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Bloom Energy

חברה שמייצרת תאי דלק שהופכים גז טבעי לחשמל באתר של הלקוח עצמו, ומוכרת אותם למרכזי נתונים שלא יכולים לחכות לרשת החשמל.

הציון שלנולא אטרקטיבית ביטחון בינוני
הציונים
ציונים · 1-4
צמיחה4/4 ↑

ההכנסות זינקו ב-138% ברבעון השלישי של 2026, והתחזית לשנה כולה הועלתה שוב לצמיחה של כ-122%. הקצב אמיתי, גם אם הוא נשען על מעט לקוחות.

איכות העסק2/4 →

פלטפורמה קניינית באמת, אבל היא נמכרת למממנים שלא נחשפו בשמם, ומאיימים עליה מנועים זולים יותר וגם יצרניות חשמל שחותמות במקום זאת על חוזי אספקה דרך הרשת.

איתנות פיננסית4/4 ↑

בקופה 2.49 מיליארד דולר, והתזרים מפעילות שוטפת בתשעת החודשים הראשונים חיובי, אף שברבעון השלישי של 2026 נשרפו 27 מיליון דולר. זה עדיין החלק החזק ביותר בטיעון.

יכולת ביצוע3/4 ↑

הציגה מפנה אמיתי בשיעור הרווח ובתזרים המזומנים והעלתה את התחזית, אבל ההיסטוריה קצרה, והתוצאות מעל התחזיות משקפות הכנסות שאי אפשר למדל, לא יכולת תחזית מוכחת.

ערך לבעלי המניות2/4 →

מספר המניות גדל בכ-25% בחמישה עשר חודשים, ועדיין יש אג״ח להמרה במחזור, ולכן ההתקדמות למניה מפגרת בפער גדול אחרי ההתקדמות של החברה.

פוטנציאל2/4 →

מעבר הביקוש אמיתי ונמדד בידי גורם בלתי תלוי, אבל את גודל ההזדמנות לא הצלחנו לפרק לרכיבים, והיא עשויה להיות מוגבלת בגלל חומר גלם שאיש לא העריך את היקפו.

רמת סיכון1/4 ↓

שני לקוחות, אחד מהם צד קשור, היוו 69% מהמכירות ברבעון השלישי של 2026. טענת הונאה בנוגע לחומר גלם מרכזי נדחתה על ידי החברה בלבד, ואין קבוצת השוואה שבודקת אותה.

תמחור1/4 →

מכפיל של כ-17.5 על המכירות, לעומת חציון קודם של 4.3, ובהכנסות שבהן שני לקוחות מהווים 69% מהרבעון ואחד מהם לא נקוב בשמו.

חוזק הראיות2/4 →

הטענות הפיננסיות מבוססות על הדוחות והן איתנות, אבל שתי השאלות שמכריעות בתזה, זהות הלקוח ומקור הסקנדיום, לא מתועדות.

ההימור · שנתיים עד שלוש
המחיר כבר מגלם הצלחה0.8×

אם ההימור מצליח: 0.8× · אם הוא נכשל, נשארים לך כ-4%.

השורה התחתונה

הציון שלנו ל Bloom Energy: לא אטרקטיבית. החברה מייצרת תאי דלק שהופכים גז טבעי לחשמל באתר הלקוח עצמו, ובשנה האחרונה עברה בפועל לרווחיות. אבל שני לקוחות קנו כשני שלישים מהמכירות, ומוכר בשורט ותביעה משפטית מטילים ספק באספקה של מתכת מרכזית, ולכן העסק בינוני. המחיר מנופח: הוא מניח עוד הרבה רבעונים כמו האחרון, ורבעון חלש ייפגע בו. כהימור היא שבירה: גם אם ההימור יצליח היא תהיה שווה פחות מהיום, ואם המכירות יחזרו לאחור יישאר כעשירית. המעבר לרווחיות אמיתי; מה שעומד מאחוריו לא נחשף.

הטיעון לטווח הארוךמרכזי נתונים ל-AI לא יכולים לחכות שנים לחיבור לרשת החשמל, ולכן חלקם בונים מקור חשמל משלהם; תאי הדלק של Bloom ניתנים להתקנה מהירה, אם הלקוחות ימשיכו לבחור בהם על פני טורבינות.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 10 טענות
C03עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended June 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,065.4 million, up 165.5% from $401.2 million, with product revenue of $935.4 million up 215.4%; gross margin of 33.4%, up 668 basis points from 26.7%; GAAP operating income of $182.2 million against a $3.5 million operating loss a year earlier; cash flow from operating activities of positive $226.4 million against negative $213.1 million; and GAAP earnings per share of $0.62 against a loss of $0.18. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,666.9 million at June 30, 2026.
historical · Q2 2026written 2026-08-24
C04טענת ההנהלהmedium confidence
With the Q3 2026 results on October 22, 2026 Bloom raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance for the third time this year, to $4.4 billion to $4.6 billion (122% growth at the midpoint), non-GAAP operating income to $960 million to $1,030 million and non-GAAP earnings per share to $3.10 to $3.40, holding non-GAAP gross margin near 34%; the Q2 guidance had been $3.9 billion to $4.2 billion. Revenue for the first nine months was $3,052.3 million, so the range implies $1.35 billion to $1.55 billion in the fourth quarter. Filed annual revenue was $2,024.0 million for FY2025 and $1,473.9 million for FY2024.
against this

The guidance is a forward-looking management figure, and its credibility rests on the same revenue concentration recorded in C06: if one unnamed customer was approximately 73% of first-half revenue, then the full-year figure is substantially a forecast about one buyer's build schedule rather than about market-wide demand, and the company's own release lists backlog recognition among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 results: full-year revenue guidance raised to $4.4-4.6B; the Q2 range of $3.9-4.2B is superseded.
forwardwritten 2026-08-24
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C07עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's order book is a company-defined measure, not a filed contractual obligation. Its own 10-K states: 'We view product backlog as the revenue attributable to existing contractual commitments for the purchase or use of Energy Servers by a financier or an end customer in the future. Value of product backlog includes both expected Bloom product revenue and reflects anticipated ITC and other tax incentives as applicable.' The phrase 'remaining performance obligation' - the figure US accounting rules require for contracted revenue not yet recognised - appears nowhere in the FY2025 10-K. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q again reports no remaining-performance-obligation or product-backlog figure (the word backlog appears once, in the supply-chain risk factor). On the October 22 call the chief executive said the backlog is 'continuing to expand faster than our revenue' and the chief financial officer that the outlook is built on backlog assessed 'customer by customer against site readiness and conversion timing' plus a probability-weighted view of the pipeline; neither gave a figure.
against this

Backlog measures that include expected tax credits are not unique to Bloom and the company discloses its definition plainly rather than hiding it, which is the opposite of concealment. The concern is not the disclosure but the arithmetic it permits: a figure that counts anticipated investment tax credits and 'commitments' that are not stated to be firm can be much larger than the contracted revenue an auditor would recognise, and Bloom's own Q2 2026 release lists 'the ability of current product and service backlog to ultimately be recognizable as revenue' among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call: still no filed contracted-revenue figure; backlog described as growing faster than revenue without a number.
historical · as disclosed in the FY2025 10-Kwritten 2026-08-24
C11עובדהmedium confidence
On July 8, 2026 the short-seller Hunterbrook published a report titled 'Bloom's Big Lie' alleging that Bloom obtains scandium sourced from China through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan and South Korea despite telling investors it has no China supply chain, citing a representative of Hunan Oriental Scandium describing that company as Bloom's largest scandium supplier; that Bloom's five-gigawatt production goal would require roughly 220 tons of scandium oxide a year against a projected global supply near 240 tons; and that Bloom's unaudited order book of roughly $20 billion compares with audited binding performance obligations nearer $492 million. Bloom's shares fell on the report and the company said it would correct the record.
against this

Hunterbrook is a short seller with a financial position in the outcome and is therefore the least disinterested possible source on Bloom; its 220-ton and 240-ton figures also do not reconcile with the US Geological Survey's independent estimate of 40 tons of global production and 80 tons of capacity (C10), a discrepancy this thesis does not resolve and does not need to: the USGS figure is both authoritative and smaller, so the supply constraint it implies is tighter, not looser, than the short report's.

historical · 2026-07-08written 2026-08-24
C12עובדהhigh confidence
A securities class action, Nevins v. Bloom Energy Corporation, No. 26-cv-07944 in the Northern District of California, has been filed against Bloom Energy and certain executives in respect of a class period running February 27, 2025 through July 8, 2026, alleging that the company made false or misleading statements by failing to disclose that it obtained scandium through intermediaries who sourced the metal from China and thereby understated its reliance on Chinese scandium. The court-set deadline to apply for lead plaintiff is September 28, 2026. Neither the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q filed July 28, 2026 nor the Q2 2026 results release mentions the litigation, Hunterbrook, China or scandium. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q discloses the suit, says its allegations 'mirror' the Hunterbrook report, calls it without merit and records that on October 15, 2026 the court appointed Nicole Caraoué as lead plaintiff and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd as lead counsel; the complaint is still preliminary and the lead-plaintiff deadline has passed.
against this

A filed complaint is an allegation and not a finding, plaintiffs' firms solicit class members as a matter of routine after any sharp price decline, and the class action may be dismissed. The 10-Q's silence is also defensible if the suit was filed after the July 28 filing date. What survives those caveats is that the company has answered the allegation only by denial, in a July 9, 2026 8-K and one answer on the Q2 call where the chief executive said that is all Bloom will say (C27), and has named no supplier or country of origin in any document.

  1. 2026-09-24editedCaption and court added from the lead-plaintiff notices (S19); counter-evidence corrected, because the company has answered the allegation by denial in a July 9, 2026 8-K and on the Q2 call (C27), which the original pass recorded as unanswered.
  2. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: the suit is now disclosed, lead plaintiff and counsel appointed October 15; no ruling on a motion to dismiss yet.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-08-24
C13עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's balance sheet at June 30, 2026 carried cash and cash equivalents of $2,666.9 million against $2,454.1 million at December 31, 2025; accounts receivable of $458.1 million; inventories of $758.2 million; total current assets of $4,590.1 million; and total stockholders' equity of $1,640.7 million including a $28.7 million noncontrolling interest. The accumulated deficit stood at $3,721.0 million, down from $3,965.0 million a year earlier as the company turned profitable. At September 30, 2026 cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million, accounts receivable $634.7 million, contract assets $792.8 million (current), inventories $927.7 million, total current assets $5,207.8 million and recourse debt $2,473.5 million.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 balance sheet added; cash is $2.49B, little changed since December while contract assets and receivables grew.
current state · 2026-09-30written 2026-08-24
C15עובדהhigh confidence
At the October 28, 2026 close of $228.08, with the 294.5 million shares the research pack carried at the September 25 close and the filer's trailing revenue of $3,829.9 million for the four quarters to September 30, 2026, Bloom's price-to-sales is about 17.5 and its enterprise value to sales about 17.5, against prior-fiscal-years medians of 3.67 and 4.29. At the September 25 close the same two multiples were 27.31 and 27.36 on the June-quarter revenue of $3,113.2 million; the fall is the 21.0% drop in the price plus a quarter of revenue. The earnings, book and cash-flow multiples were not recomputed. The negative prior medians on the earnings ratios reflect that Bloom was loss-making across most of the comparison window.
against this

Comparing today's multiples against prior-year medians struck while the company was loss-making is close to meaningless on the earnings-based ratios, so the own-history comparison is only informative on the sales multiples, where 17.5 against 3.67 to 4.29 is a real expansion and not an artifact of the loss-making base.

  1. 2026-09-24editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-24 review (S21): the price rose 34.9% between the two reviews with no quarter reported in between, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  2. 2026-09-26editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-26 review (S22) at the September 25 close: the price rose again with no quarter reported, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  3. 2026-10-29editedRe-struck at the October 28 close ($228.08, 21.0% below the September 25 close) on the trailing revenue the September 10-Q adds; the earlier multiples (27.31 and 27.36) described a price that no longer trades.
current state · 2026-10-28written 2026-08-24
C16עובדהhigh confidence
No filed competitor cohort could be established for Bloom. Its Item 1 names three classes and no company; each class was chased to its listed members and every candidate failed the confirmation gate. Plug Power was recorded segment_only - hydrogen-led, selling into a different primary market while overlapping at the electrolyzer and data-center edges. GE Vernova was rejected on scale and perimeter - its turbines are heavy-duty and aeroderivative units sold to utilities through one line of one of three segments. Caterpillar, Cummins, Mitsubishi Power and Siemens Energy were recorded as unlisted for this purpose. The research pack therefore returns peer_valuation unavailable with zero members.
current state · 2026-08-24written 2026-08-24
C44עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended September 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,235.8 million, up 138.1% from $519.0 million, with product revenue of $1,073.6 million up 179.4%; GAAP gross margin of 33.8% against 29.2%; GAAP operating income of $225.4 million against $7.8 million; and GAAP diluted earnings per share of $0.78 against a loss of $0.10 (non-GAAP $0.94 against $0.15). Cash flow from operating activities was a use of about $27.1 million in the quarter (nine months $272.9 million less first half $300.0 million), because over nine months contract assets rose $618.0 million and receivables $264.8 million. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million at September 30, 2026.
against this

The quarter's cash use is working capital rather than weaker earnings: contract assets (revenue recognised before it is billed) stood at $792.8 million against $178.9 million at December 31, 2025, while deferred revenue and customer deposits rose $610.6 million over nine months. Management calls the business self-funding and expects positive free cash flow for the full year, which is a forecast, not a filed result.

historical · Q3 2026written 2026-10-22
01

החברה

מרכז נתונים ל-AI עשוי להמתין שנים לחיבור לרשת. Bloom מוכרת לו דרך לעקוף את ההמתנה: מערכת תאי דלק באתר של הלקוח, שהופכת גז טבעי, ביו-גז או מימן לחשמל בלי לשרוף אותם ובלי חלקים נעים.

האפשרויות האחרות של הקונה הן מנועי גז, טורבינות גז קטנות או פאנלים סולריים עם סוללות. כ-1,100 אתרים בתשע מדינות פועלים על מערכות של Bloom.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 2 טענות
C01עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom Energy manufactures the Bloom Energy Server, a proprietary high-temperature solid-oxide fuel cell system converting natural gas, biogas or hydrogen into electricity without combustion or moving parts, and the Bloom Electrolyzer for hydrogen production, both built on a common solid-oxide platform with shared supply chain and manufacturing. As of December 31, 2025 Bloom had Energy Server systems deployed across approximately 1,100 sites in 9 countries, employed more than 2,000 people, and manufactured in Fremont, California and Delaware. Nearly all product revenue has been attributable to the Energy Server rather than the Electrolyzer.
historical · as of 2025-12-31written 2026-08-24
C02עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's FY2025 10-K competition section names classes of competitor and no company: it states it competes against centralized utility grids and against original equipment manufacturers providing on-site firm resources, specifically gas reciprocating engines, small gas turbines, and intermittent solar power paired with storage.
historical · as disclosed in the FY2025 10-Kwritten 2026-08-24

ממה היא מרוויחה

Bloom מוכרת את המערכת לא תמיד למשתמש עצמו, אלא לא פעם למממן שמחזיק בה ומוכר את החשמל, כי רוב המשתמשים מעדיפים לשלם רק על החשמל שהם צורכים. את היתר מוסיפים שירותים. ברבעון שהסתיים ביוני הגיעו המוצרים ל-935.4 מיליון דולר מתוך 1.07 מיליארד, ומכל דולר מכירות נשארו ל-Bloom 33.4 סנט אחרי עלות הייצור.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 2 טענות
C20עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's stated strategic partnerships are with SK ecoplant Co., Ltd. - its related party, South Korean distribution partner, and largest FY2025 customer - and with Brookfield Asset Management, which participates through joint-venture financing structures Bloom accounts for under the equity method because it does not have a controlling financial interest. Bloom's customers are frequently financiers rather than end users: the company states that the majority of end users prefer to pay for power consumed, so the Energy Server is sold to a financier or strategic partner that then owns it.
historical · as disclosed in the FY2025 10-Kwritten 2026-08-24
C03עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended June 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,065.4 million, up 165.5% from $401.2 million, with product revenue of $935.4 million up 215.4%; gross margin of 33.4%, up 668 basis points from 26.7%; GAAP operating income of $182.2 million against a $3.5 million operating loss a year earlier; cash flow from operating activities of positive $226.4 million against negative $213.1 million; and GAAP earnings per share of $0.62 against a loss of $0.18. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,666.9 million at June 30, 2026.
historical · Q2 2026written 2026-08-24
פירוט מקורות ההכנסה
מקורמשקל במכירות (המחצית הראשונה של 2026)איך
מוצר87.5%מערכות תאי הדלק Energy Server, שנמכרות ללקוחות או למממנים שמחזיקים בהן ומוכרים הלאה את החשמל.
שירות7.2%חוזי תחזוקה לצי המערכות המותקן, בניכוי תשלומים לפי ערבויות ביצועים.
התקנה4.2%עבודות באתר להתקנת השרתים במקומות שבהם Bloom מבצעת אותן; הלקוחות יכולים לבחור במתקין צד שלישי.
חשמל1.1%חשמל שנמכר משרתים ש-Bloom שומרת במאזן שלה, במסגרת חוזי שירותים מנוהלים וחוזי חכירה.

ההנהלה

קיי.אר. סרידהר ייסד את Bloom ועומד בראשה מאז 2002, והוביל אותה משנים של הפסדים לרווח התפעולי הראשון שלה ב-2024. סמנכ״ל כספים חדש, סיימון אדוארדס, הצטרף באפריל 2026. בעלי העניין מחזיקים בכ-3% מהמניות, שני שלישים מהן בידי סרידהר. הבונוס שלו נקבע לפי המכירות והרווח התפעולי המתואם, והמניות שהוא מקבל לפי צמיחת מכירות המוצרים, שיעור הרווח על המוצרים והשגת עסקאות גדולות עם מרכזי נתונים ל-AI; אף רכיב בשכר שלו לא קשור למזומנים או לרווח למניה.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 3 טענות
C39עובדהhigh confidence
KR Sridhar founded Bloom and has been its chief executive and chairman since 2002 (a director since January 2002). Simon Edwards became chief financial officer on April 13, 2026; from May 2025, when Daniel Berenbaum left, Maciej Kurzymski, chief accounting officer since July 2021, was acting principal financial officer, and he stays principal accounting officer.
current state · 2026-07-28written 2026-10-04
C40עובדהhigh confidence
As of February 27, 2026 the 14 directors and executive officers as a group beneficially owned 8,339,993 shares, 3.0% of 282,410,088 Class A shares; KR Sridhar held 5,662,140 (2.0%, including 1,704,670 exercisable options), the largest insider, and none of the shares was pledged. Ameriprise (10.7%), BlackRock (7.9%) and Vanguard (6.9%) were the holders above 5%. Class A is the only class outstanding, so no holder has voting control.
against this

Insiders filed Form 144 notices of proposed sales and Form 4s through August, September and early October 2026, so the February holdings are likely higher than today's; the sales were not read for this block.

current state · 2026-02-27written 2026-10-04
C41עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's 2025 annual cash incentive paid on total revenue and non-GAAP operating income, with the maximum raised to twice target; it paid 200% on $2.024 billion of revenue and $250 million of non-GAAP operating income. The 2025-2027 PSUs pay 0 to 200% on average annual product revenue growth and non-GAAP product gross margin; the CEO's December 2024 package of 1,500,000 PSUs and 500,000 RSUs uses the same metrics, plus 300,000 PSUs on strategic goals including large AI data-centre wins. No metric pays on cash flow, return on capital or a per-share figure.
against this
  • The PSU targets are not disclosed, the board citing competitive harm, so how hard the goals are cannot be checked; in the first year the financial targets for one-third of the CEO's PSUs were met at 300%.
  • Revenue growth is rewarded twice, in the cash bonus and the PSUs, while the share count that dilutes it (C14) is rewarded nowhere.
historical · FY2025written 2026-10-04
02

היתרון התחרותי, ומי מאיים עליו

למה הלקוחות נשארים

Bloom מתכננת ומדפיסה בעצמה את התאים ובונה את ערימות התאים, כך שהכימיה, המכונה והמפעל הם פלטפורמה אחת שבבעלותה, ולא ערכת חלקים שנקנו מבחוץ.

מבחוץ רואים זאת בהתקנות שפועלות יותר מעשור בכ-1,100 אתרים: רשימת ההפניות שקונה של חשמל קריטי בודק לפני שהוא חותם.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 1 טענה
C01עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom Energy manufactures the Bloom Energy Server, a proprietary high-temperature solid-oxide fuel cell system converting natural gas, biogas or hydrogen into electricity without combustion or moving parts, and the Bloom Electrolyzer for hydrogen production, both built on a common solid-oxide platform with shared supply chain and manufacturing. As of December 31, 2025 Bloom had Energy Server systems deployed across approximately 1,100 sites in 9 countries, employed more than 2,000 people, and manufactured in Fremont, California and Delaware. Nearly all product revenue has been attributable to the Energy Server rather than the Electrolyzer.
historical · as of 2025-12-31written 2026-08-24

האיום

האיום הגדול יותר הוא קונה שבוחר בכלל לא לייצר חשמל באתר. Constellation ו-Vistra חתמו על חוזים ל-20 שנה לאספקת חשמל ל-Microsoft ול-Meta מתחנות כוח קיימות, ו-Vistra לבדה על 2,609 מגה-וואט.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 1 טענה
C26עובדהhigh confidence
The merchant power generators in this repo's own coverage are converting exactly the demand that would otherwise justify on-site generation: Constellation Energy has signed long-term nuclear power agreements with Microsoft (approximately 835 megawatts, 20 years), Meta (the Clinton plant, 20 years), CyrusOne (380 megawatts) and Walmart (approximately 176 megawatts, two 15-year terms), and Vistra has signed a 20-year agreement with Meta for 2,609 megawatts. Each of those is a buyer choosing a contract for grid-delivered firm power over becoming a power-plant owner.
against this

These contracts and Bloom's product are not strictly substitutes for every buyer: a power purchase agreement delivers electrons over the grid and remains subject to interconnection timing, whereas an Energy Server delivers power on site in months, so a buyer facing a five-year queue may need both. The threat is to the marginal decision rather than to the whole market.

current state · 2026-08-24written 2026-08-24

המתחרות: CAT, CMI, CEG, VST, GEV, PLUG.

פירוט המתחרים
סימולמתחרהשלבבסיס להשוואה
CAT · CMICaterpillar ו-Cummins, היצרניות הנסחרות של גנרטורי גז טבעי בוכנתיים, שסעיף 1 (Item 1) בדוח של Bloom עצמה מציין כסוג המתחרים הראשוןבסיס להשוואה: אותו מוצרכבר נמכראותו מוצר
CEG · VSTConstellation Energy ו-Vistra, שמוכרות הסכמי רכישת חשמל ארוכי טווח, בסמוך לצרכן או דרך הרשת, מצי תחנות הכוח הגרעיניות והגז הקיימות שלהןבסיס להשוואה: מוצר שונהכבר נמכרמוצר שונה
GEVGE Vernova וגם Mitsubishi Power, בסוג טורבינות הגז הקטנות, שסעיף 1 בדוח של Bloom מציין במקום השניבסיס להשוואה: מוצר שונהכבר נמכרמוצר שונה
PLUGPlug Powerבסיס להשוואה: בתחום אחד בלבדכבר נמכרבתחום אחד בלבד
03

פוטנציאל הצמיחה

גודל ההזדמנות

הביקוש נמדד: לפי תחזיות ממשלת ארה״ב, חלקם של שרתי מרכזי נתונים בצריכת החשמל של מבנים מסחריים יעלה מכ-7% ב-2025 לשיעור שבין 22% ל-33% עד 2050.

ההיצע עשוי להיות המגבלה. התאים משתמשים בסקנדיום, ובעולם הופקו ב-2024 כ-40 טון ממנו, רובם בסין. מוכר בחסר מעריך שיעד החמישה ג'יגה-וואט של Bloom ידרוש כ-220 טון בשנה. Bloom לא אמרה כמה היא משתמשת, ולכן הביקוש וההיצע אף פעם לא נפגשים במספר אחד.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 3 טענות
C23עובדהhigh confidence
Independent Energy Information Administration data projects US data-center server electricity use rising from roughly 7% of commercial-building electricity consumption in 2025 toward 22%-33% by 2050 across its modelled cases, the same national demand base used in this repo's Constellation Energy thesis.
current state · 2026-08-24written 2026-08-24
C10עובדהhigh confidence
The US Geological Survey's Mineral Commodity Summaries for January 2025 reports: 'In 2024, the global consumption of scandium oxide was estimated to be about 30 to 40 tons per year with a global capacity estimate of 80 tons per year. According to industry estimates, global production totaled 40 tons.' It states 'China was the leading producer', that 'In the United States, there is no current mine production of scandium', and that scandium 'is produced exclusively as a byproduct during processing of various ores'. It also records that in Tangshan, Hebei Province, China, new scandium oxide production capacity reached 20 tons per year.
historical · 2024 data, published January 2025written 2026-08-24
C11עובדהmedium confidence
On July 8, 2026 the short-seller Hunterbrook published a report titled 'Bloom's Big Lie' alleging that Bloom obtains scandium sourced from China through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan and South Korea despite telling investors it has no China supply chain, citing a representative of Hunan Oriental Scandium describing that company as Bloom's largest scandium supplier; that Bloom's five-gigawatt production goal would require roughly 220 tons of scandium oxide a year against a projected global supply near 240 tons; and that Bloom's unaudited order book of roughly $20 billion compares with audited binding performance obligations nearer $492 million. Bloom's shares fell on the report and the company said it would correct the record.
against this

Hunterbrook is a short seller with a financial position in the outcome and is therefore the least disinterested possible source on Bloom; its 220-ton and 240-ton figures also do not reconcile with the US Geological Survey's independent estimate of 40 tons of global production and 80 tons of capacity (C10), a discrepancy this thesis does not resolve and does not need to: the USGS figure is both authoritative and smaller, so the supply constraint it implies is tighter, not looser, than the short report's.

historical · 2026-07-08written 2026-08-24

מי כבר התחייב

הלקוחות המחויבים שעולים מהדוחות הם לקוחות ש-Bloom אינה מציינת בשמם. אחד מהם קנה כ-73% מהמכירות במחצית הראשונה של 2026; ברבעון ספטמבר שניים קנו 43% ו-26%, והשני צד קשור. שנה קודם לכן אף לקוח בודד לא עבר 30% ממכירות רבעון.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 1 טענה
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
מאיפה מגיעה הצמיחה, לפי פעילות

מאיפה מגיעה הצמיחה

פעילותמשקל בהכנסותצמיחה ברבעון האחרוןבחצי השנה האחרונהבשנה האחרונה
מוצר87%+179.4%+195.0%+170.4%
התקנה7%+35.2%+36.3%+40.0%
שירות5%+15.3%+20.8%+17.9%
חשמל1%-5.2%-14.7%-37.4%
החברה כולה100%+138.9%+150.5%+126.7%

הפילוח שבדוחות עד 30 בספטמבר 2026. הקצבים האלה לא מועברים קדימה: ההסבר שלהלן.

איך אנחנו קוראים את זה: השוק מניח צמיחה של כ-100% לפי התחזית, לא את ה-188% המשולבים: הקצב נשען על שני לקוחות שהיוו 69% מהרבעון השלישי של 2026, ועל בסיס חלש במחצית הראשונה של 2025. התחזית מרמזת על מחצית שנייה איטית יותר.

04

התוצאות

המספרים

היא צומחת?מהר

המכירות צמחו ב-111% ב-12 החודשים עד ספטמבר 2026, לעומת 37% בשנה שהסתיימה בדצמבר 2025.

Dec 2021: $972MDec 2022: $1.20BDec 2023: $1.33BDec 2024: $1.47BDec 2025: $2.02B12 mo to Sep 2026: $3.83B$972M$3.83B
היא רווחית?כן

שיעור הרווח התפעולי הוא 15%, לעומת ‎−16% בשנה שהסתיימה בדצמבר 2023.

Dec 2021: −12%Dec 2022: −22%Dec 2023: −16%Dec 2024: 1.6%Dec 2025: 3.6%12 mo to Sep 2026: 15%−12%15%
הצמיחה משתלמת?משתלמת

ההוצאות התפעוליות עומדות על 18 סנט מכל דולר מכירות, לעומת 32 סנט בשנה שהסתיימה בדצמבר 2021.

Dec 2021: 32¢Dec 2022: 34¢Dec 2023: 30¢Dec 2024: 26¢Dec 2025: 25¢12 mo to Sep 2026: 18¢32¢18¢
התשואה על ההון גבוהה?גבוהה מאוד

התשואה על ההון העצמי עומדת על 40% בשנה, לעומת ‎−11 פעמים בשנה שהסתיימה בדצמבר 2021.

Dec 2021: −11×Dec 2022: −213%Dec 2023: −73%Dec 2024: −5.1%Dec 2025: −13%12 mo to Sep 2026: 40%−11×40%
היא מייצרת מזומנים?כן

11% מהמכירות הפכו לתזרים מזומנים חופשי: 437 מיליון דולר ב-12 החודשים האחרונים.

Dec 2021: −$110MDec 2022: −$309MDec 2023: −$456MDec 2024: $33.1MDec 2025: $57.2M12 mo to Sep 2026: $437M−$110M$437M
המאזן איתן?מזומן נטו

בקופה 2.49 מיליארד דולר מזומנים מול 2.48 מיליארד דולר חוב, כלומר 7.25 מיליון דולר יותר מזומן ממה שהיא חייבת.

Dec 2021: −$131MDec 2022: −$63.1MDec 2023: −$182MDec 2024: −$440MDec 2025: −$168M12 mo to Sep 2026: $7.25M−$131M$7.25M
בעלי המניות מדוללים?כן

מספר המניות עלה ב-87% ב-4.8 שנים.

Dec 2021: 173MDec 2022: 186MDec 2023: 213MDec 2024: 227MDec 2025: 240M12 mo to Sep 2026: 324M173M324M
כל המספרים

נתונים מהדוחות השנתיים (10-K) והרבעוניים (10-Q) של החברה, נקראו ב-22 באוקטובר 2026. שנת הכספים מסתיימת בדצמבר.

דצמבר 2021דצמבר 2022דצמבר 2023דצמבר 2024דצמבר 202512 חודשים עד ספטמבר 2026
גודל וצמיחה
מכירות$972M$1.20B$1.33B$1.47B$2.02B$3.83B
צמיחת המכירות+22%+23%+11%+11%+37%+111%
רווח
שיעור הרווח הגולמי20%12%15%27%29%32%
שיעור הרווח התפעולי−12%−22%−16%1.6%3.6%15%
שיעור הרווח הנקי−20%−26%−23%−1.8%−4.3%14%
עלות הצמיחה, לכל דולר מכירות
מחקר ופיתוח11%13%12%10%9.2%6.2%
מכירות ושיווק8.9%7.6%6.7%4.6%6.4%4.6%
הנהלה וכלליות13%14%12%11%9.8%6.8%
השקעות הוניות5.1%9.7%6.3%4.0%2.8%6.6%
מזומנים
תזרים מפעילות שוטפת−$60.7M−$192M−$373M$92.0M$114M$691M
תזרים מזומנים חופשי−$110M−$309M−$456M$33.1M$57.2M$437M
מאזן
מזומנים והשקעות לזמן קצר$396M$348M$665M$803M$2.45B$2.49B
חוב$527M$412M$847M$1.24B$2.62B$2.48B
מזומן נטו−$131M−$63.1M−$182M−$440M−$168M$7.25M
תשואות ומניות
תשואה על ההון המושקע-----18%
מספר המניות (בדילול מלא)173M186M213M227M240M324M

עלות הצמיחה

הצמיחה משפרת את הרווחיות של Bloom: ההוצאות על מחקר, מכירות ומשרדים גדלות לאט בהרבה מהמכירות, ולכן כל מכירה נוספת עולה פחות. התנאי הוא שהרווח על כל שרת יישמר; כשהוא נחלש ב-2022, ההפסדים העמיקו.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 2 טענות
C43עובדהhigh confidence
Per sales dollar, research and development fell from 10.5 cents in 2020 to 9.2 in 2025 and 7.1 over the four quarters to June 2026, sales and marketing from 7.0 to 6.4 and 5.3, general and administrative from 13.5 to 9.8 and 7.6, and capital spending from 4.8 to 2.8 and 3.6, while gross margin rose from 20.9% to 29.0% and 31.2%; operating margin went from -10.2% to 3.6% and 11.2%. R&D dollars rose 2.6 times to $220.3 million while revenue rose 3.9 times to $3,113.2 million.
against this
  • In 2022, when gross margin fell to 12.4%, R&D rose to 12.6 cents per sales dollar and operating margin to -21.8%, so the leverage depends on the gross margin holding.
  • Sales and marketing rose from 4.6 cents in 2024 to 6.4 in 2025, and stock pay from 5.6 to 6.9 cents (C42), so not every overhead line is shrinking.
historical · FY2020 to the four quarters to June 2026written 2026-10-04
C03עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended June 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,065.4 million, up 165.5% from $401.2 million, with product revenue of $935.4 million up 215.4%; gross margin of 33.4%, up 668 basis points from 26.7%; GAAP operating income of $182.2 million against a $3.5 million operating loss a year earlier; cash flow from operating activities of positive $226.4 million against negative $213.1 million; and GAAP earnings per share of $0.62 against a loss of $0.18. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,666.9 million at June 30, 2026.
historical · Q2 2026written 2026-08-24

הדוח האחרון (28 ביולי)

הרבעון שהסתיים ביוני 2026, לפי הדוחות.

41.8%
צמיחה לעומת הרבעון הקודם
לעומת ‎−3.4% ברבעון שלפני כן
17¢
רווח תפעולי
לכל דולר מכירות

ברבעון שהסתיים ב-30 בספטמבר 2026 המכירות הגיעו ל-1,235.8 מיליון דולר, עלייה של 138%. מכל דולר מכירות נשארו ל-Bloom 33.8 סנט אחרי עלות המכר, הרווח התפעולי עמד על 225.4 מיליון דולר לעומת 7.8 מיליון, והתחזית השנתית עלתה ל-4.4 עד 4.6 מיליארד דולר.

המזומנים לא הלכו אחרי הרבעון: התזרים מפעילות שוטפת היה שלילי, 27 מיליון דולר, כי החיוב בפועל התעכב אחרי המכירות שהחברה רשמה. שני לקוחות, אחד מהם צד קשור, קנו 69% מהרבעון.

מה זה אומר על התזההדוח אישר את המעבר לרווחיות ואת התחזית. הוא לא ענה על הספקות שמאחורי הציון לא אטרקטיבית: שני קונים עדיין מחזיקים ברוב המכירות, אף דיווח רשמי לא אומר מאיפה מגיע הסקנדיום, ובתביעה הייצוגית כבר יש תובע מוביל.

הרבעון בפירוט

צמיחת המכירות לעומת הרבעון הקודם, לפי הדוחות.

רווח למניה $0.78 לעומת $0.39 צפוי; $0.62 לפי הדוחות, והפער הוא הסעיפים שהחברה מנטרלת.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 5 טענות
C44עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended September 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,235.8 million, up 138.1% from $519.0 million, with product revenue of $1,073.6 million up 179.4%; GAAP gross margin of 33.8% against 29.2%; GAAP operating income of $225.4 million against $7.8 million; and GAAP diluted earnings per share of $0.78 against a loss of $0.10 (non-GAAP $0.94 against $0.15). Cash flow from operating activities was a use of about $27.1 million in the quarter (nine months $272.9 million less first half $300.0 million), because over nine months contract assets rose $618.0 million and receivables $264.8 million. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million at September 30, 2026.
against this

The quarter's cash use is working capital rather than weaker earnings: contract assets (revenue recognised before it is billed) stood at $792.8 million against $178.9 million at December 31, 2025, while deferred revenue and customer deposits rose $610.6 million over nine months. Management calls the business self-funding and expects positive free cash flow for the full year, which is a forecast, not a filed result.

historical · Q3 2026written 2026-10-22
C04טענת ההנהלהmedium confidence
With the Q3 2026 results on October 22, 2026 Bloom raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance for the third time this year, to $4.4 billion to $4.6 billion (122% growth at the midpoint), non-GAAP operating income to $960 million to $1,030 million and non-GAAP earnings per share to $3.10 to $3.40, holding non-GAAP gross margin near 34%; the Q2 guidance had been $3.9 billion to $4.2 billion. Revenue for the first nine months was $3,052.3 million, so the range implies $1.35 billion to $1.55 billion in the fourth quarter. Filed annual revenue was $2,024.0 million for FY2025 and $1,473.9 million for FY2024.
against this

The guidance is a forward-looking management figure, and its credibility rests on the same revenue concentration recorded in C06: if one unnamed customer was approximately 73% of first-half revenue, then the full-year figure is substantially a forecast about one buyer's build schedule rather than about market-wide demand, and the company's own release lists backlog recognition among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 results: full-year revenue guidance raised to $4.4-4.6B; the Q2 range of $3.9-4.2B is superseded.
forwardwritten 2026-08-24
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C09עובדהhigh confidence
The word 'scandium' does not appear anywhere in Bloom's FY2025 10-K, a document of approximately 649,000 characters, nor in its Q2 2026 results release. Scandium oxide is a standard stabiliser for solid-oxide fuel cell electrolytes and is the material at the centre of the July 2026 short report and the subsequent securities class action. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q (filed October 22, 2026) does not contain the word either; its risk factor says Bloom 'rejected the report's conclusions regarding our supply chain' and that it believes it has 'sufficient supply of the relevant raw materials to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog', without the China statement or any supplier. Neither the October 22 release nor the call, where no analyst asked, mentions scandium or China.
against this

A company is not required to name every input material in its annual report, so this silence is not itself proof of dependence. Nor is it silence in every filing: on July 9, 2026 Bloom filed an 8-K (C27) rejecting the short report's conclusions and stating that its scandium oxide supply is sufficient for current demand and backlog and is not dependent on China, which also settles that Bloom's cells use scandium oxide, a point this ledger previously recorded as unconfirmed. What keeps the absence load-bearing is that the 8-K names no supplier and no country of origin, and the annual report's affirmative China statement (C08) still never names the input the allegation concerns.

  1. 2026-09-24editedCounter-evidence corrected in the open: it said Bloom had never confirmed its cells use scandium, but the July 9, 2026 8-K (S14), which the original pass did not open, discusses Bloom's scandium oxide supply directly. The claim text itself remains true.
  2. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q, release and call read: scandium still unnamed in any filing; the denial is repeated in shorter form.
historical · FY2025 10-K, Q2 and Q3 2026 releases and 10-Qswritten 2026-08-24
C12עובדהhigh confidence
A securities class action, Nevins v. Bloom Energy Corporation, No. 26-cv-07944 in the Northern District of California, has been filed against Bloom Energy and certain executives in respect of a class period running February 27, 2025 through July 8, 2026, alleging that the company made false or misleading statements by failing to disclose that it obtained scandium through intermediaries who sourced the metal from China and thereby understated its reliance on Chinese scandium. The court-set deadline to apply for lead plaintiff is September 28, 2026. Neither the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q filed July 28, 2026 nor the Q2 2026 results release mentions the litigation, Hunterbrook, China or scandium. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q discloses the suit, says its allegations 'mirror' the Hunterbrook report, calls it without merit and records that on October 15, 2026 the court appointed Nicole Caraoué as lead plaintiff and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd as lead counsel; the complaint is still preliminary and the lead-plaintiff deadline has passed.
against this

A filed complaint is an allegation and not a finding, plaintiffs' firms solicit class members as a matter of routine after any sharp price decline, and the class action may be dismissed. The 10-Q's silence is also defensible if the suit was filed after the July 28 filing date. What survives those caveats is that the company has answered the allegation only by denial, in a July 9, 2026 8-K and one answer on the Q2 call where the chief executive said that is all Bloom will say (C27), and has named no supplier or country of origin in any document.

  1. 2026-09-24editedCaption and court added from the lead-plaintiff notices (S19); counter-evidence corrected, because the company has answered the allegation by denial in a July 9, 2026 8-K and on the Q2 call (C27), which the original pass recorded as unanswered.
  2. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: the suit is now disclosed, lead plaintiff and counsel appointed October 15; no ruling on a motion to dismiss yet.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-08-24
לאן הלך הכסף

ל-Bloom אין בעיית מזומנים: 2.67 מיליארד דולר בקופה ביוני. אבל מספר המניות גדל בכ-25% מאז מרץ 2025, ולכן כל מניה מחזיקה בנתח קטן יותר מהמפנה.

בעלי עניין ברבעון השני של 2026: 13 רכישות ו-18 מכירות, לפי דיווחי Form 4 שלהם.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 2 טענות
C13עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's balance sheet at June 30, 2026 carried cash and cash equivalents of $2,666.9 million against $2,454.1 million at December 31, 2025; accounts receivable of $458.1 million; inventories of $758.2 million; total current assets of $4,590.1 million; and total stockholders' equity of $1,640.7 million including a $28.7 million noncontrolling interest. The accumulated deficit stood at $3,721.0 million, down from $3,965.0 million a year earlier as the company turned profitable. At September 30, 2026 cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million, accounts receivable $634.7 million, contract assets $792.8 million (current), inventories $927.7 million, total current assets $5,207.8 million and recourse debt $2,473.5 million.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 balance sheet added; cash is $2.49B, little changed since December while contract assets and receivables grew.
current state · 2026-09-30written 2026-08-24
C14עובדהmedium confidence
Shares of common stock outstanding rose from 231,969,446 at March 31, 2025 to 233,661,168 at June 30, 2025 to 280,045,459 at December 31, 2025. Against the August 24, 2026 research pack's reference price of $204.02 and market capitalisation of $59.33 billion, implied shares outstanding are approximately 291 million, roughly 25% above the March 2025 count. Bloom also has convertible notes outstanding, with a premium on convertible debt recorded in additional paid-in capital. The Q3 2026 equity statement shows 295,537,217 shares outstanding at September 30, 2026, including 7,796,169 shares issued on conversion of the Green Notes and 2,154,231 on a cashless exercise of the warrant issued as consideration for Oracle's partnership.
against this

Share growth at a company transitioning from losses to profit is partly the mechanical effect of stock compensation vesting and convertible instruments moving in the money as the price rises, rather than distress financing, and the equity raised has funded a balance sheet now holding $2.67 billion of cash. The offsetting point is that roughly 25% share growth in fifteen months means per-share progress lags company progress by a wide margin, and the convertible notes add further potential dilution the share count does not yet reflect.

  1. 2026-09-24editedWording made explicit that the reference price is the August 24, 2026 pack's, since the pack beside the thesis was refreshed at the 2026-09-24 review.
  2. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: 295.5 million shares at September 30, 2026, up from 280.0 million at December 31, 2025.
current state · 2026-09-30written 2026-08-24
05

המחיר, ואיפה אנחנו חלוקים על השוק

בקצרה. מגלם תרחיש מושלם. המפנה של Bloom לרווחיות אמיתי, אבל המחיר מניח שהוא יחזור על עצמו פעמים רבות, כשרוב המכירות הולכות לקונה אחד שלא נחשף בשמו ואיש מבחוץ לא יכול לבדוק אותו.

מחיר המניה
$276.98
שער סגירה,
שווי החברה לכל דולר מכירות
27.4
המכפיל המקובל בשש השנים האחרונות: 4.3

הדוח פורסם. המניה נסגרה ב-28 באוקטובר על 228.08 דולר, 21% מתחת לסגירה של 25 בספטמבר שעליה נשענו טענות המחיר הקודמות שלנו, ולכן קבענו אותן מחדש לפי הסגירה הזאת.

המבחן הבא הוא הדוח השנתי בתחילת 2027. הנקודות לבדיקה: מי הלקוחות, האם דיווח רשמי מגלה מאיפה מגיע הסקנדיום, והאם התזרים מפעילות שוטפת יחזור להיות חיובי.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 4 טענות
C18עובדהhigh confidence
As of the October 28, 2026 close Bloom traded at $228.08, 21.0% below the $288.70 close of September 25, 11.8% above the $204.02 close on which this thesis was first struck, and 35.1% below its 252-day high of $351.28 (the high is from the September 25 pack).
  1. 2026-09-24editedRefreshed at the 2026-09-24 review on the refreshed research pack (S21); the 20-day range fell out of the 'Very volatile' bucket.
  2. 2026-09-26editedRefreshed at the 2026-09-26 review on the refreshed research pack (S22) at the September 25 close.
  3. 2026-10-29editedRe-struck at the October 28 close after the September-quarter report; the price fell 21.0% from the September 25 strike, over the 12% drift trigger. The moving-average, range and return figures were dropped because they were not recomputed.
current state · 2026-10-28written 2026-08-24
C15עובדהhigh confidence
At the October 28, 2026 close of $228.08, with the 294.5 million shares the research pack carried at the September 25 close and the filer's trailing revenue of $3,829.9 million for the four quarters to September 30, 2026, Bloom's price-to-sales is about 17.5 and its enterprise value to sales about 17.5, against prior-fiscal-years medians of 3.67 and 4.29. At the September 25 close the same two multiples were 27.31 and 27.36 on the June-quarter revenue of $3,113.2 million; the fall is the 21.0% drop in the price plus a quarter of revenue. The earnings, book and cash-flow multiples were not recomputed. The negative prior medians on the earnings ratios reflect that Bloom was loss-making across most of the comparison window.
against this

Comparing today's multiples against prior-year medians struck while the company was loss-making is close to meaningless on the earnings-based ratios, so the own-history comparison is only informative on the sales multiples, where 17.5 against 3.67 to 4.29 is a real expansion and not an artifact of the loss-making base.

  1. 2026-09-24editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-24 review (S21): the price rose 34.9% between the two reviews with no quarter reported in between, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  2. 2026-09-26editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-26 review (S22) at the September 25 close: the price rose again with no quarter reported, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  3. 2026-10-29editedRe-struck at the October 28 close ($228.08, 21.0% below the September 25 close) on the trailing revenue the September 10-Q adds; the earlier multiples (27.31 and 27.36) described a price that no longer trades.
current state · 2026-10-28written 2026-08-24
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C44עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended September 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,235.8 million, up 138.1% from $519.0 million, with product revenue of $1,073.6 million up 179.4%; GAAP gross margin of 33.8% against 29.2%; GAAP operating income of $225.4 million against $7.8 million; and GAAP diluted earnings per share of $0.78 against a loss of $0.10 (non-GAAP $0.94 against $0.15). Cash flow from operating activities was a use of about $27.1 million in the quarter (nine months $272.9 million less first half $300.0 million), because over nine months contract assets rose $618.0 million and receivables $264.8 million. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million at September 30, 2026.
against this

The quarter's cash use is working capital rather than weaker earnings: contract assets (revenue recognised before it is billed) stood at $792.8 million against $178.9 million at December 31, 2025, while deferred revenue and customer deposits rose $610.6 million over nine months. Management calls the business self-funding and expects positive free cash flow for the full year, which is a forecast, not a filed result.

historical · Q3 2026written 2026-10-22
ההימורהמחיר כבר מגלם הצלחה
אם ההימור מצליח
0.8×
מהשווי היום, במכפיל שצוין
אם ההימור נכשל
נשאר 4%
מהשווי בשוק היום: מה שהמקרה הגרוע ביותר משאיר לבעלי המניות
איך לקרוא את המכפיל

שווי החברה כולה, כולל החוב, הוא כ-17.5 פעמים מכירות של שנה, לעומת כ-4 בעבר הקרוב של Bloom עצמה. Bloom הגיעה לרווחיות רק לאחרונה.

המחיר הזה לא מסתפק במפנה שכבר קרה; הוא מגלם עוד כמה כמוהו, מרשימת לקוחות שאיש מבחוץ לא רואה.

אין חברה נסחרת שעושה מספיק קרוב את אותו הדבר כדי שאפשר יהיה לבדוק מולה את המחיר.

מול ההיסטוריה שלה. המניה יקרה בהרבה מהעבר שלה בכל מדד. העסק אכן הפך לרווחי, אבל המחיר התרחק הרבה יותר מהעסק.

הראיות (באנגלית) · 2 טענות
C15עובדהhigh confidence
At the October 28, 2026 close of $228.08, with the 294.5 million shares the research pack carried at the September 25 close and the filer's trailing revenue of $3,829.9 million for the four quarters to September 30, 2026, Bloom's price-to-sales is about 17.5 and its enterprise value to sales about 17.5, against prior-fiscal-years medians of 3.67 and 4.29. At the September 25 close the same two multiples were 27.31 and 27.36 on the June-quarter revenue of $3,113.2 million; the fall is the 21.0% drop in the price plus a quarter of revenue. The earnings, book and cash-flow multiples were not recomputed. The negative prior medians on the earnings ratios reflect that Bloom was loss-making across most of the comparison window.
against this

Comparing today's multiples against prior-year medians struck while the company was loss-making is close to meaningless on the earnings-based ratios, so the own-history comparison is only informative on the sales multiples, where 17.5 against 3.67 to 4.29 is a real expansion and not an artifact of the loss-making base.

  1. 2026-09-24editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-24 review (S21): the price rose 34.9% between the two reviews with no quarter reported in between, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  2. 2026-09-26editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-26 review (S22) at the September 25 close: the price rose again with no quarter reported, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  3. 2026-10-29editedRe-struck at the October 28 close ($228.08, 21.0% below the September 25 close) on the trailing revenue the September 10-Q adds; the earlier multiples (27.31 and 27.36) described a price that no longer trades.
current state · 2026-10-28written 2026-08-24
C16עובדהhigh confidence
No filed competitor cohort could be established for Bloom. Its Item 1 names three classes and no company; each class was chased to its listed members and every candidate failed the confirmation gate. Plug Power was recorded segment_only - hydrogen-led, selling into a different primary market while overlapping at the electrolyzer and data-center edges. GE Vernova was rejected on scale and perimeter - its turbines are heavy-duty and aeroderivative units sold to utilities through one line of one of three segments. Caterpillar, Cummins, Mitsubishi Power and Siemens Energy were recorded as unlisted for this purpose. The research pack therefore returns peer_valuation unavailable with zero members.
current state · 2026-08-24written 2026-08-24
המכפיל מול המתחרים

אין קבוצת חברות להשוות אליה. אין קבוצת השוואה מבוססת דוחות, ולכן מכפיל המכירות נבחן מול ההיסטוריה של Bloom בלבד, וההיסטוריה הזו נקבעה בזמן שהחברה הפסידה. לכן המחיר נבחן מול ההיסטוריה של החברה עצמה.

מתחרות פרטיות או זרות שאין להן מחיר להשוואה: Caterpillar ו-Cummins (מנועי גז בוכנתיים),‏ Mitsubishi Power וכן Siemens Energy (טורבינות גז קטנות).

ההימור: מה הוא מניב אם יצליח

גם אם ההימור יצליח, המניה נראית יקרה. התרחיש הטוב ביותר שלנו הוא שהמכירות יוכפלו שוב אחרי ההכפלה השנה, מה שדורש מ-Bloom למצוא עוד כשלושה קונים גדולים כמו הלקוח הגדול שלה שלא נחשף בשמו. גם אז, במכפיל נדיב על המכירות, שווי החברה יהיה נמוך מהיום.

אם ההימור נכשל, Bloom עדיין תהיה עסק אמיתי ורווחי עם הרבה מזומנים, אבל המכירות עלולות לחזור לקרבת הרמה של שנה שעברה והמניה תהיה שווה חלק קטן ממחירה היום.

הכנסות בעוד שנתיים עד שלושקונים בסדר גודל כזה שנדרשיםבמכפיל שצוין
$6.00Bכ-2 אם נשמר 100%0.6×
8.00 מיליארד דולר (ההצלחה הגדולה)כ-3 אם נשמר 100%0.8×
10.84 מיליארד דולר (תחזית השוק)כ-5 אם נשמר 100%1.1×
$12.00Bכ-5 אם נשמר 100%1.2×

לפי התחזיות, ההתקנות בארה״ב של מקורות חשמל באתר למרכזי נתונים יגיעו ב-2029 לכ-20 ג'יגה-וואט בשנה; בנתח של 15% תספק Bloom 3 ג'יגה-וואט, פי 1.5 מהיכולת שלה ב-2026, כ-8.8 מיליארד דולר בנוסף לעסק של היום. לפי התחזית הזו, 10.84 מיליארד דולר מניבים 1.1× מהשווי היום: הימור יקר על תרחיש השוק.

כדי להניב 2× (הימור הוגן) נדרשות הכנסות של כ-20.43 מיליארד דולר (כ-10 קונים בגודל כזה); כדי להניב 5× (הימור זול), כ-51.08 מיליארד דולר (כ-26 קונים בגודל כזה), באותו מכפיל.

השלבים שעליה לעבור

  • הושלם רווח תפעולי ותזרים חיובי מפעילות שוטפת באותו רבעון
  • הושלם אתר של ענקית ענן שמוזכרת בשמה בוחר ב-Bloom: בקשת ההיתר של Oracle לפרויקט Project Jupiter
  • נדחה הדוח הרבעוני (10-Q) לרבעון השלישי של 2026: הריכוז יורד מתחת ל-73% של לקוח יחיד, ושמות הלקוחות נחשפים צפוי בפברואר 2027
  • נדחה צינור הגז של Project Jupiter נכנס לפעולה ויחידות של Bloom פועלות שם צפוי בפברואר 2027
  • בתהליך ההכנסות לשנת 2026 המלאה נמצאות בתוך טווח התחזית, בין 3.9 ל-4.2 מיליארד דולר צפוי בפברואר 2027
  • טרם התחיל נתון מדווח של התחייבויות הביצוע שנותרו (remaining performance obligation), במקום צבר ההזמנות שהחברה מגדירה בעצמה צפוי בפברואר 2027
  • טרם התחיל שרשרת אספקה של סקנדיום מחוץ לסין שמתועדת בדיווח רשמי, והתביעה הייצוגית נדחית צפוי בדצמבר 2027
  • טרם התחיל שלושה קונים או יותר בגודל הלקוח המרכזי, הכנסות של קרוב ל-8 מיליארד דולר בשנה צפוי בדצמבר 2028
הפירוט שמאחורי הדירוג
Rating
Expensive
the big win's payoff against the 2× and 5× lines
Cheap bet at about
≈ $42.97
‎84% מתחת למחיר (שער סגירה, )
Market case
1.1×
an expensive bet if the market forecast holds
הראיות (באנגלית) · 6 טענות
C03עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended June 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,065.4 million, up 165.5% from $401.2 million, with product revenue of $935.4 million up 215.4%; gross margin of 33.4%, up 668 basis points from 26.7%; GAAP operating income of $182.2 million against a $3.5 million operating loss a year earlier; cash flow from operating activities of positive $226.4 million against negative $213.1 million; and GAAP earnings per share of $0.62 against a loss of $0.18. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,666.9 million at June 30, 2026.
historical · Q2 2026written 2026-08-24
C04טענת ההנהלהmedium confidence
With the Q3 2026 results on October 22, 2026 Bloom raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance for the third time this year, to $4.4 billion to $4.6 billion (122% growth at the midpoint), non-GAAP operating income to $960 million to $1,030 million and non-GAAP earnings per share to $3.10 to $3.40, holding non-GAAP gross margin near 34%; the Q2 guidance had been $3.9 billion to $4.2 billion. Revenue for the first nine months was $3,052.3 million, so the range implies $1.35 billion to $1.55 billion in the fourth quarter. Filed annual revenue was $2,024.0 million for FY2025 and $1,473.9 million for FY2024.
against this

The guidance is a forward-looking management figure, and its credibility rests on the same revenue concentration recorded in C06: if one unnamed customer was approximately 73% of first-half revenue, then the full-year figure is substantially a forecast about one buyer's build schedule rather than about market-wide demand, and the company's own release lists backlog recognition among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 results: full-year revenue guidance raised to $4.4-4.6B; the Q2 range of $3.9-4.2B is superseded.
forwardwritten 2026-08-24
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C07עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's order book is a company-defined measure, not a filed contractual obligation. Its own 10-K states: 'We view product backlog as the revenue attributable to existing contractual commitments for the purchase or use of Energy Servers by a financier or an end customer in the future. Value of product backlog includes both expected Bloom product revenue and reflects anticipated ITC and other tax incentives as applicable.' The phrase 'remaining performance obligation' - the figure US accounting rules require for contracted revenue not yet recognised - appears nowhere in the FY2025 10-K. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q again reports no remaining-performance-obligation or product-backlog figure (the word backlog appears once, in the supply-chain risk factor). On the October 22 call the chief executive said the backlog is 'continuing to expand faster than our revenue' and the chief financial officer that the outlook is built on backlog assessed 'customer by customer against site readiness and conversion timing' plus a probability-weighted view of the pipeline; neither gave a figure.
against this

Backlog measures that include expected tax credits are not unique to Bloom and the company discloses its definition plainly rather than hiding it, which is the opposite of concealment. The concern is not the disclosure but the arithmetic it permits: a figure that counts anticipated investment tax credits and 'commitments' that are not stated to be firm can be much larger than the contracted revenue an auditor would recognise, and Bloom's own Q2 2026 release lists 'the ability of current product and service backlog to ultimately be recognizable as revenue' among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call: still no filed contracted-revenue figure; backlog described as growing faster than revenue without a number.
historical · as disclosed in the FY2025 10-Kwritten 2026-08-24
C13עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's balance sheet at June 30, 2026 carried cash and cash equivalents of $2,666.9 million against $2,454.1 million at December 31, 2025; accounts receivable of $458.1 million; inventories of $758.2 million; total current assets of $4,590.1 million; and total stockholders' equity of $1,640.7 million including a $28.7 million noncontrolling interest. The accumulated deficit stood at $3,721.0 million, down from $3,965.0 million a year earlier as the company turned profitable. At September 30, 2026 cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million, accounts receivable $634.7 million, contract assets $792.8 million (current), inventories $927.7 million, total current assets $5,207.8 million and recourse debt $2,473.5 million.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 balance sheet added; cash is $2.49B, little changed since December while contract assets and receivables grew.
current state · 2026-09-30written 2026-08-24
C15עובדהhigh confidence
At the October 28, 2026 close of $228.08, with the 294.5 million shares the research pack carried at the September 25 close and the filer's trailing revenue of $3,829.9 million for the four quarters to September 30, 2026, Bloom's price-to-sales is about 17.5 and its enterprise value to sales about 17.5, against prior-fiscal-years medians of 3.67 and 4.29. At the September 25 close the same two multiples were 27.31 and 27.36 on the June-quarter revenue of $3,113.2 million; the fall is the 21.0% drop in the price plus a quarter of revenue. The earnings, book and cash-flow multiples were not recomputed. The negative prior medians on the earnings ratios reflect that Bloom was loss-making across most of the comparison window.
against this

Comparing today's multiples against prior-year medians struck while the company was loss-making is close to meaningless on the earnings-based ratios, so the own-history comparison is only informative on the sales multiples, where 17.5 against 3.67 to 4.29 is a real expansion and not an artifact of the loss-making base.

  1. 2026-09-24editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-24 review (S21): the price rose 34.9% between the two reviews with no quarter reported in between, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  2. 2026-09-26editedRe-struck on the research pack refreshed at the 2026-09-26 review (S22) at the September 25 close: the price rose again with no quarter reported, so every price multiple moved and the own-history medians did not.
  3. 2026-10-29editedRe-struck at the October 28 close ($228.08, 21.0% below the September 25 close) on the trailing revenue the September 10-Q adds; the earlier multiples (27.31 and 27.36) described a price that no longer trades.
current state · 2026-10-28written 2026-08-24

איפה אנחנו חלוקים על השוק

השוק חושב

Bloom היא הדרך הנקייה ביותר להחזיק בחשמל באתר למרכזי נתונים ל-AI, והדוח של המוכר בחסר ביולי היה רעש שהתוצאות ענו עליו.

אנחנו חושבים

המפנה לרווחיות אמיתי, אבל הוא נשען על קונה אחד שלא נחשף בשמו, והשאלות על האספקה נוגעות ליכולת של Bloom לצמוח.

הסיקור התקשורתי קורא את התוצאות שעקפו את התחזיות ואת ערימת ההזמנות העתידיות ש-Bloom מפרסמת. הדוחות מראים מה הם משמיטים: את הריכוזיות, את ספירת ההזמנות ש-Bloom מגדירה בעצמה וכוללת בה זיכויי מס שהיא מצפה לקבל, ואת ההכחשה בעניין הסקנדיום שלא מציינת אף ספק.

שבעה עשר אנליסטים ממליצים לקנות, והמניה עלתה ב-317% בשנה למרות הדוח של יולי. השוק החליט שהתוצאות ענו על השאלות; לפי הדוחות הן לא ענו.

מה אומרים האנליסטים
המלצות חיוביות
52%
מתוך 29, 1 בספטמבר
לפני ארבעה חודשים
47%
מתוך 30, 1 במאי
הראיות (באנגלית) · 6 טענות
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C07עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's order book is a company-defined measure, not a filed contractual obligation. Its own 10-K states: 'We view product backlog as the revenue attributable to existing contractual commitments for the purchase or use of Energy Servers by a financier or an end customer in the future. Value of product backlog includes both expected Bloom product revenue and reflects anticipated ITC and other tax incentives as applicable.' The phrase 'remaining performance obligation' - the figure US accounting rules require for contracted revenue not yet recognised - appears nowhere in the FY2025 10-K. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q again reports no remaining-performance-obligation or product-backlog figure (the word backlog appears once, in the supply-chain risk factor). On the October 22 call the chief executive said the backlog is 'continuing to expand faster than our revenue' and the chief financial officer that the outlook is built on backlog assessed 'customer by customer against site readiness and conversion timing' plus a probability-weighted view of the pipeline; neither gave a figure.
against this

Backlog measures that include expected tax credits are not unique to Bloom and the company discloses its definition plainly rather than hiding it, which is the opposite of concealment. The concern is not the disclosure but the arithmetic it permits: a figure that counts anticipated investment tax credits and 'commitments' that are not stated to be firm can be much larger than the contracted revenue an auditor would recognise, and Bloom's own Q2 2026 release lists 'the ability of current product and service backlog to ultimately be recognizable as revenue' among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call: still no filed contracted-revenue figure; backlog described as growing faster than revenue without a number.
historical · as disclosed in the FY2025 10-Kwritten 2026-08-24
C27טענת ההנהלהmedium confidence
On July 9, 2026, the day after the short report, Bloom filed an 8-K under Item 7.01 stating that it 'categorically rejects' the report's claims about its financial results and accounting and, on scandium oxide: 'We have sufficient supply of scandium oxide to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog, and our supply is not dependent on China. We are also not dependent on China to scale scandium oxide to meet future demand growth,' with 'clear visibility into our supply chain to support production of 25GW of fuel cells per year.' Asked about scandium on the July 28, 2026 Q2 call, the chief executive repeated that Bloom is 'not dependent on China' and added: 'That's all we are going to say about it. Everything else is proprietary to the company.' The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q repeats a shortened form of the denial ('we believe we have sufficient supply of the relevant raw materials to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog') without the China statement, and no analyst asked about scandium on the October 22 call.
against this

The statement names no supplier, no country of origin and no tonnage, so it cannot be checked against the short report's specific allegation that Chinese-origin scandium reaches Bloom through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan and South Korea (C11); 'not dependent on China' is compatible with some Chinese-origin supply. The US Geological Survey names China as the leading producer of a market of about 40 tons a year (C10). And with the chief executive declining to say more, the class action (C12) rather than a company filing is now the likeliest place the sourcing gets tested.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call read: the denial is repeated more narrowly and nothing further was said.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-09-24
C09עובדהhigh confidence
The word 'scandium' does not appear anywhere in Bloom's FY2025 10-K, a document of approximately 649,000 characters, nor in its Q2 2026 results release. Scandium oxide is a standard stabiliser for solid-oxide fuel cell electrolytes and is the material at the centre of the July 2026 short report and the subsequent securities class action. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q (filed October 22, 2026) does not contain the word either; its risk factor says Bloom 'rejected the report's conclusions regarding our supply chain' and that it believes it has 'sufficient supply of the relevant raw materials to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog', without the China statement or any supplier. Neither the October 22 release nor the call, where no analyst asked, mentions scandium or China.
against this

A company is not required to name every input material in its annual report, so this silence is not itself proof of dependence. Nor is it silence in every filing: on July 9, 2026 Bloom filed an 8-K (C27) rejecting the short report's conclusions and stating that its scandium oxide supply is sufficient for current demand and backlog and is not dependent on China, which also settles that Bloom's cells use scandium oxide, a point this ledger previously recorded as unconfirmed. What keeps the absence load-bearing is that the 8-K names no supplier and no country of origin, and the annual report's affirmative China statement (C08) still never names the input the allegation concerns.

  1. 2026-09-24editedCounter-evidence corrected in the open: it said Bloom had never confirmed its cells use scandium, but the July 9, 2026 8-K (S14), which the original pass did not open, discusses Bloom's scandium oxide supply directly. The claim text itself remains true.
  2. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q, release and call read: scandium still unnamed in any filing; the denial is repeated in shorter form.
historical · FY2025 10-K, Q2 and Q3 2026 releases and 10-Qswritten 2026-08-24
C19עובדהhigh confidence
Sell-side consensus is 17 buy, 12 hold and 3 sell - a Buy, but with the largest proportion of hold and sell ratings of any name in this repo's current energy coverage. Bloom has beaten consensus earnings per share in 7 of the last 8 quarters, most recently by 100.0% ($0.78 against $0.39) on 2026-07-28 and by 255.1% ($0.44 against $0.12) on 2026-04-28.
against this

Beating consensus by 100% and 255% in consecutive quarters is not primarily evidence of operational outperformance; it is evidence that the analyst community cannot model this revenue line, which is what one would expect when three-quarters of revenue comes from a single undisclosed customer whose delivery schedule outsiders cannot see.

  1. 2026-09-24editedRe-checked at the 2026-09-24 review against the refreshed pack (S21): the rating split and the surprise history are unchanged.
current state · 2026-09-23written 2026-08-24
C18עובדהhigh confidence
As of the October 28, 2026 close Bloom traded at $228.08, 21.0% below the $288.70 close of September 25, 11.8% above the $204.02 close on which this thesis was first struck, and 35.1% below its 252-day high of $351.28 (the high is from the September 25 pack).
  1. 2026-09-24editedRefreshed at the 2026-09-24 review on the refreshed research pack (S21); the 20-day range fell out of the 'Very volatile' bucket.
  2. 2026-09-26editedRefreshed at the 2026-09-26 review on the refreshed research pack (S22) at the September 25 close.
  3. 2026-10-29editedRe-struck at the October 28 close after the September-quarter report; the price fell 21.0% from the September 25 strike, over the 12% drift trigger. The moving-average, range and return figures were dropped because they were not recomputed.
current state · 2026-10-28written 2026-08-24
06

מה יכול להשתבש, ואיך נדע

הסיכונים

  • שני לקוחות גדולים. שני קונים לקחו כ-69% מרבעון ספטמבר, אחד מהם צד קשור, ומבחוץ אי אפשר לראות מי הם.
  • המזומנים מפגרים אחרי המכירות. התזרים מפעילות שוטפת היה שלילי, 27 מיליון דולר, ברבעון, בעוד מכירות שחויבו ולא שולמו ומכירות שטרם חויבו גדלו בכ-880 מיליון דולר בתשעת החודשים.
  • הזמנות עתידיות שאי אפשר לבדוק. הספירה של Bloom עצמה כוללת זיכויי מס שהיא מצפה לקבל; הנתון המבוקר של הכנסות חוזיות לא מופיע בשום מקום בדוח השנתי שלה.
  • טענת הונאה. מוכר בחסר טוען ש-Bloom קונה סקנדיום סיני דרך מתווכים, ובעקבות זאת הוגשה תביעה ייצוגית. Bloom הכחישה בלי לנקוב בשם ספק.
  • האתר הגדול ביותר ששמו ידוע מתעכב. הקמפוס של Oracle בניו מקסיקו יפעל על תאים של Bloom, אבל צינור הגז שלו נדחה לפברואר 2027 ו-Oracle שלחה הודעת כוח עליון (force majeure).
  • בעלי עניין מוכרים, אף אחד לא קונה. 55 מכירות בשוק הפתוח וללא רכישות בשנה האחרונה, כולל ארבעה נושאי משרה בכירים ב-16 בספטמבר.
הראיות (באנגלית) · 8 טענות
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C07עובדהhigh confidence
Bloom's order book is a company-defined measure, not a filed contractual obligation. Its own 10-K states: 'We view product backlog as the revenue attributable to existing contractual commitments for the purchase or use of Energy Servers by a financier or an end customer in the future. Value of product backlog includes both expected Bloom product revenue and reflects anticipated ITC and other tax incentives as applicable.' The phrase 'remaining performance obligation' - the figure US accounting rules require for contracted revenue not yet recognised - appears nowhere in the FY2025 10-K. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q again reports no remaining-performance-obligation or product-backlog figure (the word backlog appears once, in the supply-chain risk factor). On the October 22 call the chief executive said the backlog is 'continuing to expand faster than our revenue' and the chief financial officer that the outlook is built on backlog assessed 'customer by customer against site readiness and conversion timing' plus a probability-weighted view of the pipeline; neither gave a figure.
against this

Backlog measures that include expected tax credits are not unique to Bloom and the company discloses its definition plainly rather than hiding it, which is the opposite of concealment. The concern is not the disclosure but the arithmetic it permits: a figure that counts anticipated investment tax credits and 'commitments' that are not stated to be firm can be much larger than the contracted revenue an auditor would recognise, and Bloom's own Q2 2026 release lists 'the ability of current product and service backlog to ultimately be recognizable as revenue' among its risk factors.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call: still no filed contracted-revenue figure; backlog described as growing faster than revenue without a number.
historical · as disclosed in the FY2025 10-Kwritten 2026-08-24
C11עובדהmedium confidence
On July 8, 2026 the short-seller Hunterbrook published a report titled 'Bloom's Big Lie' alleging that Bloom obtains scandium sourced from China through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan and South Korea despite telling investors it has no China supply chain, citing a representative of Hunan Oriental Scandium describing that company as Bloom's largest scandium supplier; that Bloom's five-gigawatt production goal would require roughly 220 tons of scandium oxide a year against a projected global supply near 240 tons; and that Bloom's unaudited order book of roughly $20 billion compares with audited binding performance obligations nearer $492 million. Bloom's shares fell on the report and the company said it would correct the record.
against this

Hunterbrook is a short seller with a financial position in the outcome and is therefore the least disinterested possible source on Bloom; its 220-ton and 240-ton figures also do not reconcile with the US Geological Survey's independent estimate of 40 tons of global production and 80 tons of capacity (C10), a discrepancy this thesis does not resolve and does not need to: the USGS figure is both authoritative and smaller, so the supply constraint it implies is tighter, not looser, than the short report's.

historical · 2026-07-08written 2026-08-24
C12עובדהhigh confidence
A securities class action, Nevins v. Bloom Energy Corporation, No. 26-cv-07944 in the Northern District of California, has been filed against Bloom Energy and certain executives in respect of a class period running February 27, 2025 through July 8, 2026, alleging that the company made false or misleading statements by failing to disclose that it obtained scandium through intermediaries who sourced the metal from China and thereby understated its reliance on Chinese scandium. The court-set deadline to apply for lead plaintiff is September 28, 2026. Neither the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q filed July 28, 2026 nor the Q2 2026 results release mentions the litigation, Hunterbrook, China or scandium. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q discloses the suit, says its allegations 'mirror' the Hunterbrook report, calls it without merit and records that on October 15, 2026 the court appointed Nicole Caraoué as lead plaintiff and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd as lead counsel; the complaint is still preliminary and the lead-plaintiff deadline has passed.
against this

A filed complaint is an allegation and not a finding, plaintiffs' firms solicit class members as a matter of routine after any sharp price decline, and the class action may be dismissed. The 10-Q's silence is also defensible if the suit was filed after the July 28 filing date. What survives those caveats is that the company has answered the allegation only by denial, in a July 9, 2026 8-K and one answer on the Q2 call where the chief executive said that is all Bloom will say (C27), and has named no supplier or country of origin in any document.

  1. 2026-09-24editedCaption and court added from the lead-plaintiff notices (S19); counter-evidence corrected, because the company has answered the allegation by denial in a July 9, 2026 8-K and on the Q2 call (C27), which the original pass recorded as unanswered.
  2. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: the suit is now disclosed, lead plaintiff and counsel appointed October 15; no ruling on a motion to dismiss yet.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-08-24
C17עובדהmedium confidence
Over the research pack's 365-day window the vendor's Form 4 roster records 55 open-market sales and zero open-market purchases. Since this thesis was written on August 24, 2026 there have been four more sales, all on September 16, 2026 at $268.42 to $270.07: the Chief Commercial Officer (3,601 shares), the Chief Operations Officer (2,870), the Chief Legal Officer (2,870) and the Chief Accounting Officer (2,295). The chairman and chief executive reported a gift of 300,000 shares on August 31, 2026, and no insider bought. Earlier sellers include director Jeffrey R. Immelt (30,000 shares at $238.91 on 2026-08-17) and director John T. Chambers (15,000 shares at $250.00 on 2026-08-13). On October 1, 2026 the Chief Commercial Officer sold a further 8,437 shares at $277.17 under a Rule 10b5-1 plan; the 45-day Form 4 read to October 22 shows five open-market sales, four under a plan (88.6% of the shares), and no purchase.
against this

Concentrated selling after a large twelve-month move is what any rational holder of appreciated equity compensation does. The Form 4s now answer the plan question the first pass could not: of the nine open-market sales from August 13 to September 16, 2026, seven, carrying 92.2% of the shares sold, were marked as made under a Rule 10b5-1 plan, including Immelt's and Chambers'. The two that were not are small - the Chief Accounting Officer's 2,295 shares on September 16 and the Chief Legal Officer's 2,895 shares on August 14 - so the pattern is mostly scheduled selling, not a run of discretionary judgements.

  1. 2026-09-24editedRefreshed at the 2026-09-24 review: four more open-market sales and no purchases since the thesis, and the Rule 10b5-1 box now read on each Form 4 (S20) rather than left unknown.
  2. 2026-10-22editedInsider read refreshed at the Q3 print: one more planned sale on October 1, no purchases.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-08-24
C27טענת ההנהלהmedium confidence
On July 9, 2026, the day after the short report, Bloom filed an 8-K under Item 7.01 stating that it 'categorically rejects' the report's claims about its financial results and accounting and, on scandium oxide: 'We have sufficient supply of scandium oxide to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog, and our supply is not dependent on China. We are also not dependent on China to scale scandium oxide to meet future demand growth,' with 'clear visibility into our supply chain to support production of 25GW of fuel cells per year.' Asked about scandium on the July 28, 2026 Q2 call, the chief executive repeated that Bloom is 'not dependent on China' and added: 'That's all we are going to say about it. Everything else is proprietary to the company.' The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q repeats a shortened form of the denial ('we believe we have sufficient supply of the relevant raw materials to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog') without the China statement, and no analyst asked about scandium on the October 22 call.
against this

The statement names no supplier, no country of origin and no tonnage, so it cannot be checked against the short report's specific allegation that Chinese-origin scandium reaches Bloom through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan and South Korea (C11); 'not dependent on China' is compatible with some Chinese-origin supply. The US Geological Survey names China as the leading producer of a market of about 40 tons a year (C10). And with the chief executive declining to say more, the class action (C12) rather than a company filing is now the likeliest place the sourcing gets tested.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call read: the denial is repeated more narrowly and nothing further was said.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-09-24
C28עובדהmedium confidence
Oracle, the tenant of Project Jupiter, a data-center campus in Doña Ana County, New Mexico, told the New Mexico Environment Department on July 2, 2026 that the project 'will now use Bloom Energy fuel cells to power the AI data center campus', running on natural gas, under an updated air permit application then pending. Coverage of a filing by Energy Transfer's Transwestern unit with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reports that the in-service date of the 'Green Chile' gas pipeline to the site moved from August 15, 2026 to February 1, 2027, after New Mexico's land commissioner twice refused its route across state trust land; Bloomberg reported in September 2026 that Oracle sent a force majeure notice to the project's developer, Stack Infrastructure. No Bloom filing names Project Jupiter, and no primary document read states the capacity Bloom is to supply there.
against this

On the July 28, 2026 Q2 call the chief financial officer said that where a project is delayed the equipment can be redeployed to other projects and 'the financier is on the hook to take delivery of the equipment from Bloom', and the chief executive said 2026 guidance is 'not dependent on any single project' (S15); Oracle is reported to remain committed to the campus. So the delay may move where Bloom's servers are installed rather than when Bloom recognises the sale. What this ledger cannot establish is whether Project Jupiter sits behind the single customer that was 73% of first-half revenue (C06), because that customer is unnamed.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 release, 10-Q and call read: none restates the figure or the delay in this claim; Oracle appears only for the warrant and the Utah site, so it rolls to the annual report.
current state · 2026-09-24written 2026-09-24
C44עובדהhigh confidence
For the quarter ended September 30, 2026 Bloom reported record revenue of $1,235.8 million, up 138.1% from $519.0 million, with product revenue of $1,073.6 million up 179.4%; GAAP gross margin of 33.8% against 29.2%; GAAP operating income of $225.4 million against $7.8 million; and GAAP diluted earnings per share of $0.78 against a loss of $0.10 (non-GAAP $0.94 against $0.15). Cash flow from operating activities was a use of about $27.1 million in the quarter (nine months $272.9 million less first half $300.0 million), because over nine months contract assets rose $618.0 million and receivables $264.8 million. Cash and cash equivalents were $2,486.7 million at September 30, 2026.
against this

The quarter's cash use is working capital rather than weaker earnings: contract assets (revenue recognised before it is billed) stood at $792.8 million against $178.9 million at December 31, 2025, while deferred revenue and customer deposits rose $610.6 million over nine months. Management calls the business self-funding and expects positive free cash flow for the full year, which is a forecast, not a filed result.

historical · Q3 2026written 2026-10-22
שאלות פתוחות
  • מי הלקוחות שמאחורי 69% ממכירות רבעון ספטמבר, ולמה נתוני תשעת החודשים ב-10-Q של הרבעון השלישי לא תואמים את ה-73% שב-10-Q של הרבעון השני.
  • מאיפה מגיע הסקנדיום של Bloom. החברה אומרת שלא מסין, וה-10-Q אינו מציין ספק.
הראיות (באנגלית) · 2 טענות
C06עובדהhigh confidence
For the six months ended June 30, 2026, revenue from one customer, which is NOT the related party, accounted for approximately 73% of Bloom's total revenue. For the three months ended June 30, 2026, two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 44% and 21%. By comparison, for the three months ended June 30, 2025 four customers represented approximately 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, none of them related parties. The 73% customer is not named anywhere in the filing. The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q does not repeat the single-customer figure: for the three months ended September 30, 2026 two customers, the second of which is the related party, accounted for approximately 43% and 26% of revenue (69% together), for the nine months approximately 43% and 23%, and three customers held approximately 31%, 24% and 15% of receivables. The two filings do not reconcile on their face: 73% of first-half revenue is about $1.33 billion, which is 43% of nine-month revenue of $3.05 billion, yet the same buyer would then have bought almost nothing in the third quarter. The 10-Q does not explain the difference, defines a customer as the contractual counterparty (which may be a project-finance affiliate, not the end user), and names no customer.
against this
  • Concentration this extreme can be a sign of winning a very large customer rather than of fragility, and the customer is described as not a related party, which is an improvement on the FY2025 structure. But the direction is the wrong way: a year earlier the largest four customers were 30%, 18%, 15% and 11%, so the business became dramatically more concentrated as it grew, and the buyer whose orders are three-quarters of revenue is disclosed to the market only as a percentage.
  • The largest customer is 43% of nine-month revenue in the Q3 10-Q, below the 73% single customer of the Q2 10-Q, so the worst reading of the first half is not repeated; but two customers at 69% of the September quarter, one of them the related party, is still a business that depends on two relationships, and the 10-Q's customer definition (the contractual counterparty, possibly a financing affiliate) means the filing does not say who the end buyers are.
  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q: largest customer 43% and second 26% of the quarter; the 73% six-month figure is not repeated and does not reconcile with the nine-month one.
historical · H1 and Q3 2026written 2026-08-24
C27טענת ההנהלהmedium confidence
On July 9, 2026, the day after the short report, Bloom filed an 8-K under Item 7.01 stating that it 'categorically rejects' the report's claims about its financial results and accounting and, on scandium oxide: 'We have sufficient supply of scandium oxide to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog, and our supply is not dependent on China. We are also not dependent on China to scale scandium oxide to meet future demand growth,' with 'clear visibility into our supply chain to support production of 25GW of fuel cells per year.' Asked about scandium on the July 28, 2026 Q2 call, the chief executive repeated that Bloom is 'not dependent on China' and added: 'That's all we are going to say about it. Everything else is proprietary to the company.' The Q3 2026 Form 10-Q repeats a shortened form of the denial ('we believe we have sufficient supply of the relevant raw materials to meet our current fuel cell demand and backlog') without the China statement, and no analyst asked about scandium on the October 22 call.
against this

The statement names no supplier, no country of origin and no tonnage, so it cannot be checked against the short report's specific allegation that Chinese-origin scandium reaches Bloom through intermediaries in Thailand, Japan and South Korea (C11); 'not dependent on China' is compatible with some Chinese-origin supply. The US Geological Survey names China as the leading producer of a market of about 40 tons a year (C10). And with the chief executive declining to say more, the class action (C12) rather than a company filing is now the likeliest place the sourcing gets tested.

  1. 2026-10-22editedQ3 2026 10-Q and call read: the denial is repeated more narrowly and nothing further was said.
current state · 2026-10-22written 2026-09-24

מה ישנה את ההערכה שלנו

  1. לא אטרקטיבית→אטרקטיביתבסיס ההכנסות נעשה ברור, במכפיל קרוב יותר להיסטוריה שלו

    נדרשים כל אלה:

    • ○שני הלקוחות הגדולים ביותר יורדים בחדות מתחת ל-69% ממכירות רבעון ספטמבר, ובמקומם לקוחות ש-Bloom מציינת בשמם.ייבדק בדוח הבא, עד 4 בפברואר
    • ○Bloom מדווחת על הכנסות מחוזים מחייבים כנתון מבוקר, במקום סכום של הזמנות עתידיות שכולל זיכויי מס צפויים.ייבדק בדוח הבא, עד 4 בפברואר
    • ○המניות יורדות לכ-8 פעמים המכירות: עדיין כפול מהמכפיל הרגיל שלה בעבר, אבל המחיר מגלם רק את המהפך שכבר קרה.בערך ‎≈$84.42 במחירי היום, 70% מתחת לסגירה האחרונה
  2. פותח מחדש את המחקרשני הגורמים המעיבים מתפוגגים

    בתנאי ש:

    • ○דיווח רשמי מתעד אספקת סקנדיום מחוץ לסין, והתביעה הייצוגית בניירות ערך נדחית.במעקב עד שיקרה
נטעה גם אם
  • שיעורי רווח מעל 33% ותזרים מזומנים חיובי נשמרים ארבעה רבעונים ברציפות. התזרים ברבעון ספטמבר היה שלילי, ולכן הספירה מתחילה מחדש.
  • בעלי עניין מפסיקים למכור וקונים מניות מהכסף שלהם.

מה בהמשך

  • 27 באוקטובר 2026 תוצאות הרבעון השלישי של 2026 ודוח 10-Q: האם שוב רוב ההכנסות מגיעות מלקוח אחד שלא נחשף בשמו, האם התחזית לשנה המלאה, בין 3.9 ל-4.2 מיליארד דולר, נשמרת, והאם ה-10-Q אומר משהו על הסקנדיום או על התביעה הייצוגית.
כל האירועים הצפויים
  • 27 באוקטובר 2026 תוצאות הרבעון השלישי של 2026 ודוח 10-Q: האם שוב רוב ההכנסות מגיעות מלקוח אחד שלא נחשף בשמו, האם התחזית לשנה המלאה, בין 3.9 ל-4.2 מיליארד דולר, נשמרת, והאם ה-10-Q אומר משהו על הסקנדיום או על התביעה הייצוגית.
  • דצמבר 2026 המפעל בפרמונט מגיע לקצב ייצור שנתי של 2 ג'יגה-וואט: האם הכפלת קיבולת המפעל שה-10-K הבטיח לסוף 2026 מגיעה בזמן; המסירות ל-Oracle ול-Nebius תלויות בה.
  • פברואר 2027 תוצאות הרבעון הרביעי של 2026 ודוח ה-10-K לשנת 2026: ההכנסות לשנה המלאה מול התחזית, ריכוזיות הלקוחות בשנה, הגדרת צבר ההזמנות, והאם התחזית ל-2027 מציינת לקוחות חדשים בשמם.
מה קרה מאז
נכתבה
24 באוגוסט
המחיר בעת כתיבת התזה
$288.70
25 בספטמבר
שער סגירה אחרון
$276.98
שער סגירה, · ‎-4.1% מאז
  • 29 באוקטוברתנועת מחירהמניה ירדה ב-21%; מחירים נקבעו מחדש, ההערכה לא השתנתהמכפיל המכירות עומד כעת על כ-17.5, אחרי 27. שני לקוחות עדיין מחזיקים ב-69% מהמכירות וענין הסקנדיום עדיין לא מוסבר, ולכן מחיר נמוך יותר לבדו לא משנה את ההערכה.
  • 22 באוקטוברדוחותהמכירות זינקו ב-138% והתחזית הועלתה, אבל שני קונים הם 69%הקונה היחיד שהיווה 73% לא חזר, אבל שני לקוחות עדיין לקחו 69% מהמכירות, הסקנדיום לא הוזכר, והתזרים מפעילות שוטפת היה שלילי, 27 מיליון דולר. ההערכה לא השתנתה.
  • 6 באוקטוברבדיקת התזהשווי מקרה הכישלון של ההימור חושב מחדש לפי דוח יונילקוח אחד היה כ-73% מההכנסות במחצית הראשונה, ולכן מקרה הכישלון נשען עכשיו על מה שקנו כל השאר, כ-3.6 מיליארד דולר בשווי, ולא על רמת ההכנסות של 2025.
  • 5 באוקטוברבדיקת התזהההימור מציין עכשיו על מה הוא נשעןהבעלים ביקש שכל הימור יציין את המגמה המקרו-כלכלית שעומדת מאחוריו, אחרי שבהימור על BWXT חסר הטיעון של מנכ״ל החברה בעד אנרגיה גרעינית על פני גז.
  • 4 באוקטוברבדיקת התזהרשימת הבדיקות של הבעלים: מקורות ההכנסה, עלות הצמיחה, ההנהלה, אירועים צפוייםרשימת הבדיקות של הבעלים הראתה שהשיטה שותקת בשאלות מי מנהל את החברה, כמה עולה הצמיחה, מאיפה מגיע הכסף ואילו אירועים צפויים בתאריכים ידועים. בסבב הזה מילאנו את ארבעת הנושאים מתוך דוח הזימון לאסיפה והדוחות.
  • 26 בספטמברבדיקת התזהמכפיל המכירות עולה ל-27; תוקנה הערה בנתוניםהמניה עלתה שוב בלי תוצאות חדשות, ולכן המחיר דורש יותר מלקוח אחד שלא נחשף בשמו. הערה אחת כינתה נתוני רבעון מרץ בתור נתוני יוני; את רבעון יוני תמיד קראנו מהדוח עצמו.
  • 24 בספטמברחדשותאותרה ההכחשה של Bloom מיולי בעניין הסקנדיום; האתר הגדול ביותר ששמו ידוע מתעכב. ההערכה לא השתנתהההכחשה לא מציינת ספק, ולכן הסיכון בעינו. המניה עלתה ב-34.9% בלי תוצאות חדשות, מה שחיזק את ההסתייגות מהמחיר.
  • 24 באוגוסטהתזה נכתבהלא אטרקטיבית, ביטחון בינונינכתבה חודש אחרי המפנה לרווחיות ברבעון יוני, כשקונה אחד שלא נחשף בשמו אחראי ל-73% ממכירות המחצית הראשונה וטענת הונאה בעניין הסקנדיום עדיין תלויה ועומדת.

נבדקה גם 6 פעמים, ללא ממצא חדש שמצריך פעולה.

מקורות 36

Where this came from

Sources - 36

Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.

  1. S01primarycompany filing2026-02-09
    product and platform description, competition classes, customer concentration, backlog definition, the China supply-chain statement, SK ecoplant and Brookfield relationships, turbine supply-constraint assertion
    backsC01C02C05C07C08C09C15C20C21C34C42C43
  2. S02primarycompany filing2026-07-28
    Q2 2026 revenue, margin, operating income, operating cash flow and per-share figures; raised FY2026 guidance; balance-sheet detail; the backlog-recognition risk factor; the absence of any China or scandium reference
    backsC03C09C12C13C19C24C25
  3. S03primarycompany filing2026-07-28
    the H1 2026 single-customer 73% concentration disclosure, quarterly concentration detail, accounts-receivable concentration, share-count roll-forward and convertible-debt premium
    backsC06C12C13C14C34C38C39C42C43
  4. S04primarycompany filing2026-02-05
    the full-year 2025 results release filed alongside the annual report, read for the prior-year guidance and comparison base
    read, but no claim rests on it
  5. S05secondaryvendor data2026-08-24
    Portfolio-management research pack (market tier: price, technicals, insiders, analysts, own-history valuation)
    content/BE/research-pack.json
    price and technicals snapshot, volatility bucket and beta, insider Form 4 aggregation, analyst consensus and earnings-surprise history, own-history valuation time series
    backsC14
  6. S06secondaryvendor data2026-08-24
    Portfolio-management research pack (vendor_fundamentals tier: statements, peer_valuation, segments)
    content/BE/research-pack.json
    the filed annual and quarterly revenue and margin series from the filer's own XBRL, the peer_valuation unavailable result, the no_segment_axis reading, and the 2024 fiscal-year labelling defect
    backsC04C16C24
  7. S07primaryindustry data2025-01
    the authoritative independent measure of global scandium supply, China's position in it, and the absence of United States mine production - the external bound on the prize and the external test of the moat
    In 2024, the global consumption of scandium oxide was estimated to be about 30 to 40 tons per year with a global capacity estimate of 80 tons per year. According to industry estimates, global production totaled 40 tons. Scandium was recovered from cobalt, nickel, titanium, and zirconium process streams. China was the leading producer.
    backsC10
  8. S08tertiarynews2026-07
    coverage of the July 8, 2026 Hunterbrook short report, its scandium and backlog allegations, and the market reaction
    Hunterbrook released a report titled "Bloom's Big Lie"
    backsC11
  9. S09secondarynews2026-08
    the existence of the securities class action, its class period of February 27, 2025 to July 8, 2026, the alleged scandium and China misstatements, and the September 28, 2026 lead-plaintiff deadline
    Bloom Energy Corporation (BE) Investors to a Securities Class Action Deadline on September 28, 2026
    backsC11C12
  10. S10secondaryvendor data2026-08-24
    Portfolio-management filed-competitor roster (data/reference/competitors.json, BE entry)
    data/reference/competitors.json
    the recorded cohort search: the classes Bloom names, the candidates chased, and the verdict on each
    backsC16
  11. S11secondaryindustry data2026
    independent tracking of behind-the-meter generation actually online, reused from this repo's Vistra and Constellation Energy theses
    approximately 2 GW of behind-the-meter generation capacity is online across four projects, with the vast majority belonging to xAI
    backsC22
  12. S12primaryindustry data2026
    the independent national demand base for the prize block, reused from this repo's Constellation Energy thesis
    Data center server electricity use grows to 22%-33% of commercial building electricity use by 2050 across our cases.
    backsC23
  13. S13secondaryvendor data2026-08-24
    Portfolio-management theses for Constellation Energy (CEG) and Vistra (VST), machine.demand blocks
    content/CEG/thesis.json and content/VST/thesis.json
    the named, quantified long-term data-center power agreements the merchant generators have signed, each traced in those theses to the sellers' own 8-K filings - the competing option Bloom's own Item 1 does not list
    backsC26
  14. S14primarycompany filing2026-07-09
    Bloom's own filed response to the short report: it rejects the report's conclusions on scandium oxide and states its supply is sufficient for current demand and backlog and not dependent on China, with visibility to 25GW of fuel cells a year
    backsC09C27
  15. S15primarytranscript2026-07-28
    Bloom Energy Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-07-28, question-and-answer section
    the chief executive's answer on scandium (David Arcaro's question), the chief financial officer's answer on project delays ('the financier is on the hook to take delivery of the equipment from Bloom') and the statement that 2026 guidance is 'not dependent on any single project'; Oracle described as 'our first direct hyperscaler customer'
    And we are not dependent on China. Those are the statements we make. That's all we are going to say about it. Everything else is proprietary to the company.
    backsC27C35
  16. S16primaryother2026-07-02
    the counterparty's own statement that Project Jupiter, where Oracle is the tenant, will be powered by Bloom fuel cells running on natural gas, under an air permit application then pending
    The project will now use Bloom Energy fuel cells to power the AI data center campus, replacing the previously proposed gas turbines and diesel generators with a lower-impact fuel cell microgrid.
    backsC28
  17. S17tertiarynews2026-09-24
    coverage of Bloomberg's report that Oracle sent a force majeure notice to Project Jupiter's developer, and of the gas-pipeline delay behind it
    The pipeline has been delayed from its original August 2026 target to February 2027, following repeated denials by the New Mexico State Land Office for right-of-way permits across state trust lands.
    backsC28
  18. S18secondarynews2026-08
    the pipeline's revised in-service date as filed with FERC by Transwestern, and the land commissioner's two refusals of the route; FERC itself refuses this repository (403), so the filing was not read
    Energy Transfer's Transwestern unit told federal regulators on Friday that the Green Chile Project now has an in-service date of 1 February 2027, against a previous target of 15 August.
    backsC28
  19. S19secondarynews2026-09-21
    the case caption, court and docket number, and the unchanged class period and lead-plaintiff deadline
    Captioned Nevins v. Bloom Energy Corporation, No. 26-cv-07944 (N.D. Cal.), the Bloom Energy class action lawsuit charges Bloom Energy and certain of Bloom Energy's executives with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
    backsC12
  20. S20primarycompany filing2026-09-18
    the transactions since the thesis, with the Rule 10b5-1 box as filed on each sale (read by scripts/insider_fetch.py)
    backsC17
  21. S21secondaryvendor data2026-09-24
    Portfolio-management research pack, refreshed at the 2026-09-24 review (market tier at the 2026-09-23 close)
    content/BE/research-pack.json
    price, technicals, volatility bucket, beta, trailing multiples against Bloom's own history, insider roster and analyst consensus as of the 2026-09-23 close
    backsC17C19
  22. S22secondaryvendor data2026-09-26
    Portfolio-management research pack, refreshed at the 2026-09-26 review (market tier at the 2026-09-25 close)
    content/BE/research-pack.json
    price, technicals, volatility bucket, trailing multiples against Bloom's own history (the vendor's trailing twelve months now running through the June 2026 quarter) as of the 2026-09-25 close; the filed quarterly series, which still ends at the March 2026 quarter
    backsC15C18
  23. S23primarygovernment data2024-12-20
    the government laboratory's range for US data-centre electricity use in 2028, the independent bound on how much new load there is to power at all; read through ir_fetch
    The report finds that data centers consumed about 4.4% of total U.S. electricity in 2023 and are expected to consume approximately 6.7 to 12% of total U.S. electricity by 2028. The report indicates that total data center electricity usage climbed from 58 TWh in 2014 to 176 TWh in 2023 and estimates an increase between 325 to 580 TWh by 2028.
    backsC29
  24. S24primaryindustry data2026-06-25
    an independent research firm's forecast of US data-centre additions (+21GW in 2026 to +84GW by 2030), the behind-the-meter share from 2028 and a BTM equipment market above 50GW a year by 2029, naming Bloom among the new entrants that overcame turbine constraints; the free preview of a paid report, read through ir_fetch
    Our research suggests that BTM will power well over half of new US datacenters in 2028+ , and the Total Addressable Market (TAM) for DC BTM equipment to cross 50GW/ year by 2029. ... Faster technologies like Fuel Cells and RICE are being aggressively secured directly by datacenter operators for onsite generation.
    backsC30
  25. S25secondaryanalyst2026-05-14
    a bank's tally, from Bloomberg and company reports, of announced, ordered and under-construction behind-the-meter gas capacity for US data centres and its split by technology, in which fuel cells are not a category; read through ir_fetch
    As of 2026, data center developers have announced approximately 101 gigawatts of behind-the-meter natural gas generation capacity in the United States. While some of these projects may be speculative, over 57 gigawatts have already publicly disclosed equipment orders, and approximately 7 gigawatts are already under construction. ... The left vertical bar chart categorizes capacity by technology, showing Gas turbine as the dominant type at nearly 70 GW, followed by Engine at approximately 18 GW, Unknown at 13 GW, and Mixed use at 3 GW.
    backsC31
  26. S26primarycompany filing2026-07-22
    the incumbent turbine maker's gas equipment backlog and slot reservations, its annual turbine output now and its expectation for year-end contracts
    backsC32
  27. S27primarycompany filing2026-01-08
    the buyer's own filing of its $2.65 billion unconditional purchase of most of its 900 MW option on Bloom's solid oxide fuel cells, the only filed price for a block of Bloom capacity
    backsC33
  28. S28primarycompany filing2026-05-20
    the customer's own filing of its May 14, 2026 capacity agreement with Bloom: three ten-year phases, about 328 MW installed and 250 MW guaranteed, up to $2.6 billion of service fees
    backsC33
  29. S29primarycompany release2026-04-13
    the size of the Oracle master agreement and the part of it contracted; no Bloom filing states either figure (the April 13 8-K covers only the warrant); read through ir_fetch
    Under a master services agreement, Oracle intends to procure up to 2.8 gigawatts (GW) of Bloom’s fuel cell systems. As part of this agreement, an initial 1.2 GW of capacity has been contracted, with deployment underway and continuing into next year.
    backsC33
  30. S30secondaryvendor data2026-10-01
    FMP key-metrics-ttm and analyst-estimates (annual) for BE, GEV, VRT, CAT and SIEGY, fetched 2026-10-01 through scripts/api/fmp.py
    trailing enterprise value to sales for the listed makers of the equipment Bloom displaces or sits beside, the same enterprise value over consensus 2029 revenue, and Bloom's own consensus revenue path to 2029
    backsC36
  31. S31primarycompany filing2026-04-08
    beneficial ownership as of February 27, 2026, the executive officers and their start dates, the 2025 annual cash incentive and its 200% payout, the PSU metrics for 2025-2027 and the CEO's December 2024 equity package, the CFO appointment effective April 13, 2026
    backsC39C40C41
  32. S32primarycompany filing2026-10-04
    Bloom Energy XBRL company facts, 2020 to the four quarters to June 2026, frozen as content/BE/financials.json
    content/BE/financials.json
    revenue, gross profit, research and development (ResearchAndDevelopmentExpense, the same line the income statement labels Research and development), sales and marketing, general and administrative, capital spending, operating income and diluted share counts per year
    backsC43
  33. S33secondaryvendor data2026-10-04
    Earnings calendar saved by the daily routine, content/calendar/2026-10-04.json (FMP earnings, per symbol)
    content/calendar/2026-10-04.json
    the next print date, 2026-10-27, with the consensus revenue and earnings per share for it
    read, but no claim rests on it
  34. S34primarycompany filing2026-10-22
    Q3 2026 revenue, margins, operating income, per-share figures, balance sheet and the raised 2026 guidance; the release does not mention China or scandium
    backsC04C09C13C44
  35. S35primarycompany filing2026-10-22
    the three- and nine-month customer concentration, receivables concentration, nine-month cash flow statement, share count, litigation note and supply-chain risk factor; the word scandium does not appear
    backsC04C06C07C09C12C13C14C15C27C34C44
  36. S36primarytranscript2026-10-22
    Bloom Energy Q3 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-10-22
    the backlog and pipeline description behind the guidance, the Fremont expansion answer and the free-cash-flow answer; no analyst asked about scandium or China
    Our customer pipeline continues to grow and our backlog is continuing to expand faster than our revenue.
    backsC04C07C09C27C34
הופק מ-content/BE/thesis.json · התזה נבדקה ב-29 באוקטובר 2026. הדף מסביר חברה; הוא לא קובע כמה לשלם, מתי לקנות או בכמה.