Centrus Energy
An American company that resells enriched uranium fuel to power plants and wants to build the first US-owned enrichment plant in decades, in Ohio.
The scores
Growth2/4 →
Revenue $442M to $449M in 2025 and $474M trailing; the business shrinks as Russian supply ends, and nothing new produces before 2029.
Business quality2/4 →
A reseller of others' enrichment with no moat today; the US-origin shelter applies only to a plant not yet built.
Financial position2/4 →
Net cash about $1.2B after September, but the build's cost is undisclosed and it raised equity and notes repeatedly to fund it.
Execution record2/4 ↑
The 2007 plan for this site ended in bankruptcy; the recent HALEU record is real but 16 machines.
Per share capture2/4 ↓
Shares up 21% in a year while revenue per share fell 10%, with 6,992,382 warrants and in-the-money notes above.
Potential3/4 ↑
US buyers need about 3.4 million SWU of non-Russian supply, with $2.4B of definitive contracts and DOE's $900M behind the plant.
Risk profile2/4 →
Over half of deliveries through 2027 are Russian, the waivers end after 2027, and the plant's cost is unknown.
Valuation2/4 ↑
26.8 times trailing EBITDA against a 7.3 norm; the price pays for about 2 million SWU of a plant not yet costed.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Supply, backlog, cash and the market are filed or official; the plant's cost, size and margin are inferred or missing.
If it works 1.8× · if it fails you keep about 44%.
The Verdict
We rate Centrus unattractive. Today it is a middleman reselling enrichment bought mostly from Russia and France, a weak business whose supply runs out after 2027. The value rests on a new Ohio plant that customers and the government are backing but whose cost and size nobody has published. The price is full: it counts on a plant of about 2 million units a year at today's high prices, paid up front before it is built. As a bet it is priced for success: if the plant works it pays a little more than today's value, and if it fails shareholders keep about a third.
The long caseUS law shuts out Russian enrichment, so utilities need a new American supplier; Centrus wins if it can build a plant on time and on budget.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The trade agreement sets aside Russian quota for Centrus through 2028, and management reports strong order momentum and rising long-term prices (S03, S05).
On September's shares and cash the market value is about $3.1B and net cash about $1.2B, which leaves company value near $1.95B either way; and DOE's $900M pays for part of the HALEU build (C23, C09).
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
The company
Nuclear plants burn uranium that has been enriched: spun in thousands of fast centrifuges until the useful kind makes up about 5%. The industry measures that work in separative work units, or SWU.
Centrus buys SWU from Russia's TENEX and France's Orano and resells it to utilities on long contracts. It also ran a small 16-machine cascade in Ohio for the Department of Energy, which ends this year. It now plans its own plant, using an American centrifuge design.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Centrus is working with DOE on agreements to run the cascade privately on a commercial basis (S01).
General Matter, a US company, won an equal $900M HALEU award from DOE (S08), and a second US-origin enricher would end the claim to be the only one.
How it makes money
Almost all the profit is a margin between what Centrus pays its suppliers and what utilities pay it. Its suppliers' prices were fixed lower in 2018, so it earned $111.5M of gross profit on $346.2M of fuel sales in 2025.
That gap lasts only as long as the supply does. Over half of what it delivers through 2027 is Russian, and nothing else it holds can replace it.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
First-half 2026 LEU gross profit of $79.5M runs ahead of 2025's pace, and new sales at a $200 spot carry wider margins (C03, C14).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY 2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Enrichment (SWU) sales | 66.6% | Resells enrichment bought mostly from Russia's TENEX and France's Orano to utilities under long-term contracts. |
| Uranium sales | 10.6% | Sells natural uranium to utilities, some of it taken as payment for enrichment; volumes swing quarter to quarter. |
| Technical Solutions | 22.8% | Contract work for DOE, chiefly running the HALEU cascade at Piketon; production funding ended on 30 September 2026. |
Who runs it
Amir Vexler has run Centrus since January 2024; before that he ran Orano's American arm, a rival enricher. The finance chief and the head of the Ohio site both arrived in 2025. Directors and executives together own under 1% of the company. Their yearly bonus pays on trading results, progress toward enriching again, and revenue, profit and cash; their shares vest on a three-year profit goal, and that profit includes interest earned on money raised from shareholders.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Net income, the long-term award's only test, includes interest on cash raised from shareholders: $16.3M of Q2 2026's $16.8M (C03), so the goal can be met by raising money rather than by enriching.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
For the fuel it resells there is no moat: anyone with supply can sell the same thing.
The plant is different. US rules bar foreign-designed enrichment from military uses, and Centrus says its centrifuge is the only American design ready to deploy. That is why the government picked it for a $900M award. But the government picked General Matter, a private rival, for an equal award, and holds a free right to use Centrus's design for its own purposes.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
General Matter, a US company, won an equal $900M HALEU award from DOE (S08), and a second US-origin enricher would end the claim to be the only one.
General Matter received an identical $900M HALEU award and Orano the LEU one, so DOE is funding rivals on both halves of Centrus's plan (S08).
US buyers paid an average of $108.70 per SWU in 2025, so most enrichment still sells near half the spot price (S09).
The threat
Others are moving first. Urenco already runs a US plant of about 4.6 million SWU a year and is adding 700,000 by 2027. Orano plans a $5B plant in Tennessee from 2031, with its own $900M award, and General Matter is building in Kentucky. Utilities can buy from them directly, without a middleman.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
General Matter received an identical $900M HALEU award and Orano the LEU one, so DOE is funding rivals on both halves of Centrus's plan (S08).
The rivals: CCJ, and 4 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not listed | Urenco USA, Eunice, New MexicoPriced against it: Not listed | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | On sale | Not listed |
| Not listed | Orano, Project IKE in Oak Ridge and its French plantPriced against it: Not listed | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | Announced | Not listed |
| Private | General Matter, Paducah, KentuckyPriced against it: Private | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | Announced | Private |
| CCJ | Global Laser Enrichment, owned by Silex and CamecoPriced against it: One segment only | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | In research | One segment only |
| Not listed | Urenco and Orano selling to utilities directlyPriced against it: Not listed | LEU trading business | On sale | Not listed |
How big it could get
How big this could get
US reactor owners bought 13 million SWU in 2025, paying an average of $108.70 each, about $1.4B. A quarter of it came from Russia, about 3.4 million SWU a year that US law stops after 2027.
That gap is the prize. At today's spot price of $200, filling it would be worth roughly $680M a year in sales, shared with whoever else builds.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The average is a contract price that lags the market: spot was $200 at the end of 2025 (S10).
US buyers paid an average of $108.70 per SWU in 2025, so most enrichment still sells near half the spot price (S09).
Waivers have been granted before, and some 2025 Russian deliveries may already sit in utilities' inventories (S01).
Who has signed
Customers have signed $2.4B of contracts for fuel from the new plant, payable only once it runs. The government signed a $900M order for its high-grade fuel. Three makers of small reactors, X-energy, Radiant and Antares, signed contracts with advance payments, without saying how much.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
General Matter received an identical $900M HALEU award and Orano the LEU one, so DOE is funding rivals on both halves of Centrus's plan (S08).
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 8.5% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, faster than the 1.5% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 1.6%, down from 16% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 22¢ of each sales dollar, up from 15¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 0.5% a year after tax, down from 67% in the year to Dec 2023.
It used $164M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $1.87B it holds lasts about 11.4 years at that pace.
It holds $1.87B of cash against $1.18B of debt, $691M more cash than it owes.
The share count rose 58% in 4.5 years.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $298M | $294M | $320M | $442M | $449M | $474M |
| Sales growth | +21% | −1.5% | +9.0% | +38% | +1.5% | +8.5% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 38% | 40% | 35% | 25% | 26% | 24% |
| Operating margin | 23% | 20% | 16% | 11% | 11% | 1.6% |
| Net margin | 59% | 18% | 26% | 17% | 17% | 10% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 0.7% | 5.0% | 4.4% | 3.9% | 3.8% | 8.5% |
| Selling, general and admin | 12% | 12% | 12% | 7.9% | 8.1% | 12% |
| Pay in shares | 4.1% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.3% | 1.3% | - |
| Capital spending | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 4.4% | 23% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $50.0M | $20.6M | $9.10M | $37.0M | $51.0M | −$55.0M |
| Free cash flow | $48.8M | $19.9M | $7.50M | $32.9M | $31.3M | −$164M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $194M | $180M | $201M | $671M | $1.96B | $1.87B |
| Debt | $108M | $102M | $95.7M | $479M | $1.17B | $1.18B |
| Net cash | $85.9M | $78.1M | $106M | $193M | $782M | $691M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | 67% | 12% | 3.5% | 0.5% |
| Shares (diluted) | 13.9M | 15.0M | 15.5M | 16.4M | 19.9M | 21.9M |
What growth costs
Growing has made Centrus less profitable, not more. Office costs barely moved, but the enrichment it resells costs more as sales rise, and spending on the new plant now arrives years before the plant earns anything. Until the Ohio centrifuges run, each year of building eats into a thin trading profit.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
Sales rose because Centrus sold uranium as well as enrichment; the amount of enrichment it sold fell 23%. Profit fell as share-based pay and building costs rose, and a third of what was left came from interest on its cash.
The better news was in signed orders: contracts waiting on the new plant reached $3.0B, up from $2.3B in December. The government's order for its existing Ohio cascade, meanwhile, is ending.
What it did to the thesisIt proved the demand: signed contracts for the new plant grew again. It did not touch the cost or size of the plant, and it showed the old trading shrinking in volume while the government work ended.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.77 against $0.73 expected; $0.77 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
Consensus for Q3 revenue is about $64M (pack), far below the $176.1M of Q2, so the year leans on lumpy LEU deliveries (S15).
Centrus is working with DOE on agreements to run the cascade privately on a commercial basis (S01).
What management did with the money
Insiders in 2026Q3: 1 purchases and 2 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price already pays for a big new plant earning at today's high prices, before anyone knows what it costs to build.
The shares have fallen from $464 in October 2025 to near their lowest in a year, and in September Centrus sold $500M of new shares and warrants.
In December it holds its first investor day at the Ohio site, where it says it will set out its long-term plan. That is when the plant's cost and size may finally be known.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The 2007 plan for the same site promised 3.8 million SWU by 2012 and ended in a 2014 bankruptcy (C12).
How we read the multiple
Counting its cash, the whole company is valued at about $1.95B. For the price to work:
- The existing trading is worth about $225M, since its supply runs out within a few years.
- That leaves about $1.7B for the plant.
- Valued at a common 11 times its yearly profit before interest, tax and wear, it must earn about $157M a year.
- At today's spot price and Urenco's margin, that takes about 2 million SWU a year, more than its signed contracts cover.
Against its own history. Buyers are paying far more for each dollar of today's profit than they used to, because they are paying for a plant that does not yet exist.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
On September's shares and cash the market value is about $3.1B and net cash about $1.2B, which leaves company value near $1.95B either way; and DOE's $900M pays for part of the HALEU build (C23, C09).
First-half 2026 LEU gross profit of $79.5M runs ahead of 2025's pace, and new sales at a $200 spot carry wider margins (C03, C14).
US buyers paid an average of $108.70 per SWU in 2025, so most enrichment still sells near half the spot price (S09).
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
The bet: what it pays if it works
This is a bet that the Ohio plant gets built and sells about twice the fuel its customers have already signed for, filling part of the gap Russia leaves. Even then, valued like a steady fuel supplier, the company would be worth only a little more than today.
If the plant slips or costs far more, the old trading runs out and shareholders keep its last years of profit and whatever cash is left: about a third of today's value.
| Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon EBITDA in two to three years | Million SWU a year of new Piketon capacity needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $105.00M | about 1 at 38% kept | 1.0× |
| $210.00M (the big win) | about 3 at 38% kept | 1.8× |
| $292.00M | about 4 at 38% kept | 2.5× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $230.98M of Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon EBITDA (about 3 million SWU a year of new Piketon capacity at 38% kept); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $608.14M of Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon EBITDA (about 8 million SWU a year of new Piketon capacity at 38% kept), at the same multiple.
Each row is Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon alone, plus the rest of the company (LEU trading business) counted at about $225.00M.
The steps it has to take
- Done DOE's $900M HALEU task order signed
- Done Financing contingency met on more than $3B of customer contracts
- Done Definitive HALEU contracts with prepayments from X-energy, Radiant and Antares
- Not started The plant's cost, capacity and schedule published at the first Investor Day due 2026-12
- In progress High-rate centrifuge manufacturing running in Oak Ridge due 2027-12
- Not started First new centrifuges online in Piketon due 2029-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 6 claims
First-half 2026 LEU gross profit of $79.5M runs ahead of 2025's pace, and new sales at a $200 spot carry wider margins (C03, C14).
The trade agreement sets aside Russian quota for Centrus through 2028, and management reports strong order momentum and rising long-term prices (S03, S05).
Contract prices lag spot by years and a first plant runs below a mature one's margin, so the contracts may earn less than this (S01, C13).
Waivers have been granted before, and some 2025 Russian deliveries may already sit in utilities' inventories (S01).
Where we disagree with the market
America's enrichment champion: the only US-owned centrifuge, $3B of contracts waiting for its plant, government money behind it, and a halved share price.
The trading that earns today's profit runs out, and the plant that replaces it has no published cost, size or margin yet.
The coverage counts the contracts; the filing says they depend on a plant nobody has costed. The contracts are real and growing, which is the best evidence against us.
We would be wrong if Centrus shows a plant of at least 3 million SWU a year at a sensible cost, with signed contracts above $3.5B. Over a quarter of the shares available are sold short.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
The trade agreement sets aside Russian quota for Centrus through 2028, and management reports strong order momentum and rising long-term prices (S03, S05).
On September's shares and cash the market value is about $3.1B and net cash about $1.2B, which leaves company value near $1.95B either way; and DOE's $900M pays for part of the HALEU build (C23, C09).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Russian supply stops early If permits are refused or Russia halts shipments before 2027 ends, Centrus cannot fill much of what it has sold.
- The plant costs more Orano's French expansion cost about $760 per unit of yearly capacity; a new US plant may cost far more.
- It has failed before A 2007 plan for this site promised 3.8 million SWU by 2012, cost $2.3B, and ended in bankruptcy.
- More new shares It sold shares and warrants in September; an expensive plant could need more.
- Rivals arrive first Urenco adds US capacity by 2027, two years before Centrus's first machines.
- The government's rights The government can use Centrus's centrifuge design for its own purposes without paying for it.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
A third waiver request covering 2026 and 2027 sales is pending, and TENEX has received its licences except for isolated delays (S01).
Orano is extending an operating plant with proven modules, so a new US hall should cost more per SWU, and Project IKE alone is a $5B plan (S11, S13).
What we still do not know
- What the Ohio plant will cost, how much fuel it will make each year, and when it reaches full output.
- At what prices and volumes the $2.4B of contracts were signed, and how large the advance payments are.
- Whether the government will allow Russian deliveries in 2028, the last year of the supply contract.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
A third waiver request covering 2026 and 2027 sales is pending, and TENEX has received its licences except for isolated delays (S01).
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralThe plant is sized and costed, and it is big enough
It needs all of:
- ○Centrus publishes what the plant will cost and shows it can make at least 3 million SWU a year.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- ○Signed contracts waiting on the plant pass $3.5B.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe plant runs on time and the contracts double
It needs all of:
- ○The first new machines run in Ohio in 2029, as planned.watched as it happens
- ○Signed contracts waiting on the plant pass $5B.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- The government refuses more permits, or Russian deliveries stop, before the end of 2027.
- Centrus sells more shares before it publishes the plant's cost and size.
What is coming
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether contingent backlog grows past $3.0B, whether any plant cost or capacity is given, and spending against the $350M to $500M capital guide.
Every dated event ahead
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether contingent backlog grows past $3.0B, whether any plant cost or capacity is given, and spending against the $350M to $500M capital guide.
- December 2026 First Investor Day at Piketon: The plant's cost, SWU capacity and schedule: whether it reaches the roughly 2 million SWU a year the price already pays for, and at what cost per SWU.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the 2026 10-K: 2026 against the $450M to $500M revenue guide, Technical Solutions after DOE's production funding ended, and whether TENEX deliveries held.
- December 2027 Russian import waivers end for committed deliveries: Whether Centrus finds waivers or other supply for 2028, or the trading business starts running off as C20 expects.
Since we wrote this
- 29 OctNewsCentrus shipped its first new centrifuge ahead of target, still with no plant cost. View heldCentrus shipped its first new centrifuge from Oak Ridge to Ohio.
- 28 OctBet moveBet re-struck: Speculation to Priced for successRe-priced at the 27 October close; the rating moved from Fair bet to Expensive bet.
- 26 OctBet moveBet re-struck: Priced for success to SpeculationRe-priced at the 23 October close; the rating moved from Expensive bet to Fair bet.
- 19 OctNewsCentrus bought its casing supplier for $116 million, and still gave no plant cost. View heldCentrus acquired Westerman Holdings, a centrifuge-parts maker.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe bet now names what it ridesThe owner asked that every bet name the macro trend behind it, after BWXT's bet was missing its chief executive's case for nuclear over gas.
- 4 OctThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionWritten two months after the June-quarter print and three weeks after the September offering, with the shares near their 52-week low.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 17
Sources - 17
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-08-06segment results, backlog and its contingent part, the TENEX and Russian-waiver risk factors, the HALEU contract's end, DOE's task order, cash, convertible notes, share counts and the build planbacksC01C03C04C05C06C08C09C10C11C12C22C24C25C26C29C36C44C45
- S02primarycompany release2026-08-05quarter and half-year income statement, segment commentary, the non-GAAP reconciliation and 2026 guidancebacksC03C11C24C37C38
- S03primarycompany filing2026-02-11the business, competition and market size, supply contracts, customer concentration, the national-security rule, DOE's rights to the technology and the notes' termsbacksC01C02C04C06C07C11C12C15C22C31C40C44C45
- S04primarycompany release2026-02-10the 2025 income statement by revenue line, segment gross profit and the cash-flow statementbacksC02C36
- S05primarytranscript2026-08-06Centrus Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)the financing contingency, the 2029 date, the Oklo letter of intent, NNSA's sole-source intent, nearly 2 tonnes of HALEU, the December Investor Day and the analysts' questions on Russian supply and timing
Recall that Centrus is the only viable production-ready technology that can meet national security needs.
backsC08C11C29 - S07primarycompany filing2026-09-11the $500M offering: shares, pre-funded warrants, the four warrant series and their pricesbacksC23C26
- S08primaryregulator2026-01-05U.S. Department of Energy: DOE awards $2.7 billion to restore American uranium enrichment U.S. Department of Energythe three $900M awards: American Centrifuge Operating and General Matter for HALEU, Orano Federal Services for LEU
The following companies were awarded task orders totaling $2.7 billion to provide enrichment services for LEU and HALEU
backsC09C18 - S09primarygovernment data2026-07-29U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report U.S. Energy Information AdministrationSWU bought by US owners and operators in 2025, the average price, and the shares by origin: 23% US, 26% Russia, 18% France, 14% UK, 8% Netherlands
The average price paid by the COOs for the 13 million SWU was $108.70 per SWU in 2025, up 11% from the $97.66 per SWU paid in 2024. In 2025, the U.S.-origin SWU share was 23%, and the foreign-origin SWU accounted for the remaining 77%. Foreign-origin SWU included 26% from Russia, 18% from France, 14% from the United Kingdom, and 8% from the Netherlands (Table 16).
backsC13 - S10primarycompany release2026-03-12revenue, EBITDA and its 38.4% margin, the order book, US cascades added in 2025, the capacity programme and the spot price of $200 per SWU
From an average US$193/SWU at the end of 2024, as reported by TradeTech and UxC, they reached an average of US$200/SWU by the end of December 2025.
backsC14C16C17 - S11secondarynews2024-10-11Urenco USA's capacity and 700,000 SWU addition due 2027; Orano's EUR1.7 billion, 2.5 million SWU French extension
The plant currently has a production capacity of 4600 tSWU per year.
backsC17 - S12secondarynews2007-04-16the 2007 licence: 11,500 machines, about 3.8 million SWU by 2012, $2.3 billion
Costs for the new plant are estimated at $2.3 billion.
backsC12 - S13secondarynews2026-01-06American Nuclear Society, Nuclear Newswire: DOE awards $2.7B for HALEU and LEU enrichment American Nuclear Societyeach awardee's plan: Orano's $5 billion Project IKE from 2031, General Matter at Paducah, GLE's laser plant and its $28.5M
If the plan holds, the facility will begin producing LEU in 2031.
backsC18 - S14primarycompany release2026-08-06a definitive LEU and HALEU contract with prepayments; no volume or price
Under the contract, X-energy will provide prepayments to Centrus to support its domestic commercial enrichment capacity program.
backsC30 - S15secondaryvendor data2026-10-04Research pack (FMP market data and FINRA short interest), as of 4 October 2026price, returns and the price decomposition, company value and multiples, the analyst series, short interest, insider rows and the Q3 consensusbacksC24C25C26C28
- S16primarycompany release2026-09-09a definitive multi-year HALEU contract with prepayments, and the unobligated claim; no volume or price
Centrus' AC100 centrifuge design is the only deployment-ready U.S.-origin technology available for unobligated enrichment today.
backsC30C31 - S17primarycompany release2026-09-17a definitive multi-year HALEU contract with prepayments, deliveries before the end of the decade; no volume or price
The new contract includes prepayments from Antares to support the expanded HALEU capacity.
backsC30 - S18primarycompany filing2026-04-24the executive officers and their start dates, beneficial ownership at 27 March 2026, the Class B holders, the 2025 corporate goals and payout, the long-term award's net income test and the CEO's employment agreementbacksC41C42C43