Dorian LPG
A shipowner with 19 giant refrigerated tankers that carry propane and butane across oceans, mostly from America to Asia, and earn whatever the day's freight rate pays.
The scores
Growth2/4 ↑
Revenue doubled on rate, not ships: available days rose 3.8% while the rate rose 31%, and the fleet shrank.
Business quality2/4 →
A price-taker among 129 owners, but with a younger fleet and a marginal fuel edge - not the worse cost position a 1 requires.
Financial position4/4 ↑
Cash of nearly $600M against $507.5M of debt, nothing needs raising, and September's refinancing pushed maturities out seven years.
Execution record3/4 →
Sold four ships at large gains and kept the balance sheet clean through two cycles, but issues no guidance to miss.
Per share capture4/4 →
Share count up 0.6% in a year, no convertible, no share-funded deals, and about 83 cents of every dollar earned since 2021 paid out.
Potential2/4 →
A bigger version of today that depends on somebody else's war lasting and on 155 ships not arriving - expected, not committed.
Risk profile2/4 →
The result turns on one externally controlled event - whether Hormuz reopens - and 99.96% of revenue arrives through one related party.
Valuation2/4 ↓
$1.97 per dollar of net worth against a 0.91 median, and 12.5 to 26.6 times what a five-year charterer pays.
Evidence quality3/4 →
The load-bearing figures are filed by Dorian, BW LPG and the EIA, but the orderbook and cargo flows rest on single disclosures.
The Verdict
We rate Dorian LPG unattractive. It owns giant tankers that carry propane and butane across oceans, earning whatever the day's freight rate pays, so the business is mixed. A war that closed the Strait of Hormuz sent buyers to American cargo on longer routes and lifted its daily rate sharply. The price assumes that windfall lasts: the shares cost about twice the company's net worth, so it is full, not cheap. Charterers signing long-term deals pay about half today's rate, and many new ships are on order. The view hinges on how long the wartime rate holds.
The long caseAmerica is replacing the Gulf as the big gas exporter, so cargoes travel further and need more ships; Dorian needs those long routes and high rates to last.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- BW LPG puts the same fall at 46% year on year for the first half of 2026 on VLGC-carried volumes - a different measure over a different window, and less severe.
- Neither figure is filed; both are the operators' reading of a commercial cargo-tracking series.
- Net worth is depreciated cost. Dorian sold the 2015-built Cobra for $81,900,000 at a gain of $30,116,869, which implies a carrying value of about $51.8M and a market value 1.58 times it - so the fleet is worth more than the balance sheet says and the true premium to asset value is smaller.
- Second-hand values are themselves at a cyclical extreme: the chief financial officer said the Cobra sold for more than her 2015 contract price, and BW LPG booked gains of about $36M and $37M on two 2007-built ships. A net asset value struck on those prices is struck on the same spike as the earnings.
- The prior-year median is a median of fiscal-year-end readings taken over a period that included two troughs, so it is not a neutral benchmark either.
- It is one ship and one counterparty, disclosed as a range rather than a number, and a 2016-built vessel is not the same asset as a 2026 newbuilding.
- A five-year rate is struck partly on the charterer's own view, so it can be wrong in the same direction the spot market is right; the 2023-24 cycle's term rates also sat below a spot market that stayed high for eighteen months.
- Dorian's own chartering officer says there is 'appetite out in the market' for multi-year cover, which is the same fact read as demand rather than as a price.
- The chief executive points out the orderbook peaked above 50% of the fleet in 2007, so 35.7% is large rather than unprecedented.
- 78 of the 124 ships Dorian counted in May were ammonia carriers, and if ammonia demand arrives they carry ammonia rather than competing for LPG cargoes.
- About 9% of the existing fleet is 25 years or older, so some of the additions replace ships that will leave.
- Both years carried a lower cash balance than the roughly $600M management reported in August, so interest income is understated in each.
- FY2026 included no gains on vessel sales and FY2027 already carries $30,116,869 from the Cobra alone; selling ships into a strong asset market is a real and repeatable part of this company's earnings.
- If the term market is simply wrong - if charterers systematically underpay at the top of a cycle - the whole comparison reverses, and the 2023-24 episode is a case where spot stayed above term for eighteen months.
The company
Propane and butane are gases, so to cross an ocean they are cooled to about minus 42 degrees and carried as liquid. Dorian owns 19 very large carriers built for that, each holding about 44,000 tonnes, and hires in six more. There is no pipeline across the Pacific; the only alternative is a smaller, costlier ship.
Every ship sails in the Helios Pool, run jointly with MOL Energia, which markets 29 ships as one fleet and shares the revenue by formula.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
How it makes money
The pool rents the ships out mostly voyage by voyage, at the going rate on the day, so Dorian's revenue is roughly the market rate times the days its ships are free to work. Almost all of it, 99.96% last quarter, arrives as one payment from the pool. A ship costs about $26,000 to $27,000 a day in cash to run, so every dollar of rate above that is profit.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Net pool revenues - related party (Helios Pool) | 98.6% | Each ship takes a share of the Helios Pool's net freight income, by days in the pool and pool points; the pool mostly trades spot. |
| Other revenues, net | 1.4% | Charterers, mainly the pool, reimbursing security guards and war-risk insurance on voyages through high-risk areas. |
| Time charter revenues | 0% (2.3% in FY2025) | Fixed daily hire on charters outside the pool; none in FY2026, the remaining fixed charters now running inside the pool. |
Who runs it
John Hadjipateras has run Dorian since it was formed in 2013 and has worked in shipping since the early seventies; Ted Young has run the money just as long, and the operating chief is Hadjipateras's son. Insiders control roughly one vote in seven, mostly through Hadjipateras, though under half of his block is his own stock. The yearly bonus rides mainly on profit before depreciation, which follows freight rates, and last year's target sat below the weakest recent year.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The proxied shares are voted, not owned: the chief executive's own sole holding is about 4.3% of the company, and he disclaims beneficial ownership beyond his pecuniary interest.
- BlackRock's figure dates from a January 2024 filing and may have moved since.
- The EBITDA target sat below the $206.0M of adjusted EBITDA earned in FY2025 (C44), the weakest of the three filed years, and EBITDA moves with the freight index management does not set (C33), so 40% of the bonus paid on the market.
- The personal component was paid at the maximum on the chief executive's recommendation for the team.
- Shareholders approved the pay advisorily by 26,477,726 votes to 1,131,073, though 38.1% voted against the larger share plan (C42).
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
There is none. The rate is set on a published index for every owner at once, and about 129 owners share the fleet, the ten largest holding 41% of the ships. The proof: BW LPG, the other big listed owner, earned $74,000 a day last quarter against Dorian's $75,926, two fleets and two sales teams within 2.6%.
Dorian's younger ships, 10.5 years old on average against 11.7, cost a little less to run. That edge is real, and small.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- BW's figure is struck after negative accounting and hedging adjustments of $16.4M and $12.0M, so the underlying gap is not 2.6%.
- BW carried 53% of its days on time charter at $64,000 while Dorian ran about 75% spot, so the two rates are mixes of different things and their closeness is partly coincidence.
- A single quarter in an extreme market is the worst place to look for a durable cost or commercial advantage in either direction.
The threat
The threat is more ships. 155 very large carriers are on order, about 35.7% of today's fleet, and 50 were ordered in a single quarter. Many are built for ammonia but can carry propane just as well whenever ammonia demand disappoints. Traders such as Petredec also own fleets and carry cargo in direct competition with owners like Dorian.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The chief executive points out the orderbook peaked above 50% of the fleet in 2007, so 35.7% is large rather than unprecedented.
- 78 of the 124 ships Dorian counted in May were ammonia carriers, and if ammonia demand arrives they carry ammonia rather than competing for LPG cargoes.
- About 9% of the existing fleet is 25 years or older, so some of the additions replace ships that will leave.
The rivals: BWLP, and 3 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not listed | The 90,000 to 93,000 cbm very large ammonia carrier (VLAC) - the hull type that was 78 of the 124 ships Dorian counted on order in May 2026Priced against it: Not listed | On sale | Not listed |
| Private | Petredec Pte. Ltd.Priced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| Not listed | Medium gas carriers of 38,000 to 60,000 cbmPriced against it: Not listed | On sale | Not listed |
| BWLP | BW LPGPriced against it: Same product | On sale | Same product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
America now ships about 65% of the world's seaborne propane and butane, up from under half a year earlier, and exported a record 1.8 million barrels a day of propane in 2025. Nobody publicly counts how much of that travels on very large carriers rather than smaller ships, so the market can only be bounded, against a world fleet of about 427 of these ships.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The figure is unsourced and no public agency publishes a global seaborne LPG export split; EIA measures US exports and not the denominator.
- A jump from under 50% to 65% in a year is a measure of the Middle East's absence rather than of American growth, and it reverses with a reopening.
- The chief executive points out the orderbook peaked above 50% of the fleet in 2007, so 35.7% is large rather than unprecedented.
- 78 of the 124 ships Dorian counted in May were ammonia carriers, and if ammonia demand arrives they carry ammonia rather than competing for LPG cargoes.
- About 9% of the existing fleet is 25 years or older, so some of the additions replace ships that will leave.
Who has signed
Seven of Dorian's 19 ships are rented out on longer contracts, ending between early 2027 and mid-2030, at rates nobody outside the company knows. The rest of the pool, just over 75% of its 29 ships, works at the day's rate.
The evidence under this - 1 claim
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 81% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, faster than the 36% in the year to Mar 2026.
Operating margin is 58%, about where it was (59%) in the year to Mar 2024.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from −37% to +44% over the last 5 years, with sales falling in 2 of them.
Shareholders' money earned 28% a year, up from 7.7% in the year to Mar 2022.
The business brought in $240M of cash from operations, 41% of sales, before capital spending, which the filer does not tag.
It owes $165M more than the cash it holds, about 0.7 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count rose 5.9% in 4.3 years, and pay in shares costs 1.9% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in March.
| Mar 2022 | Mar 2023 | Mar 2024 | Mar 2025 | Mar 2026 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $274M | $390M | $561M | $353M | $482M | $585M |
| Sales growth | −13% | +42% | +44% | −37% | +36% | +81% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | 34% | 51% | 59% | 32% | 44% | 58% |
| Net margin | 26% | 44% | 55% | 26% | 40% | 55% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| General and admin | 11% | 8.2% | 7.0% | 12% | 11% | 8.5% |
| Pay in shares | 1.2% | 1.1% | 1.5% | 2.9% | 2.3% | 1.9% |
| Capital spending | 8.5% | 18% | - | - | - | - |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $119M | $224M | $388M | $173M | $210M | $240M |
| Free cash flow | $95.5M | $155M | - | - | - | - |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $237M | $149M | $294M | $317M | $327M | $342M |
| Debt | $663M | $657M | $605M | $553M | $560M | $508M |
| Net cash | −$426M | −$509M | −$311M | −$236M | −$233M | −$165M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | 40.4M | 40.2M | 40.5M | 42.2M | 42.6M | 42.7M |
What growth costs
Dorian does not spend to grow the way a software or chip company does: it has no research or sales budget, and running a ship costs about the same each year. Sales rise and fall with the freight rate. Office overhead and stock pay have kept pace with sales over the cycle, so margins swing with the rate rather than widening as the company grows.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
The first quarter of fiscal 2027, which ended in June, was Dorian's best: $75,926 a day per ship, up 91.1% on a year earlier, as the benchmark freight rate roughly tripled. The strait's closure cut Middle East loadings by more than 70%, and American exports hit a record 7.3 million tonnes in May.
The next quarter is already locked in: 99% of September-quarter days are fixed above $88,000 a day. That peak is what the price is reading.
What it did to the thesisIt is the peak our case is about. The record rate comes from a war closing a shipping route, not from anything Dorian controls, and longer charters pay far less. It confirms the earnings are a windfall the price treats as lasting, so the view stays Unattractive.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $2.52 against $2.12 expected; $3.24 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- BW LPG puts the same fall at 46% year on year for the first half of 2026 on VLGC-carried volumes - a different measure over a different window, and less severe.
- Neither figure is filed; both are the operators' reading of a commercial cargo-tracking series.
What management did with the money
It has been selling into the boom: three ships sold this year, one of them eleven years old for more than she cost new, and a fourth under contract. It has ordered four new ships for 2029 and 2030. Cash stood at almost $600M in early August.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 0 purchases and 5 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- A 2015 contract price is not a like-for-like comparison with 2026 money; the chief executive's own history has newbuilding prices under $70M until 2021 and about $115M now, so much of the gap is shipyard inflation rather than a scarcity premium on the ship itself.
- The comparison is management's and is not reconciled in any filing.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price assumes today's wartime shipping rate lasts. Ship-hirers signing five-year deals are paying about half of it.
Because the rate is at a peak and the price has followed it. The last time a disruption lifted the rate, in 2024, the shares reached $51.66 and then fell 67.7% within a year as the rate fell 36%.
The next reading comes on 5 November, with the September-quarter results and the rate fixed for December.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about $2 for each $1 of Dorian's net worth, what it owns minus what it owes, against about 90 cents in its own past years. That only makes sense if today's rate lasts.
Ship-hirers will commit for five years at the mid-to-high $40,000s a day. At such rates Dorian has earned between $2.14 and $4.54 a share a year, so the price is 12.5 to 26.6 times that profit.
Against its own history. Roughly twice what buyers have normally paid for each dollar of its net worth, struck on the best rate the company has ever reported.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Net worth is depreciated cost. Dorian sold the 2015-built Cobra for $81,900,000 at a gain of $30,116,869, which implies a carrying value of about $51.8M and a market value 1.58 times it - so the fleet is worth more than the balance sheet says and the true premium to asset value is smaller.
- Second-hand values are themselves at a cyclical extreme: the chief financial officer said the Cobra sold for more than her 2015 contract price, and BW LPG booked gains of about $36M and $37M on two 2007-built ships. A net asset value struck on those prices is struck on the same spike as the earnings.
- The prior-year median is a median of fiscal-year-end readings taken over a period that included two troughs, so it is not a neutral benchmark either.
- Both years carried a lower cash balance than the roughly $600M management reported in August, so interest income is understated in each.
- FY2026 included no gains on vessel sales and FY2027 already carries $30,116,869 from the Cobra alone; selling ships into a strong asset market is a real and repeatable part of this company's earnings.
- If the term market is simply wrong - if charterers systematically underpay at the top of a cycle - the whole comparison reverses, and the 2023-24 episode is a case where spot stayed above term for eighteen months.
- It is one ship and one counterparty, disclosed as a range rather than a number, and a 2016-built vessel is not the same asset as a 2026 newbuilding.
- A five-year rate is struck partly on the charterer's own view, so it can be wrong in the same direction the spot market is right; the 2023-24 cycle's term rates also sat below a spot market that stayed high for eighteen months.
- Dorian's own chartering officer says there is 'appetite out in the market' for multi-year cover, which is the same fact read as demand rather than as a price.
Priced against its rivals
Only BW LPG sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK Line), Petredec Pte. Ltd.
Where we disagree with the market
A cheap cash machine whose rate eases from 2028; most analysts say hold and none sell.
The rate is a war's windfall, paid into a fleet growing 35.7% by 2030. Both unwind.
The market is not naive: analysts already model revenue falling to $419.7M in fiscal 2028, from $585.2M over the last year. But the evidence that the rate is borrowed sits outside Dorian's filings: a rival's five-year charter price, and a pile of new orders that grew by a quarter in ten weeks.
We would be wrong if Middle East loadings recover and the rate still holds above $60,000 a day, because American volumes alone keep the voyages long.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- It is one ship and one counterparty, disclosed as a range rather than a number, and a 2016-built vessel is not the same asset as a 2026 newbuilding.
- A five-year rate is struck partly on the charterer's own view, so it can be wrong in the same direction the spot market is right; the 2023-24 cycle's term rates also sat below a spot market that stayed high for eighteen months.
- Dorian's own chartering officer says there is 'appetite out in the market' for multi-year cover, which is the same fact read as demand rather than as a price.
- The chief executive points out the orderbook peaked above 50% of the fleet in 2007, so 35.7% is large rather than unprecedented.
- 78 of the 124 ships Dorian counted in May were ammonia carriers, and if ammonia demand arrives they carry ammonia rather than competing for LPG cargoes.
- About 9% of the existing fleet is 25 years or older, so some of the additions replace ships that will leave.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- The strait reopens. BW LPG puts full recovery of Middle East exports at 12 to 36 months, and says reopening could shorten voyages overall.
- The rate is a price gap. Freight clears the gap between American and Asian propane prices, so anything that narrows the gap takes the rate down.
- Being early. The September quarter is fixed above $88,000 a day and December may be too; the shares can rise a long way on it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Dorian's chief executive takes the opposite reading, calling the market's treatment of peace as a negative 'kind of silly' and arguing traffic and replenishment increase.
- Both are interested parties: BW has 41% of its second-half days already fixed at $44,100 and Dorian has 75% of its pool days on spot, so each is describing the exposure it holds.
- The gap is not the only constraint: BW says that once new US terminal capacity came online 'vessel availability rather than export infrastructure emerged as the primary bottleneck', which makes the rate a scarcity price on ships as well as a share of the arbitrage.
- A structurally longer voyage raises the rate even at an unchanged price gap, because the same cargo occupies a ship for longer - so part of the level survives a narrowing.
- Panama Canal restrictions and war-risk insurance raise the rate through cost rather than through arbitrage, and neither reverses with a ceasefire.
What we still do not know
- When the Strait of Hormuz reopens, and whether that even lowers the rate. The two largest listed owners publicly disagree.
- What the seven chartered-out ships earn. No rate is disclosed on any of them.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Dorian's chief executive takes the opposite reading, calling the market's treatment of peace as a negative 'kind of silly' and arguing traffic and replenishment increase.
- Both are interested parties: BW has 41% of its second-half days already fixed at $44,100 and Dorian has 75% of its pool days on spot, so each is describing the exposure it holds.
What would change our view
- Unattractive→AttractivePriced near the assets, not near the spot rate
It needs:
- ○The price falls to about 1.0 times net worth, close to what Dorian's own past years averaged, from 1.97 today.about $29.37 today, 48% below the last close
- Reopens the researchThe earnings stop being the war's
It needs any of:
- ○Dorian signs multi-year charters that free its earnings from the day-to-day freight rate.watched as it happens
- ○Rates on multi-year charters climb toward the day rate, instead of the day rate falling toward them.checked at the next results, due by 5 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Middle East loadings recover fully and Dorian's rate still settles above $60,000 a day.
- The pile of new ships shrinks through cancellations, or scrapping runs far beyond the 9% of the fleet now 25 or older.
- American exports alone, with no disruption, keep the rate above $70,000 a day.
What is coming
- 5 November 2026 Q2 FY2027 results, quarter ending 30 September 2026: Whether September books near the $88,000 a day already fixed, what December is fixed at, and whether multi-year charters are still written in the $40,000s.
Every dated event ahead
- 5 November 2026 Q2 FY2027 results, quarter ending 30 September 2026: Whether September books near the $88,000 a day already fixed, what December is fixed at, and whether multi-year charters are still written in the $40,000s.
- February 2027 Q3 FY2027 results, quarter ending 31 December 2026: The first quarter after late-2026 newbuild deliveries; whether the rate holds as the fleet grows and Middle East exports recover.
- June 2027 Sale of the Clermont completes: Whether a third 2015-built ship sells well above book while rates are high, adding cash and shrinking the fleet before the orderbook delivers.
- December 2027 Nine Chinese propane dehydrogenation plants scheduled to start: Whether new Chinese import demand arrives on schedule to absorb the ships on order, or the plants start late.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 16 SepThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionA war closed the Strait of Hormuz and nearly doubled the daily rate. The price assumes it lasts, while five-year charters are being signed at about half.
Sources 18
Sources - 18
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-05-27Item 1 business and Competition; the fleet table; the three-year operating statistics table with time charter equivalent rate, available days and adjusted EBITDA for FY2024, FY2025 and FY2026; the buyback authority; the single-segment determinationbacksC15C19C21C27C34C38C39C44C45C49C50
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-05the balance sheet, the revenue split between net pool revenue and other, the newbuilding commitment note, share counts, and the Helios Pool variable-interest disclosurebacksC02C17C24C34C35C36C51
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-05the quarter's time charter equivalent rate and available days, the Baltic index averages, the fleet table with charter-out expiries, and the market outlook section carrying the orderbook, US export tonnage, Chinese import tonnage and Far East propane pricesbacksC01C03C04C08C14C22C28C29C30C32C36C37C39
- S04primarytranscript2026-08-05Dorian LPG Q1 FY2027 earnings call transcriptmanagement's account of the Hormuz closure and Middle East liftings, the cash and debt figures between filings, the guided cash cost per day, the pool's spot exposure; and two analyst questions - Clarksons on capital allocation, Jefferies on the orderbook - that produced the chief executive's statement about the orderbook
The United States now accounts for approximately 65% of global seaborne LPG exports, up from less than 50% a year ago.
backsC05C10C22C25C29C34C35C37C41 - S05primarycompany filing2026-09-04the September quarter forward fixture, the three Hanwha Ocean newbuildings and their price, the seven-year $368.4M credit facility, and the current fleet countbacksC01C13C24C40
- S06primarycompany filing2026-05-20the FY2026 full-year revenue, net income, earnings per share and time charter equivalent rate, and the Q4 FY2026 quarter against Q4 FY2025backsC19C36C44
- S07primarytranscript2026-05-20Dorian LPG Q4 FY2026 earnings call transcriptthe chief executive's twenty-year newbuilding price history and his orderbook framing, and the chief financial officer's statement that the Cobra sold for more than her 2015 contract pricebacksC15C23
- S08primarycompany filing2026-08-28the largest competitor's own realised rate, its 2H 2026 fixed charter cover, the five-year charter it signed, the orderbook and delivery count, the Middle East and US cargo movements, and its statement on what a reopening of Hormuz would dobacksC06C11C12C14C16C28C31C41C43
- S09primarycompany filing2026-03-31the peer's own description of the product and the buyer, used to gate it into the filed competitor setread, but no claim rests on it
- S10primarygovernment data2026-05-12the government's own assessment of how long the strait was shut, and its statement that US propane exports will likely increase through 2027 as Asian buyers replace Middle East supply
the Strait of Hormuz will remain effectively closed through late May, with traffic gradually resuming in June
backsC07 - S11primarygovernment data2026-04-07the size of the Gulf production shut-in, measured outside the shipping industry
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain collectively shut in 7.5 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil production in March.
backsC07 - S12primarygovernment data2026-03the driver's rate from a statistical agency rather than from the company: propane and butane export volumes and their growth
U.S. propane exports averaged a record 1.8 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2025 ... U.S. propane exports rose just 3% compared with the previous year ... U.S. normal butane exports have increased every year since 2006, reaching a record-high average of nearly 535,000 b/d in 2025, a 9% increase from the previous year.
backsC09 - S13primaryvendor data2026-09-16Research pack, LPG, 16 September 2026price and the 52-week range, price to book against its own prior-year median, the price-move decomposition, the analyst split and its history, the sell side's forward estimates and price-target drift, short interest and the insider base ratebacksC18C36
- S14primarycompany filing2026-09-16Dorian LPG Forms 4, September 2025 to September 2026, read through insider_fetch.pyevery open-market transaction with its Rule 10b5-1 flag read off the filing itself - sixteen sales, one purchase, none of the sales scheduledbacksC26
- S15primarycompany filing2026-09-14the vote on the amended equity incentive plan - 17,099,624 for against 10,536,213 withheldbacksC42C47
- S16primaryvendor data2026-09-16Interactive Brokers monthly price history, LPG, five years to 16 September 2026the monthly high and low series that dates the prior repricing: $51.66 in May 2024 and $16.66 in April 2025backsC21
- S17primarycompany filing2026-07-27beneficial ownership at 14 July 2026 with the revocable proxies behind the chief executive's figure, executive officers' biographies and family ties, the FY2026 bonus metrics, goals and payouts, and the long-term award mix and PSU metricsbacksC46C47C48
- S18primarycompany filing2026-10-04six years of revenue, general and administrative expense, stock pay and operating income as the filer tagged them, for the cost-per-sales-dollar readingbacksC50