Nutanix
Nutanix sells the software that turns a company's own servers into a private cloud, and is the first place many VMware customers look when they leave.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Revenue grew 15%, 18% and 12% in three years and ARR 16%, but FY2026 slowed and the FY2027 guide holds near 12%.
Business quality3/4 ↑
Hypervisor switching costs are real and Gartner ranks Nutanix first, but Broadcom's renewals keep growing and Microsoft and Red Hat ship alternatives.
Financial position4/4 →
About $1.0B of net cash after the convertible notes and $841M of free cash flow; the $500M 2027 notes are covered by cash.
Execution record3/4 →
Beat adjusted earnings eight quarters running and FY2026 revenue topped the cut guide, but that guide was cut once.
Per share capture3/4 →
Buybacks exceeded share pay and diluted shares fell, but share pay takes 43% of free cash flow and the 2027 notes are in the money.
Potential3/4 →
A large base is moving off VMware on Gartner's estimate and $3.44B is contracted, but the share Nutanix wins is not measured.
Risk profile3/4 →
No end customer above 10%, but two distributors carry 47% of revenue and server supply sets the timing of sales.
Valuation3/4 ↓
About 37 times cash after share pay and 21 times free cash flow: fair if growth reaches management's FY2029 target, not cheap.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Revenue, cash and the balance sheet are filed, but ARR, retention, the migration rate and the new lines rest on management or reported Gartner views.
If it works 1.1× · if it fails you keep about 98%.
The Verdict
We rate Nutanix Neutral. The business is solid: customers rarely leave once their systems run on it, they spend more each year, and it turns a large share of sales into cash. VMware's customers are moving after Broadcom raised prices, and Nutanix is the alternative an industry analyst tells them to try first. But they move slowly, at their next hardware refresh, and after the shares rose by about three quarters in six months the price is fair rather than cheap: it already assumes management's plan for faster growth. As a bet on its new storage and AI lines it is Defensive: little upside, little to lose.
The long caseMost VMware customers keep their data on separate storage arrays; letting them move without replacing those arrays widens who can leave for Nutanix.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Palmer advised against moving every workload, and Gartner's guide expects most organisations not to move until 2027 (C31), so the third is a ceiling-shaped estimate spread over years.
- Free cash flow is lifted by multi-year prepayment (C16, C17), so 37 times may understate what the price asks of the business once payment terms shorten.
- The 2027 notes are in the money, so treating them as $500M of debt understates dilution by about $106M of value at today's price.
Revenue growth was 12% in FY2026 and is guided at about 12% for FY2027 (C02, C05), so the target needs an acceleration that has not yet begun.
Retention is a company-defined metric stated on the call; it is not in the 10-K and cannot be checked from filings.
- The 10-K warns that external storage may cannibalise Nutanix's own hyperconverged sales.
- No figure is filed, so the claim that it leads growth cannot be checked.
The company
Every company that runs its own computers needs software to split each server into many virtual ones and to store their data safely. For years that meant VMware. Nutanix sells the alternative: a storage layer that pools the disks inside the servers, a hypervisor (the software that runs the virtual machines) and one console to manage it all, mostly on multi-year subscriptions.
Buyers are company IT departments. Gartner's analyst tells VMware users to look at Nutanix first, and Hewlett Packard Enterprise names it as a main rival.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Palmer advised against moving every workload, and Gartner's guide expects most organisations not to move until 2027 (C31), so the third is a ceiling-shaped estimate spread over years.
- The 10-K warns that external storage may cannibalise Nutanix's own hyperconverged sales.
- No figure is filed, so the claim that it leads growth cannot be checked.
How it makes money
Customers sign subscriptions, usually for about three years and often paid upfront. Half of revenue is the licence, counted when the subscription starts; most of the rest is support and cloud services, counted month by month; services are 5%.
Recurring revenue reached $2.55B. Existing customers spend $1.06 a year later for every dollar before, and $3.44B of signed contracts is still to be counted as revenue. Most sales pass through distributors, two of them handling 47%.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- ARR is a company-defined metric, not audited, and its method changed during the year, so the 16% compares two definitions restated by the company.
- Revenue grew 12% against ARR's 16%, a gap the CFO puts down to future start dates (C07).
Retention is a company-defined metric stated on the call; it is not in the 10-K and cannot be checked from filings.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Upfront licences on term subscriptions | 49.5% | The software licence portion of term subscriptions, recognised when the licence starts, which is why future start dates move revenue. |
| Ratable subscriptions (support, entitlements and SaaS) | 45.5% | Support on the licences and cloud-delivered subscriptions, recognised evenly over the contract. |
| Professional services and other | 5.0% | Deployment, migration and training work, and a little hardware. |
Who runs it
Rajiv Ramaswami has been chief executive since December 2020 and Rukmini Sivaraman finance chief since May 2022. The head of sales, Tarkan Maner, left in October 2026 and sold shares outside a pre-set plan on the day his exit was filed.
Directors and officers own about 2.4%, mostly Bain Capital's stake. Bonuses pay on recurring revenue and operating margin; half of long-term pay depends on the share price against the Nasdaq.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Changing the software every application runs on is slow, costly and risky: workloads have to be moved and staff retrained. That cost kept customers on VMware for years. It now works for Nutanix too: once a customer has moved, it tends to stay and spend more.
What made the move worth it was Broadcom. Gartner says its pricing usually raised VMware customers' software costs 300 to 400 percent, and European cloud providers report rises of more than tenfold. Nutanix is not much cheaper, just comparable, with good migration tools.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Palmer advised against moving every workload, and Gartner's guide expects most organisations not to move until 2027 (C31), so the third is a ceiling-shaped estimate spread over years.
Retention is a company-defined metric stated on the call; it is not in the 10-K and cannot be checked from filings.
The threat
The biggest rival is the customer staying put. Broadcom's software revenue grew 26% last year, so most VMware customers paid the higher price. Those who do leave can also choose Red Hat, Microsoft's own hypervisor, a public cloud or a storage maker such as HPE, each selling the same job as part of a larger business.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Gartner's analyst ranks Microsoft's Azure Local third and warns its clusters are small (C32), consistent with his list; no outside body publishes win rates.
Palmer advised against moving every workload, and Gartner's guide expects most organisations not to move until 2027 (C31), so the third is a ceiling-shaped estimate spread over years.
The rivals: AVGO, IBM, MSFT, HPE.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVGO | VMware Cloud Foundation, renewed with BroadcomPriced against it: One segment only | Nutanix Cloud Infrastructure on hyperconverged servers, with cloud clusters and portfolio products | On sale | One segment only |
| IBM | Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization (IBM)Priced against it: One segment only | Nutanix Cloud Infrastructure on hyperconverged servers, with cloud clusters and portfolio products | On sale | One segment only |
| MSFT | Microsoft Hyper-V and Azure LocalPriced against it: One segment only | Nutanix Cloud Infrastructure on hyperconverged servers, with cloud clusters and portfolio products | On sale | One segment only |
| HPE | HPE's private cloud with its own storage (GreenLake)Priced against it: One segment only | External storage and enterprise AI | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
VMware held over 96% of the market for this software in 2024, and Gartner expects more than a third of the workloads on it to move to another platform by 2028. Nobody publishes the market in dollars: VMware's revenue sits inside Broadcom's $27.0B software line. Against that, Nutanix's recurring revenue is $2.55B, so even a modest share of what moves is large for it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Palmer advised against moving every workload, and Gartner's guide expects most organisations not to move until 2027 (C31), so the third is a ceiling-shaped estimate spread over years.
Who has signed
No customer is above 10% of revenue. What is signed is $3.44B of contracts not yet counted as revenue, up 28% in a year, about half due within twelve months.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 12% in the year to Jul 2026, slower than the 18% in the year before.
Operating margin is 9.6%, up from −11% in the year to Jul 2023.
Running costs take 77¢ of each sales dollar, down from 109¢ in the year to Jul 2022.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +12% to +18% over the last 5 years.
It turned 29% of sales into free cash, $841M over the year.
Free cash flow was 0.6 times net income.
The share count rose 32% in 4.0 years, and pay in shares costs 13% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-16. Fiscal years end in July.
| Jul 2022 | Jul 2023 | Jul 2024 | Jul 2025 | Jul 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | |||||
| Sales | $1.58B | $1.86B | $2.15B | $2.54B | $2.85B |
| Sales growth | +13% | +18% | +15% | +18% | +12% |
| Profit | |||||
| Gross margin | 80% | 82% | 85% | 87% | 87% |
| Operating margin | −29% | −11% | 0.4% | 6.8% | 9.6% |
| Net margin | −51% | −14% | −5.8% | 7.4% | 53% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | |||||
| Research and development | 36% | 31% | 30% | 29% | 28% |
| Sales and marketing | 62% | 50% | 45% | 42% | 40% |
| General and admin | 11% | 12% | 9.3% | 9.4% | 9.2% |
| Pay in shares | 22% | 17% | 16% | 14% | 13% |
| Capital spending | 3.1% | 3.5% | 3.5% | 2.8% | 2.7% |
| Cash | |||||
| Cash from operations | $67.5M | $272M | $673M | $821M | $917M |
| Free cash flow | $18.5M | $207M | $598M | $750M | $841M |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $1.32B | $1.44B | $994M | $1.99B | $2.36B |
| Returns and shares | |||||
| Return on capital | - | - | - | - | 68× |
| Shares (diluted) | 221K | 233K | 245K | 294K | 292K |
What growth costs
Growth has got cheaper. Since FY2023 revenue rose 53% while selling, research and admin costs per dollar of sales all fell, turning an operating loss into a 9.6% margin. Share pay fell from about 17 to 12.5 cents per dollar of sales, and job cuts in August 2026 show costs are still being trimmed.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Part of the fall in selling cost per dollar is revenue growing into a sales force hired earlier, and the restructuring of August 2026 (C27) says the cost base was still being cut.
The last report (26 Aug)
Quarter ended July 2026, filed figures.
In FY2026, the year to 31 July 2026, revenue rose 12% to $2.85B and recurring revenue 16%. Free cash flow was $841M, 29% of sales, and the operating margin rose to 9.6%.
The guide for FY2027 is about 12% growth again, with free cash flow of $850-950M. Management says demand is fine and the gap is timing: customers wait for scarce servers, so their software licences start later and revenue arrives later than bookings.
What it did to the thesisIt confirmed the November cut was timing rather than lost demand: recurring revenue sped up and cash came in strong. It left open the speed question, because the new guide keeps growth near the same pace while customers wait for servers.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.60 against $0.49 expected.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- ARR is a company-defined metric, not audited, and its method changed during the year, so the 16% compares two definitions restated by the company.
- Revenue grew 12% against ARR's 16%, a gap the CFO puts down to future start dates (C07).
- About $1.18B of deferred revenue is due beyond twelve months because customers prepay multi-year contracts (C16), which pulls cash forward.
- Management plans more annual payment terms in FY2027 (C17), which would slow cash collection.
- Nutanix cut its FY2026 revenue guide in its first quarter, citing future start dates (C06), so a first-quarter guide has been reset before.
- The CFO expects a moderately higher share of orders with future start dates in FY2027 (C07), which pushes revenue out of the year.
- The same management called the November 2025 cut solely timing, and FY2026 revenue then landed above the cut guide (C06), which supports the timing reading.
- Neither executive quantified how much revenue the start dates moved.
What management did with the money
Nutanix spent more on buying back shares than it handed staff in share pay, so the share count fell slightly. It also sold $150M of new shares to AMD in May 2026.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 25 purchases and 20 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price pays for management's plan working, faster growth by FY2029, but not for much more; part of today's cash also comes from customers paying years upfront.
Nutanix cut its revenue forecast in November 2025, the shares fell 18% the next day and hit $34 in April 2026. Revenue then beat the cut forecast and recurring growth sped up, and the shares nearly doubled.
So the question now is not whether the slowdown was real but whether the price has run ahead. The next check is the first-quarter report on 24 November 2026, against a guide of $755-765M.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Nutanix cut its FY2026 revenue guide in its first quarter, citing future start dates (C06), so a first-quarter guide has been reset before.
- The CFO expects a moderately higher share of orders with future start dates in FY2027 (C07), which pushes revenue out of the year.
How we read the multiple
A buyer pays about $17.9B for the business after cash and debt: about 37 times the cash an owner kept last year, after share pay.
To earn 7 cents a year on each dollar paid, a common rule of thumb for what a share should return, Nutanix must:
- Grow that cash, $483M last year, about 15% a year.
- Hold that pace for about a decade, as customers keep leaving VMware.
- That is roughly management's target for FY2029: the plan, little more.
Against its own history. It costs more per dollar of sales than it usually has, because the market now trusts the migration story it doubted in the spring.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Free cash flow is lifted by multi-year prepayment (C16, C17), so 37 times may understate what the price asks of the business once payment terms shorten.
- The 2027 notes are in the money, so treating them as $500M of debt understates dilution by about $106M of value at today's price.
- About $1.18B of deferred revenue is due beyond twelve months because customers prepay multi-year contracts (C16), which pulls cash forward.
- Management plans more annual payment terms in FY2027 (C17), which would slow cash collection.
Revenue growth was 12% in FY2026 and is guided at about 12% for FY2027 (C02, C05), so the target needs an acceleration that has not yet begun.
The Q4 duration of 3.3 years was below management's own expectation, so the prepayment habit is already moving.
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Fujitsu, Hitachi Vantara and Lenovo.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on two new lines: letting customers keep their existing storage boxes from Dell, Everpure or NetApp, and AI software. Neither has a revenue figure yet, though management expects storage to lead next year's growth.
If both do well, the whole company is worth only a little more than today, because the price already pays for most of it. If they fail, shareholders still keep the main business and its cash. Little upside, little to lose.
| External storage and enterprise AI revenue in two to three years | Customers at Nutanix's average recurring revenue of about $80,000 needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $150.00M | about 1.9K at 100% kept | 1.0× |
| $300.00M (the big win) | about 3.8K at 100% kept | 1.1× |
| $500.00M | about 6.2K at 100% kept | 1.1× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $3.21B of External storage and enterprise AI revenue (about 40.1K customers at Nutanix's average recurring revenue of about $80,000); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $12.68B of External storage and enterprise AI revenue (about 158.5K customers at Nutanix's average recurring revenue of about $80,000), at the same multiple.
Each row is External storage and enterprise AI alone, plus the rest of the company (Nutanix Cloud Infrastructure on hyperconverged servers, with cloud clusters and portfolio products) counted at about $18.60B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Dell PowerFlex and Everpure support generally available
- Done Several seven-figure external-storage deals signed
- In progress NetApp support generally available due 2026-12
- Not started Nutanix states a revenue figure for external storage or AI due 2027-08
- Not started External storage and AI reach about $300M a year due 2029-07
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The 10-K warns that external storage may cannibalise Nutanix's own hyperconverged sales.
- No figure is filed, so the claim that it leads growth cannot be checked.
- Nutanix cut its FY2026 revenue guide in its first quarter, citing future start dates (C06), so a first-quarter guide has been reset before.
- The CFO expects a moderately higher share of orders with future start dates in FY2027 (C07), which pushes revenue out of the year.
- Free cash flow is lifted by multi-year prepayment (C16, C17), so 37 times may understate what the price asks of the business once payment terms shorten.
- The 2027 notes are in the money, so treating them as $500M of debt understates dilution by about $106M of value at today's price.
- About $1.18B of deferred revenue is due beyond twelve months because customers prepay multi-year contracts (C16), which pulls cash forward.
- Management plans more annual payment terms in FY2027 (C17), which would slow cash collection.
Where we disagree with the market
Nutanix is the VMware-migration winner and the server-shortage scare is over.
The migration is real but slow, and after the rebound the price already assumes it.
Gartner and Nutanix's own annual report both say customers move in waves at their next hardware refresh, over three years or more. That is a steady tailwind, not a sudden one, and the price already counts on it speeding up.
We could be wrong if recurring revenue growth climbs back toward 19% with customers spending more each year: that would show the wave arriving faster than we think.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Free cash flow is lifted by multi-year prepayment (C16, C17), so 37 times may understate what the price asks of the business once payment terms shorten.
- The 2027 notes are in the money, so treating them as $500M of debt understates dilution by about $106M of value at today's price.
Palmer advised against moving every workload, and Gartner's guide expects most organisations not to move until 2027 (C31), so the third is a ceiling-shaped estimate spread over years.
- ARR is a company-defined metric, not audited, and its method changed during the year, so the 16% compares two definitions restated by the company.
- Revenue grew 12% against ARR's 16%, a gap the CFO puts down to future start dates (C07).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Customers may simply stay Broadcom's software revenue grew 26% last year, so most VMware customers paid up rather than leave.
- Server shortages delay revenue Customers wait for scarce servers, so licences start later; management expects more of this through FY2027.
- Two distributors carry 47% Most sales pass through two distributors, so trouble at either would hit revenue quickly.
- Cash may grow slower More customers will pay yearly instead of years upfront, which slows the cash that flatters today's numbers.
- A sales chief left The head of sales left in October 2026 and sold shares outside a pre-set plan on the day his exit was filed.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- The same management called the November 2025 cut solely timing, and FY2026 revenue then landed above the cut guide (C06), which supports the timing reading.
- Neither executive quantified how much revenue the start dates moved.
The Q4 duration of 3.3 years was below management's own expectation, so the prepayment habit is already moving.
What we still do not know
- How much the new external-storage line earns, and whether it adds customers or replaces Nutanix's own sales.
- What share of departing VMware customers choose Nutanix over Red Hat, Microsoft or a public cloud.
- How much of last year's cash came from customers paying several years upfront.
- How big the market is in dollars: the research firms sell that figure.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The 10-K warns that external storage may cannibalise Nutanix's own hyperconverged sales.
- No figure is filed, so the claim that it leads growth cannot be checked.
Gartner's analyst ranks Microsoft's Azure Local third and warns its clusters are small (C32), consistent with his list; no outside body publishes win rates.
The Q4 duration of 3.3 years was below management's own expectation, so the prepayment habit is already moving.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveA cheaper price on an unchanged business
It needs all of:
- ○The business becomes cheaper: about 28 times the cash an owner keeps, from about 37 today.about ≈$50.52 today, 28% below the last close
- ○And recurring revenue still grows at least 14% a year.checked at the next results, due by 24 Nov
- Neutral→AttractiveThe migration wave speeds up
It needs all of:
- ○Recurring revenue growth climbs to 19% or more.checked at the next results, due by 24 Nov
- ○And existing customers spend at least $1.08 a year later for every dollar before.checked at the next results, due by 24 Nov
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe wave fades
It needs any of:
- ○Recurring revenue growth falls below 12%.checked at the next results, due by 24 Nov
- ○Or existing customers spend less than $1.03 a year later for every dollar before.checked at the next results, due by 24 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Management cuts the FY2027 revenue forecast below $3.1B.
- The cash an owner keeps falls below $400M in a year.
What is coming
- 24 November 2026 Q1 FY2027 results: ARR growth against 15%, revenue against the $755-765M guide, retention against 106%, and whether future start dates grew as the CFO expects.
Every dated event ahead
- 24 November 2026 Q1 FY2027 results: ARR growth against 15%, revenue against the $755-765M guide, retention against 106%, and whether future start dates grew as the CFO expects.
- December 2026 NetApp support generally available: Whether the third large storage vendor's arrays are fully supported, widening the base external storage can reach.
- February 2027 Q2 FY2027 results: Whether external storage shows up in bookings the company will quantify, and how annual payment plans move free cash flow.
Since we wrote this
- 16 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionVMware's customers are moving and Nutanix is first in line, but slowly; after a 77% rise the price already holds the plan.
Sources 16
Sources - 16
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-09-18products, competition, customers and distributor concentration, risk factors on the VMware opportunity and external storage, statements, convertible notes, remaining performance obligations, share counts, patents and headcountbacksC01C02C04C09C10C11C12C14C15C16C18C28C35C38C44
- S02primarycompany release2026-08-26revenue, ARR, margins, free cash flow, share pay, buybacks, balance sheet, the FY2027 and Q1 FY2027 guidebacksC02C03C04C05C06C11C12C13C14C16C18C19C37C41
- S03primarytranscript2026-08-26Q4 FY2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/NTNX-2026Q4.jsonnet retention, future start dates, server shortages, external storage as the largest growth contributor, annual payment plans, renewals pool, AI and ChronoScale
So I would put that in terms of contribution from a growth perspective, that's probably going to be the largest growth contributor.
backsC03C05C07C08C09C17C27C35C37C40 - S04primarytranscript2025-11-25Q1 FY2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/NTNX-2026Q1.jsonthe FY2026 revenue guide cut and its reason, the migration choices, new-customer count, federal share
this is solely a timing issue, and the amount of revenue we expect to recognize over time from business booked in FY '26 remains unchanged
backsC06C09C23C34C42 - S05primarytranscript2026-05-27Q3 FY2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/NTNX-2026Q3.jsonthe investor day FY2029 target, external storage as most of the installed base, who customers migrate to
the vast majority of data center infrastructure today is still external storage connected to legacy hypervisors on servers
backsC34C36C39 - S06primarycompany filing2025-10-22executive officers and tenure, beneficial ownership, bonus and equity metricsbacksC25C26
- S07primarycompany filing2026-08-04about 5% of the workforce and $33-43M of chargesbacksC27
- S08primarycompany filing2026-09-24Tarkan Maner stepping down effective 2 October 2026backsC24C25
- S09primarycompany filing2026-10-07the $37,500 monthly advisory feebacksC25
- S10primarycompany filing2025-12-18Nutanix named among the primary competitors of HPE's Hybrid Cloud business
Our primary competitors are other infrastructure and cloud management software technology vendors, such as Broadcom, Cisco Systems Inc., Dell Technologies Inc., IBM, NetApp Inc., Nutanix, and Pure Storage
backsC29 - S11primarycompany filing2025-12-18infrastructure software revenue and the reason for its growth
Net revenue from our infrastructure software segment increased primarily due to strong demand for our VCF product
backsC30 - S12secondarynews2025-09-11Gartner's estimate that more than a third of VMware workloads move by 2028, the three-year migration, and its ranking of Nutanix first
More than a third of workloads currently running under VMware will run on another platform by 2028
backsC32 - S13secondarynews2025-11-17VMware's 2024 revenue share, the 300-400% cost rises, the migration timing and the advice to plan an exit
as of 2024 VMware dominated the server virtualization market with over 96 percent of revenue share
backsC31 - S14secondaryindustry data2025-07-29the cloud providers' association's account of terminated contracts, cost rises and its appeal
These include drastic cost increases (sometimes exceeding tenfold) and mandatory multi-year commitments for access to essential VMware software.
backsC33 - S15secondaryvendor data2026-10-16Research pack (FMP market data, FINRA short interest), frozencontent/NTNX/research-pack.jsonprice, market value, the 52-week range, the price-move decomposition, analyst ratings and their series, short interest, the earnings historybacksC19C21C22C23C41
- S17primarycompany filing2026-10-16every open-market sale and its Rule 10b5-1 flagbacksC24