MercadoLibre
Latin America's largest online shop, with its own delivery network and a digital bank, Mercado Pago, that lends to the people who shop there.
The scores
Growth4/4 ↑
Revenue up 39% in 2025 and 50% in Q2 2026, organically, with buyers up 26% and fintech users 30% across all three countries.
Business quality3/4 ↓
A share Mexico's regulator measured, but Brazil's margin halved since 2023 as it cut fees and shipping against Shopee.
Financial position3/4 →
Investment grade, with company cash above corporate notes, but the loans are funded by rolling securitisations and deposits, and loan growth absorbs the cash.
Execution record3/4 →
Years of delivered growth and margin cuts flagged in advance, but the Q1 2026 provision rise surprised the market.
Per share capture4/4 →
50.7M shares a year ago and now, no convertible, corporate debt small; what has not reached each share is margin.
Potential3/4 →
88M fintech users against 229M banked adults and growing card credit, but nothing is contracted and the margin path is unpromised.
Risk profile3/4 ↓
Argentina supplies 40% of segment profit through a volatile peso, and Brazil's credit cycle is turning; neither resolves in one step.
Valuation3/4 ↑
46 times trailing earnings depressed by chosen investment, 31 times 2027; pays for the plan, not beyond it, and below its own history.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Revenue, segments, loans and funding are filed; credit quality and the payback of price cuts rest on management's own figures.
The Verdict
We rate MercadoLibre neutral. It is a strong business: sales are growing about 40% a year across Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, and in Mexico it and Amazon carry most online shopping. The price is fair if profits recover, because it assumes the slice of each sales dollar kept as operating profit climbs back from under 7 cents toward 9. There is no speculative bet here. The view hinges on that recovery: earnings per share are no higher than in 2024, the company keeps cutting prices in Brazil, and it is lending fast while Brazilian defaults rise.
The long caseLatin Americans are opening accounts and moving their shopping and borrowing online; MercadoLibre must grow with them while its profit margins recover.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The flat EPS is a choice as much as a result: provisions are booked up front on a book growing 75%, and fee and shipping cuts are discretionary (C05, C10).
- The trailing multiple is struck on a margin management chose to compress; at 2024's 12.7% operating margin the trailing year would have earned roughly half as much again.
- The six-year median trailing P/E is 65.6, so the shares are cheap against their own history (C18).
The finding is shared with Amazon, so it shows a duopoly in Mexico rather than MercadoLibre's own share; and the commission found barriers it chose not to remedy, which a successor regulator could revisit.
Direct contribution excludes corporate costs and is struck before them, so it overstates each country's profit; the ranking still holds.
The series covers the whole system, including companies; MercadoLibre says its own 15-90 day NPL is near historical lows (C07).
The company
MercadoLibre runs an online marketplace where millions of sellers list goods and it takes a fee. It stores and delivers most orders itself, with warehouses, trucks and even planes, which is hard to do cheaply across Brazil and Mexico.
Its second half, Mercado Pago, is a payment app, account and lender. In Mexico only 53% of adults had any account in 2024, so for many people it is the first bank they use. The alternative is a physical shop, cash, or an incumbent bank.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The finding is shared with Amazon, so it shows a duopoly in Mexico rather than MercadoLibre's own share; and the commission found barriers it chose not to remedy, which a successor regulator could revisit.
How it makes money
Money arrives three ways. Commerce, $5.76B of sales in Q2 2026, is seller fees, delivery charges and goods it sells itself. Fintech, $4.41B, is payment fees and, increasingly, interest on loans and cards. Advertising, sold to sellers who want to be seen, grows fastest but is not reported on its own.
Lending is the part to watch: interest arrives over months, but the expected losses are set aside the day a loan is made.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The user and volume figures are the company's own operating metrics, not audited; only the commerce and fintech revenue split is in the 10-Q.
Advertising revenue is not reported separately, and no outside measure of the market share was found; the company does not say whose market estimate it used.
A large allowance is partly an accounting effect of growth: lifetime losses are provisioned when a loan is made, so a book growing 75% carries a heavy reserve before its interest arrives (S05).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Commerce services | 44.1% | Seller fees on each sale, shipping and storage fees, advertising and subscriptions charged on the marketplace. |
| Financial services and income | 23.1% | Payment fees off the marketplace, instalment financing, interest on wallet and fund balances, debit-card and insurance fees. |
| Credit revenues | 20.3% | Interest on consumer and merchant loans, and interest and fees on Mercado Pago credit cards. |
| Commerce product sales | 12.3% | Goods it buys and resells itself, first-party, with their shipping fees. |
| Fintech product sales | 0.2% | Card readers sold to merchants. |
Who runs it
Ariel Szarfsztejn became chief executive in January 2026. He joined in 2017, built the delivery network, then ran the shopping side, including Brazil's free-shipping cuts. Founder Marcos Galperin, in charge since 1999, stays on as executive chairman.
Directors and managers own less than 1%; a trust in the Galperin name holds about 7%. Most of the yearly bonus rides on sales and operating profit in dollars, not on margin, and long-term pay is cash tied to the share price, so no new shares go to executives.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Shoppers come for the range and sellers come for the shoppers, and owning delivery and payments makes both cheaper. Mexico's competition regulator found in 2025 that MercadoLibre and Amazon together carry over 85% of online retail sales there, and that sellers find it hard to move between platforms.
That is a position somebody outside the company measured. What it does not do is stop price competition, as Brazil shows.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The finding is shared with Amazon, so it shows a duopoly in Mexico rather than MercadoLibre's own share; and the commission found barriers it chose not to remedy, which a successor regulator could revisit.
In Brazil, Shopee built a large marketplace despite it (C23), and Brazil's margin halved while the company cut fees to hold its place (C09), so the network does not stop price competition.
The company does not disclose what share of users are on both sides or the cost of the free shipping, so the payback cannot be checked.
The threat
In Brazil, Shopee, owned by Sea Limited, calls itself a leading marketplace and competes on cheap goods. MercadoLibre answered with lower fees and free shipping, and its Brazilian profit stopped growing. In Mexico, Amazon is the other half of the duopoly. In lending, Nubank and the big Brazilian banks sell the same card and account.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Direct contribution excludes corporate costs and is struck before them, so it overstates each country's profit; the ranking still holds.
The finding is shared with Amazon, so it shows a duopoly in Mexico rather than MercadoLibre's own share; and the commission found barriers it chose not to remedy, which a successor regulator could revisit.
The rivals: AMZN, SE, NU, ITUB, BBD, GOOGL, META.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMZN | Amazon's marketplace and Prime delivery in Mexico and BrazilPriced against it: Same product | Commerce (marketplace, Mercado Envios logistics and first-party sales) | On sale | Same product |
| SE | Shopee, Sea Limited's marketplacePriced against it: One segment only | Commerce (marketplace, Mercado Envios logistics and first-party sales) | On sale | One segment only |
| NU | Nubank's card and accountPriced against it: One segment only | Fintech (Mercado Pago payments, acquiring and credit) | On sale | One segment only |
| ITUB · BBD | Itaú Unibanco and Bradesco cards and consumer loansPriced against it: One segment only | Fintech (Mercado Pago payments, acquiring and credit) | On sale | One segment only |
| GOOGL · META | Google search ads and Meta's Instagram and Facebook adsPriced against it: One segment only | Advertising (Mercado Ads) | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
About 305 million adults live in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, and about 229 million of them have an account. Mercado Pago has 88 million monthly users across all its countries.
Brazilians owe about $142B on credit cards, a figure up 13.2% in a year; MercadoLibre's own card loans are $7.7B. That is the size of the pond, not a forecast of what it wins.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Account ownership counts any account, including a basic wallet, so it overstates the people a lender could serve.
The user and volume figures are the company's own operating metrics, not audited; only the commerce and fintech revenue split is in the 10-Q.
A large allowance is partly an accounting effect of growth: lifetime losses are provisioned when a loan is made, so a book growing 75% carries a heavy reserve before its interest arrives (S05).
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year | Share in 3 years at its half-year rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service | 85% | +45.7% | +45.4% | +42.3% | 75% |
| Product | 15% | +78.8% | +80.9% | +75.4% | 25% |
| Whole company | 100% | +49.8% | +49.4% | +46.0% | 100% |
On the filed split through 2026-06-30, if each business keeps its last half-year's growth, the company grows about 51% next year and 53% in year 3, against 46.0% over the last twelve months. A scenario, not a forecast: no business holds its rate.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 46% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, faster than the 39% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 8.3%, down from 15% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 34¢ of each sales dollar, down from 36¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 13% a year after tax, about where it was (11%) in the year to Dec 2022.
It turned 35% of sales into free cash, $12.4B over the last twelve months.
It owes $4.90B more than the cash it holds, about 0.4 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count rose 1.8% in 4.5 years.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $7.07B | $10.8B | $15.1B | $20.8B | $28.9B | $35.2B |
| Sales growth | - | +52% | +40% | +38% | +39% | +46% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 43% | 48% | 50% | 46% | 45% | 43% |
| Operating margin | 6.2% | 9.9% | 15% | 13% | 11% | 8.3% |
| Net margin | 1.2% | 4.5% | 6.5% | 9.2% | 6.9% | 5.3% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 8.3% | 10% | 12% | 9.3% | 7.9% | 7.3% |
| Sales and marketing | 15% | 12% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% |
| General and admin | 6.6% | 6.1% | 5.1% | 4.6% | 3.7% | 3.5% |
| Capital spending | 8.1% | 4.2% | 3.4% | 4.1% | 4.6% | 4.3% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $965M | $2.94B | $5.14B | $7.92B | $12.1B | $13.9B |
| Free cash flow | $392M | $2.48B | $4.63B | $7.06B | $10.8B | $12.4B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $3.40B | $4.25B | $6.04B | $7.12B | $6.30B | $5.73B |
| Debt | $3.52B | $4.76B | $4.50B | $5.71B | $9.19B | $10.6B |
| Net cash | −$123M | −$509M | $1.54B | $1.41B | −$2.89B | −$4.90B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | 11% | 20% | 23% | 17% | 13% |
| Shares (diluted) | 49.8M | 51.3M | 51.0M | 50.7M | 50.7M | 50.7M |
What growth costs
Growth here is getting more expensive, not cheaper. Engineering and head-office costs grow slower than sales, which helps. But free delivery, goods the company sells itself, and money set aside for card loans that may go bad all grow faster than sales, so each new dollar of sales has earned less profit every year since 2023.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Part of the gross-margin fall is mix rather than price: first-party product sales, a low-margin line, rose from 9.6% of revenue in 2023 to 12.3% in 2025 (C40).
- Management argues the shipping and fee cuts and the card build are investments that pay back, citing items sold up 56% and card cohorts breaking even after 12 to 18 months (C30, C07, C10); if so the narrowing is a choice that reverses.
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
Q2 2026 was the fastest growth in four years: buyers up 26%, fintech users up 30%, both halves of the business up about 50%.
The cost showed below the sales line. Money set aside for bad loans was $1.28B against $690M a year earlier, nearly twice the quarter's operating profit, and Brazil's profit barely grew on 59% more sales. Management says its credit measures are near their best and that the losses on new cards fade after 12 to 18 months.
What it did to the thesisIt showed the growth is real and broad, and that it is still not reaching profit: the margin held at the first quarter's low level rather than recovering. Credit looked steadier by the company's own measures, which leaves the recovery the price needs unproven.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $9.19 against $8.65 expected; $9.19 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The user and volume figures are the company's own operating metrics, not audited; only the commerce and fintech revenue split is in the 10-Q.
Management says provisions rose about 2 points as a share of revenue only because credit grows faster than revenue, and that the book is profitable after them (S04).
- An analyst on the call noted the 90-day-plus NPL deteriorated meaningfully in the quarter; management said fast-growing short loans distort it (S05).
- Brazil's system-wide default rate rose from 3.96% to 5.04% over the year to August 2026 (C26).
Direct contribution excludes corporate costs and is struck before them, so it overstates each country's profit; the ranking still holds.
What management did with the money
Insiders in 2026Q2: 10 purchases and 1 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price pays for the business plus profits recovering as analysts expect, which management has not promised and the last two years have not shown.
The shares are about 30% below their high, and the whole fall came from investors paying less for each dollar of sales, not from the business shrinking.
Twice in two years the shares fell sharply on loan-loss worries: 16% in November 2024, then 13% in May 2026. The first time, sales and profit grew through it and the shares hit new highs. The next report, on 4 November 2026, is the first chance to see whether the second scare passes the same way.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
How we read the multiple
At $1,696.56 a share, for the price to make sense:
- Over the last four quarters the company earned about $36.75 a share.
- The price is about 46 times that, cheap against its own past but still a lot.
- Analysts expect $54.98 a share in 2027, 44% more than this year.
- That needs operating profit back near 9 cents of each sales dollar, from under 7 today.
Against its own history. Investors have usually paid much more for each dollar of its earnings and sales; today they pay less because profit stopped rising.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The trailing multiple is struck on a margin management chose to compress; at 2024's 12.7% operating margin the trailing year would have earned roughly half as much again.
- The six-year median trailing P/E is 65.6, so the shares are cheap against their own history (C18).
The six years include 2020 and 2021, when the company earned little and growth stocks were priced for low rates, so the median flatters today.
The flat EPS is a choice as much as a result: provisions are booked up front on a book growing 75%, and fee and shipping cuts are discretionary (C05, C10).
The CFO says each initiative has growth targets and a path to profitability, and operating costs fell 2.5 points of revenue on the quarter (S05).
Priced against its rivals
Only Amazon.com sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Where we disagree with the market
The margin fall is investment that pays back, so profits will jump as new card customers mature and price cuts bring loyal buyers.
The business is real, but nothing yet shows the margin returning, and lending is growing fast as Brazil's defaults rise.
Most analysts rate the shares a buy and expect 2027 earnings far above today's. They may be right: the company did this before, in 2024.
But earnings per share have not moved since 2024 while sales rose 69%, management says it will keep reinvesting, and the Brazilian central bank's default rate rose from 3.96% to 5.04% in a year. The evidence against us is a quarter with a margin above 9% and clean credit.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The panel is a vendor aggregation: the snapshot endpoint counts 33 opinions against 27 in the dated series.
- An analyst on the call noted the 90-day-plus NPL deteriorated meaningfully in the quarter; management said fast-growing short loans distort it (S05).
- Brazil's system-wide default rate rose from 3.96% to 5.04% over the year to August 2026 (C26).
The flat EPS is a choice as much as a result: provisions are booked up front on a book growing 75%, and fee and shipping cuts are discretionary (C05, C10).
The CFO says each initiative has growth targets and a path to profitability, and operating costs fell 2.5 points of revenue on the quarter (S05).
The series covers the whole system, including companies; MercadoLibre says its own 15-90 day NPL is near historical lows (C07).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- A credit cycle Loans grew 75% and Brazil's system default rate is rising; if losses outrun the money set aside, profit falls further.
- Argentina carries the profit Argentina earns 40% of segment profit; a sharp peso devaluation would cut it in dollars quickly.
- Price war in Brazil Shopee competes on price; each fee or shipping cut lifts sales and leaves Brazil's profit flat.
- Investment without end Management names no margin target and says it will keep reinvesting gains, so recovery may never come.
- Rules on lending Brazil caps card interest and is tightening capital rules to 2028; banking licences in Mexico and Argentina are still pending.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The series covers the whole system, including companies; MercadoLibre says its own 15-90 day NPL is near historical lows (C07).
A large allowance is partly an accounting effect of growth: lifetime losses are provisioned when a loan is made, so a book growing 75% carries a heavy reserve before its interest arrives (S05).
Direct contribution excludes corporate costs and is struck before them, so it overstates each country's profit; the ranking still holds.
The CFO says each initiative has growth targets and a path to profitability, and operating costs fell 2.5 points of revenue on the quarter (S05).
What we still do not know
- How Mercado Pago's own default rate compares with Brazil's system rate; only the company reports its figure.
- What a card customer earns after the first 18 months, and how many of the card loans are that old.
- Its share of Brazilian online shopping against Shopee; no regulator publishes it.
- How big advertising is, since it is not reported on its own.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- An analyst on the call noted the 90-day-plus NPL deteriorated meaningfully in the quarter; management said fast-growing short loans distort it (S05).
- Brazil's system-wide default rate rose from 3.96% to 5.04% over the year to August 2026 (C26).
The series covers the whole system, including companies; MercadoLibre says its own 15-90 day NPL is near historical lows (C07).
The company does not disclose what share of users are on both sides or the cost of the free shipping, so the payback cannot be checked.
Advertising revenue is not reported separately, and no outside measure of the market share was found; the company does not say whose market estimate it used.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe price stops asking for the recovery
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to 32 times the last four quarters' earnings per share, from about 46.about $1,175.11 today, 31% below the last close
- Neutral→AttractiveThe margin comes back with credit intact
It needs all of:
- ○Operating profit reaches 9 cents of each sales dollar in a quarter, from 6.7.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- ○Loans 15 to 90 days late stay at or below 7.5% of all loans, from 7.0%.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe credit build turns into losses
It needs any of:
- ○Lending profit after losses falls below 17% of all loans, from 20.7%.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- ○Brazil's profit before head-office costs falls below 7 cents per sales dollar, from 9.9.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Argentina's profit falls by a third in dollars within a year.
What is coming
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether the margin holds at 6.7% or better with NIMAL at 20% and the 15-90 day NPL at or below 7.5%; the pre-registered next test.
Every dated event ahead
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether the margin holds at 6.7% or better with NIMAL at 20% and the 15-90 day NPL at or below 7.5%; the pre-registered next test.
- February 2027 Q4 and full-year 2026 results, with the 10-K: The new chief executive's first full year: whether operating income grew in dollars, and whether the 2027 consensus margin near 9% has a visible path.
- April 2027 2027 proxy statement: What the board sets the new chief executive's bonus on, and whether margin or credit losses enter the metrics beside revenue and operating income.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten as a watchlist candidate for Attractive, with the shares 30% below their high on a falling margin.
- 4 OctThesis reviewChecklist added: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what they own and are paid on, and what growth costs. Filled from the proxy and the 10-K.
Sources 23
Sources - 23
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-25Item 1, logistics, competition classes, regulation, risk factors, segment note, Argentine inflation, 2024 and 2025 statementsbacksC01C02C08C31C33C40C41C46
- S02primarycompany release2026-02-24the year's growth, free-shipping rationale, buyers
revenue growth of 45% YoY in Q4'25, capping a year in which we grew 39% YoY
backsC02 - S03primarycompany filing2026-08-06income statement, segment contribution, loans and allowance, restricted cash, funding note, cash flow, card lines, buybackbacksC03C04C05C06C09C11C12C14C15C16C31
- S04primarycompany release2026-08-05operating metrics, NIMAL, NPL, advertising, adjusted free cash flow
we surpassed 10% share of the digital advertising market in Latin America for the first time, with net revenue growing 62% YoY on an FX-neutral basis
backsC03C04C05C06C07C10C14C29C30 - S05primarytranscript2026-08-05Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-08-05margin drivers, reinvestment intent, card cohort economics, 90-day NPL exchange, Brazil free-shipping results
each cohort typically reaches NIMAL breakeven after 12 to 18 months
backsC07C10C29C30 - S06primarycompany release2026-05-07Q1 2026 revenue and operating income
Income from operations decreased by 20% YoY as we chose to prioritize long-term growth investments over short-term profitability
backsC21 - S07primarycompany filing2026-09-14size, coupon, use of proceeds, ratingsbacksC13
- S08secondaryvendor data2026-10-04Research pack, frozen beside this thesis (FMP market tier, SEC XBRL statements, FINRA)price, returns, multiple history, consensus series and estimates, short interest, daily closes, filed quarterly seriesbacksC15C16C18C19C21C35
- S09primarycompany filing2026-04-17Shopee's own description of its Brazilian position
Shopee is the largest e-commerce platform in Southeast Asia and Taiwan and is a leading e-commerce platform in Brazil.
backsC23 - S10primarycompany filing2026-04-08Nu's product and its named competitors in Brazilian consumer credit
We began our journey in 2013 with a small team, launching our first product, the Nu Credit Card, in Brazil in 2014.
backsC24 - S11secondarynews2025-09-12the regulator's market-share and barrier findings, quoted from its communiqué; cofece.mx itself refused the repository's fetcher
Amazon y Mercado Libre detentan más del 85% de las ventas y transacciones en el mercado de comercio electrónico minorista mexicano.
backsC22 - S12primarygovernment data2026-10-04Banco Central do Brasil, SGS series 20590: household credit-card balances, non-earmarked credit Banco Central do Brasilcard balances and their growth
20590-saldo-da-carteira-de-credito-com-recursos-livres---pessoas-fisicas---cartao-de-credito-total: 01/08/2025 654266; 01/08/2026 740378 (R$ millions)
backsC25 - S13primarygovernment data2026-10-04Banco Central do Brasil, SGS series 20541: household credit balances, total Banco Central do Brasiltotal household credit
20541-saldo-da-carteira-de-credito---pessoas-fisicas---total: 01/08/2025 4228171; 01/08/2026 4670170 (R$ millions)
backsC25 - S14primarygovernment data2026-10-04Banco Central do Brasil, SGS series 21082: credit default rate, total Banco Central do Brasilthe system default rate
21082-inadimplencia-da-carteira-de-credito---total: 01/07/2025 3.96; 01/08/2026 5.04
backsC26 - S15primarygovernment data2026-07-13the driver's rate and the prize's intensity factor
Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider (% of population ages 15+): MEX 2011 27.4, 2024 53.0; BRA 2011 55.9, 2024 86.4; ARG 2011 33.1, 2024 81.7
backsC27 - S16primarygovernment data2026-07-13World Bank World Development Indicators: population ages 15-64 and 65 and above, 2024 The World Bankadults by country
Population ages 15-64, total 2024: BRA 146884644; MEX 87993476; ARG 30150350. Population ages 65 and above, total 2024: BRA 23424113; MEX 10794162; ARG 5673637.
backsC28 - S17primarycompany filing2026-06-15Form 4 filings, October 2025 to September 2026 (read through insider_fetch.py)open-market purchases and sales with the Rule 10b5-1 flagbacksC32
- S18primarycompany filing2026-06-12director votesbacksC39C45
- S19secondarynews2026-09-24Bloomberg Línea, September 2026: Mercado Livre terá entrega em até 60 minutos e venda de medicamentos com receita Bloomberg Líneathe one-hour delivery and pharmacy launch
A solução promete entregar produtos pequenos de até 15 quilos em até 60 minutos, sendo operada por uma rede de entregadores parceiros.
backsC34 - S20primarygovernment data2026-10-02Banco Central do Brasil, SGS series 1: US dollar selling rate Banco Central do Brasilthe exchange rate used to convert card balances
Dólar americano (venda), série 1, 02/10/2026: valor 5.2238 reais por dólar
backsC25 - S22primarytranscript2024-11-06Q3 2024 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2024-11-06the first credit-provision episode
Our EBIT was $557 million with a 10.5% margin. The majority of the margin compression from last year comes from the strategic initiatives
backsC35 - S23primarytranscript2026-05-07Q1 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-05-07the cause of the Q1 2026 provision rise
We used to have loans typically on average of 5 months, and that has moved to 8 months.
backsC21 - S24primarycompany filing2026-04-23CEO transition, executive officers and tenure, beneficial ownership table, annual bonus metrics and 2025 results, the 2025 long-term retention program, equity award policybacksC43C44C45