Ubiquiti
Business WiFi, switches, cameras and door readers, sold online without salespeople or licence fees and all run from one free piece of software.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Two fast organic years after a flat one, and the growth narrows to one platform while the other shrinks.
Business quality3/4 →
Measured in five rivals' own accounts and taking share - but nothing stops a buyer leaving, and Omada ships the same model.
Financial position4/4 ↑
Net cash, no debt at all, nothing to refinance, and free cash flow is 4.7 times the dividend it pays.
Execution record3/4 →
The operating record is clean and unbroken, but it guides nothing to be measured against and its legal note names none of four live disputes.
Per share capture4/4 →
Share count rose 0.05% on stock pay worth a fifth of a percent of sales; no deals, no convertibles, dividend paid.
Potential2/4 →
Nothing is contracted - distributors commit to nothing - and the market it sells into cannot be sized in units from any free source.
Risk profile2/4 ↓
Several externally controlled matters each resolve in one step: a customs determination, two lawsuits, and firmware licences terminable each year.
Valuation2/4 ↑
The price pays for the plan and for the best operating margin the company has ever earned holding, with operating costs already near their floor.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Central claims are filings or government data, but the size of the surcharge inside revenue is disclosed nowhere, so revenue quality cannot be checked.
The Verdict
We rate Ubiquiti neutral. It sells business WiFi, switches and cameras online, with no sales force, reseller or licence fee, and that low cost lets it win share in a market that is not growing. It is a solid, very profitable business, already at its best-ever margin. The price is full, not cheap: it still counts on years of fast growth from that peak, which must all come from selling more. The view hinges on whether selling costs stay low and the margin holds as component costs rise, and on surcharges its annual report never mentions.
The long caseUbiquiti rides no rising market: schools and businesses switching to networking gear they own outright is a share gain, and it must keep winning share to justify the price.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- Its share fell for the first time in funding year 2026, from 7.01% to 6.85%, and its units from 91,430 to 85,263.
- Funding year 2026 carries 319,430 line items against 347,380 for 2025 across the whole dataset, so the newest year may be incomplete and the fall may be an artefact of the filing window rather than of demand.
- The sample is the four category pages the storefront server-renders - cameras and recorders, cloud gateways, switching and WiFi - and not the whole catalogue, so the proportions describe those four categories rather than all revenue.
- A surcharge the buyer pays is pricing power only while the buyer keeps paying it, and nothing in the data says what happened to unit volumes after it was added around October 2025.
The company
A school, shop or office needs WiFi, switches to wire it together, cameras and door readers. Ubiquiti designs all of them, has contractors in Vietnam and China make them, and runs them from one program, UniFi, that it gives away. 45% of sales go through its own web store.
The alternative is Cisco Meraki: the same boxes, bought through a reseller, each needing a paid licence to work at all. In US school purchases, a Ubiquiti WiFi point costs $275 against Meraki's $645.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
How it makes money
It makes its money on the box, once. There is nothing to renew: in US school purchases, licences are 0.6% of what is spent on Ubiquiti against 36.6% of what is spent on Meraki. So every sale has to be won again, and no customer reaches 10% of sales.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Technology | 90.8% | UniFi gateways, WiFi, switches, cameras, door access and phones, sold as hardware with the management software included free. |
| Service Provider Technology | 9.2% | airMAX, airFiber, UFiber and GPON radios and fibre gear sold to internet providers building wireless and fibre access networks. |
Who runs it
Robert Pera founded Ubiquiti in 2003 and has run it since it started trading in 2005; Kevin Radigan has run the books since 2016. They are the only two officers. Pera owns 93% and takes no salary or stock awards, so he is paid the way every shareholder is, through dividends and the share price. Radigan's bonus is left to the board's discretion. Since a director died in late 2025 the board has had three members and no replacement has been reported.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Its advantage is cost. It pays for neither a sales force nor a channel: installers learn the platform, recommend it and answer each other's questions in a forum Ubiquiti hosts. Selling and administration take 3.7% of its sales, against 16.6% to 38.1% at five US-listed rivals, so it can charge less than half Meraki's price and still out-earn Cisco on operating margin.
The outside proof: its units in US school WiFi purchases went from 44,748 to 85,263 in three years while the market stood still.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- Its share fell for the first time in funding year 2026, from 7.01% to 6.85%, and its units from 91,430 to 85,263.
- Funding year 2026 carries 319,430 line items against 347,380 for 2025 across the whole dataset, so the newest year may be incomplete and the fall may be an artefact of the filing window rather than of demand.
The threat
TP-Link's Omada copies the model: one controller for WiFi, switches and routers, and now cameras, at a lower hardware price. It has yet to appear in US school purchasing at all. The other threat is Cisco itself, which could drop the licence requirement, the one thing that gives a buyer a reason to switch.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- TP-Link, MikroTik and Verkada have zero line items in US E-Rate Form 471 data for funding years 2024 to 2026, against Ubiquiti's 32,141 - so in the one purchasing channel that publishes its transactions, the nearest imitators have not arrived.
- TP-Link is the named subject of a US Department of Commerce proposal to bar its products on national-security grounds, reported in the press but carrying no Federal Register notice of a final determination as of 2026-09-16, which is a constraint on the attack rather than a defence Ubiquiti built.
The rivals: CSCO, HPE, FTNT, CRNT, and 2 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private | TP-Link OmadaPriced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| CSCO | Cisco MerakiPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| Private | VerkadaPriced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| HPE | Hewlett Packard Enterprise CompanyPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| FTNT | FortinetPriced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
| CRNT | Ceragon NetworksPriced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
US schools and libraries alone buy about $714M of WiFi points and $1.12B of switches a year, and Ubiquiti holds 6.2% of those WiFi units but 3.0% of the dollars. Beyond that channel lie 12.06 million US workplaces, but nobody publishes what they buy, so the full market is unsized.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year | Share in 3 years at its half-year rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Technology | 93% | +27.7% | +25.3% | +31.9% | 97% |
| Service Provider Technology | 7% | -12.7% | -11.5% | -5.5% | 3% |
| Whole company | 100% | +23.5% | +21.2% | +27.2% | 100% |
On the filed split through 2026-06-30, if each business keeps its last half-year's growth, the company grows about 23% next year and 24% in year 3, against 27.2% over the last twelve months. A scenario, not a forecast: no business holds its rate.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 27% in the year to Jun 2026, slower than the 33% in the year before.
Operating margin is 36%, up from 28% in the year to Jun 2023.
Running costs take 10¢ of each sales dollar, down from 12¢ in the year to Jun 2022.
Each dollar put into the business earns 82% a year after tax, down from 88% in the year to Jun 2022.
It turned 28% of sales into free cash, $909M over the year.
It holds $611M of cash against $0 of debt, $611M more cash than it owes.
The share count fell 1.9% in 4.0 years, and pay in shares costs 0.2% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in June.
| Jun 2022 | Jun 2023 | Jun 2024 | Jun 2025 | Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | |||||
| Sales | $1.69B | $1.94B | $1.93B | $2.57B | $3.27B |
| Sales growth | −11% | +15% | −0.6% | +33% | +27% |
| Profit | |||||
| Gross margin | 40% | 39% | 38% | 43% | 46% |
| Operating margin | 27% | 28% | 26% | 32% | 36% |
| Net margin | 22% | 21% | 18% | 28% | 29% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | |||||
| Research and development | 8.1% | 7.5% | 8.3% | 6.6% | 6.2% |
| Selling, general and admin | 4.1% | 3.7% | 4.2% | 4.3% | 3.7% |
| Pay in shares | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.2% |
| Capital spending | 0.8% | 1.1% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.6% |
| Cash | |||||
| Cash from operations | $370M | −$145M | $542M | $640M | $929M |
| Free cash flow | $357M | −$166M | $530M | $627M | $909M |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $137M | $115M | $126M | $150M | $611M |
| Debt | $786M | $1.08B | $706M | $250M | $0 |
| Net cash | −$650M | −$963M | −$580M | −$99.8M | $611M |
| Returns and shares | |||||
| Return on capital | 88% | 67% | 47% | 86% | 82% |
| Shares (diluted) | 61.7M | 60.5M | 60.5M | 60.5M | 60.6M |
What growth costs
Ubiquiti spends very little to grow: about a dime of each sales dollar on engineers, selling and running the company, and almost nothing on buildings or shares for staff. That share creeps up when sales stall and falls when they jump, but the bigger swings in profit come from what the hardware costs to make and what it sells for.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
Over the five years operating costs grew faster than sales, 90% against 72%, so the recovery since fiscal 2024 has not brought the cost ratio back to fiscal 2021's.
The last report (21 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
The fourth quarter of fiscal 2026, to June, was a record and beat analysts' earnings forecast by 17.4%. The year's sales reached $3.27B, up 27.2%, at a 36.2% operating margin.
Two things tempered it. Gross margin slipped to 45.8% from 47.0% the quarter before on higher component and shipping costs, which management says may keep rising. And about a quarter of the year's profit growth came from wider margins rather than more sales, which cannot repeat for ever.
What it did to the thesisIt confirmed this is a superb business taking share, with record sales and a beat. It also showed the risk the full price ignores: margins slipped on rising costs, and part of the profit growth came from wider margins that cannot widen for ever. The view stays Neutral.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $4.73 against $4.03 expected.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Ubiquiti already answers component cost with a named Memory surcharge on its own storefront rather than absorbing it, so a warning about cost is not automatically a warning about margin.
- The same company warned about component supply on the last call it held, in 2018, and gross margin has since gone from 38.4% in fiscal 2024 to 46.2% in fiscal 2026.
- Operating expenses fell from 10.93% of revenue to 9.95%, so holding gross margin constant and expenses at their actual dollar level flatters the counterfactual; on a constant expense ratio too the growth is nearer 30.9%, which does not change the reading.
- Management attributes the gross margin gain to favourable product mix and lower other indirect costs, partly offset by higher tariff costs - mix is a durable driver if Enterprise keeps taking share and is not one if it is a single strong quarter of camera sales.
What management did with the money
It has no debt and $611.2M of cash, pays a dividend of $1.00 a share each quarter, and barely issues new stock. It authorised a $500M buyback and bought nothing in a year while the shares halved. The founder, Robert Pera, owns 93%.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 0 purchases and 1 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The intention is explicitly conditioned: the release reserves the board's determination each quarter on cash flow, capital requirements and other factors, and one holder controls 93% of the votes that appoint that board.
- The board authorised a $500M buyback in August 2025 and spent none of it through a year in which the shares halved, which is the nearest available evidence of how firmly this board's stated capital intentions bind it.
- With 7.0% free float and six holders of record, buying back stock would shrink the float further and could threaten the exchange listing standards a company needs public shareholders to meet.
- Ubiquiti spent the year repaying $250.0M of term debt and paying $193.6M of dividends, so the cash was allocated rather than idle.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. A superb business at a price that already expects it to keep growing fast for years.
The shares are far below their April high. They fell 39.4% in seven sessions after the only earnings miss in eight quarters, then fell again on a record quarter. This market prices Ubiquiti's quarters, not its business: it has twice doubted the margin, and the margin kept rising.
The next test is on 6 November: whether gross margin holds above 45% as component costs rise.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The quarter itself was not weak: revenue was up 18.7% on the year, gross margin of 47.0% was the highest of the four, and operating margin was 36.9% - the miss was against an estimate that had run up, not against the business.
- The shares had risen 84% in the six months to 2026-04-21, so part of what fell was the run-up rather than the business.
- Ubiquiti already answers component cost with a named Memory surcharge on its own storefront rather than absorbing it, so a warning about cost is not automatically a warning about margin.
- The same company warned about component supply on the last call it held, in 2018, and gross margin has since gone from 38.4% in fiscal 2024 to 46.2% in fiscal 2026.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about $36 for each $1 of last year's profit, a little above Ubiquiti's usual level and its rivals'. Its profit on each dollar of sales is already a record.
Counting its cash, the company costs 28.4 times operating profit. For a buyer to earn 10% a year for five years:
- Operating profit must grow about 10% a year, from selling more, if buyers keep paying that price for it.
- About 16% a year if buyers later pay only 22 times.
Against its own history. A little above its own normal on almost every measure, even after a year in which the business grew far faster than the shares.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Operating profit grew 41.8% in fiscal 2026 and 67.6% in fiscal 2025, so 10% a year is far below what the business has just delivered and the bar looks easy on that record.
- It looks easy because the base is the best margin in the company's history: operating margin went from 25.9% in fiscal 2024 to 36.2% in fiscal 2026 and operating expenses are already down to 9.95% of revenue, so almost all of the next five years has to come from volume.
- Cisco and HPE, the only two listed rivals whose filings describe the same product, trade at less than half Ubiquiti's multiple of sales - so the exit multiple assumption is the whole argument and it is an assumption.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on price for each $1 of yearly profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | price for each $1 of yearly profit |
|---|---|---|
| HPE | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company | 27.8× |
| CSCO | Cisco Systems | 32.8× |
| UI | Ubiquiti | 35.5× |
The middle of the other 2 is 30.3. Ubiquiti Inc. is dearest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Dearest of its filed rivals, on the highest operating margin of the group, so the position is this company's own.
Also checked and set aside: Belden (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: MikroTik (SIA Mikrotikls), TP-Link Technologies Co., Ltd., Tarana Wireless, Inc., Trango (Trango Systems / Trango Networks), Verkada Inc., Axis Communications AB, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd. (HIKVISION), Hanwha Vision Co., Ltd., Cambium Networks Corporation, Aruba Networks and Juniper Networks, Ruckus.
Where we disagree with the market
A hardware company with one controlling owner, no guidance and no earnings call, whose margins are a peak that a single miss proved fragile.
The low selling cost is built in and is taking share in a market that is not growing, but the price already pays for it.
The market has rejected the same margin objection twice while the margin kept rising. We measured the cost gap from US school purchase records and five rivals' own accounts, rather than inferring it.
We would be wrong if selling costs climb as a share of sales while gross margin falls, or if the school share keeps slipping, as it did this year.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The quarter itself was not weak: revenue was up 18.7% on the year, gross margin of 47.0% was the highest of the four, and operating margin was 36.9% - the miss was against an estimate that had run up, not against the business.
- The shares had risen 84% in the six months to 2026-04-21, so part of what fell was the run-up rather than the business.
- Its share fell for the first time in funding year 2026, from 7.01% to 6.85%, and its units from 91,430 to 85,263.
- Funding year 2026 carries 319,430 line items against 347,380 for 2025 across the whole dataset, so the newest year may be incomplete and the fall may be an artefact of the filing window rather than of demand.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Surcharges nobody filed. 78% of its web-store products carry memory or tariff surcharges its annual report never mentions, and a class action seeks the tariff charge back.
- Undisclosed disputes. Its legal note names no litigation, yet its dockets show a class action, a suit by Ukrainian plaintiffs and eight patent suits since 2022.
- Customs could send a bill. US Customs is challenging how it values and classifies imports, and says back duties with penalties could follow.
- Suppliers can pull the plug. The licences that let it rewrite its chips' software renew each year and can be ended without cause.
- One owner, little float. The founder owns 93%, only 7% of shares trade, and the company gives no guidance and holds no calls.
The evidence under this - 9 claims
- The sample is the four category pages the storefront server-renders - cameras and recorders, cloud gateways, switching and WiFi - and not the whole catalogue, so the proportions describe those four categories rather than all revenue.
- A surcharge the buyer pays is pricing power only while the buyer keeps paying it, and nothing in the data says what happened to unit volumes after it was added around October 2025.
- The docket gives the Delaware case's caption, date and class-action character but not its subject matter; that the claim is about the tariff surcharge comes from plaintiff-firm descriptions, which are a tertiary and interested source.
- Neither case has been decided, and the two run in opposite directions - a refund from the government is an asset and restitution to customers a liability - so the net exposure could be either sign or close to nothing.
- Disclosure turns on materiality, and for a company with $611.2M of cash and $908.9M of annual free cash flow a set of unquantified civil claims may reasonably be judged immaterial.
- Two of the three non-patent cases were filed within eleven weeks of the 10-K and one - the Ukrainian action, filed 2026-08-11 - only ten days before it, so a company could not have completed an assessment.
What we still do not know
- How much revenue the surcharges carry, and how much might be owed back. No filing puts a number on either.
- Whether the allegation that its radios reach Russian forces becomes a legal cost. The shares have priced it at nothing so far.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The sample is the four category pages the storefront server-renders - cameras and recorders, cloud gateways, switching and WiFi - and not the whole catalogue, so the proportions describe those four categories rather than all revenue.
- A surcharge the buyer pays is pricing power only while the buyer keeps paying it, and nothing in the data says what happened to unit volumes after it was added around October 2025.
- The docket gives the Delaware case's caption, date and class-action character but not its subject matter; that the claim is about the tariff surcharge comes from plaintiff-firm descriptions, which are a tertiary and interested source.
- Neither case has been decided, and the two run in opposite directions - a refund from the government is an asset and restitution to customers a liability - so the net exposure could be either sign or close to nothing.
- The 80% figure is one officer's observation, not a measurement, and the publisher held a short position in the stock at publication - an interested source reporting an unmeasured quantity.
- Ukraine's own state register of foreign parts found in Russian weapons, 6,107 components as of 2026-09-10, carries no Ubiquiti entry in its manufacturer index - though it catalogues components inside weapons rather than commercial equipment used alongside them, so it is the wrong instrument rather than a contrary finding.
- A market that has not priced something is not a market that has judged it groundless; the Southern District of New York action post-dates the report by seven months and the price reaction to that filing is inside the general decline.
- With 4.2 million shares of free float, an absent price reaction is weak evidence about what anybody concluded.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveVolume growth carries it, at a lower multiple
It needs all of:
- ○Operating margin stays above 30% and selling and administration below 6% of sales, so growth is not being bought.checked at the next results, due by 6 Nov
- ○The company's value falls to about 20 times operating profit, from 28.4, so volume growth alone pays an owner properly.about ≈$401.67 today, 29% below the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveIt has to start paying for demand
It needs any of:
- ○Selling and administration pass 6% of sales, or operating margin falls below 30% for two quarters running.checked at the next results, due by 6 Nov
- ○A chip supplier ends the licence that lets it rewrite chip software, or a regulator imposes a charge above a year's free cash.watched as it happens
We would also be wrong if
- Its share of US school WiFi purchases falls for a second year running.
What is coming
- 6 November 2026 Q1 fiscal 2027 results: Gross margin against 45% with component costs rising, whether the storefront surcharges are still itemised, and operating costs against 11% of sales.
Every dated event ahead
- 6 November 2026 Q1 fiscal 2027 results: Gross margin against 45% with component costs rising, whether the storefront surcharges are still itemised, and operating costs against 11% of sales.
- December 2026 2026 proxy statement and annual meeting: Whether a fourth director and third audit committee member have been named, how the say-on-pay vote goes, and Pera's stake re-dated.
- February 2027 Q2 fiscal 2027 results: Whether the $500M buyback authorisation is finally used and the quarterly dividend of at least $1.00 holds as promised.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 16 SepThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionThe cost advantage is real and measured from school purchase records, but the price already pays for it, and surcharges missing from the annual report cloud the revenue.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 25
Sources - 25
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-08-21Item 1 business and competitor list, the risk factors, the full income statement, balance sheet and cash flow, the product and geographic revenue split, distributor-versus-webstore mix, the customer and receivable concentration tables, the tariff and Customs disclosures, the buyback and dividend notes, the properties table, six holders of record, and the Legal Matters notebacksC01C02C03C07C08C09C11C12C15C16C20C22C24C26C27C28C29C31C32C34C35C37C38C39C40C42C44C49C51C52C53C55C57C58C60C61C62
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-21the quarterly product and geographic tables, GAAP against non-GAAP earnings per share, the component-cost warning, the dividend intention for fiscal 2027, and the absence of any revenue or earnings guidancebacksC24C41C42C47C53C56
- S03primarycompany filing2025-10-24Robert Pera's beneficial ownership, the four-person board, and the related-party sales to the Memphis GrizzliesbacksC45C58C59
- S04primaryvendor data2026-09-16Ubiquiti research pack, frozen beside this thesiscontent/UI/research-pack.jsonprice and the return series, the price-move decomposition, the analyst rating history and estimate panel, price-target drift, the derived multiples against their six-year medians, FINRA short interest, the insider roster, and the filed competitor cohortbacksC11C26C38C39C40C41C42C44C46C47C48C49C52C54
- S05primarycompany filing2026-09-02Cisco's own selling and administrative expense ratio, its gross and operating margins, revenue by product category, and the statement that its Networking growth came from AI infrastructurebacksC08C09C21
- S06primarycompany filing2026-02-25Fortinet's own expense ratios and margins, and its self-description as a network-security company selling through distributors to resellers and managed security service providersbacksC08C09
- S07primarycompany filing2025-12-18HPE's own expense ratios and group operating margin, and the Networking and Campus & Branch segment revenue that sizes the part of HPE which actually competesbacksC08
- S08primarycompany filing2026-06-30Extreme's own selling and administrative expense ratio, gross margin and operating marginbacksC08C09
- S09primarycompany filing2025-12-31NETGEAR's own expense ratio and margins - the one comparator in the set that sells at Ubiquiti's price point and loses money doing itbacksC08
- S10primaryother2026-09-16Cisco Meraki licensing guidelines and licensing FAQs Cisco Systemsthe incumbent's own statement that each device requires a licence to function, that licences and hardware are sold separately, and that an out-of-compliance estate is shut down after thirty days
the organization will enter a 30-day grace period, during which the organization must be brought back into compliance, otherwise it will be shut down until proper licensing is applied to the organization
backsC04 - S11primarygovernment data2026-09-16USAC E-Rate Form 471 line-item open data, funding years 2019 to 2026 Universal Service Administrative Companywhat US schools actually pay, by manufacturer, per unit - access points, switches and licences - from the applicants' own filed funding requests, and the unit volumes behind them. The quote is one line item verbatim; every aggregate in the ledger is computed over this dataset with SoQL, grouping on form_471_manufacturer_name and form_471_function_name and summing one_time_quantity and pre_discount_extended_eligible_line_item_costs for funding_year >= 2024, so any figure can be re-run against the same endpoint.
form_471_manufacturer_name":"Meraki","model_of_equipment":"MS390 48-port Enterprise License and Support, 5 Year","one_time_eligible_costs":"2243.66"
backsC05C06C10C14C17C19 - S12primaryregulator2026-03-23the date and scope of the Covered List addition, and the NIST definition that limits it to consumer-grade devices primarily intended for residential use
On March 23, 2026, the FCC added to the Covered List Routers produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS
backsC15 - S13primarygovernment data2026-09-16BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages - annual 2024 US totals, and the published CSV field layout behind them Bureau of Labor Statisticsthe count of US establishments - 12,057,370 in total and 11,750,888 private, read from data.bls.gov/cew/data/api/2024/a/area/US000.csv - and the bureau's own definition of the field, which is the annual average of quarterly establishment counts
annual_avg_estabs Numeric 8 Annual average of quarterly establishment counts for a given year
backsC18 - S14primaryother2026-09-16the live US price list, showing a named Memory surcharge and a named Tariff surcharge added on top of the base price of most listed products
"minDisplayPrice":{"amount":19900,"currency":"USD"},"minDisplayPriceWithSurcharges":{"amount":22800,"currency":"USD"},"productSurchargeTypes":["Memory","Tariff"]
backsC30C31 - S15primaryother2026-09-16US federal court dockets naming Ubiquiti Inc., via CourtListener's RECAP search API US federal courtsthe Delaware class action, the Southern District of New York action brought by Ukrainian plaintiffs, Ubiquiti's own Court of International Trade case against the United States, and eight patent infringement suits since 2022
JAMES HIGGINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UBIQUITI INC., CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMAND
backsC33C35 - S16secondaryanalyst2026-01-27Hunterbrook Media, "Ubiquiti: The U.S. Tech Enabling Russia's Drone War" Hunterbrook Mediathe 80% radio-bridge estimate and its single-officer provenance, the finding that diversion ran through distributors and third countries rather than direct sales, and the publisher's own disclosure that its fund was short the stock
Based on Hunterbrook Media's reporting, Hunterbrook Capital is short $UI and long a basket of comparable securities at the time of publication.
backsC36 - S17tertiarynews2026-08-12Global Investigations Review, "New York tech company sued over alleged role in Russian strikes" Global Investigations Reviewthat the Southern District of New York action is brought by seven Ukrainian plaintiffs and what it pleads - the docket gives the caption and date, this gives the substance
Ubiquiti allowed its encrypted radio products to aid the Russian military's "human safari" drone operations against civilians
backsC35 - S18primaryother2026-09-16TP-Link Omada software-defined networking product pages, US site TP-Link Technologiesthat the nearest imitation of the UniFi model is generally available in the US today, in cloud, hardware and software controller forms, and that its range now includes security cameras and video recorders
Omada's Software-Defined Networking (SDN) platform integrates network devices, including access points, switches, and routers. It provides 100% centralized cloud management and a highly scalable network controlled from a single interface.
backsC13 - S19primarygovernment data2026-09-10Ukraine Defence Intelligence "War & Sanctions" register of foreign components in the aggressor's weapons Ukraine Defence Intelligence (GUR)that the one state register of foreign parts found inside Russian weapons carries no Ubiquiti entry in its manufacturer index - and that it catalogues components inside weapons rather than commercial equipment used alongside them, so it is the wrong instrument for this question
The world`s only open database portal of foreign-produced weapon components Total number: 6 107 Components 207 Weapon Units Updated: 10.09.2026
read, but no claim rests on it - S20primarytranscript2018-08-24Robert Pera's own account of the channel's inability to hold stock and of chronic stock-outs; three analyst questions, from BMO and JMP, and nothing sincebacksC47
- S21secondaryvendor data2026-09-16that Ubiquiti is covered with 27 transcripts and that the newest is fiscal 2018 Q4 - so the absence of a recent call is the company's choice and not a coverage gapbacksC47
- S22primaryregulator2026-09-11Federal Register, FCC equipment-authorisation security rulemakings, 2026 Office of the Federal Register / FCCthe September 2026 component-part rule and the August 2026 proposals on hardware and software bills of materials - the compliance load the whole category now carries - and the absence of any Federal Register notice of a final Commerce determination on TP-Link
The Commission closes a component-part loophole by prohibiting authorization of devices that incorporate logic-bearing hardware components produced by an entity identified on the Commission's Covered List
read, but no claim rests on it - S23tertiarynews2026-09-10that a plaintiff firm is soliciting shareholders over the Russia allegations - a solicitation rather than a proceeding, and the only reason this appeared in the news filter at allread, but no claim rests on it
- S24primarycompany filing2023-08-25the fiscal 2021 to 2023 income statements and cash flows: research and development, sales, general and administrative, the $618.1M fiscal 2022 buyback and the dividends paidbacksC61C62
- S25primarycompany filing2025-12-05director Ronald Sege's death on 2025-11-30, the vacant Class II seat, the two-member audit committee and the NYSE notice of non-compliance of 2025-12-04, and the 2025 annual meeting votebacksC60