FTAI Aviation
A rebuilder of the engines on older 737s and A320s: it keeps a pool of refurbished engine sections and swaps them onto an airline's engine in days.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Four years above 40% growth, but it narrowed to two customers at half of revenue and part of it was acquired.
Business quality3/4 →
Not Protected: StandardAero is spending on a CFM56 line in Dallas and the largest airlines run engine shops of their own.
Financial position2/4 →
Serviceable but for $1.0 billion due May 2028, six quarters of negative operating cash flow, and a $500 million buyback promised from $337 million cash.
Execution record2/4 ↓
The February raise to $1.625 billion was fully reversed in July without warning, and the panel's estimate has been missed in seven of eight prints.
Per share capture3/4 →
Diluted count up 0.9%, no convertible, a $500 million buyback authorised but unexecuted; Strategic Capital still hands leasing economics to limited partners.
Potential2/4 ↑
A signed $1.465 billion order argues for Material, but the Mod-1 has never been delivered and three independent ramps must land together.
Risk profile2/4 ↓
More than one concentration: two customers at half of revenue, a single engine platform, and a first Mod-1 delivery a customer must accept.
Valuation2/4 ↑
At about 25 times trailing operating profit, flat and partly gains, the 2027 bridge has to land close to in full.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Every trailing figure is filed and re-checkable, but the 2027 bridge and the market-share figures exist only in management's own words.
If it works 1.6× · if it fails you keep about 100%.
The Verdict
We rate FTAI neutral. Its engine business rebuilds the engines on older passenger jets and is growing fast, but the company around it has stopped growing: group profit is flat because leasing profits were sold into partnerships and a new power business has yet to earn. The business is mixed. The price is full, not cheap: it already counts on management's promise that profit roughly doubles next year, so a missed promise would hurt. As a bet it is defensive: engine repair and leasing could pay for today's price on their own, so if the power turbines work the shares gain about half, and if they fail little is lost.
The long caseData centres cannot wait years for the grid or a new turbine, so they build their own gas power, and a rebuilt jet engine ships now.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- Adjusted EBITDA is management's own definition and includes a pro-rata share of unconsolidated entities, so the trailing figure mixes consolidated and equity-accounted profit.
- The flatness is by design rather than by failure: leasing earnings were deliberately sold into third-party partnerships, and management argues the fee stream replacing them arrives from the December quarter.
- Net income attributable to shareholders was flat too over the same span, which the same explanation covers, so the finding does not separate a mix shift from a deterioration on its own.
- Enterprise value adds gross debt to market value, and the $337.2 million of cash netted against it is working cash in a business that has consumed cash in operations for six straight quarters - and is now also the cash named to fund a $500 million buyback.
- The 2027 guidance is a sum of segment figures before Corporate & Other, interest and depreciation, so ten times it is not a company multiple and understates what is being paid.
- Trailing earnings carry $245.1 million of first-half gains the cash flow reverses out, so the earnings multiple is struck on a profit whose composition is unusual.
- The operating-profit line is the vendor's construction, because the filer presents no operating income subtotal; the multiple on it cannot be reconciled to a filed figure.
- 2026-09-27editedre-struck at the 25 September 2026 close in the 27 September review; the shares fell 8.2% in the week with no filing and no stated cause
- It is a sum of segment figures: it excludes Corporate & Other, which was negative $46.5 million in the June quarter alone, and it excludes about $265 million a year of interest and preferred dividends and about $268 million of depreciation and amortisation.
- It requires roughly a doubling of trailing adjusted EBITDA in eighteen months, of which $450 million comes from a product that has never been delivered.
- The same management raised 2026 guidance in February and took the raise back in July.
- The February 2026 results release stated planned production of 100 units in 2027, so the number underlying the guidance has moved down while the headline production target has not.
- Management would not disclose the per-megawatt economics on the call, calling them commercially sensitive, so the range cannot be checked against a unit price.
- No Mod-1 has been delivered; the first delivery was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78) and the business is starting from zero.
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
- No Form 8-K was filed for it: the only 8-K between 29 May and 31 August 2026 is the June-quarter results release, so the only account of the terms is the company's own press release.
- The counterparty is not named, so its credit cannot be checked, and the contracting party is the joint venture rather than FTAI.
- No Mod-1 has ever been delivered to a customer; the first was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78).
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
The company
An airliner's engine needs a major overhaul every few years. At a shop approved by the engine's maker, that takes it off the plane for months and rebuilds it with new parts.
FTAI sells the shortcut. It buys used CFM56 and V2500 engines, the ones on 737NGs and A320ceos, and keeps a pool of rebuilt sections. The airline swaps one in, pays for a set number of flights, and has the plane back in days.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- An exchange is not always cheaper: management's own arithmetic prices a full 10,000-cycle build at roughly $12 million, which is shop-visit money, so the saving is in downtime and in cycle-matching rather than in headline price.
- Large airlines with in-house engine shops can and do keep the work; management's pitch is that they should stop, which is an argument it is still making rather than one it has won.
- StandardAero's own filing describes on-wing and field service support as part of what it sells, so the incumbent alternative is not only a months-long shop visit.
How it makes money
The engine business earned $875.0M of the $953.1M total revenue in the June quarter. A second business leased whole aircraft, but most of its planes have been sold to a partnership FTAI manages, which now buys its replacement engines from FTAI. The third, Power, turns the same engine into a generator for data centres and has yet to deliver one.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Both figures are related-party: the vehicle is FTAI's own, so a fifth of Aerospace Products demand is bought by an entity FTAI is general partner of, and neither the 10-Q nor the 10-K discloses the pricing of that supply.
- The 300 aircraft are described as closed or under letter of intent, not all closed, and management says closings shift between quarters.
- The CFO declined to hold Strategic Capital work to the 40% margin discussed earlier in the year, which means the captive volume is not automatically the profitable volume.
- No Form 8-K was filed for it: the only 8-K between 29 May and 31 August 2026 is the June-quarter results release, so the only account of the terms is the company's own press release.
- The counterparty is not named, so its credit cannot be checked, and the contracting party is the joint venture rather than FTAI.
- No Mod-1 has ever been delivered to a customer; the first was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78).
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Aerospace products | 72.6% | Rebuilt CFM56 and V2500 engines, modules and used parts sold outright, plus engine-management contracts that replace engines on call. |
| MRE contract revenue | 19.2% | Serviceable engines and modules sold to, and worn ones exchanged from, the 2025 Partnership that bought FTAI's leased aircraft. |
| Lease income | 2.9% | Rent on the aircraft and engines FTAI still owns and leases to airlines. |
| Maintenance revenue | 2.7% | Lessees' maintenance reserves FTAI does not expect to pay back. |
| Asset sales and other | 2.6% | Aircraft and engines sold from the leasing fleet, and servicing fees from the 2025 Partnership. |
Who runs it
Joseph Adams has run FTAI since 2015, first for the fund manager Fortress and, since 2024, as its own employee. Nicholas McAleese became finance chief in March 2026. Insiders own just over 1% of the company. Their bonus rides mostly on a profit measure that leaves out interest and cash: last year it paid the maximum while the business used more cash than it brought in.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Tuchman sold 254,260 shares on 1 and 4 May 2026, after the record date, so his holding and the group figure are lower now (C44).
- The bonus measure is segment adjusted EBITDA before corporate costs and interest, which includes gains on asset sales, while operating cash flow was negative $310.7M in 2025; nothing in the plan pays on cash.
- The 25% individual component was also paid at the maximum for every officer, a discretionary call.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
FTAI owns the parts rather than selling labour. It gets them by tearing down engines it bought used, or from approved makers of replacement parts, so its cost is set by what it paid for the old engine. A shop selling labour buys the same parts new from the maker at list price.
The evidence it works comes from management: it says its share of CFM56 maintenance rose from 12% to 14% in the June quarter alone, against a goal of 25%.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- An exchange is not always cheaper: management's own arithmetic prices a full 10,000-cycle build at roughly $12 million, which is shop-visit money, so the saving is in downtime and in cycle-matching rather than in headline price.
- Large airlines with in-house engine shops can and do keep the work; management's pitch is that they should stop, which is an argument it is still making rather than one it has won.
- StandardAero's own filing describes on-wing and field service support as part of what it sells, so the incumbent alternative is not only a months-long shop visit.
- The share figure appears in no filing, has no stated denominator, and is not measured by anyone outside the company.
- Management's own two numbers do not reconcile: 1,200 modules at a 14% share implies an industry throughput near 8,600 modules a year, while 3,000 modules of capacity said to support a 25% objective plus 100 Mod-1s implies something closer to 11,000.
- The share is being bought: management guides Aerospace Products margin down to about 30% from 34.7% in FY2025 in order to take it.
The threat
Established shops are moving in, StandardAero among them. The larger threat is time. The engine's maker says its newer LEAP engine will overtake the CFM56 as the largest fleet. In power, GE Vernova and Bloom Energy already sell on-site electricity to data centres.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The rivals: SARO, GE, GE, WLFC, DAL, GEV, BE, ASLE.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SARO | StandardAero, Inc.Priced against it: Yes | Aerospace Products | On sale | Yes |
| GE | CFM International's own authorised overhaul network, run by GE Aerospace and Safran Aircraft EnginesPriced against it: Not yet priced | Aerospace Products | On sale | Not yet priced |
| The LEAP-1A and LEAP-1B engine | Aerospace Products | On sale | ||
| WLFC | Willis Lease Finance CorporationPriced against it: No usable figure | Aerospace Products | On sale | No usable figure |
| DAL | Delta TechOps, the maintenance arm of Delta Air LinesPriced against it: Small part of it | Aerospace Products | On sale | Small part of it |
| GEV | GE Vernova's aeroderivative gas turbinesPriced against it: One segment only | FTAI Power | On sale | One segment only |
| BE | Bloom Energy's solid-oxide fuel cellsPriced against it: Different product | FTAI Power | On sale | Different product |
| ASLE | AerSalePriced against it: Yes | - | On sale | Yes |
How big it could get
How big this could get
More than 20,000 of these engines are in service. Safran, one of the engine's two makers, expects 2,300 to 2,400 overhauls a year through 2028, more than 750 above its earlier forecast, and a decline from 2029. How much of that work is section rebuilds cannot be worked out from outside the company.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The source is a PMA supplier announcing its own approval, and a large installed base is the number that makes that approval valuable - an interested witness.
- The platform owner's own figures could not be read: CFM International returns HTTP 429 and Safran HTTP 403 to every non-browser client, so the count is uncorroborated.
- Safran owns half the platform and sells the new parts, so a longer CFM56 life is its own revenue too: this is the platform owner forecasting its own aftermarket.
- It counts whole shop visits and FTAI sells module exchanges, so the figure bounds the market without sizing the one this company actually sells into.
- Safran's own pages refuse every non-browser client, so the number is read from trade-press coverage of the call rather than from the company's transcript.
- The coverage carrying it pairs the forecast with a broker's estimate that retirements ran near 1% of the fleet in 2025 and with that broker's own doubt about the 2029 date; neither is Safran's statement and neither is relied on here.
- FTAI's Aerospace Products revenue includes whole-engine sales as well as module work, so revenue per module overstates the price of a module and the composition may fail for that reason rather than because the market is smaller than it looks.
- Management's stated share may be measured on value rather than on module count, in which case the implied industry throughput is not comparable to a module count at all.
Who has signed
The power business has one order: $1.465B from an unnamed large cloud company, placed with FTAI's joint venture, for deliveries through November 2027. The other firm commitment is FTAI's own partnership, which bought 60 of its aircraft for about $700M and must take their replacement engines from FTAI.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- No Form 8-K was filed for it: the only 8-K between 29 May and 31 August 2026 is the June-quarter results release, so the only account of the terms is the company's own press release.
- The counterparty is not named, so its credit cannot be checked, and the contracting party is the joint venture rather than FTAI.
- No Mod-1 has ever been delivered to a customer; the first was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78).
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 45% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, about the same pace as the 45% in the year to Dec 2025.
It keeps 16% of sales as profit, down from 21% in the year to Dec 2023.
It keeps 39¢ of each sales dollar after making what it sells, and spends 0¢ of it on admin, its biggest running cost.
Shareholders' money earned 174% a year, up from −12% in the year to Dec 2021.
It used $480M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $337M it holds lasts about 0.7 years at that pace.
It owes $3.12B more than the cash it holds, and its operations bring in no cash to repay it.
The share count rose 16% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 0.8% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $336M | $708M | $1.17B | $1.73B | $2.51B | $3.11B |
| Sales growth | +13% | +111% | +65% | +48% | +45% | +45% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 96% | 65% | 57% | 52% | 46% | 39% |
| Net margin | −39% | −30% | 21% | 0.5% | 20% | 16% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| General and admin | 4.0% | 2.0% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.3% |
| Pay in shares | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Capital spending | 47% | 20% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 1.1% | 1.3% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$22.0M | −$20.7M | $129M | −$188M | −$311M | −$440M |
| Free cash flow | −$179M | −$165M | $123M | −$197M | −$338M | −$480M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $138M | $33.6M | $90.8M | $115M | $300M | $337M |
| Debt | $2.50B | $2.18B | $2.52B | $3.44B | $3.45B | $3.45B |
| Net cash | −$2.36B | −$2.14B | −$2.43B | −$3.33B | −$3.15B | −$3.12B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | 89.9M | 99.4M | 100M | 102M | 104M | 104M |
What growth costs
Each extra dollar of sales costs FTAI more to make than the last. Overheads stay small, but selling rebuilt engine parts costs far more than renting out planes, so profit has stood still while sales grew. Growth also ties up cash in engines bought to rebuild.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The rise in cost of sales is partly mix: lease and maintenance revenue, which carry almost no cost of sales, fell from 34% of revenue in 2023 to under 6% in the June 2026 quarter as aircraft went to the 2025 Partnership (C68, C17).
- The numbers card's general and administrative line is the filer's narrow GeneralAndAdministrativeExpense tag ($9.5M in 2025); the income statement's separate Operating expenses line ($152.5M), which carries pay, is the overhead that matters and is used here as well.
- Adjusted EBITDA is management's own definition and includes a pro-rata share of unconsolidated entities, so the trailing figure mixes consolidated and equity-accounted profit.
- The flatness is by design rather than by failure: leasing earnings were deliberately sold into third-party partnerships, and management argues the fee stream replacing them arrives from the December quarter.
- Net income attributable to shareholders was flat too over the same span, which the same explanation covers, so the finding does not separate a mix shift from a deterioration on its own.
The last report (29 Jul)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
In the quarter ended September 30, 2026 the engine business sold $910.0M and earned $282.4M before interest, tax and wear, a 31% margin against 28.5% in June. It rebuilt 311 engine sections. Across the whole company profit of the same kind rose 17.1% to $348.3M, because the leasing business earned less.
The year's $1,050M engine goal now needs $295.3M in December's quarter, 4.6% more than September's. The power turbine passed its tests, but its first delivery is now next year, not this one. Customer concentration and cash use are in the quarterly filing, which was not yet out.
What it did to the thesisThe margin held where we said it needed to, which supports the engine business. The turbine moved later and the goal needs a bigger final quarter, so the price still leans on a promise. The view stays Neutral.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $1.13 against $1.36 expected; $1.13 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Management raised the module target to 1,200 and capacity to 3,000 in the same release, so the volume the step-up needs is the volume it says it is building.
- Segment EBITDA rose 51% year on year in the June quarter; a 16% sequential step from that quarter is smaller than the 12% step from March to June.
- The guide is a segment figure before Corporate & Other, so hitting it says nothing about group adjusted EBITDA, which is the flat line the thesis rests on.
- 2026-10-29editedre-struck on the Q3 2026 release: $754.7M earned in nine months, $295.3M needed in the fourth quarter (C74)
What management did with the money
On 27 October the board doubled the buyback to $1.0B and FTAI said it will buy $500.0M of shares through a bank in the fourth quarter. It held $385.6M of cash at September, and the announcement does not say how the purchase is paid for.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 10 purchases and 7 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Operating activities consumed cash in each of the last six reported quarters and cash was $385.6 million at 30 September against $500.0 million to be bought, so the purchase must be funded from borrowing, asset sales or the capital-call line, none of which the release names.
- An accelerated purchase is a bank-funded advance settled over the fourth quarter, so announcing it does not show the business generated the cash.
- Cash on the balance sheet was $337.2 million at 30 June 2026 against $500 million authorised, and operating activities have consumed cash in six consecutive quarters, so the stated funding source does not yet exist in the amount authorised.
- Nothing obliges the company to buy a single share: the authorisation runs three years and may be suspended without notice, so it is a statement of intent rather than a return of capital.
- The same balance sheet carries $3.5 billion of senior notes, a $1.0 billion maturity in May 2028 and an equity co-investment into the 2026 vehicle that management says is bridged by a capital-call facility.
- 2026-10-29editedextended with the 27 October doubling of the authorisation and the accelerated repurchase
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price pays for management's 2027 profit target being met. On what FTAI earns today it is expensive, and two parts of that target are unproven or already cut.
The shares fell 21.5% between late June and the results with no stated reason, and another 8.2% in the week to 25 September with none either. Over six months the price paid for each dollar of sales fell 41.1% while sales per share rose 23.9%, so the fall was the price, not the business.
The September-quarter results came on 29 October: the engine business earned $282.4M, just under the $289M a quarter the goal needed, so December's quarter must earn $295.3M. Next is the quarterly filing, for the two biggest customers' share and the cash behind the buyback.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Revenue per share is the wrong numerator for this business: half the revenue growth arrived with a five-point margin concession, so a falling sales multiple partly records a falling margin rather than a cheaper stock.
- The target series is a vendor aggregation - two targets in the last month against sixteen in the year - so the recent average is two analysts' opinion.
- A panel that has read 100% positive for a year cannot register a change of view except by leaving, and the count has not moved either, so the series says nothing about whether the objection behind the slide was shared.
- 2026-09-27editedre-struck at the 25 September 2026 close in the 27 September review; the shares fell 8.2% in the week with no filing and no stated cause; the last month's target average now rests on one target rather than two
- Management raised the module target to 1,200 and capacity to 3,000 in the same release, so the volume the step-up needs is the volume it says it is building.
- Segment EBITDA rose 51% year on year in the June quarter; a 16% sequential step from that quarter is smaller than the 12% step from March to June.
- The guide is a segment figure before Corporate & Other, so hitting it says nothing about group adjusted EBITDA, which is the flat line the thesis rests on.
- 2026-10-29editedre-struck on the Q3 2026 release: $754.7M earned in nine months, $295.3M needed in the fourth quarter (C74)
How we read the multiple
A buyer pays about 25 times last year's operating profit, what is left from sales after running costs, and that profit has not grown. Against the $2.3B of 2027 profit, before interest, tax and wear on assets, that management promises, the same price is about 9 times.
The promise leans on a power business that has not yet delivered a turbine, and a leasing business whose forecast was cut in July.
Against its own history. About where it has usually sat on each measure, so the market has not repriced FTAI against its own past. The open question is whether the promised growth arrives.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Enterprise value adds gross debt to market value, and the $337.2 million of cash netted against it is working cash in a business that has consumed cash in operations for six straight quarters - and is now also the cash named to fund a $500 million buyback.
- The 2027 guidance is a sum of segment figures before Corporate & Other, interest and depreciation, so ten times it is not a company multiple and understates what is being paid.
- Trailing earnings carry $245.1 million of first-half gains the cash flow reverses out, so the earnings multiple is struck on a profit whose composition is unusual.
- The operating-profit line is the vendor's construction, because the filer presents no operating income subtotal; the multiple on it cannot be reconciled to a filed figure.
- 2026-09-27editedre-struck at the 25 September 2026 close in the 27 September review; the shares fell 8.2% in the week with no filing and no stated cause
- It is a sum of segment figures: it excludes Corporate & Other, which was negative $46.5 million in the June quarter alone, and it excludes about $265 million a year of interest and preferred dividends and about $268 million of depreciation and amortisation.
- It requires roughly a doubling of trailing adjusted EBITDA in eighteen months, of which $450 million comes from a product that has never been delivered.
- The same management raised 2026 guidance in February and took the raise back in July.
- The February 2026 results release stated planned production of 100 units in 2027, so the number underlying the guidance has moved down while the headline production target has not.
- Management would not disclose the per-megawatt economics on the call, calling them commercially sensitive, so the range cannot be checked against a unit price.
- No Mod-1 has been delivered; the first delivery was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78) and the business is starting from zero.
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of operating profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of operating profit |
|---|---|---|
| SARO | StandardAero | 16.5× |
| FTAI | FTAI Aviation | 25.3× |
| ASLE | AerSale | 234.0× |
| WLFC | Willis Lease Finance held out | not priced |
The middle of the other 2 is 125.2. FTAI Aviation Ltd. is 2nd cheapest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Dearer than the larger established engine shop and far cheaper than the smaller one. With only two rivals this far apart, the comparison says little about the price.
Also checked and set aside: AerCap Holdings (a substitute, not the same product); AAR (a substitute, not the same product).
The bet: what it pays if it works
This bet is on one business only: FTAI Power, the turbines made from old jet engines. Engine repair and aircraft leasing are counted separately, at what a listed engine-repair rival fetches, and if they hit their 2027 targets they pay for all of today's price on their own.
So today's price asks nothing of Power. If Power hits management's own target the company is worth a little more than today, which makes it an expensive bet; if Power delivers nothing, little is lost.
| FTAI Power EBITDA in two to three years | Mod-1 units delivered in a year needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $450.00M (the big win) | about 60 at 100% kept | 1.6× |
| $750.00M | about 100 at 100% kept | 1.8× |
| $900.00M (market forecast) | about 120 at 100% kept | 2.0× |
Private forecasts put US on-site gas for data centres near 20 GW a year by 2029; at 15% FTAI ships 120 Mod-1 units, a fifth above its stated capacity, earning about $900 million. On that forecast, $900.00M pays 2.0× from today's value: an Expensive bet on the market case. FTAI Power would be worth about $16.20B, and the price pays nothing for it.
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $929.69M of FTAI Power EBITDA (about 124 Mod-1 units delivered in a year); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $4.14B of FTAI Power EBITDA (about 552 Mod-1 units delivered in a year), at the same multiple.
Each row is FTAI Power alone, plus the rest of the company (Aerospace Products and Aviation Leasing) counted at about $21.83B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Five-year supply agreement and a $1.465 billion first order signed with a cloud provider
- Done Mod-1 unit through testing, with launch customers secured
- In progress First Mod-1 unit delivered to an end customer due 2026-12
- Not started Every batch of the first order delivered due 2027-11
- Not started 2027 Power EBITDA of at least $450 million reported due 2028-02
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- It is a sum of segment figures: it excludes Corporate & Other, which was negative $46.5 million in the June quarter alone, and it excludes about $265 million a year of interest and preferred dividends and about $268 million of depreciation and amortisation.
- It requires roughly a doubling of trailing adjusted EBITDA in eighteen months, of which $450 million comes from a product that has never been delivered.
- The same management raised 2026 guidance in February and took the raise back in July.
- The February 2026 results release stated planned production of 100 units in 2027, so the number underlying the guidance has moved down while the headline production target has not.
- Management would not disclose the per-megawatt economics on the call, calling them commercially sensitive, so the range cannot be checked against a unit price.
- No Mod-1 has been delivered; the first delivery was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78) and the business is starting from zero.
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
- The transcript itself was unreachable, so the source is a model's reading of a summary article, and one figure in the same summary - a $6 billion raise by the first Strategic Capital vehicle - contradicts the 10-K's $2.0 billion equity fundraise.
- The share figure is struck on a different denominator from the 14% of CFM56 maintenance stated on the June call - CFM56 and V2500 shop visits together - so the two cannot be compared.
- At $7 million to $8 million a unit the $450 million 2027 Power guide assumes 56 to 64 units delivered and accepted in a year the business has never delivered one.
- 2026-10-29editedexpiry rolled: the 29 October release reaffirmed 2026 and 2027 adjusted EBITDA guidance across all business lines
- No Form 8-K was filed for it: the only 8-K between 29 May and 31 August 2026 is the June-quarter results release, so the only account of the terms is the company's own press release.
- The counterparty is not named, so its credit cannot be checked, and the contracting party is the joint venture rather than FTAI.
- No Mod-1 has ever been delivered to a customer; the first was targeted for the fourth quarter of 2026 when this was written, and the 29 October 2026 release says first deliveries come next year (C78).
- 2026-10-29editedcounter-evidence updated: the Q3 2026 release moves the first Mod-1 delivery from the fourth quarter of 2026 to 2027 (C78)
Where we disagree with the market
An engine-maintenance compounder taking share in a market short of capacity, and 2027's doubling is credible.
The engine business is real. The two-thirds of the company around it is consuming what that business earns.
All 18 analysts rate the shares a buy, and none has asked why group profit is flat while revenue rose 45.3%. That is arithmetic on the company's own figures.
What would prove us wrong is group profit turning up sharply in the coming quarters once the first turbine ships, which the company now puts in 2027.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- 2026-09-27editedre-struck at the 25 September 2026 close in the 27 September review; the shares fell 8.2% in the week with no filing and no stated cause; the 2028 estimate eased from $18.34 and short interest fell 10.2% at the newer settlement
- Adjusted EBITDA is management's own definition and includes a pro-rata share of unconsolidated entities, so the trailing figure mixes consolidated and equity-accounted profit.
- The flatness is by design rather than by failure: leasing earnings were deliberately sold into third-party partnerships, and management argues the fee stream replacing them arrives from the December quarter.
- Net income attributable to shareholders was flat too over the same span, which the same explanation covers, so the finding does not separate a mix shift from a deterioration on its own.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Heavy debt, thin equity. $3.45B of long-term debt against $404.0M of shareholders' equity, with $1.0B due in May 2028.
- Profit that will not repeat. 93% of first-half profit came from asset sales, sales to the partnership and insurance payouts on planes stuck in Russia.
- Power still on paper. The $1.465B order was never filed as a material event, and no turbine has been delivered.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- None of the three figures is in a filing: the 10-Q debt note gives gross borrowings and no covenant leverage calculation, and the release carries no free-cash-flow reconciliation at all.
- Adjusted free cash flow is undefined here and is not a GAAP measure; operating cash flow, which is, was negative $265.3 million in the same half.
- The free-cash-flow guide was cut in the same release that cut leasing EBITDA, so the two moved together rather than one offsetting the other.
- Selling rebuilt engines is FTAI's business, so a gain on sale is operating profit by nature rather than a one-off; the same reconciliation removed a larger $325.9 million in the first half of 2025.
- The insurance recoveries are genuinely finite - they settle claims on aircraft and engines stranded in Russia - but they are $49.5 million of the $245.1 million, not the bulk of it.
- FTAI itself treats only the partnership sales as outside ordinary activities, accounting for them under ASC 610-20 as non-recurring.
What we still do not know
- Whether two customers at half the engine revenue is a passing order or how the business now works.
- Whether a power turbine run all year at a data centre needs overhauls 4 to 6 times sooner than one used only at peak times.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- The 10-Q says "30% and 20% of its revenue" where the 10-K said "of total revenue"; if the 10-Q denominator is segment rather than company revenue the step-up is smaller than it reads.
- An engine exchange is lumpy: a single large airline programme can land several engines in one quarter, so a quarter-end concentration is not necessarily a run rate. The six-month figures are lower, at 23%, 21% and 13% across three customers.
- Management says Strategic Capital, FTAI's own vehicle, should be about 20% of Aerospace Products revenue, which may be one of the two names and is a related party rather than an external dependency.
- Maintenance intervals are not set by hours alone: starts, firing temperature, load and site conditions all move them, and a unit run at steady base load is treated more gently per hour than one cycled daily.
- FTAI has published no Mod-1 maintenance interval, overhaul cost or contribution margin, so the frequency cannot be turned into either a cost to the customer or a revenue to FTAI.
- It runs both ways and the company says so: management describes maintenance by exchange, swapping a turbine in under 48 hours, which makes frequent overhauls its own aftermarket rather than only the customer's problem.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe 2027 guide stops being a promise
It needs all of:
- ○The engine business keeps a margin of at least 30% for four quarters running, with its sales still growing above 20% a year.checked at the next results, due by 9 Nov
- ○The first power turbine is delivered to a customer, turning the $1.465B order into revenue.watched as it happens
- ○The price falls to about 15 times operating profit, whether through the share price or through the 2027 profit arriving.about ≈$99.09 today, 37% below the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe concentration breaks the other way
It needs any of:
- ○One of the two biggest engine customers stops buying, and engine-business sales fall from one quarter to the next.checked at the next results, due by 9 Nov
- ○Debt, net of cash, stays above 3.0 times a year's profit for two quarters, with $1.0B due in May 2028 not refinanced.checked at the next results, due by 9 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- The engine business's margin settles below 25% for two quarters running.
- Engine-business sales growth falls below 20% a year for two quarters running.
What is coming
- 9 November 2026 Q3 2026 Form 10-Q: The top-two customer share, operating cash flow, net leverage, and how the $500M accelerated repurchase is paid for.
Every dated event ahead
- 9 November 2026 Q3 2026 Form 10-Q: The top-two customer share, operating cash flow, net leverage, and how the $500M accelerated repurchase is paid for.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the FY2026 10-K: Whether the $1.05B 2026 Aerospace Products guide was met and the $2.3B 2027 bridge kept, and how much of the buyback was spent against negative operating cash.
- November 2027 Last batch of the $1.465B J&F order due: Whether the joint venture's first order is delivered on schedule without hitting the 10% performance adjustments.
- December 2027 First Mod-1 power turbine delivered: Whether the first unit ships in 2027, as the October release now says rather than late 2026, and enough units follow to reach the $450M floor.
- May 2028 First senior notes mature: Whether $1.0B is refinanced on Ba1 terms or repaid from cash the business has yet to generate.
Since we wrote this
- 29 OctEarningsEngine margin held at 31%; first power turbine slips to 2027Aerospace Products earned $282.4M at a 31% margin and the guide was reaffirmed, but the first Mod-1 delivery moved into 2027 and a $500M accelerated buyback was announced.
- 5 OctThesis reviewPilot: the bet now names what it ridesThe owner asked that each bet name the macro trend behind it, after BWXT's bet was missing its chief executive's case for nuclear over gas.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 29 SepNewsFTAI buys 27 WestJet 737-700s, no price given; case unchanged. View heldFTAI bought 27 Boeing 737-700 aircraft from WestJet.
- 27 SepThesis reviewA five-year shop deal in Asia, and an 8% fall. View heldGMF AeroAsia guaranteed FTAI five years of engine shop capacity, with no volume disclosed. The shares fell 8.2% in a week on no stated cause, to about 25 times operating profit.
- 20 SepThesis reviewThe engine's maker dates its decline to 2029. View heldAn outside investor's thesis prompted a second look. The engine market grows through 2028 on its maker's forecast, and the power business now has two named rivals. Neither touches the flat group profit.
- 19 SepThesis reviewA $500M buyback against $337M of cash. View heldThe buyback is a promise against cash the company does not yet hold. The margin, the first turbine and the two customers all resolve at the October results.
- 31 AugThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionThe engine business compounds, but group profit over twelve months had not moved while revenue grew 45%, a gap no results headline or analyst question had named.
Also checked 3 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 39
Sources - 39
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-27Item 1 business description and competitor classes, the shop footprint and PMA joint venture, the Strategic Capital terms, fleet counts including the Russia assets, and FY2025 customer concentrationbacksC01C02C07C17C28C31C40C68C69C73
- S02primarycompany filing2026-07-31the cash flow statement and its presentation note, the customer concentration disclosure, the debt maturity table, the ASC 610-20 treatment of partnership sales and the Russia insurance recoveriesbacksC01C02C07C17C28C29C30C31C32C33C35C68C69C73
- S03primarycompany filing2026-07-29the quarter's statements, the adjusted EBITDA reconciliations for the group and for Aerospace Products, the leasing guidance cut and the 2027 segment guidancebacksC21C23C24C25C35C47
- S04primarytranscript2026-07-30FTAI Aviation Q2 2026 earnings call transcriptmodule output and market share, the 30% margin guide and the mix arithmetic behind it, the Power range and unit assumption, the Strategic Capital share of segment revenue; and twenty analyst turns pressing on margin, the leasing cut and Power accounting
Our market share grew from 12% to 14% this quarter as gains from our production capabilities, parts procurement strategies and overall maintained repair and exchange, MRE, customer adoption continued. ... bringing our total physical CFM56 module production capacity to 3,000 modules per year, which is enough to achieve our 25% market share objective and produce 100 Mod-1s per annum. ... we refurbished 296 CFM56 modules this quarter across our 4 facilities, an increase of 61% compared to Q2 2025. ... we expect margins to be around 30%. ... the $450 million does not assume 100 units. It's materially less than the 100 assumption. ... there are approximately 300 aircraft, so that's 600 engines in the first vehicle. ... Historically we have communicated that the SCI will be about 20% of Aerospace Products revenue.
backsC03C08C18C23C26C27C34C43 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-25FY2025 adjusted EBITDA of $1,190.9 million, Aerospace Products at $671.3 million, the original 2026 guidance raise to $1.625 billion and the 100-unit 2027 Power production planbacksC24C47
- S06primarycompany release2026-07-22the counterparty description, the five-year master agreement, the payment structure and the 10% cap on downward performance adjustments
J&F Power Systems LLC ("J&F"), FTAI's joint venture with Jereh Group ... has entered into a master gas turbine generator set supply agreement (the "Master Agreement") with a leading international cloud service provider (the "Customer") and signed an initial purchase order under the Master Agreement valued at $1.465 billion (the "Order"). ... J&F will supply Mod-1 mobile gas turbine generator sets supporting the Customer's power infrastructure buildout, with equipment to be delivered in batches through November 2027. The five-year Master Agreement allows the Customer to issue additional purchase orders to expand the relationship. Payments will be made on a milestone basis, beginning with an advance payment at signing ... downward adjustments, capped at 10% of the corresponding equipment's value for lower power output.
backsC16 - S07primarycompany filing2026-01-29GE Aerospace FY2025 Form 10-K GE Aerospacethe installed base, services revenue and its growth attribution, the statement that LEAP will overtake the mature CFM56, the $1 billion MRO capacity investment, and third-party MRO shops named as both customers and key competitorsbacksC10C11C14C19
- S08primarycompany filing2026-02-26StandardAero FY2025 Form 10-K StandardAeroa competitor naming the CFM56 platform as one it is expanding aftermarket services on, and its own description of what it sellsbacksC09C40
- S09primaryregulator2026-01-0114 CFR Part 21 Subpart K - Parts Manufacturer Approvals US Federal Aviation Administrationwhat a Parts Manufacturer Approval actually costs an applicant, from the regulator rather than from the company
Test reports and computations necessary to show that the design of the article meets the airworthiness requirements of this subchapter.
backsC05 - S10primarygovernment data2026-01-13EIA press release - January 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook US Energy Information Administrationthe measured rate behind the demand FTAI Power is being pointed at
EIA expects U.S. electricity use to grow by 1% this year and 3% in 2027. This increase would mark the first time since 2007 that power demand has risen for four years in a row and the strongest four-year growth period since 2000.
backsC20 - S11primarycompany release2025-10-30how rare a hot-section PMA is on this platform, and a CFM56-5B/7B in-service count of over 20,000 engines, from a party outside FTAI
has received Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) for its CFM56-5B/7B High Pressure Turbine (HPT) Blade. ... Chromalloy's HPT Blade PMA is now the only aftermarket alternative to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) manufactured new part. ... The CFM56-5B/7B platform has over 20,000 engines in service
backsC06C13 - S12primaryvendor data2026-09-27Research pack, frozen at content/FTAI/research-pack.jsonprice, enterprise value, the analyst panel and its monthly history, the price-target drift, the price-move decomposition, the earnings-surprise history, FINRA short interest, the Form 4 summary and insider base rate, the news reaction to the buyback, the filed competitor cohort and the theme co-movementbacksC37C38C44C46C47C50
- S13primarycompany filing2026-03-10Willis Lease Finance FY2025 Form 10-K Willis Lease Financea listed engine lessor and servicer's own description of the model, and the absence of any CFM56 reference in itbacksC12C40
- S14primarycompany filing2026-03-10AerSale FY2025 Form 10-K AerSalea listed mid-life flight equipment trader's own description of buying, leasing, selling and tearing down aircraft and engines for used serviceable materialbacksC40
- S15primarycompany filing2026-08-31the absence of any 8-K for the $1.465 billion order, and the complete list of what was filed in the windowbacksC39
- S16primarycompany filing2026-05-05the sale sizes, the transaction codes and the weighted-average price range, read from the form rather than from the pack's transcriptionbacksC44
- S17primarycompany release2026-09-15the authorisation amount, its end date, the stated funding source, the absence of any obligation and of any executive statement
The Company expects to fund repurchases under the Share Repurchase Program using cash on its balance sheet.
backsC45 - S18primarycompany filing2026-09-19the absence of any 8-K for the repurchase authorisation, and the list of what was filed since the June 10-Q: Forms 4 and Schedules 13G onlybacksC45
- S19primarycompany filing2026-08-07StandardAero Q2 2026 Form 10-Q StandardAerothe CFM56 expansion named in its annual report now carried as a Dallas, Texas programme with industrialisation costs and a margin dragbacksC09
- S20primarycompany filing2026-02-11Delta Air Lines FY2025 Form 10-K Delta Air Linesan airline's own account of performing engine maintenance in-house and selling it to other airlines - the substitute FTAI's competition section never names
our MRO operation, known as Delta TechOps, provides engine, component, airframe and other maintenance services to aviation and airline customers from around the world
backsC48 - S21primarycompany filing2025-01-21the audit committee review announced in response to the 15 January 2025 short report, the possible delay to the annual report, and the CEO's filed answer on depreciation and on module against whole-engine salesbacksC49
- S22primarycompany filing2025-02-20the finding by independent legal and forensic accounting advisors that the short-seller allegations were without meritbacksC49
- S23primaryvendor data2026-09-19FMP historical daily prices, FTAI, 1 October 2024 to 25 September 2026the closing prices and session moves behind the repricing episodes: the January 2025 falls, the February 2026 high and the June to September 2026 slidebacksC49C50
- S24secondarynews2026-09-16a summary of management's remarks at the 16 September 2026 conference, read through an agent fetch because the transcript itself returns HTTP 403 to every client
$4.7 billion in revenue and $1.4 billion in EBITDA
backsC51 - S25secondarynews2026-02-13Leeham News - Safran hails 'outstanding' 2025; prepares for Airbus ramp-up Leeham News and Analysisthe CFM56 shop-visit count Safran's own site refuses to serve, from its chief executive on the FY2025 results call, with the retirement rate behind it and the 2029 decline date
around 2,300-2,400 shop visits per year from 2025 to 2028, more than 750 additional shop visits over the period than previously forecast ... The 750 additional shop visits referenced represents the comparison to forecasts made at the 2024 Capital Markets Day ... shop visits were expected to start declining from 2029
backsC53 - S26primarycompany release2026-06-08platform-level fleet-age and shop-visit statistics that appear in no filing, from the engine maker's quarterly investor recap
Average fleet age of less than 15 years, with 80% of our shop visits over the next few years from engines less than 20 years of age. ... Most retirements happen after 20 years, limiting the risk if retirements do increase, which is not the current trend or expectation.
backsC54 - S27primarygovernment data2026-03-01FAA Aerospace Forecast, Fiscal Years 2026-2046 US Federal Aviation Administrationa government measurement of the delivery shortfall behind the fleet extension this thesis rides, and the regulator's own expectation of how long it runs
in 2019 Boeing and Airbus delivered a combined 403 commercial widebody aircraft while in 2025, that number was just 233. As airframers are holding sizable order books, the delivery delays will take time to unwind, cascading out through the end of the decade. Besides constraining expansion plans of carriers, these delays will impact profitability as they hold on to older, less efficient aircraft
backsC55 - S28primarycompany filing2026-01-29GE Vernova FY2025 Form 10-K GE Vernovathe incumbent aeroderivative turbine maker's own description of the product, the data-centre demand behind it and the order book it is carryingbacksC57
- S29primarycompany filing2026-02-09Bloom Energy FY2025 Form 10-K Bloom Energya non-combustion competitor's own framing of the customer problem as time to power, and the customers it says it servesbacksC58
- S30primarycompany release2026-09-23GMF AeroAsia and FTAI press release - GMF and FTAI Strengthen Collaboration in Engine Maintenance Business Across Asia-Pacific PT Garuda Maintenance Facility Aero Asia Tbkthe counterparty, the engine types, the five-year capacity guarantee and the stated intent to extend to modules, piece parts and LEAP; no volume, price or value. No Form 8-K carries it; GlobeNewswire closes the connection to scripts, so it was read through an agent fetch and matched against AviTrader's independent account of 25 September
The collaboration will initially cover CFM56-5B and CFM56-7B engines and GTCP131-9 series APUs, with guaranteed capacity for FTAI over the next five years.
backsC59 - S31primarycompany release2026-07-28Safran's own first-half civil spare-parts growth, attributed to CFM56, and the full-year spare-parts outlook raised to up mid-twenties in dollars from mid-teens. safran-group.com still refuses scripts; WebDisclosure is the regulated-information distributor carrying Safran's release verbatim
Civil engine aftermarket activities outperformed expectations, with spare parts sales for civil engines rising by 27.9% (in USD) over the period. This performance was largely driven by CFM56, which benefited from a favorable workscope mix and comparison base.
backsC60 - S32primarygovernment data2024-12-20US Department of Energy press release - DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers (LBNL 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report) US Department of Energy / Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratorythe government laboratory's range for US data-centre electricity use in 2028, the independent bound on how much new load there is to power at all; read through ir_fetch
The report finds that data centers consumed about 4.4% of total U.S. electricity in 2023 and are expected to consume approximately 6.7 to 12% of total U.S. electricity by 2028. The report indicates that total data center electricity usage climbed from 58 TWh in 2014 to 176 TWh in 2023 and estimates an increase between 325 to 580 TWh by 2028.
backsC61 - S33primaryindustry data2026-06-25SemiAnalysis - US Grid Constraints: Towards 40GW+ of Behind-The-Meter Datacenter by 2028? SemiAnalysisan independent research firm's forecast of US data-centre additions (+21GW in 2026 to +84GW by 2030), the behind-the-meter share from 2028 and a BTM equipment market above 50GW a year by 2029, plus gas-turbine lead times of three to four years; the free preview of a paid report, read through ir_fetch
Our research suggests that BTM will power well over half of new US datacenters in 2028+ , and the Total Addressable Market (TAM) for DC BTM equipment to cross 50GW/ year by 2029.
backsC62 - S34secondaryanalyst2026-05-14RBC Capital Markets insight - Natural gas powers the data center boom RBC Capital Marketsa bank's tally, from Bloomberg and company reports, of announced, ordered and under-construction behind-the-meter gas capacity for US data centres, and of global turbine orders (about 100GW by end-2025) against 60-70GW a year of manufacturing capacity; read through ir_fetch
As of 2026, data center developers have announced approximately 101 gigawatts of behind-the-meter natural gas generation capacity in the United States. While some of these projects may be speculative, over 57 gigawatts have already publicly disclosed equipment orders, and approximately 7 gigawatts are already under construction.
backsC63 - S35primarycompany filing2026-07-22the incumbent turbine maker's gas equipment backlog and slot reservations, its annual turbine output now and in 2028, and the aeroderivative units it booked in the quarterbacksC64
- S36primarycompany release2026-04-16PROENERGY press release - PROENERGY To Deliver Major Generating Equipment To Power Crusoe AI Factories PROENERGY Servicesa direct rival's order: repurposed aero-engine turbine sets sold to a data-centre developer, with unit size and count; read through ir_fetch
SEDALIA, MO, April 16, 2026 - PROENERGY announced today a contract to deliver a manufactured equipment solution for Crusoe, a vertically integrated AI infrastructure provider. The solution features 13 PE6000 aeroderivative gas turbine generator sets, each capable of generating 50 MW.
backsC65 - S37primarytranscript2026-02-26FTAI Aviation Q4 2025 earnings call transcriptthe Mod-1's stated output per unit, efficiency and heat rate, the 100-unit 2027 production target and the planned expansions beyond it; read through transcript_fetch (FMP)
With FTAI Power, we're adapting the world's largest and most reliable engine platform to deliver a 25-megawatt unit that offers grid operators greater flexibility and faster deployment. ... We continue to target 100 units of production in 2027. ... We are estimating a 25-megawatt output. So it puts us in a nice size range with a 35% to 40% efficiency and a 9,000 heat rate.
backsC66 - S38primarycompany filing2026-04-15executive officers and their start dates, beneficial ownership as of 1 April 2026, the 2025 annual incentive plan's metric, goals and payouts, the long-term award design, and the directors' and officers' personal investments in the 2025 PartnershipbacksC70C71C72
- S39primarycompany filing2026-10-29Q3 2026 segment revenue and adjusted EBITDA, module output, group adjusted EBITDA and net income, the $500 million accelerated repurchase and doubled authorisation, the 30 September balance sheet, and the Mod-1 test results and delivery timingbacksC45C74C75C76C77C78