Dave
A phone app that lends people up to $500 of their next pay for about 11 days, for a flat 5% fee.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↓
Nine quarters above 30%, but it narrows to one fee and part of it is a price rise rather than new demand.
Business quality3/4 →
Real advantage in lending to members who keep their pay elsewhere, but the method is published and no cycle has tested it.
Financial position3/4 →
$254.4M of cash against $268.1M of debt maturing mostly in 2031, but the Coastal collateral account is an undated claim on it.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Guidance raised twice this year and six beats in eight prints, on a record too short for more and one softened definition.
Per share capture3/4 →
Share count down 6.0%, but the half that cut it also borrowed in convertible notes now above their conversion price.
Potential2/4 →
Nothing is contracted and four things must work: the fee, the cap removal, larger advances and Flex.
Risk profile2/4 →
A single appeal ruling on the fee that is 84.8% of revenue resolves in one step, inside the horizon.
Valuation3/4 ↓
$20 per dollar of operating profit, down from $23 on a fall with no new print, still needs the fee rise to deliver the rest.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Everything central is from filings, but how the litigation bears on the fee is our inference, not a verified fact.
The Verdict
We rate Dave neutral. Its app lends people small sums until payday for a flat fee, and it works: sales are growing fast and fewer advances go unpaid. The business is mixed, because nearly all revenue is that one fee, and three courts are weighing whether it is really a loan that must disclose an annual interest rate. The price is ordinary for the business as it runs today, so it is fair, paying nothing extra for a higher fee and taking nothing off for the lawsuits. The view hinges on those legal cases, and on whether removing the fee cap lifts revenue per member.
The long caseBanks are dropping overdraft fees, sending people who run short before payday to apps that charge for an advance; Dave must keep winning them while courts weigh its fee.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
The rate rose sequentially from Q1, which management attributes to seasonal normalisation after the tax-refund season rather than to credit. An analyst on the call observed that the 121-day charge-off rate ticked up in the quarter; Beilman answered that the Q2 2026 estimate is better than Q2 2025 and that no V6 effect is in it yet. Both readings rest on the company's own measure, and the 28-day rate is disclosed in a release rather than tagged in a filing.
The trailing figure straddles the February 2025 fee change, so the denominator is part-year at the old monetisation and the multiple flatters the current run-rate. It also charges the full $16.4M quarterly stock compensation, which a buyer who treats that as non-cash would add back and reach a materially lower multiple. And the forward deduction is my estimate of three costs the company declines to reconcile, which is why it is stated as about $20 rather than a figure.
- 2026-09-28editedre-struck at the 2026-09-25 close of $324.88 (from $372.24) on the daily review's maintenance route -- drift -13.3%, past the 12% trigger. Trailing operating profit unchanged since no new quarter has printed; net debt assumed unchanged since the last 10-Q.
Annualising an 11-day fee is contested rather than neutral arithmetic: Dave's position is that a discretionary overdraft extended by a bank is not consumer credit carrying a rate at all, which is why the product is structured through a partner bank and why the June 2026 amendment left the receivable on the bank's books. A member who takes one advance pays $10.75, not 166% of anything, and nothing compels repeat use.
The rising analyst count means the falling share of positive ratings is coverage arriving rather than conviction leaving, which is the weaker reading of the same series. The target mark-up rests on two targets in the latest month against nineteen over the year, so the 19.6% is thinly populated. And this is one vendor's panel: its own two endpoints need not agree on who is in it.
The company
When money runs out a few days before payday, a bank charges an overdraft fee and a payday lender charges more. Dave's app advances up to $500 instead, with no interest, no late fee and no credit check. The average advance is $215, repaid in about 11 days, for a fee of about $10.75.
It needs only a linked bank account, not the member's pay. More than 19 million people have signed up, and Dave has advanced more than $22B.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Chime's own filing shows it reaching MyPay through employers as well as its own members, which is a third door rather than a narrower one. And the same answer that claims lower friction concedes the cost of it: members who keep their pay elsewhere never become primary, which is why Dave's card spend grew 7% while revenue grew 30%, and why the company has stopped pursuing direct deposit as a goal.
How it makes money
Almost all of it is that fee. Since February 2025 every advance carries a compulsory 5% charge with a $5 minimum, replacing optional tips, and it brought in $144.9M of the $170.8M earned in the June 2026 quarter. A paid membership added $15.1M. The debit card meant to broaden this has stalled, its fees flat at $6.0M.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| ExtraCash fees | 84.9% | A mandatory 5% overdraft service fee, minimum $5, on each short-term advance of up to $500, collected when the advance is repaid. |
| Subscriptions | 8.8% | A monthly membership fee charged to members for access to the app and its services. |
| Interchange | 3.5% | The card networks' share of each purchase made with the Dave debit card, net of network fees. |
| ATM, transfer and other fees | 2.8% | ATM charges, fees for funding and withdrawing money, card-programme volume support and small advertising and survey fees. |
Who runs it
Jason Wilk co-founded Dave and has run it since 2016; Kyle Beilman has run its finances since 2021 and its operations since 2025. Wilk owns about 12% of the shares but, through special ten-vote shares, just over half the votes, so outside holders cannot outvote him. His bonus and half his share awards pay on an adjusted profit that leaves out stock pay and legal costs; none pays on value per share. In September he sold part of his upside on some shares for cash.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The proxy states that Dave does not currently rely on any controlled-company exemption: the board keeps an independent majority and independent compensation and nominating committees. And control is not a large economic stake: Wilk's 11.8% is mostly the convertible Class V and options, while his directly held Class A was 21,824 shares.
The other half of the long-term award is time-vested restricted stock, so the share price does carry weight, and the variable-profit metric charges credit losses at the vintage's loss rate, which is closer to the economics than the GAAP provision. But no award is measured on return on capital, per-share value or total shareholder return, and both 2025 metrics were beaten at the maximum.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Every advance is a small experiment that answers within days: repaid on payday, or not. Dave's lending model has learned from more than 180 million of them. A better model approves more people at the same losses, which produces more advances to learn from.
The method is not secret: a study found it works for other lenders too. What Dave owns is the pile of answers, and it shows: a record 951,000 new members in the June quarter at an unchanged $19 each, while late payments fell.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Every figure here is the company's, and no outside party measures model quality (C32). The feature count is an input rather than a result, and Beilman said explicitly that V6 is built to expand gross profit at the current loss rate rather than to lower losses - so the model upgrade is being spent on larger advances, not on better credit. The $22B of cumulative advances is also spread over eight years and 14 million users, which is about 1,570 advances for every million dollars.
Advertising and activation spend rose 32% year on year and 43% sequentially to $20.4M, so member growth matched spend growth rather than outran it - Beilman made that incrementality point himself. The $19 cost and the payback period are management-computed and appear in no filed statement, and Beilman said newer members start at lower revenue per user, so the mix effect of accelerating acquisition works against reported revenue per user in the near term.
The rate rose sequentially from Q1, which management attributes to seasonal normalisation after the tax-refund season rather than to credit. An analyst on the call observed that the 121-day charge-off rate ticked up in the quarter; Beilman answered that the Q2 2026 estimate is better than Q2 2025 and that no V6 effect is in it yet. Both readings rest on the company's own measure, and the 28-day rate is disclosed in a release rather than tagged in a filing.
The threat
Chime, the only other listed company selling the same thing, offers advances inside accounts that already receive the member's wages, and through employers. The simplest substitute is family: 10% of adults would borrow from them to meet a $400 bill, against 2% using any advance. Dave's answer is bigger advances, not a lower fee.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The 10-K describes the product as up to $500 throughout and the 10-Q repeats it, so no filing yet supports a higher ceiling. Beilman also conceded on the same call that new-user origination sizes are smaller and new-user loss rates higher than the portfolio average, which works against the average advance rising as fast as the limit while acquisition is being accelerated.
The rivals: CHYM, CHYM, GEN, UPBD, and 2 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| CHYM | Chime Financial (MyPay and SpotMe)Priced against it: Same product | On sale | Same product |
| Chime Enterprise and MyPay at Work | On sale | ||
| Private | Varo Bank (Varo Advance)Priced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| GEN · UPBD | Gen Digital (MoneyLion) and Upbound Group (Brigit)Priced against it: Same product | On sale | Same product |
| Not listed | The credit card, and the member's familyPriced against it: Not listed | On sale | Not listed |
How big it could get
How big this could get
About 102 million American adults could not cover a $400 emergency from cash. The money at stake is what banks charged in overdraft fees: $5.83B in 2023, down by more than half since 2019 as banks withdrew them. Dave's 2026 forecast of $730M in sales would be 12.5% of that pool.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Not covering an expense from cash is not the same as wanting a fee-bearing advance. The same survey says 15% would put it on a credit card and pay over time and 10% would borrow from friends or family, both of which are substitutes Dave does not price against, and 12% said they could not pay by any means, who are unlikely to be approvable. The share has been unchanged for three years, so this base is not itself growing.
The two are not the same market. Dave's fee is charged for liquidity taken deliberately, not for a payment that failed, and its members would otherwise use payday lenders, friends and family, or nothing at all - the regulator's own survey puts overdraft in the same 2% bucket as payday loans. The comparison bounds the displaced-fee interpretation of the business rather than the business, and the pool figure is a 2023 reading against 2026 guidance.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 49% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, slower than the 60% in the year to Dec 2025.
It keeps 35% of sales as profit, up from −19% in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +26% to +60% over the last 4 years.
Shareholders' money earned 105% a year, up from −14% in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 51% of sales into free cash, $327M over the last twelve months.
Free cash flow was 1.5 times net income.
The share count rose 221% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 5.8% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $153M | $205M | $259M | $347M | $554M | $644M |
| Sales growth | - | +34% | +26% | +34% | +60% | +49% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | −4.2% | - | - | - | - | - |
| Net margin | −3.4% | −63% | −19% | 17% | 35% | 35% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Pay in shares | 4.8% | 20% | 10% | 11% | 5.4% | 5.8% |
| Capital spending | 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$541K | −$44.9M | $33.8M | $125M | $290M | $327M |
| Free cash flow | −$912K | −$45.6M | $33.1M | $125M | $290M | $327M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $32.0M | $23.2M | $42.7M | $49.8M | $80.5M | $253M |
| Debt | $35.0M | $75.0M | $75.0M | $75.0M | $0 | - |
| Net cash | −$2.99M | −$51.8M | −$32.3M | −$25.2M | $80.5M | - |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | 4.27M | 11.6M | 11.9M | 13.8M | 14.5M | 13.7M |
What growth costs
Growing has made Dave far more profitable: staff and advertising costs rose much more slowly than sales, so each new dollar of revenue costs less to win. Credit losses and payment costs still rise with sales. This year the gain stalled, as pay in shares rose sharply.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The labels moved: 2022's line is advertising and marketing and later years' advertising and activation costs, so part of the fall may be classification. Dave tags no research and development line; technology spending sits inside compensation, capitalised software and a technology and infrastructure line. And 2026 runs the other way: stock pay rose 48.4% in the half and compensation's share edged up.
Beilman explains the step-up as performance awards granted in 2024, 2025 and 2026 whose 2026 targets became probable during the quarter, so the charge is a consequence of hitting targets rather than a widening of pay. Compensation excluding it grew only 7%. The comparison with the buyback is also a single quarter: across the half the buyback was $205.9M against $23.5M of stock compensation.
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
In the quarter ended June 30, 2026 sales grew 29.6% to $170.8M, and the forecast for the year has now been raised twice, to 31% to 33% growth. Advances 28 days late fell to 2.12% while lending grew 27%.
The warning sign is underneath. Revenue for each member grew 11%, against 36% in the December 2025 quarter, because the switch to a compulsory fee no longer flatters the comparison. From here growth has to come from bigger advances and fees.
Reported earnings of $0.49 a share compare with $4.12 on the company's adjusted basis, the gap mostly warrant revaluations and stock pay.
What it did to the thesisIt backed the business half of the case: sales and lending grew while late payments fell. It also showed the warning behind the Neutral view, since revenue per member slowed sharply once the fee switch stopped flattering the comparison. The legal question over the fee was left untouched.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $4.12 against $3.69 expected; $0.49 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The rate rose sequentially from Q1, which management attributes to seasonal normalisation after the tax-refund season rather than to credit. An analyst on the call observed that the 121-day charge-off rate ticked up in the quarter; Beilman answered that the Q2 2026 estimate is better than Q2 2025 and that no V6 effect is in it yet. Both readings rest on the company's own measure, and the 28-day rate is disclosed in a release rather than tagged in a filing.
The deceleration is arithmetic rather than decay: the February 2025 fee introduction lifted every quarter it was compared against a tip-based one, and by Q2 2026 both sides of the comparison carry the mandatory fee. Management also says accelerating acquisition shifts the mix toward newer members who start at lower revenue and more than double by their fourth month, so some of the slowdown is deliberate. But it is the reason the fee cap is being removed now rather than later, and the raised guidance leans on it.
The warrant and earnout charges move with Dave's own share price and are settled in shares rather than cash, so excluding them is defensible and the direction reverses when the stock falls - the same items made reported earnings higher than adjusted earnings in Q1 2026. They also stop entirely in January 2027 when the securities expire. What does not stop is the $16.4M of stock compensation.
What management did with the money
Dave bought back $205.9M of its own shares in the first half, cutting the share count 6.0% in a year. That half it also borrowed $193.1M in notes due 2031, repayable in cash, and a third of the buyback came from that money. Staff were paid $16.4M in stock in the June quarter, nearly that quarter's buybacks.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 6 purchases and 8 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The notes carry no coupon and the capped calls cost $17.4M against $193.1M raised, so the financing is cheap and the dilution is hedged through $421.34. The share count is falling rather than rising. Against that, the shares now trade above the $279.13 conversion price, so the premium that produced no dilutive shares in Q2 2026 will produce some at current prices, and above $421.34 the hedge stops working.
- 2026-10-04editedThe claim said the whole $205.9M buyback was funded by the notes; the Q2 2026 10-Q's treasury stock note says $70.5M (334,600 shares at $210.67) came from the note proceeds and $135.4M of open-market purchases from general corporate funds.
Beilman explains the step-up as performance awards granted in 2024, 2025 and 2026 whose 2026 targets became probable during the quarter, so the charge is a consequence of hitting targets rather than a widening of pay. Compensation excluding it grew only 7%. The comparison with the buyback is also a single quarter: across the half the buyback was $205.9M against $23.5M of stock compensation.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair for the business as it runs today. The price pays nothing extra for the fee increase working, and takes nothing off for the lawsuits.
The fee cap is the test. Dave removed the $15 cap on advances above $300, roughly the majority of advances, and by late August almost every member was on the new terms. The September-quarter results on 3 November show whether that lifts revenue per member.
The price has run ahead meanwhile. Over the last 126 trading days the shares rose 77.5%, while sales for each share rose 22.6%.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The average advance is $215, which sits below $300, so a majority of advances above $300 requires a right-skewed distribution rather than a typical advance in that band. Beilman also said the cap change had 'very little impact in the quarter' because it reached only new members, whose limits start smaller - so the same answer that sizes the opportunity concedes that nothing in the reported quarter measures it.
How we read the multiple
Counting debt and cash, buyers pay about $20 for each $1 of Dave's operating profit last year, down from $23 two weeks ago on a 13% fall with no new results; about $17 on this year's forecast. For a lender growing near 30% with late payments falling, that is a cheap-to-ordinary price.
What it leaves out is the legal risk. A lawsuit asks whether Dave's fee is really interest on a loan; if a court agrees, the product changes shape. The case is paused for Dave's appeal.
Against its own history. Dearer than its own past wherever the two can be compared, but most of that past was years of losses, so the gap mostly measures a business that became profitable.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The trailing figure straddles the February 2025 fee change, so the denominator is part-year at the old monetisation and the multiple flatters the current run-rate. It also charges the full $16.4M quarterly stock compensation, which a buyer who treats that as non-cash would add back and reach a materially lower multiple. And the forward deduction is my estimate of three costs the company declines to reconcile, which is why it is stated as about $20 rather than a figure.
- 2026-09-28editedre-struck at the 2026-09-25 close of $324.88 (from $372.24) on the daily review's maintenance route -- drift -13.3%, past the 12% trigger. Trailing operating profit unchanged since no new quarter has printed; net debt assumed unchanged since the last 10-Q.
Priced against its rivals
There is no group to price it against. No listed cohort could be established, so this price faced an absolute anchor and never a comparison. The price is judged against its own history instead.
Also checked and set aside: Affirm Holdings (a substitute, not the same product); Upstart Holdings (a substitute, not the same product); Happen, Inc. (formerly LendingClub Corporation) (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Earnin, Varo Bank, MoneyLion, Brigit, Cash App, Venmo, Klarna, Traditional banks and credit unions that offer overdraft programs.
Where we disagree with the market
A growing lender that is only now switching on its ways to earn more from each member.
The business is real and fairly priced. The legal question over its only fee is not priced at all.
Twelve of fourteen analysts are positive and none negative. Of seventeen questions on the June call, not one was about the government suit, the appeal or Baltimore.
We read the legal notes instead: every motion Dave has brought against the current fee claims has been denied. The market doubted this business once before, when the shares fell 97% in 2022, and was wrong. Then the doubt was profit; now it is legality.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The rising analyst count means the falling share of positive ratings is coverage arriving rather than conviction leaving, which is the weaker reading of the same series. The target mark-up rests on two targets in the latest month against nineteen over the year, so the 19.6% is thinly populated. And this is one vendor's panel: its own two endpoints need not agree on who is in it.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- A court calls it a loan. A class action says ExtraCash is credit; the court refused to dismiss it or send it to arbitration, and Dave has appealed.
- A government lawsuit. The US, on the Federal Trade Commission's referral, is suing Dave and its chief executive, and the court refused to dismiss the case.
- One fee is the business. A cap or ban on the 5% fee would reach 84.8% of revenue at once, and Baltimore is suing over it too.
- Bad debts can rise fast. The charge for expected bad debts rose 54.3% in the first half, against 37.3% sales growth.
- A guarantee to the bank. Dave must buy back at full value any advance its partner bank holds more than 60 days late, up to $93.0M.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The half-year comparison is the one a reader would reach for and it is the misleading one: both quarters ended on a Tuesday, the intra-week peak in balances, and Q1 established the reserve there. On the company's own reconciliation the charge as a share of originations improved one basis point sequentially with that effect neutral. Q3 and Q4 2026 end on a Wednesday and Thursday, which management says should flatter the comparison - so the favourable second half is partly a calendar.
What we still do not know
- Whether removing the fee cap lifts revenue per member. The September quarter is the first with nearly every member on the new terms.
- Whether advances well above $500, which management plans, can be made without worse repayment.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The 10-K describes the product as up to $500 throughout and the 10-Q repeats it, so no filing yet supports a higher ceiling. Beilman also conceded on the same call that new-user origination sizes are smaller and new-user loss rates higher than the portfolio average, which works against the average advance rising as fast as the limit while acquisition is being accelerated.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe economics prove out while the legal risk stays contained
It needs all of:
- ○Removing the fee cap lifts revenue for each member by the December 2026 quarter.checked at the next results, due by 3 Nov
- ○The share of advances 28 days late stays below 2.5% while advances get larger.checked at the next results, due by 3 Nov
- Neutral→UnattractiveA court redefines the product
It needs any of:
- ○A court rules that ExtraCash is a loan that must disclose an annual interest rate.watched as it happens
- ○A settlement or order limits the fee Dave may charge, or Dave has to pay out under its guarantee to the bank.watched as it happens
What is coming
- 3 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether revenue per member accelerates past 11% now the fee cap is gone, with the 28-day past-due rate at or below 2.12%.
Every dated event ahead
- 3 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether revenue per member accelerates past 11% now the fee cap is gone, with the 28-day past-due rate at or below 2.12%.
- December 2026 $75.0M Victory Park debt facility matures: Whether Dave repays from cash or refinances with a lender whose partner sits on its board; repayment leaves the 2031 notes as its only debt.
- December 2026 Member migration off Evolve substantially complete: Whether Coastal becomes the sole partner bank, so its guarantee and collateral terms become the whole funding model.
- 5 January 2027 Warrants and earnout securities expire: Whether about 357,632 warrant shares at $368 are exercised or lapse; either way the fair-value swings that cut reported earnings end.
- March 2027 Q4 2026 results and the FY2026 10-K: Delivery against the raised 31% to 33% growth outlook, the 2027 outlook, and certification of the last tranche of the 2024 executive performance awards.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 28 SepPrice movePrice re-struck, -13.3%; view heldNo print, filing or confirmed development since the thesis. The business now costs about $20 per $1 of operating profit rather than $23 on the same quarter.
- 15 SepThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionA profitable lender at an ordinary price, whose one fee, 84.8% of revenue, is before three courts just as the plan is to raise it.
Also checked 2 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 19
Sources - 19
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-03-02Item 1 in full: what ExtraCash is and the $500 maximum, the February 2025 move to a mandatory 5% fee with a $5 minimum, CashAI and the 180 million cumulative originations behind it, the roughly 11-day average term, the two bank partners and the Evolve consent order, the three-tier competitor list, the 280-employee headcount, the FY2025 income statement, and Note 11's full account of the DOJ, Russell and Baltimore proceedings.backsC01C04C08C09C10C12C22C23C33C40C47C50C55C59C60
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-05The June 1 2026 amended Coastal Program Agreement and its ASC 460 accounting, the $93.0M of Coastal-held receivables named as the maximum potential future payments under the guarantee, the guarantee and credit-loss liabilities, the cash collateral account and the $75.0M floor Dave may not purchase below, the 2031 convertible notes with their $279.13 conversion price and $421.34 cap, the balance sheet, the 1H26 cash flow statement and the Ninth Circuit appeal brief date.backsC01C04C08C09C10C15C16C18C24C25C26C38C41C42C43C45C46C54C59C60C61
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-05The revenue disaggregation that isolates processing and overdraft service fees at $144.9M of $170.8M, the flat $6.0M interchange line, the full non-GAAP reconciliations, the footnote disclosing the Q2 2026 change in the definitions of Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted EBITDA without recasting, raised FY2026 guidance, and the operating metrics.backsC02C03C18C19C21C22C24C26C38C41C42C43C44C46C51C52C53
- S04primarytranscript2026-08-05The fee-cap sequence and Beilman's answer that advances above $300 are the rough majority, the stated plan to raise the maximum well above $500, the 185 million customer TAM assertion, the $225M Coastal facility with $93M drawn, CashAI V6 at 700 features and a third of the base, the $215 average advance, and the full seventeen analyst turns from eight analysts in which no question touched the litigation.
Last quarter, we removed the $15 fee cap for new members. Earlier this quarter, we removed that fee cap for a large portion of grandfathered members, and we plan to increase the fee cap to $20 for the remaining grandfathered members effective late August. [...] Additionally, average ExtraCash size reached a new high of 215 [...] it is really that above $300 cohort of new customers that we would have had enhanced monetization for as a result of the fee change [...] we feel very good about letting them go well in excess of the $500 limit given we have the more flexible and scalable pricing model at this point.
backsC03C05C06C07C13C22C31C33C35C40C41C43C44C45C48C51C53 - S05secondaryvendor data2026-09-15Research pack for DAVE, frozen at content/DAVE/research-pack.jsoncontent/DAVE/research-pack.jsonPrice of $372.24 and the 252-day range, enterprise value, the FINRA short-interest settlement, the analyst consensus split and its dated history, price-target drift, the price-move decomposition that separates the business from the rating, the volatility bucket, and the headcount series indexing the 10-K.backsC14C23C37C38C39C50
- S06primarycompany filing2026-08-07Coastal Financial Corporation Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026 Coastal Financial CorporationThe bank's side of the structure Dave entered on June 1 2026: how a CCBX partner indemnifies the bank for credit losses, the $154.3M credit enhancement asset, the $46.0M valuation adjustment against one unnamed partner that drove Coastal to a $42.1M quarterly loss, and the bank's own statement that it manages counterparty partner risk with per-partner portfolio limits.
During the six months ended June 30, 2026, the Company recorded its initial valuation adjustment of $ 46.0 million against a portion of the credit enhancement asset related to one CCBX partner following an assessment of the collectability of amounts due under the applicable indemnification arrangement.
backsC17 - S07primarycompany filing2026-03-06Chime Financial, Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 Chime Financial, Inc.The only listed competitor whose own filing describes the same product sold to the same buyer, and the employer distribution channel through Chime Enterprise and MyPay at Work that Dave has explicitly declined to build.
MyPay allows eligible members to access a portion of their earned pay on demand before payday for free within 24 hours, or instantly for a low fee.
backsC34C36 - S08primarygovernment data2024-04-01CFPB data spotlight: Overdraft/NSF revenue in 2023 down more than 50% versus pre-pandemic levels Consumer Financial Protection BureauThe measured size and direction of the fee pool ExtraCash displaces: $5.8bn of reported overdraft and NSF fees in 2023, down $6.1bn and more than half from before the pandemic, with 97% of NSF fee revenue eliminated at banks above $10bn of assets and no evidence of replacement by other account fees.
Annual reported overdraft and NSF revenue was $11.16 billion in 2015, $11.44 billion in 2016, $11.47 billion in 2017, $11.56 billion in 2018, $11.96 billion in 2019, $8.82 billion in 2020, $8.76 billion in 2021, $7.61 billion in 2022, and $5.83 billion in 2023. [...] Reported annual overdraft/NSF revenue has dropped by $6.1 billion since before the pandemic - a reduction of more than half - saving the average household who overdrafts $185 per year.
backsC29C48 - S09primarygovernment data2026-05-13Federal Reserve Board, Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2025, Savings and Investments Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemThe base for the prize, measured from outside the company: 37% of US adults would not cover a $400 emergency from cash or its equivalent, and the breakdown of what they would do instead - 10% borrow from friends or family, 12% could not pay by any means, and only 2% would use a payday loan, deposit advance or overdraft.
When faced with a hypothetical expense of $400, 63 percent of all adults said they would have covered it exclusively using cash, savings, or a credit card paid off at the next statement. [Table 25, Other ways individuals would cover a $400 emergency expense, percent of adults: Borrow from a friend or family member 10; Use a payday loan, deposit advance, or overdraft 2; Would not be able to pay for the expense right now 12.]
backsC28 - S10primaryindustry data2019-07-25An independent measurement, run with Charles River Associates across several non-bank lenders including Brigit, that cash-flow underwriting predicts credit risk at least as well as bureau data. It establishes the method as validated for the whole category rather than proprietary to any one firm, which is what forces Dave's moat argument onto the dataset rather than the technique.
the predictiveness of the cash-flow scores and attributes was generally at least as strong as the traditional credit scores and credit bureau attributes studied
backsC32 - S11primarycompany filing2026-09-14The correction to the vendor feed: the rows the pack shows as 300,000-plus share sales at $368.00 are sales of WARRANTS at $1.59 each, where $368 is the warrants' exercise price, and 15,359 warrants carry 480 underlying Class A shares. The warrants expire 2027-01-05.backsC39C45
- S12primarygovernment data2026-08-01FRED series CNP16OV, Population Level, civilian noninstitutional population 16 years and over U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics via FREDThe population base the Federal Reserve's survey share is applied to: 275.4 million people aged 16 and over as of August 2026.
Population Level - civilian noninstitutional population, 16 years and over, 275,415 thousand, August 2026
read, but no claim rests on it - S13primarycompany filing2025-04-28The permanent record that MoneyLion stopped being a reporting company: it deregistered on 2025-04-28, eleven days after Gen Digital completed the acquisition on 2025-04-17, and the SEC now lists it with no ticker. Half the reason no listed cash-advance cohort can be built.backsC36
- S14primarycompany filing2025-02-05Upbound Group, Inc. Form 8-K/A reporting the completed acquisition of Bridge IT, Inc. (Brigit) Upbound Group, Inc.The acquirer's own filing stating that on 2025-01-31 it consummated the acquisition of Bridge IT, Inc., trading as Brigit. The other half of why the cohort collapsed - the two closest listed comparables were taken out eleven weeks apart in early 2025. It also corrected a date this research first had wrong.backsC36
- S15secondaryother2026-09-15data/reference/competitors.json, DAVE entrydata/reference/competitors.jsonThe cohort record: Chime confirmed as the single product match against its own filing, and Affirm, Upstart and Happen each rejected against theirs on buyer, product or instrument, one short of the two peers a cohort needs.
A cohort needs two product-matched peers besides the subject, so DAVE has none, and the multiples in the pack face no listed comparison.
backsC36 - S16primarycompany filing2026-03-02The document the source audit said was missing, and it earned the read. It carries the original 2026 outlook of 25% to 28% revenue growth, since raised twice; the increase in the buyback authorisation from $125M to $300M; FY2025 revenue of $554.2M and net income of $195.9M; and revenue for each member growing 36% in Q4 2025 against 11% in Q2 2026 - the deceleration that explains why the fee cap is being removed now. It is also where the 185 million customer market appears in a filed document rather than only in a call.backsC31C52C53
- S17primarycompany filing2026-04-20The beneficial ownership table at 3 April 2026 (directors and officers 13.2% of Class A, all of Class V and 55.0% of the vote; Jason Wilk 54.3% of the vote), the controlled-company statement, Wilk's tenure since May 2016, and the CD&A: the 2025 bonus on non-GAAP variable profit and adjusted EBITDA paid at 200% of target, and PSUs on adjusted EBITDA hurdles earned at 150%.backsC55C56C57C60C61
- S18primarycompany filing2026-09-15The chief executive's variable prepaid forward of 11 September 2026: 37,090 Class A shares pledged for a $10.9M upfront payment, settling on or about 30 August 2029 between $319.33 and $481.48, voting rights retained; beneficial ownership 1,530,172 shares, 11.8% of the class.backsC56C58
- S19primarycompany filing2023-03-13The 2021 and 2022 income statements by expense line (compensation and benefits, advertising and marketing, provision for unrecoverable advances) that the five-year cost reading starts from, and the executive officer biographies: Kyle Beilman chief financial officer since January 2021, and in finance and operations roles from July 2017.backsC55C59