 flagbacksC31
- S17primarytranscript2026-02-23Fourth quarter and fiscal 2025 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-02-23data/cache/transcripts/KTOS-2025Q4.jsonthe initial MUX TACAIR award and its split, the Valkyrie build rate and the revenue per aircraft
this initial MUX TACAIR award is approximately $230 million and will be split approximately 50-50 between Kratos and Northrop with an approximate 24-month period of performance
backsC43C44 - S18primarytranscript2026-05-06First quarter 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-05-06data/cache/transcripts/KTOS-2026Q1.jsontactical drone revenue in the quarter, predominantly the Valkyrie
The tactical revenue for the quarter was about $20 million.
backsC44 - S19secondarynews2026-01-08the MUX TACAIR agreement type, initial value and period, as given by Northrop Grumman
is an Other Transaction Agreement, which comes with an initial value of $231.5 million. The OTA covers development with an initial period of performance of 24 months.
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