Chime Financial
A checking account on your phone for lower- and middle-income Americans, run through partner banks and paid mostly by a small fee on every swipe of its debit card.
The scores
Growth4/4 ↑
Active Members +20% and revenue guided at 25%-26%, organic and broad-based, with the fastest member-add pace in company history and shrinking partner concentration.
Business quality3/4 ↑
A real, quantified cost-to-serve edge shows up as Adjusted EBITDA margin expansion, but it is young and faces a well-capitalized rival targeting the identical population.
Financial position4/4 ↑
About $1.06 billion of cash and securities, no debt, an undrawn revolver and GAAP profit - though $590 million is committed to buying Stride.
Execution record3/4 →
Guidance was beaten and raised in Q2 FY2026, but the public track record is under two years and a CFO transition just landed mid-stream.
Per share capture3/4 →
The FY2025 loss was one-time accounting noise, not new shares issued, and the buyback was renewed at $200 million, cash-funded, but RSU pay outruns it.
Potential2/4 →
A large underserved population is real per FDIC data, but expansion depends on the employer channel scaling and bank-partner headroom Chime does not fully control.
Risk profile2/4 →
Two consent orders already realized, partner banks holding the charter until a bank purchase clears two regulators, and an interim CFO.
Valuation3/4 ↑
About 18.5 times raised guided Adjusted EBITDA pays for the 17%-18% margin management guides, not expansion beyond it - though still a forecast.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Central claims are filed GAAP facts corroborated by two filings, Block and Nu, plus a regulator survey, but some color rests on unverified management commentary.
The Verdict
We rate Chime neutral. It runs a checking account on the phone for lower- and middle-income Americans, paid mostly by a small fee each time a member swipes a debit card. The business is solid: profit is arriving fast, and it has raised this year's forecast again and again. After a fall of about a fifth, the price is fair: about right if this year's forecast comes true, with no extra credit for beating it and no cushion if it slips. The view hinges on that profit showing up in reported results for two quarters running, with a permanent finance chief named.
The long casePeople are moving their main account from branch banks to free phone accounts; Chime must keep winning members faster than the shrinking pool of unbanked households alone would give.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- The guidance was raised the same week the company announced a ~10% workforce reduction and its CFO's departure - both real, recent, unresolved events that could cut either way on execution risk even though management frames the cost action as expansionary, not defensive (see C09, C10).
- This raise came in an acquisition announcement rather than with a reported quarter, so no new filed quarter stands behind it; the first reported test of it is the Q3 print on 2026-11-04.
- 2026-09-24editedSuperseded on 2026-09-08: guidance raised for the fourth time in the Stride announcement (S12).
- The vendor pack's own EV/EBITDA figure is -2,057.58x TTM (C30) - not because the business is doing badly, but because it is computed off GAAP EBITDA, which is still swamped by the IPO stock-compensation cliff in the trailing window. That vendor figure and this thesis's own Adjusted-EBITDA-based multiple are answering different questions from the same starting point, and only one of them is usable.
- The multiple is struck on guidance for a year not yet complete. Against trailing-twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA through June 2026 of about $305.7 million, the same enterprise value is about 29 times.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck at the 2026-09-23 close on filed cash and shares and the raised guidance midpoint; the price had fallen 20% since the thesis while the guide rose 3%.
The restructuring and the CFO's departure were announced within days of each other, alongside a raised full-year guide - a combination consistent with the 'position of strength' framing, but also the kind of clustering of a cost action and a finance-leadership change that a reader should not wave away as coincidence without more than management's own characterization to go on.
A guidance raise of this size five months into the year is a genuinely strong signal, but it was issued alongside a 10% workforce reduction and a CFO departure (C09, C10) rather than in isolation - the same week's other news is why this thesis treats the raise as encouraging rather than as fully resolving the execution question.
- 2026-09-24editedFourth step added: the 2026-09-08 raise (S12).
The company
Chime gives people a checking account and a debit card on their phone, with no branches. It is not a bank. Two partner banks, Bancorp and Stride, hold the deposits and issue the cards; Chime runs the app and, since 2024, its own payment processing.
It is built for people banks serve badly, whose alternative is often an overdraft fee or a payday loan. 10.4 million people use it actively, up 20% in a year.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
How it makes money
Most of the money is the small fee a shop pays each time a member swipes a Chime card: $1.5B of last year's $2.19B of sales. The fastest-growing rest comes from short advances. MyPay lets members draw pay they have earned before payday; in the June quarter it advanced $4.5B and lost 0.9% of it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management's own stated plan is to deliberately raise MyPay loss rates going forward in exchange for higher transaction profit - a real credit-risk trade-off management is choosing, not merely disclosing, and one that has not yet shown up in a reported quarter.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 FY2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Debit-card interchange | 39% | A cut of each purchase on Chime debit cards, paid by merchants through the card networks and passed on by the partner banks. |
| Credit-card interchange | 25% | The same merchant fee on Chime's secured credit card, which earns a higher rate per purchase than debit. |
| MyPay | 17% | Fees for getting part of a paycheck early, instantly, before payday; the advances are funded by Chime or its partner banks. |
| Other platform revenue | 19% | Out-of-network ATM fees, instant transfers out, SpotMe tips, Instant Loans interest, cash-deposit fees and partner offers. |
Who runs it
Co-founder Chris Britt has run Chime since he started it in 2012; his president, Troughton, is also covering finance until a new finance chief is found. Insiders own little of the stock but, through shares carrying 20 votes each, control two-thirds of the votes. The founders take no cash bonus: their extra shares pay out on sales growth plus profit as the company itself measures it, and on the share price. Neither measure counts the cost of paying staff in shares.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The founders' economic stake is far smaller than their control: about 47M of some 383M shares, roughly an eighth, against two-thirds of the votes, so control does not rest on proportionate ownership.
Both measures exclude stock pay, which is about 10% of revenue (C38), so the plan rewards a margin that leaves out the cost shareholders bear through dilution.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Chime's edge is cost. It has no branches and no loans of its own to fund, and it lends against the member's next paycheck, which lands in the Chime account first. That, management says, is how MyPay charges half what rivals do and still keeps 64% of its transaction income as profit.
Block, which owns Cash App, confirms the playbook from outside: its own annual report aims the same cheap, large-scale service at the same households.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management's own stated plan is to deliberately raise MyPay loss rates going forward in exchange for higher transaction profit - a real credit-risk trade-off management is choosing, not merely disclosing, and one that has not yet shown up in a reported quarter.
The threat
Cash App is the closest rival. Block says it wants to be a top bank for American households earning up to $150,000, much the same people Chime serves, and Cash App's financial-services revenue alone was about 1.4 times Chime's whole revenue last year.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The rivals: XYZ, SOFI, AFRM, KLAR, PYPL, NU, BAC, COF, C, JPM, PNC, WFC, ALLY.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| XYZ | Block, Inc. (Cash App)Priced against it: Small part of it | On sale | Small part of it |
| SOFI | SoFi Technologies, Inc.Priced against it: Small part of it | On sale | Small part of it |
| AFRM · KLAR · PYPL | Affirm, Klarna and PayPalPriced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
| NU | Nubank and RevolutPriced against it: Same product | Announced | Same product |
| BAC · COF · C · JPM · PNC · WFC · ALLY | Traditional card issuers and banks (Bank of America, Capital One, Citibank, J.P. Morgan Chase, PNC Bank, Wells Fargo, Ally, Discover)Priced against it: Small part of it | On sale | Small part of it |
How big it could get
How big this could get
In 2023 the FDIC, which insures American bank deposits, counted about 24.6 million households that had no bank account or leaned on services outside one: 18.4% of all households. Chime does not say how many of its 10.4 million members came from that group, so nobody can say how much of the pool it already holds.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 26% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, about the same pace as the 31% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −2.1%, up from −18% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 91¢ of each sales dollar, down from 101¢ in the year to Dec 2023.
The business brought in $345M of cash from operations, 14% of sales, before capital spending, which the filer does not tag.
The share count rose 523% in 2.5 years, and pay in shares costs 11% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||
| Sales | $1.28B | $1.67B | $2.19B | $2.46B |
| Sales growth | - | +31% | +31% | +26% |
| Profit | ||||
| Gross margin | 83% | 88% | 88% | 89% |
| Operating margin | −18% | −3.7% | −48% | −2.1% |
| Net margin | −16% | −1.5% | −46% | −0.7% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||
| Research and development | 20% | 19% | 43% | 19% |
| Sales and marketing | 35% | 31% | 29% | 26% |
| General and admin | 12% | 11% | 23% | 14% |
| Pay in shares | 2.0% | 1.8% | 49% | 11% |
| Capital spending | 0.8% | 0.3% | 0.9% | - |
| Cash | ||||
| Cash from operations | −$157M | $64.1M | $52.8M | $345M |
| Free cash flow | −$167M | $59.3M | $32.9M | - |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $240M | $707M | $1.05B | $1.06B |
| Returns and shares | ||||
| Shares (diluted) | 63.1M | 64.9M | 236M | 393M |
What growth costs
Growth is making Chime more profitable: marketing, technology and office costs each take a smaller share of every sales dollar each year. Two costs push the other way: losses on the pay advances and loans that earn its fastest-growing fees, and paying staff in shares, which rose sharply after the listing.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The cost of the credit that drives platform revenue grows faster than sales when MyPay and Instant Loans scale: transaction and risk losses rose 85% in FY2025, mostly MyPay (S01), and management has said MyPay loss rates will drift up (C19).
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
In the second quarter of 2026 sales grew 27% to $670M, and adjusted profit reached 15% of sales, up from 3% a year earlier: about 60 cents of each extra dollar of sales became profit. It also made a profit under standard accounting for a second quarter running; last year's $1.01B loss was almost all share awards that vested at the listing.
Chime added about 200,000 members, twice its usual second-quarter pace. The same week brought a 10% staff cut and the finance chief's exit.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the case that Chime turns extra sales into profit and keeps adding members. It also added the risk behind the Neutral view: a staff cut and the finance chief leaving in the same week, while the price already assumes this year's promised profit arrives cleanly.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.07 against $0.00 expected; $0.07 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The restructuring and the CFO's departure were announced within days of each other, alongside a raised full-year guide - a combination consistent with the 'position of strength' framing, but also the kind of clustering of a cost action and a finance-leadership change that a reader should not wave away as coincidence without more than management's own characterization to go on.
What management did with the money
It bought back shares with cash: a $200M programme finished by May, and a second $200M approved. In September it agreed to spend $590M of cash on Stride, about 1.5 times the bank's net assets, without raising new money.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 9 purchases and 12 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The 8-K names what is new rather than what is settled: approval may not come on the expected timeline or at all, may carry conditions that adversely affect Chime, and bank-holding-company status brings Federal Reserve supervision and regulatory requirements Chime has never carried.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price pays for the profit Chime has promised this year and the growth already in hand, nothing more. That profit has to show up in reported results before further growth comes free.
The shares fell about 20% after we first wrote while the profit forecast rose, so the price of each dollar of promised profit dropped from about 25 times to 18.5.
The test is 4 November. The September quarter is guided to about $705M of sales and $117M to $120M of adjusted profit, roughly 17%. A permanent finance chief would be news too.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The vendor pack's own EV/EBITDA figure is -2,057.58x TTM (C30) - not because the business is doing badly, but because it is computed off GAAP EBITDA, which is still swamped by the IPO stock-compensation cliff in the trailing window. That vendor figure and this thesis's own Adjusted-EBITDA-based multiple are answering different questions from the same starting point, and only one of them is usable.
- The multiple is struck on guidance for a year not yet complete. Against trailing-twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA through June 2026 of about $305.7 million, the same enterprise value is about 29 times.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck at the 2026-09-23 close on filed cash and shares and the raised guidance midpoint; the price had fallen 20% since the thesis while the guide rose 3%.
- The guidance was raised the same week the company announced a ~10% workforce reduction and its CFO's departure - both real, recent, unresolved events that could cut either way on execution risk even though management frames the cost action as expansionary, not defensive (see C09, C10).
- This raise came in an acquisition announcement rather than with a reported quarter, so no new filed quarter stands behind it; the first reported test of it is the Q3 print on 2026-11-04.
- 2026-09-24editedSuperseded on 2026-09-08: guidance raised for the fourth time in the Stride announcement (S12).
How we read the multiple
The whole company, after its cash, costs about 18.5 times the $481M to $489M of profit Chime promises this year, on its own adjusted measure. That is 17 to 18 cents of profit on each dollar of sales.
The price pays for that and the growth in hand, and asks for nothing more. For the shares to be cheap, that margin must keep climbing past the promise; for them to be dear, the promise must slip.
Against its own history. Far cheaper than its own short history, while the business now makes a profit. But that history is brief and was set while it lost money, so it anchors little.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- The vendor pack's own EV/EBITDA figure is -2,057.58x TTM (C30) - not because the business is doing badly, but because it is computed off GAAP EBITDA, which is still swamped by the IPO stock-compensation cliff in the trailing window. That vendor figure and this thesis's own Adjusted-EBITDA-based multiple are answering different questions from the same starting point, and only one of them is usable.
- The multiple is struck on guidance for a year not yet complete. Against trailing-twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA through June 2026 of about $305.7 million, the same enterprise value is about 29 times.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck at the 2026-09-23 close on filed cash and shares and the raised guidance midpoint; the price had fallen 20% since the thesis while the guide rose 3%.
- The guidance was raised the same week the company announced a ~10% workforce reduction and its CFO's departure - both real, recent, unresolved events that could cut either way on execution risk even though management frames the cost action as expansionary, not defensive (see C09, C10).
- This raise came in an acquisition announcement rather than with a reported quarter, so no new filed quarter stands behind it; the first reported test of it is the Q3 print on 2026-11-04.
- 2026-09-24editedSuperseded on 2026-09-08: guidance raised for the fourth time in the Stride announcement (S12).
Priced against its rivals
Only Nu Holdings sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. Block, SoFi Technologies, Bank of America, Capital One Financial, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase & Co., The PNC Financial Services Group, Wells Fargo & Company and Ally Financial do too, but as a small part of much bigger companies, so their price says little about this one. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Where we disagree with the market
Analysts are nearly unanimous: 13 rate the shares a buy, 1 a hold, none a sell, finance chief's exit or not.
The price assumes the forecast holds cleanly. A departing finance chief and a staff cut in the same week are real risks, not noise.
The standard measures make the shares look absurd, because listing-era share awards still swamp the accounts. On the company's own adjusted profit, the price pays for the plan and no more, so a stumble is not priced in.
We are wrong if the September quarter lands at or above the forecast and a permanent finance chief is named without more upheaval.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- 2026-10-04editedvalid_through of 2026-09-30 passed; re-struck on FMP's grade consensus of 2026-10-04 (16 buy, 1 hold, 0 sell) and shelf life rolled to the Q3 print
- The vendor pack's own EV/EBITDA figure is -2,057.58x TTM (C30) - not because the business is doing badly, but because it is computed off GAAP EBITDA, which is still swamped by the IPO stock-compensation cliff in the trailing window. That vendor figure and this thesis's own Adjusted-EBITDA-based multiple are answering different questions from the same starting point, and only one of them is usable.
- The multiple is struck on guidance for a year not yet complete. Against trailing-twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA through June 2026 of about $305.7 million, the same enterprise value is about 29 times.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck at the 2026-09-23 close on filed cash and shares and the raised guidance midpoint; the price had fallen 20% since the thesis while the guide rose 3%.
The restructuring and the CFO's departure were announced within days of each other, alongside a raised full-year guide - a combination consistent with the 'position of strength' framing, but also the kind of clustering of a cost action and a finance-leadership change that a reader should not wave away as coincidence without more than management's own characterization to go on.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Two regulators must approve Stride. Buying its bank needs the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, and closing is not expected before the first half of 2027.
- A ceiling on the main income. Card-issuing banks under $10B of assets escape a federal cap on swipe fees. Chime has promised to keep its assets below that line.
- Partner banks can say no. Bancorp caps what it will carry for Chime's advances at about $1.7B, and can limit new ones if expected losses rise.
- Losses allowed to rise. Management plans to let MyPay losses tick up this half as it raises members' limits.
- A record with regulators. A 2024 order from the federal consumer regulator runs to 2029, after earlier fines in California and Illinois.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The 8-K names what is new rather than what is settled: approval may not come on the expected timeline or at all, may carry conditions that adversely affect Chime, and bank-holding-company status brings Federal Reserve supervision and regulatory requirements Chime has never carried.
Management's own stated plan is to deliberately raise MyPay loss rates going forward in exchange for higher transaction profit - a real credit-risk trade-off management is choosing, not merely disclosing, and one that has not yet shown up in a reported quarter.
What we still do not know
- Whether the partner banks' caps on Chime's advances have ever actually stopped a loan. The filings describe the limit, not its history.
- How many members had no bank, or a poor one, before joining: how much of the pool Chime already holds.
- Who the permanent finance chief will be, and when.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractivePriced for the guided margin, not for more of it
It needs:
- ○The company's value falls to about 15 times this year's promised adjusted profit: paying for the plan, with the growth free.about ≈$21.45 today, 19% below the last close
- Neutral→AttractiveThe margin runs past its own guidance, at a lesser discount
It needs:
- ○Adjusted profit tops 17% of sales two reported quarters running, sales growth stays above 20%, and the price stays under about 20 times.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- Reopens the researchThe bank-partner cap is shown never to bind
It needs:
- ○Chime shows whether its partner banks' caps on its advances have ever actually held it back.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Adjusted profit falls back below 10% of sales for two quarters in a row.
- Growth in active members slows below 10% a year.
- After Stride, assets approach $10B or the bank loses its exemption from the swipe-fee cap.
What is coming
- 4 November 2026 Q3 FY2026 results: Adjusted EBITDA against the $117-120M guide on about $705M of revenue, MyPay losses against the slight rise flagged, and whether a permanent CFO is named.
Every dated event ahead
- 4 November 2026 Q3 FY2026 results: Adjusted EBITDA against the $117-120M guide on about $705M of revenue, MyPay losses against the slight rise flagged, and whether a permanent CFO is named.
- February 2027 Q4 FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance: Whether a second quarter clears a 17% Adjusted EBITDA margin, which route P2 needs, and whether FY2026 clears the co-founders' first 40% growth-and-profit tranche.
- June 2027 Stride Bank acquisition closes: Whether the OCC and Federal Reserve approve on time and without onerous conditions, and how close a bank-owning Chime sits to the $10 billion interchange-cap line.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewAnalyst ratings re-checked. View heldThe one expired market fact was refreshed and still reads strongly bullish. Nothing in the argument depends on it, so the view waits on the November print.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 24 SepNewsChime to buy its partner bank as price falls 20%. View heldA fourth forecast raise and the fall mean the shares now pay for the promised margin. No reported quarter has shown that margin yet, so the view waits on November.
- 30 AugThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionProfit margins had risen fast, but the finance chief left and staff were cut the same week the forecast went up.
Also checked 2 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 16
Sources - 16
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-03-06Business description, bank-partner structure and capital constraints, competition risk factors, CFPB/DFPI consent order history, revenue/expense detail, balance sheet, share count, buyback program, key metrics (Active Members, Purchase Volume, ARPAM).backsC01C02C03C04C12C13C14C15C22C23C24C25C30C35C36C37C38C42C43
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-05Q2 FY2026 GAAP and adjusted results, raised FY2026 guidance, the July 31 2026 ~10% workforce reduction and its expected cost, and the CFO transition (Matthew Newcomb departing, Mark Troughton named President & Interim CFO).backsC05C06C07C08C09C10C19C20C21C31C39
- S03primarytranscript2026-08-05Chime Financial Q2 FY2026 earnings call transcript (2026-08-05)CEO's framing of the workforce reduction as being done 'from a position of strength', MyPay/Instant Loans loss-rate and pricing commentary, Chime Enterprise pipeline color. The Q&A is a distinct origin from the prepared remarks even though both share this filing's independence group.
I think as you can see from these results we just reported, we are truly taking this action from a position of strength.
backsC10C19 - S04primarycompany filing2026-02-26Cash App's own description of targeting 'households in the United States that earn up to $150,000 per year' - external confirmation that Chime's target population is contested by a well-capitalized rival - and Cash App/Square segment revenue detail used to assess cohort perimeter.backsC16C18
- S05primarycompany filing2026-04-08Nu's own description of serving customers 'unserved or underserved by incumbent banks' in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia - a near-identical positioning to Chime's, in a different geography, used as a cohort candidate.backsC17
- S06primarygovernment data2023The regulator's own count of unbanked and underbanked U.S. households - the population Chime's own positioning targets - independent of Chime's own S-1/10-K market-sizing assertions.
In 2023, 4.2 percent of U.S. households-representing about 5.6 million households-were unbanked...In 2023, 14.2 percent of U.S. households-representing about 19.0 million households-were considered underbanked
backsC11 - S07secondaryvendor data2026-08-30CHYM research pack (market tier) - price, volatility, analyst split, insider filings, short interest, earnings historyLast close price and market cap, 20-day volatility, analyst consensus split, Form 4 insider activity, earnings-beat history, technicals.backsC26C28C30
- S08primarygovernment data2026-08-30CHYM's short interest at the most recent FINRA settlement.
18,952,244 shares short, 8.4% of float, settled 2026-08-14, -17.8% vs prior settlement, 1.56 days to cover
read, but no claim rests on it - S09primarycompany filing2026-02-25The original FY2026 guidance (before the Q2 2026 raise) and management's own statement that 2026 was expected to be Chime's first full year of GAAP net income profitability.backsC31
- S10primarycompany filing2026-05-06Completion of the original $200 million buyback and a new $200 million authorization, the Q1 FY2026 guidance raise (the middle step of the three-step FY2026 guidance progression), and Active Member and primary-account-growth figures.backsC23C31C32
- S11primarycompany filing2026-08-06June 30, 2026 balance sheet (cash and cash equivalents $536.0 million, marketable securities $527.4 million) and the Class A and Class B share counts outstanding on August 3, 2026.backsC29C36C37C38C42C43
- S12primarycompany filing2026-09-08The merger agreement with Central Service Corporation (parent of Stride Bank, N.A.) for $590 million in cash, its approval conditions and expected timing, management's synergy and accretion statements, the commitment to keep assets below $10 billion, and raised Q3 and FY2026 guidance.backsC07C29C31C33C34C35
- S13primarygovernment data2026-09-24CHYM's short interest at the most recent FINRA settlement.
21,348,953 shares short, 9.5% of float, settled 2026-08-31, +12.7% vs prior settlement, 3.06 days to cover
backsC27 - S14secondaryvendor data2026-09-24CHYM research pack (market tier), refreshed - last close and market capitalisationLast completed-session close of $26.46 on 2026-09-23.backsC29
- S15secondaryvendor data2026-10-04FMP grades-consensus and price-target-summary snapshot, CHYMCurrent analyst rating split: 16 buy, 1 hold, 0 sell.backsC28
- S16primarycompany filing2026-04-17Directors and executive officers with tenure, beneficial ownership at March 31, 2026 by class and voting power, the 2025 bonus plan's metrics and targets, and the 2025 co-founder performance awards (growth-and-profit and stock-price-hurdle PSUs).backsC39C40C41C43