Vale
Brazil's biggest miner: it digs some of the world's richest iron ore, ships most of it to China's steel mills, and also mines copper and nickel.
The scores
Growth2/4 →
Iron ore volumes sit near 330 Mt and Northern output fell; 2026's revenue rise is price. Copper grew 18%, too small to move the whole.
Business quality3/4 ↓
Rare high-grade ore at a mine cost level with the Pilbara; but it sells at index prices, ships far, and its premium shrinks.
Financial position3/4 ↑
Net debt is 0.8 times EBITDA with 8.1 years of maturity, but $6B of dam provisions sit on top and are paid out over years.
Execution record3/4 →
Output guidance met and Bacaba and Salobo ahead of schedule; but 2026 cost guidance rose about $2 a tonne and EPS missed twice.
Per share capture3/4 →
Payouts of 30% of EBITDA less sustaining capital, buybacks and no dilution; but golden shares and politics limit what Vale can sell or list.
Potential2/4 →
Bacaba and Salobo are committed, adding about 50 kt; the 700 kt goal and 360 Mt are only expected; ore prices are set elsewhere.
Risk profile2/4 →
China takes 63% of the ore, the state holds a veto and presses on the board, and dams and the caves decree rest with courts.
Valuation3/4 ↑
About 4 times EBITDA with an 8% payout: fair for ore sliding toward $84, as Simandou and China suggest; cheap only above $100.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Costs, debt, provisions and payouts are filed; the ore outlook, the premium under Simandou and the copper ramp rest on management, rivals and trade press.
If it works 1.1× · if it fails you keep about 100%.
The Verdict
We rate Vale Neutral. The business is mixed: its Brazilian ore is rich and cheap to dig, but it sells at whatever the market pays, mostly to China, and the extra it earns for quality is shrinking. The price is fair: at about 4 times a year's cash profit, buyers already assume the ore price falls toward the level Vale itself plans on. As a bet on its new copper mines it is expensive but defensive: the new copper adds little to the whole company, while iron ore alone covers today's price. Rising costs, a rival mine in Africa and Brazilian politics give no reason to pay more yet.
The long caseCheap new copper from mines Vale already runs adds a growing business the iron ore price does not touch.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
Management presents the mid-grade shift as flexibility that lifts volume and lowers cost, not as lost quality (C21).
Chinese buying is consolidating: the state's China Mineral Resources Group now negotiates for many mills, which no single-customer figure shows.
Proforma EBITDA excludes the dam and non-recurring charges that expanded net debt counts, and the vendor's EV/EBITDA on reported figures reads 7.0.
Costs fall with ore prices too, through freight and royalties, so the drop in EBITDA is smaller than the arithmetic.
Bacaba is classed a sustaining project: it extends Sossego's life, so most of its tonnes replace an exhausting pit (C27).
The added tonnes are an upper bound ('up to'), and Salobo's grade declines over its life, so the gain may be less than capacity.
Coelho's link to Previ is this thesis's reading of public coverage, not stated in the minutes.
The company
Vale sells the main ingredient of steel. A steel mill melts iron ore with coke in a blast furnace, and richer ore needs less coke and leaves less waste, so mills pay a little more for it and mix it with cheaper, poorer ore.
Vale's best ore, from Serra Sul in the Amazon state of Pará, holds about 65% iron, against 61-62% for the standard ore that sets the world price. It also sells pellets, small baked balls of ore, and mines copper and nickel through Vale Base Metals.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management presents the mid-grade shift as flexibility that lifts volume and lowers cost, not as lost quality (C21).
How it makes money
About four-fifths of sales are iron ore, sold at the world index price plus or minus adjustments for quality. Copper and nickel make most of the rest; copper alone earned $1.03B of cash profit in the June quarter, helped by record copper and gold prices.
Vale hands back a set share of its cash profit after the spending needed to keep mines running, at least 30% of it; in 2025 that came to $4.3B.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Proforma EBITDA leaves out $390M of dam and non-recurring charges in the quarter, which are real cash over time.
Copper EBITDA per tonne rests on record copper and gold prices that were 40% and more below a year earlier.
Proforma figures exclude the nickel write-downs, which record capital that will not come back.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (2Q26) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Iron ore fines | about 66% | IOCJ, BRBF, mid-grade Carajás and China pellet feed sold at index-linked prices, mostly to China. |
| Iron ore pellets and other ferrous | about 12% | Pellets and briquettes for blast furnaces and direct reduction, plus ore logistics. |
| Copper | about 15% | Concentrate from Salobo and Sossego with gold by-product, sold to smelters. |
| Nickel and other base metals | about 12% | Refined nickel and copper from Canada, Brazil and Indonesia, net of the base metals' other lines. |
Who runs it
Gustavo Pimenta, finance chief from 2021, has run Vale since 2024; Marcelo Bacci runs finance. Nobody controls the company: the Banco do Brasil staff pension fund Previ owns 8%, BlackRock 7% and Mitsui 7%, while directors and officers together own a tiny 0.02%.
Most of the chief executive's pay is bonus and shares tied to returns against rivals, return on capital and safety. In July the chairman resigned in a fight with Previ, and shareholders elected an independent chair over the pension fund's preferred names.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Coelho's link to Previ is this thesis's reading of public coverage, not stated in the minutes.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Few deposits are as large and as rich as Serra Sul: billions of tonnes at about 65% iron. That lets Vale sell ore that saves a mill fuel, at a mining cost of about $24 a tonne, level with Rio Tinto's in Australia.
The edge is real but narrowing. The extra Vale earns over the index fell from $6.2 to $4.4 a tonne in a quarter, as it sold a third less of its top-grade ore and more middle-grade ore instead.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Management presents the mid-grade shift as flexibility that lifts volume and lowers cost, not as lost quality (C21).
Vale's Brent hedge earned $99M in the quarter, about $1.6 a tonne, booked below the line; with it all-in cost was $60.0.
Rio's figure is per wet tonne and Vale's C1 excludes third-party ore, so the two are close but not identical measures.
The threat
Simandou, a huge high-grade mine in Guinea built by Rio Tinto and Chinese partners, is shipping and aims for 60 Mt a year by late 2028, with rail and port room for 120 Mt. Its ore carries more alumina, which mills dislike, but buyers expect it to cap the price of high-grade ore. Australian ore also reaches China in about ten days, against forty from Brazil.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Rio guides only 5-10 Mt of Simandou sales in 2026, so the ramp is slow at first.
The same buyer said existing premium products still have their market value, so the cap is not a collapse.
Rio's figure is per wet tonne and Vale's C1 excludes third-party ore, so the two are close but not identical measures.
The rivals: RIO, BHP, FCX, SCCO, FCX, SCCO, and 2 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RIO | Simandou (Rio Tinto, Chinalco consortium and WCS)Priced against it: Yes | Iron Ore Solutions | On sale | Yes |
| RIO · BHP | Rio Tinto and BHP in the PilbaraPriced against it: Yes | Iron Ore Solutions | On sale | Yes |
| FortescuePriced against it: Listed abroad | Iron Ore Solutions | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| Not listed | Scrap-fed electric arc furnacesPriced against it: Not listed | Iron Ore Solutions | On sale | Not listed |
| FCX · SCCO | Copper miners such as Freeport-McMoRan and Southern CopperPriced against it: Not checked | Vale Base Metals | On sale | Not checked |
| Other copper mine projects, such as Freeport-McMoRan's and Southern Copper's expansions | Copper growth projects | Announced |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The world mined about 2,600 Mt of iron ore in 2025, worth roughly $258B at the year's average price of about $99 a tonne. Vale produced 336.1 Mt, about 13% of it.
So Vale's results depend far more on the price of ore than on selling more: its volumes have barely changed for years, and its Northern mines produced less in each of the last two years.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The southern and southeastern systems in Minas Gerais made 134.7 Mt, so Carajás is about half of output, not all of it.
The results
What growth costs
Growth is not making Vale more profitable. In the June quarter sales rose 19% but costs rose 20%, so the share of each sales dollar kept as cash profit stayed at 39%. Delivering a tonne of ore to China cost 18% more than a year before.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Proforma EBITDA leaves out $390M of dam and non-recurring charges in the quarter, which are real cash over time.
Vale's Brent hedge earned $99M in the quarter, about $1.6 a tonne, booked below the line; with it all-in cost was $60.0.
The guide assumes the real and Brent where they were in July; both have moved since.
The last report (30 Jul)
In the June 2026 quarter Vale's sales rose 19% to $10.5B and its cash profit before the dam charges rose 19% to $4.07B, carried by copper and by higher ore prices. Profit for shareholders fell 35% to $1.38B, after $390M of dam and one-off charges.
Costs went the wrong way. Mining a tonne of ore cost $24.1, up 9%, and delivered to China $61.6, up 18%, on a stronger Brazilian real and dearer ship fuel, so Vale raised its cost forecast for 2026. It bought back $140M of shares and declared $1.7B of dividends.
What it did to the thesisIt showed copper and prices carrying the results while the iron ore business moved the wrong way: higher costs and a smaller premium for quality. That is the side of the argument that keeps the view at Neutral rather than better.
The quarter in detail
Earnings per share $0.36 against $0.41 expected.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Proforma EBITDA leaves out $390M of dam and non-recurring charges in the quarter, which are real cash over time.
Vale's Brent hedge earned $99M in the quarter, about $1.6 a tonne, booked below the line; with it all-in cost was $60.0.
Management presents the mid-grade shift as flexibility that lifts volume and lowers cost, not as lost quality (C21).
The guide assumes the real and Brent where they were in July; both have moved since.
What management did with the money
Vale pays out at least 30% of its cash profit after the spending that keeps mines running, and added $1B on top in 2025. It is buying back shares and has approved two copper projects at much lower cost than first planned. It wrote down its Canadian nickel business by about $3.5B in 2025.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 13 purchases and 3 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Bacaba is classed a sustaining project: it extends Sossego's life, so most of its tonnes replace an exhausting pit (C27).
The added tonnes are an upper bound ('up to'), and Salobo's grade declines over its life, so the gain may be less than capacity.
Proforma figures exclude the nickel write-downs, which record capital that will not come back.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price already assumes ore gets cheaper and leaves the new copper almost free, but rising costs and a shrinking premium give no reason to pay more.
The shares fell 29% in six months to $12.20 while sales per share rose 7%, so the whole fall was buyers paying less for each dollar of sales. It followed a raised cost forecast, two quarters of profit below forecasts, a board fight and reports that politics stalled a listing of the copper and nickel business.
Fewer analysts are positive than in February. Third-quarter results on 29 October show whether costs came back down.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Coelho's link to Previ is this thesis's reading of public coverage, not stated in the minutes.
Vale's own denial is that nothing was ever decided, so the report and the reply can both be true.
How we read the multiple
A buyer pays for Vale as if the ore price will slide toward the $84 a tonne Vale itself uses to value its reserves.
- Counting dam payments owed as debt, the business is valued at about $68.6B.
- That is about 4 times the $17.2B of cash profit it earned in the last four quarters.
- Each $10 a tonne off the ore price cuts that profit by about $3.2B a year.
- At Vale's long-term ore price, that is near 6.5 times, close to its rivals.
Against its own history. On the vendor's reported profit, cut by 2025's write-downs and dam charges, Vale looks dearer than usual; before those charges it sits near its long-held discount.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Proforma EBITDA excludes the dam and non-recurring charges that expanded net debt counts, and the vendor's EV/EBITDA on reported figures reads 7.0.
Costs fall with ore prices too, through freight and royalties, so the drop in EBITDA is smaller than the arithmetic.
Both peers' multiples price copper, aluminium and coal as well as iron ore, so the comparison is of companies, not ore.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of cash profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of cash profit |
|---|---|---|
| VALE | Vale | 4.8× |
| RIO | Rio Tinto | 6.2× |
| BHP | BHP Group Limited | 6.8× |
The middle of the other 2 is 6.5. Vale S.A. is cheapest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Cheaper than both rivals, but they also mine copper, aluminium and coal closer to China, and Vale has traded at a discount for years.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Fortescue Ltd, Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara AB (LKAB), Kumba Iron Ore Limited, Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (SNIM).
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on Vale's new copper mines: Bacaba starting in 2027 and a larger Salobo plant in 2028. Even if both deliver in full, the whole company would be worth only a little more than today, because iron ore is so much bigger.
If no new copper comes, the iron ore and today's copper and nickel, at the price Vale usually trades on, less what it owes, still cover today's market value.
| Copper growth projects EBITDA in two to three years | Tonnes of new copper a year needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $400.00M (the big win) | about 50.0K at 100% kept | 1.1× |
| $1.04B | about 130.0K at 100% kept | 1.2× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $9.33B of Copper growth projects EBITDA (about 1.2M tonnes of new copper a year); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $38.63B of Copper growth projects EBITDA (about 4.8M tonnes of new copper a year), at the same multiple.
Each row is Copper growth projects alone, plus the rest of the company (Iron ore and today's copper and nickel) counted at about $71.41B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Bacaba licensed and construction started
- Done Salobo flotation expansion approved, with Wheaton funding
- In progress Bacaba starts producing due 2027-09
- Not started Alemão investment decision due 2027-12
- Not started Salobo expansion starts producing due 2028-06
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Bacaba is classed a sustaining project: it extends Sossego's life, so most of its tonnes replace an exhausting pit (C27).
The added tonnes are an upper bound ('up to'), and Salobo's grade declines over its life, so the gain may be less than capacity.
The 70% return is management's own figure on today's copper and gold prices; no study with its assumptions has been filed.
Bacaba's ore and Salobo's carry gold, so at today's prices a new tonne would earn more than $8,000.
Copper EBITDA per tonne rests on record copper and gold prices that were 40% and more below a year earlier.
Proforma figures exclude the nickel write-downs, which record capital that will not come back.
Where we disagree with the market
A cheap, high-paying miner held back by China's slowdown and a rival African mine; most analysts say hold.
Fair at today's price: the ore business is good but under pressure, and nothing yet shows its costs or premium turning.
Most analysts say hold, and fewer are positive than in February. The market blames China and Simandou. The filings add something closer to home: Vale's own costs rose and the extra it earns for quality fell, so its cheapness is not by itself a reason to buy.
We would be wrong if costs fall back and the premium recovers, or if the price falls far enough to pay for much cheaper ore.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Proforma EBITDA excludes the dam and non-recurring charges that expanded net debt counts, and the vendor's EV/EBITDA on reported figures reads 7.0.
Management presents the mid-grade shift as flexibility that lifts volume and lowers cost, not as lost quality (C21).
The guide assumes the real and Brent where they were in July; both have moved since.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- China buys most of it. China took 63% of Vale's ore in 2025, and its steel output fell 4.4% that year and 3.7% in August 2026.
- A rival mine arrives. Simandou aims for 60 Mt a year of high-grade ore by late 2028, aimed at the same mills.
- The dams still cost. Two dam collapses, at Mariana in 2015 and Brumadinho in 2019, still carry about $6B of provisions.
- The state has a veto. Brazil's government holds golden shares that can block any sale of the iron ore mines, railways or ports.
- Rules on caves. A decree protecting caves limits mining in the older Northern mines, and its new terms are not final.
- Costs are rising. A stronger Brazilian real and dearer ship fuel pushed delivered costs up 18% in a year.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Chinese buying is consolidating: the state's China Mineral Resources Group now negotiates for many mills, which no single-customer figure shows.
Rio guides only 5-10 Mt of Simandou sales in 2026, so the ramp is slow at first.
Decharacterisation spending outside expanded net debt continues to 2035 on the annex's own schedule.
The same quarter's premium fell by $1.8 a tonne (C05), so the flexibility costs price.
Vale's Brent hedge earned $99M in the quarter, about $1.6 a tonne, booked below the line; with it all-in cost was $60.0.
What we still do not know
- How much Simandou's ore will cut the price mills pay for Vale's best ore.
- What the new caves decree will let Vale mine in its older Northern mines.
- Whether Brasília would ever let Vale list or sell part of its copper and nickel business.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The same buyer said existing premium products still have their market value, so the cap is not a collapse.
The same quarter's premium fell by $1.8 a tonne (C05), so the flexibility costs price.
Vale's own denial is that nothing was ever decided, so the report and the reply can both be true.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveA price that pays for lower ore
It needs:
- ○The business is valued at 3.5 times its last four quarters' cash profit, down from about 4, with that profit held.about ≈$10.68 today, 12% below the last close
- Neutral→AttractiveCosts and the premium turn
It needs all of:
- ○Delivering a tonne of ore to China costs under $55, reported at a quarterly print.checked at the next results, due by 29 Oct
- ○The extra Vale earns over the index for quality rises above $6 a tonne.checked at the next results, due by 29 Oct
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe ore business weakens
It needs any of:
- ○The price Vale gets for its ore falls below $80 a tonne at a quarterly print.checked at the next results, due by 29 Oct
- ○The extra Vale earns for quality turns into a discount.checked at the next results, due by 29 Oct
We would also be wrong if
- Debt including the dam payments rises above $20B, the top of Vale's own range.
- Another dam fails, or the government moves to undo the 2026 board elections.
What is coming
- 29 October 2026 Q3 2026 results and call: Whether costs fall back into the guide, the premium holds, and how much more is returned.
Every dated event ahead
- 29 October 2026 Q3 2026 results and call: Whether costs fall back into the guide, the premium holds, and how much more is returned.
- 28 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and 2027 guidance: The 2027 cost and volume guide, and the year's total remuneration.
- 30 September 2027 Bacaba copper start-up: Whether the first copper project lands early and on budget.
Since we wrote this
- 23 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten a week before Q3 results, after the shares fell 29% in six months on costs, China and a board fight.
Sources 23
Sources - 23
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-03-27the businesses, production by system, reserves and grades, customers, competitors, risk factors, the golden shares, holders, officers' holdings, pay plans and the remuneration policybacksC01C02C03C04C09C13C15C16C20C23C28C42C45C46
- S02primarycompany release2026-02-122025 revenue, proforma EBITDA, impairments, net income, free cash flow, capex and the year's remuneration
Rio de Janeiro, February 12th, 2026 Vale’s performance in 4Q25 and 2025
backsC01C09C40C41 - S03primarycompany release2026-07-30the quarter's results by business, prices and premiums, product mix, costs, debt, provisions, buybacks, dividends and the project table
C1 cash costs and all-in costs were revised to US$ 22.5-23.5/t and US$ 58-62/t, respectively, largely reflecting a stronger BRL and higher oil price expectations.
backsC05C06C07C08C10C11C14C22C23C24C25C28C40C41C42C43C44C48 - S04primarycompany filing2026-08-24the reviewed IFRS statements and segment note behind the 2Q26 reportbacksC08
- S05primarycompany release2026-07-21quarterly iron ore, pellet, copper and nickel output and the 2026 production guidance
Vale delivered a solid operating performance in Q2
backsC22 - S06primarytranscript2026-07-31Vale Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 31 July 2026the commercial chief's read of China and the cost curve, the freight book, the year-end debt aim, the remuneration choice and the copper project pipeline
at $95 per ton of prices, you'd have about 120 million tons of iron ore that would actually be reaching the cost limit.
backsC12C21C27C30C36 - S07primarycompany release2026-07-30the revised 2026 cost guidance against the previous one
C1 cash cost of iron ore (1) (2) 22.5 - 23.5 20.0 - 21.5 All-in iron ore cost (3) 58 - 62 52 - 56
backsC07 - S08primarycompany release2026-08-12the Salobo expansion's start-up, added capacity and Wheaton's contribution
Annual copper production is projected to increase by up to approximately 30,000 tonnes contained in concentrate
backsC26 - S09primarycompany release2026-07-06the chair's resignation ahead of a shareholder meeting called to vote on him
As a result of this event, item 1 of the agenda of the Extraordinary General Meeting called for July 22, 2026 is rendered without effect.
backsC17 - S10primarycompany filing2026-07-22the chair and director elections and the votes for each candidatebacksC17
- S11primarycompany release2026-07-22the sanction on the vice-chairman after an outside investigation
the Company’s Board of Directors (“Board”) resolved today to impose the sanction of removal from office on Board member Marcelo Gasparino da Silva, due to the leakage of confidential information
backsC18 - S12primarycompany release2026-06-24the board's refusal of the Bamin investment and the railway-concession talks with the government
the Company assessed the opportunity and did not approve any investment related to Bahia Mineração S.A. - Bamin.
backsC18 - S13primarycompany release2026-09-08the press report of a shelved IPO amid political pressure, and the company's answer
there were no ongoing studies, nor had any decision been made by the management of Vale or VBM regarding a potential public offering of shares
backsC19 - S14primarycompany release2026-09-23a court-authorised restart of a stopped mine, with guidance unchanged
The Company reinforces that the resumption does not change its current production guidance.
backsC44 - S15primarycompany release2026-10-14Simandou's ramp, the corridor's 120 Mtpa capacity, Rio's 2026 Simandou sales range and its Pilbara unit cost guidance
Simandou hit an annualised production run-rate of ~10 Mtpa (100% basis) in Q3 as the project ramps up and remains on track to reach a 60 Mtpa production run-rate during H2 2028
backsC31C35 - S16primarycompany filing2026-02-19the largest rival's own view of iron ore demand
robust steel demand growth from the Global South will compensate (in part or in full) for expected decline in demand from China. Incremental iron ore supply growth is needed just to offset depletions.
backsC33 - S17primarygovernment data2026-02-01world and Brazilian usable ore output, reserves by country, and the 62% Fe price
Global prices of iron ore averaged a unit value of $99.07 per ton (spot prices for imported iron ore fines, 62% iron content, cost, insurance, and freight, at Tianjin Port, China) in the first 9 months of 2025, a decrease from $112.07 during the same period in 2024.
backsC34 - S18primarygovernment data2026-02-01world mine and refinery copper output and the copper price
The COMEX copper price was projected to average a record high of $4.80 per pound in 2025, 14% greater than $4.22 per pound in 2024.
backsC47 - S19secondarynews2026-09-23China's and the world's crude steel output, from worldsteel's monthly release
According to World Steel, the top ten steel-producing countries in August were: China - 74.6 million tonnes (-3.7% year-on-year)
backsC29 - S20secondarynews2026-06-09Simandou ore's chemistry against Vale's IOCJ, and the pressure it puts on high-grade premiums
The main obstacle is the high alumina content (2.7% compared to 1.4% in IOCJ), which thickens the slag and reduces smelting efficiency.
backsC32 - S21secondaryindustry data2026-07-02a steel-mill buyer's view of what Simandou does to the high-grade premium
“It will give a cap to the 65% premium, but existing premium products still have their market value,” he said.
backsC32 - S22primarycompany filing2026-08-18BHP's Pilbara iron ore system, Vale's other main rival into Asia
WAIO is an integrated system of four processing hubs and five open-cut operational mines in the Pilbara region of northern Western Australia
read, but no claim rests on it - S23primaryvendor data2026-10-22Research pack for VALE (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest), fetched 23 October 2026the 22 October close, returns and the move split, the vendor's multiples and cohort, analyst ratings and their drift, earnings surprises, short interest and insider tradesbacksC37C38C39C40C41C43