Live Nation Entertainment
The company behind most big concerts: it books the artist, often owns the venue, and through Ticketmaster sells the ticket and takes a fee.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Adjusted operating income rose 10% in 2025 and fans 5%, but first-half 2026 grew 4.3% and US revenue has been flat for three years.
Business quality3/4 ↓
Ticketing earns 37% on exclusive contracts a jury found unlawful; promotion is easy to enter and earns 3.3%, and rivals attack resale.
Financial position3/4 →
$9.2B of debt against $2.4B of yearly adjusted operating income and $1.9B of its own cash; refinancing 2027 notes at higher rates.
Execution record3/4 →
Hit 102% of its 2025 profit target and grew double digits, but Q2 2026 Concerts profit fell 14% and the conduct led to a verdict.
Per share capture2/4 ↓
Diluted shares up 15% since 2020 with no buyback, minority partners take about $325M a year, and venue spending leaves little cash.
Potential2/4 →
US live spending of $57.3B grew 15.5% in real terms since 2019, but Live Nation's US revenue is flat and growth abroad is unmeasured.
Risk profile2/4 →
A court remedy could reshape the segment earning 42.5% of profit, and a 29.62% holder sits on the board.
Valuation2/4 →
20.3 times adjusted operating income needs about 10% yearly growth for ten years, management's plan, with nothing for the remedy.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Filed figures carry the numbers and the regulator states the verdict, but the remedy, ticket pace and resale share are management's or unknown.
The Verdict
We rate Live Nation neutral. The business is mixed: it is the world's biggest concert promoter, and its ticketing arm, Ticketmaster, earns rich margins, but a US jury found that ticketing grip an unlawful monopoly and the court has not yet decided the punishment. The price is full. At about 20 times its yearly profit before interest, buyers are paying for roughly 10% growth for a decade, which is what management promises, and nothing for a remedy aimed at the part of the company that earns over 40% of the profit. Growth now comes from abroad while US sales have stalled.
The long caseAs screens fill with cheap machine-made content, being in the room grows scarcer; the biggest promoter sells that room worldwide.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Adjusted operating income leaves out depreciation, stock pay, acquisition costs and the $450M legal accrual; reported operating income was $1,251.2M in 2025.
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
- The settlement with the Justice Department already sets conduct and structural terms without a sale of Ticketmaster (C06), and the market rose 6.2% on it (C18).
- Outside North America and Australia Ticketmaster mostly sells by allocation, which the US case does not reach (C03).
- Management says it can compound double-digit growth for years (C08), which would cover the 9.9% needed.
- Minority stakes at book value understate what partners' shares are worth, so the true multiple is higher.
- First-half adjusted operating income grew only 4.3% (C09), so the year depends on the second half.
- Concerts' adjusted operating income fell 14% in Q2 2026 (C10).
Management says North America large-venue shows for 2026 were pacing up double digits in February (S02), so flat US revenue may not persist.
The company
Live Nation does three things. It promotes concerts and festivals: it pays the artist, books the venue, often one it owns, and sells food, drink and parking on the night. In 2025 that was 55,000 events and 159 million fans.
It runs Ticketmaster, which sold 646 million tickets for 10,500 venues, teams and promoters. And it sells sponsorship, such as naming rights and signs, to brands that want to reach those fans.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
How it makes money
Concerts bring in about 83 cents of every dollar of sales but keep only about 3 cents of it as profit, because most of the ticket money goes to the artist. Ticketing keeps about 37 cents of each dollar it earns in fees and sponsorship about 64 cents. So a thin promotion business feeds two rich ones, and fans pay for tickets months before the show.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Adjusted operating income leaves out depreciation, stock pay, acquisition costs and the $450M legal accrual; reported operating income was $1,251.2M in 2025.
Management says new venues earn high returns, so part of that spending buys future profit rather than maintaining today's.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Concerts | 82.8% | Ticket money, food, drink, parking and premium seats at the shows and festivals it promotes and the venues it runs. |
| Ticketing | 12.2% | Ticketmaster's service fees on first-sale and resale tickets, shared with venues, plus fees from clients for its software. |
| Sponsorship & Advertising | 5.3% | Brands paying for naming rights, signage, presales and online ads aimed at concert fans. |
Who runs it
Michael Rapino has run Live Nation since 2005, and his new contract runs to 2031. Joe Berchtold is president and finance chief. Insiders own only 2.89% of the shares; Liberty Live, a tracking stock of Liberty Media, owns 29.62% and has two board seats. Bonuses pay on the company's preferred profit figure, and new share awards on returns against the S&P 500. Nothing rewards cash per share, and insiders sold shares this year and bought none.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
The pieces protect each other. The biggest promoter routes tours through venues it runs, and venues sign Ticketmaster for three to five years, in North America usually for every ticket they sell. Its money and traffic then win the next contract.
The best outside evidence is the court. In April 2026 a jury found Ticketmaster holds a monopoly in ticketing at major concert venues and Live Nation one in large amphitheaters, and that it unlawfully ties the two.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The company's own 10-K says barriers to entry in promotion are low (C28), and Concerts earns only 3.3% on revenue (C04).
- Eventim grew ticketing 11.0% in 2025 against Ticketmaster's 3% revenue growth (C25).
- The settlement with the Justice Department provides for injunctive and structural relief (C06), which reporting says limits exclusive terms; until approved the contracts stand.
- Venues set ticket prices and fees and keep part of each fee, so the venue, not the fan, is the buyer Ticketmaster competes for.
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
Adjusted operating income leaves out depreciation, stock pay, acquisition costs and the $450M legal accrual; reported operating income was $1,251.2M in 2025.
The threat
The biggest threat is the court. The remedy for the states' case could limit exclusive contracts or go further, and it would land on ticketing, the most profitable part.
Rivals push too. StubHub wants artists to sell first-sale tickets through it, Europe's CTS Eventim grew ticketing faster in 2025, and Live Nation itself says starting a promotion business is easy.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
- The settlement with the Justice Department already sets conduct and structural terms without a sale of Ticketmaster (C06), and the market rose 6.2% on it (C18).
- Outside North America and Australia Ticketmaster mostly sells by allocation, which the US case does not reach (C03).
The rivals: STUB, SEAT, MSGE, MSGE, and 3 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not listed | A court-ordered remedy, from conduct terms to a forced sale of TicketmasterPriced against it: Not listed | Ticketing (Ticketmaster) | Announced | Not listed |
| STUB | StubHub direct issuancePriced against it: One segment only | Ticketing (Ticketmaster) | On sale | One segment only |
| SEAT | Vivid SeatsPriced against it: One segment only | Ticketing (Ticketmaster) | On sale | One segment only |
| CTS EventimPriced against it: Listed abroad | Ticketing (Ticketmaster) | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| Private | AEG Presents and AXS, and SeatGeekPriced against it: Private | Concerts | On sale | Private |
| MSGE | MSG EntertainmentPriced against it: One segment only | Concerts | On sale | One segment only |
| MSG Entertainment and other venue owners selling naming rights and signage | Sponsorship & Advertising | On sale |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Americans spent $57.3B on live entertainment other than sports in 2025, and after rising prices are stripped out they bought 15.5% more of it than in 2019. That counts theatre too, so the concert slice is not measured.
Live Nation's US sales of $14.33B sit inside that, flat for three years. The growth is abroad, where no outside body measures the market at all.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management says North America large-venue shows for 2026 were pacing up double digits in February (S02), so flat US revenue may not persist.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 11% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, about the same pace as the 8.8% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 3.0%, about where it was (4.8%) in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +1.9% to +237% over the last 5 years.
Each dollar put into the business earns 5.6% a year after tax, about where it was (10%) in the year to Dec 2022.
It turned 5.3% of sales into free cash, $1.38B over the last twelve months.
It owes $130M more than the cash it holds, about 0.0 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count rose 12% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 0.6% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-10. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $6.27B | $16.7B | $22.7B | $23.2B | $25.2B | $26.3B |
| Sales growth | +237% | +166% | +36% | +1.9% | +8.8% | +11% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | −6.7% | 4.3% | 4.8% | 3.6% | 5.0% | 3.0% |
| Net margin | −10% | 1.6% | 2.5% | 3.9% | 2.0% | 0.5% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Selling, general and admin | 28% | 18% | 15% | 17% | 16% | 17% |
| Pay in shares | 3.3% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| Capital spending | 2.4% | 2.1% | 1.9% | 2.8% | 4.2% | 4.7% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $1.78B | $1.84B | $1.36B | $1.73B | $1.40B | $2.61B |
| Free cash flow | $1.63B | $1.49B | $924M | $1.08B | $334M | $1.38B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $4.88B | $5.61B | $6.23B | $6.10B | $7.09B | $9.07B |
| Debt | $5.73B | $5.90B | $6.59B | $6.44B | $8.20B | $9.20B |
| Net cash | −$846M | −$297M | −$362M | −$343M | −$1.11B | −$130M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | 10% | 14% | 13% | 11% | 5.6% |
| Shares (diluted) | 217M | 232M | 231M | 236M | 232M | 244M |
What growth costs
Growth adds profit dollars but not a fatter margin. Over the last three years the company kept between about 4 and 5 cents of each dollar of sales as reported operating profit, and office and selling costs stayed near 16 cents. Bigger shows bring more money in and send most of it straight back to the artists.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
Adjusted operating income leaves out depreciation, stock pay, acquisition costs and the $450M legal accrual; reported operating income was $1,251.2M in 2025.
The last report (30 Jul)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
In Q2 2026 sales rose 9% to $7.67B, but profit before interest and other costs rose only 2%. Ticketing and sponsorship each grew about 13% to 14%. Concerts' profit fell 14%.
Management kept its promise of double-digit profit growth for the year and pointed to a record $6.4B of tickets already sold for later shows. That promise now needs profit up about 15% in the second half, after 4% in the first.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the ticketing and sponsorship side of the case and left the rest open. The concert business lost ground, so the year's promise now rests on the second half. It said nothing about the court remedy, which no analyst asked about. The view stays neutral.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures. The company has restated its own history, so a quarter either side of the restatement may describe a different business; n/c marks one that does not compare.
Earnings per share $1.05 against $0.66 expected; $1.05 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Event deferred revenue was a record $6.4B at June, up 25% (C10), and management says most of Concerts' gain falls in Q4.
- First-half adjusted operating income grew only 4.3% (C09), so the year depends on the second half.
- Concerts' adjusted operating income fell 14% in Q2 2026 (C10).
Concerts' Q2 2026 adjusted operating income fell 14% (C10), so more tickets have not yet meant more profit this year.
What management did with the money
It spends heavily on new venues, about $1.1B this year, ten of them under construction and arenas bought in Bangkok, Milan and Buenos Aires. That leaves little cash after spending, it buys back no stock, and the number of shares has risen since 2020. It is refinancing debt due in 2027 at higher interest rates.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 0 purchases and 6 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Management says new venues earn high returns, so part of that spending buys future profit rather than maintaining today's.
Venue spending is a choice; cut back to maintenance, cash would be near the $1.3B company figure (C14).
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price pays for management's plan of about 10% growth a year, delivered for a decade, and gives no discount for a court remedy aimed at ticketing.
The shares fell 6.3% on the verdict day in April and then recovered, and on the latest call nine analysts asked questions and none asked about the case. The market is treating the verdict as a fine, not as a change to how Ticketmaster works.
Two tests are close. Q3 2026 results on 3 November show whether the second half can deliver the year's promise. The judge's ruling on the post-trial motions and the court's decision on the Justice Department settlement decide how hard the remedy is.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
Event deferred revenue was a record $6.4B at June, up 25% (C10), and management says most of Concerts' gain falls in Q4.
How we read the multiple
Counting debt and partners, Live Nation is valued at about $49.14B. What has to be true:
1. Over the last year it earned $2.41B of profit before interest, tax and wear on its assets, so the price is about 20 times that. 2. A buyer wanting 9% a year, a common yardstick, needs its spare cash to grow about 10% a year for ten years.
That spare cash, $1.33B by its own measure, leaves out about $1B a year of new venues; count them and $0.2B to $0.3B was left.
Against its own history. Buyers pay well above its own normal for each dollar of cash profit, so the price already assumes the growth continues; the pandemic years make that normal a rough guide.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Management says it can compound double-digit growth for years (C08), which would cover the 9.9% needed.
- Minority stakes at book value understate what partners' shares are worth, so the true multiple is higher.
Venue spending is a choice; cut back to maintenance, cash would be near the $1.3B company figure (C14).
Management says new venues earn high returns, so part of that spending buys future profit rather than maintaining today's.
- First-half adjusted operating income grew only 4.3% (C09), so the year depends on the second half.
- Concerts' adjusted operating income fell 14% in Q2 2026 (C10).
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: CTS Eventim, Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG Presents, AXS), SeatGeek, Legends Global and Nederlander, Eventbrite.
Where we disagree with the market
The court case is settled and costs a one-off fine; growth of about 10% a year continues.
Growth near 10% abroad is likely, but the remedy is open and could cut ticketing profit the price does not allow for.
Most analysts rate the shares a buy and none a sell, and the company booked $450M as its best estimate of the loss. The settlement with the Justice Department already sets rules without forcing a sale of Ticketmaster, and the market rose on it.
The evidence against us is real: if the remedy ends up no harsher than that settlement, today's price is fair, and tickets sold for 2026 shows are running well ahead of last year.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- The settlement with the Justice Department already sets conduct and structural terms without a sale of Ticketmaster (C06), and the market rose 6.2% on it (C18).
- Outside North America and Australia Ticketmaster mostly sells by allocation, which the US case does not reach (C03).
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
- First-half adjusted operating income grew only 4.3% (C09), so the year depends on the second half.
- Concerts' adjusted operating income fell 14% in Q2 2026 (C10).
The 10-Q warns that remedies or compliance requirements imposed by the court could adversely affect how it operates, a cost no accrual measures.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- A harsh court remedy. The court could end exclusive venue contracts or force Ticketmaster out of the company, hitting the part that earns over 40% of profit.
- This year's promise slips. Profit grew 4% in the first half, so the promised double digits need about 15% growth in the second.
- US sales stall. US sales have been flat for three years; if growth abroad slows too, the price has no cushion.
- Heavy borrowing. It owes $9.2B and is refinancing 2027 debt at higher rates while spending about $1B a year on venues.
- Owners' slice shrinks. Share count has risen since 2020, partners take a growing share of profit, and convertible notes can add more shares.
- Insiders are selling. Insiders sold shares by choice this year, including the general counsel weeks after the verdict, and bought none.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
- The settlement with the Justice Department already sets conduct and structural terms without a sale of Ticketmaster (C06), and the market rose 6.2% on it (C18).
- Outside North America and Australia Ticketmaster mostly sells by allocation, which the US case does not reach (C03).
Event deferred revenue was a record $6.4B at June, up 25% (C10), and management says most of Concerts' gain falls in Q4.
Management says North America large-venue shows for 2026 were pacing up double digits in February (S02), so flat US revenue may not persist.
What we still do not know
- What remedy the court will order for the states' case, and when the separate remedies trial will be held.
- How much Ticketmaster would earn without exclusive venue contracts; the company does not split it out.
- How fast concert spending is growing abroad, where the growth now comes from; no outside body publishes it.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Post-trial motions were argued on 31 July 2026 and the company says it will appeal to the Second Circuit, so the verdict is not final.
- The finding covers the United States; Ticketmaster sells by allocation rather than exclusive venue deals in most other markets (C03).
- The settlement with the Justice Department already sets conduct and structural terms without a sale of Ticketmaster (C06), and the market rose 6.2% on it (C18).
- Outside North America and Australia Ticketmaster mostly sells by allocation, which the US case does not reach (C03).
- The 10-K says only that resale is a small portion; no filed figure confirms the share.
- Management says it is pushing more concert tickets to first sale to curb scalpers, so the resale share may be falling by design.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveA lower price on unchanged growth
It needs all of:
- ○The shares fall until the company is valued at 16 times its yearly profit before interest, with growth still near 10%.about ≈$134.25 today, 21% below the last close
- ○Profit before interest grows 10% or more in 2026.checked at the next results, due by 3 Nov
- Neutral→AttractiveThe remedy settles no harsher than the settlement
It needs all of:
- ○The court sets a remedy that keeps Ticketmaster in the company on terms no harsher than the Justice Department settlement.watched as it happens
- ○Profit before interest grows 10% or more in 2026.checked at the next results, due by 3 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Fans fall from one year to the next in 2027.
- US sales grow 8% or more in 2026, which would strengthen the case.
What is coming
- 3 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether adjusted operating income grows enough to keep the year's double-digit guide in reach.
Every dated event ahead
- 3 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether adjusted operating income grows enough to keep the year's double-digit guide in reach.
- 31 December 2026 Ruling on post-trial motions in the states' case: Whether the verdict stands and when the remedies trial begins.
- 28 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the 2027 outlook: Whether the double-digit year was delivered and the plan for 2027 still calls for it.
- 31 March 2027 Court decision on the Justice Department settlement: Whether the conduct and structural terms become binding without a sale of Ticketmaster.
Since we wrote this
- 10 OctThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten three weeks before Q3 2026 results, six months after the jury's verdict and with remedies still unset.
Sources 17
Sources - 17
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-19business description, fans, venues, ticketing contracts and exclusivity, named competitors, revenue by geography, segment results, executives, share count, headcountbacksC01C02C03C11C13C28C33C34C35
- S02primarycompany release2026-02-19segment revenue and adjusted operating income, free cash flow as the company defines it, free cash, the 2026 outlook, the definition of adjusted operating income
Concerts delivered record results with AOI of $687 million, up 30% with best-ever margin of 3.3%
backsC04C08C14C34 - S03primarycompany release2026-07-30Q2 and first-half segment results, event deferred revenue, fee-bearing tickets, the full-year 2026 outlook, balance sheet, free cash, the $450M accrual in corporate expenses
In a world of endless screens and AI-generated everything, the one thing that can't be copied is being there.
backsC07C08C10C12C13C14C30 - S04primarycompany filing2026-07-30the antitrust case, the settlement with the Justice Department, the jury verdict, the $450M accrual, the FTC suit, debt by instrument, the share count on 2026-07-23, the April 2026 venue financingbacksC05C06C07C12C13C32
- S05primaryregulator2026-04-15New York State Attorney General, 'Attorney General James and Coalition of States Win Trial Against Live Nation and Ticketmaster' New York State Attorney Generalthe jury's findings, the overcharge per ticket, and that remedies go to a separate bench trial; read through press_fetch.py
The jury found that Ticketmaster unlawfully maintains a monopoly in the market for ticketing services at major concert venues. The jury also found that Live Nation has a monopoly in the market for large amphitheaters used by artists and that Live Nation unlawfully requires artists who use the amphitheaters it owns to also use its event promotion services. ... New Yorkers Overcharged $1.72 Per Ticket in Higher Fees ... Attorney General James and the coalition will argue for remedies and financial penalties at a separate bench trial.
backsC05 - S06primarytranscript2026-07-30Live Nation Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (held 2026-07-30)secondary ticketing's share of sales, the Spotify presale deal, arenas bought in Bangkok, Milan and Buenos Aires; questions from nine analysts, none on the verdict
Secondary now on a global GTV basis is below teens. It's low double-digit portion. ... It's probably 5% of our global GTV.
backsC20C29C33 - S07primarycompany filing2026-04-24beneficial ownership, Liberty Live's stake and nominees, the 2025 bonus target and payout, pay designbacksC22C23
- S08primarycompany filing2026-10-02the chief executive's contract to 2031 and its pay termsbacksC23
- S09primarygovernment data2026-09-30U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, personal consumption expenditures on live entertainment excluding sports, nominal (FRED DLIGRC1A027NBEA) and real quantity index (FRED DLIGRA3A086NBEA), read through FRED's API U.S. Bureau of Economic AnalysisUS consumer spending on live entertainment other than sports, in dollars and in real terms, 2019 to 2025
"date":"2019-01-01","value":"39.388" ... "date":"2025-01-01","value":"57.289" ; quantity index "date":"2019-01-01","value":"108.481" ... "date":"2025-01-01","value":"125.296"
backsC24 - S10primarycompany release2026-03-26the largest European rival's ticketing growth and margin
Revenue in the Ticketing segment grew by 11.0% in 2025 to stand at EUR 977.1 million. Adjusted EBITDA advanced by 8.9% to EUR 453.7 million. The adjusted EBITDA margin stood at 46.4%.
backsC25 - S11primarycompany filing2026-03-20a rival's plan to sell first-sale tickets and 'disrupt the legacy primary ticketing model'
Our vision for direct issuance is that content rights holders will list tickets directly on our marketplace as any other seller would at scale.
backsC26 - S12primarycompany filing2026-03-12a resale rival naming Ticketmaster as a primary competitor
Our primary competitors are StubHub, Ticketmaster, SeatGeek, and TicketNetwork.
backsC27 - S13primarycompany filing2026-10-1013 open-market sales in the year, none under a Rule 10b5-1 plan, no purchasesbacksC21
- S14primarycompany release2026-07-21the share of uploads and of listening that machine-made music takes on one streaming service
Despite the enormous volume of uploads, fully AI-generated music accounts for only a small fraction of listening activity, between 1 and 3% of total streams.
backsC31 - S15secondaryvendor data2026-10-10Research pack, frozen 2026-10-10 (FMP market data, FINRA short interest)daily closes, the price decomposition, analyst ratings and estimates, short interest, news reactionsbacksC17C18C19
- S16primarycompany filing2026-10-07$730M of 7.125% and €600M of 6.125% notes due 2032 to redeem the 6.5% secured notes due 2027backsC32
- S17primarycompany filing2026-08-12Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2026 MSG Entertainmenta rival venue operator's portfolio and revenue of $1,060.8M, up 13%
Our company includes (i) our portfolio of venues: Madison Square Garden (“The Garden”), the Infosys Theater at Madison Square Garden, Radio City Music Hall, the Beacon Theatre, and The Chicago Theatre
backsC36