The St. Joe Company
One of Florida's largest landowners: it turns small parts of its 165,000 Gulf-coast acres into homesites for builders, hotels, a club and shops.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Revenue rose 27.4% in 2025, but it narrows to one driver: price per homesite went from $108,000 to $137,000 while volume was 911 against 912.
Business quality3/4 →
The entitlement is unrepeatable, but two thirds of revenue is hotels and shops where nothing stops a rival, and Forestar sells the same lot nearby.
Financial position3/4 ↑
Net debt of $253.0M rather than net cash, but project-level, 84% fixed at 4.7% over 19.8 years, with no maturity inside the horizon.
Execution record3/4 →
No guidance to hit or miss. It builds what it describes and retired 37.8% of the shares, but its backlog and cash-flow measures flatter.
Per share capture4/4 ↑
34.9 million shares retired since 2015; issuance in the first half of 2026 was 19,408 restricted shares against 499,700 bought in one quarter.
Potential2/4 →
The entitlement is vast, but only 1,104 homesites carry a near-term contract and the rate turns on permits nobody at the company controls.
Risk profile2/4 →
Several at once: one venture over a fifth of pre-tax income, two counties, and a county that lost 6.8% of residents after Hurricane Michael.
Valuation2/4 ↓
After the operating business about $3.53B is left for land, against a planned pipeline worth about $1.67B of gross profit before any development spending.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Every figure is filed and four origins sit outside the company, but the price conclusion rests on my own assumed capitalisation rate.
The Verdict
We rate St. Joe unattractive. It owns a large part of Florida's Gulf coast and turns small pieces into homesites, hotels, a club and shops, and recent quarters have been very profitable, so the business is solid. But most of that profit comes from selling land once, and homesite sales have been flat for two years. The price is full: the shares cost roughly double what the whole current plan would earn; the rest is for land with no stated use. The view hinges on homesite sales breaking higher as two new communities open, and on the recurring business growing. The land is irreplaceable; it is not selling fast enough.
The long casePeople keep moving to the two Florida counties where St. Joe owns its land; that growth must speed up its land sales to justify the price.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- The $46.2M of depreciation is non-cash and falls on hotels, clubs and shops built in the last few years, so it overstates the economic decline of assets that are still filling up.
- The residual is improving fast: half a year of 2026 already carries more of it than the whole of 2025, because hospitality gross profit rose 22.5% on revenue up 9.7%.
- Corporate expense and interest are charged wholly against the recurring side here; part of both serves the land business, so the split flatters the land half.
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter sold 80 homesites against 189, so the claim now runs to nine months
- The 25-times multiple is chosen, not observed, and the recurring profit it is applied to is depressed by depreciation on assets still filling up; at 40 times the residual falls to about $3.32B and $139,000 a homesite, which does not change the conclusion.
- The pipeline is not the entitlement: the Sector Plan covers over 170,000 units, so the residual is being divided by 14% of what is legally permitted.
- Land carried at 1936-era cost is genuinely worth far more than its book value, so a residual above book proves nothing on its own.
- Prices rise: the average has gone from $108,000 to $137,000 in one year, and a pipeline sold over decades would not be sold at today's price.
- The 18,391 sites carrying only a concept plan are the cheap-to-hold part of the pipeline, so applying one average price across all three stages overstates the cost and understates the mix.
- It ignores the hospitality, leasing and commercial businesses and the entitlement beyond the pipeline, both of which are real value.
- Management plans two new communities, Teachee and Pigeon Creek, to commence in early 2027 and says it is in discussions with builders not yet in the market, so the run rate is not intended to hold.
- The joint venture sells homes on top of the homesite count - 2,542 contracts since 2021 - so the land is being converted faster than the homesite line alone shows.
- The company's own July release strips out the bulk contracts and shows the comparable book down 8.7% in units and 10.3% in value, so the two presentations of backlog point opposite ways.
- Nothing in the presentation is inaccurate - the composition simply changed, and the headline does not say so.
The company
A homebuilder needs a finished lot: a legal parcel with roads, water, sewer and drainage already in. Getting raw land there takes permits, engineering and utilities, and a year or two in which the money earns nothing. St. Joe does that work and sells the finished homesite, at about $137,000 in 2025.
It has 23,904 homesites planned, but only 2,013 are mapped into legal lots or being built; 18,391 exist only as a concept plan.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
How it makes money
Selling homesites and land, plus its share of a homebuilding joint venture, made $147.4M of the $165.8M of pre-tax profit in the year to June. The hotels, club, shops and offices made the other $18.4M after their own costs.
So the business is mostly selling its land, once. The hotels and club brought in $215.4M of revenue in 2025, but after depreciation, overheads and interest the recurring side adds little.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The $46.2M of depreciation is non-cash and falls on hotels, clubs and shops built in the last few years, so it overstates the economic decline of assets that are still filling up.
- The residual is improving fast: half a year of 2026 already carries more of it than the whole of 2025, because hospitality gross profit rose 22.5% on revenue up 9.7%.
- Corporate expense and interest are charged wholly against the recurring side here; part of both serves the land business, so the split flatters the land half.
- Corporate expense and interest also serve the land business, so charging both wholly against the recurring side is the harshest available split.
- Hospitality gross profit grew 22.5% on revenue up 9.7% in the first half, so the same arithmetic a year from now would look materially better.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Hospitality | 43.0% | Hotel rooms, Watersound Club dues, restaurants and other services on its own land, mostly earned at the time of the stay or meal. |
| Residential | 32.2% | Developed homesites sold to homebuilders, with a later residual share of each home's sale price. |
| Commercial | 23.2% | About half rent from shops, offices and apartments it owns; the rest sales of commercial land. |
| Other | 1.6% | Small land sales and leases outside the three segments. |
Who runs it
Jorge Gonzalez has run St. Joe since 2015 and chairs the board; Marek Bakun has been finance chief since 2013. The directors and officers together own under 1%. The big owner is Bruce Berkowitz, an outside investor with about a third of the shares, who has been selling. Bonuses are set by the board's judgement, with no formula, and the stock awards vest with time, not with results.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- He keeps sole voting power over only 1,909,967 shares; the rest is voted jointly through Fairholme, so the stake is a fund's position as much as a person's.
- The company's own buyback has been absorbing the selling (C20).
- The committee names the year's financial results and the company's liquidity as inputs, and the restricted stock still rises and falls with the share price.
- Over 97% of votes cast approved the 2025 pay plan.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Most of its land sits inside a long-term master plan approved under Florida law, which lets each new community skip a regional review every other developer must pass. Its land carries rights to build over 170,000 homes, and a rival would need thousands of neighbouring acres in counties where St. Joe is the main owner.
It shows: in 2025 St. Joe sold 911 homesites while its two counties authorised 4,471 new homes, roughly one in five.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Permits include multifamily and infill on lots already platted, neither of which needs a developer-supplied homesite, so the denominator is larger than the market St. Joe actually addresses and the true share is higher.
- The Latitude Margaritaville joint venture's homes are permitted in the same counties and are not in the 911, so the numerator is understated too.
The threat
Forestar develops lots the same way at national scale, sold 14,240 in its 2025 fiscal year at an average $108,400, and lists Panama City among its markets. Millrose lets builders take homesites on option instead of buying them. Neither offers the club, golf and hotels already built around a St. Joe lot.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Its volume fell from 15,068 while its average price rose 12.2%, the same volume-flat, price-up pattern St. Joe shows - so the price gap may be product mix rather than competitive pressure.
- 83% of its lot revenue goes to its parent D.R. Horton, so most of its volume is captive and not bidding against St. Joe for third-party builders.
The rivals: FOR, MRP.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| FOR | Forestar Group (NYSE: FOR)Priced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
| MRP | Millrose Properties (NYSE: MRP)Priced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The market is new homes in its two counties. They authorised 4,471 in 2025, down 16.5% and the lowest since 2019. At St. Joe's own price of about $137,000, that is about $612M a year of lots if every new home needed one.
St. Joe sold 911 homesites in 2025, 912 in 2024 and 1,063 in 2023: flat, in a local market that is shrinking.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter sold 80 homesites against 189, so the claim now runs to nine months
Who has signed
Builders had 1,104 homesites under contract at June for about $109.2M, against 1,209 a year earlier, leaving aside two long-dated bulk deals. The joint venture with Minto is 64% built: 2,359 of about 3,700 homes occupied.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- The two excluded contracts are real: 1,326 homesites in the Pigeon Creek plan and about 647 at SouthWood, and the company excludes them because of their scale and timing rather than to hide them.
- Including everything, homesites under contract were 3,077 at 30 June 2026 against 1,209, which is how the company presents the same fact.
- 2026-10-28editedthe 10-Q and release restate the contracts excluding the two long-dated ones: 1,048 homesites for about $103.6M against 1,345 for about $137.4M a year earlier
- 2026-10-28editedthe second phase adds about 3,500 homes to the venture, taking the plan from about 3,700 to about 7,200; 2,426 sales are complete and 222 homes are under contract
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 11% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, slower than the 27% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 32%, up from 23% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 14¢ of each sales dollar, down from 18¢ in the year to Dec 2022.
Each dollar put into the business earns 11% a year after tax, about where it was (9.2%) in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 34% of sales into free cash, $184M over the last twelve months.
It owes $244M more than the cash it holds, about 1.3 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count fell 3.6% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 0.2% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-28. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $267M | $252M | $389M | $403M | $513M | $543M |
| Sales growth | +66% | −5.5% | +54% | +3.5% | +27% | +11% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | - | 42% | 39% | 42% | 43% | 46% |
| Operating margin | 35% | 24% | 23% | 24% | 28% | 32% |
| Net margin | 28% | 28% | 20% | 18% | 23% | 22% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Pay in shares | - | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
| Capital spending | 1.6% | 2.9% | 1.6% | 1.9% | 0.8% | 0.8% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $112M | $48.2M | $104M | $108M | $191M | $188M |
| Free cash flow | $107M | $40.9M | $97.7M | $100M | $187M | $184M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $70.2M | $37.7M | $86.1M | $88.8M | $130M | $118M |
| Debt | $223M | $386M | $454M | $438M | $391M | $362M |
| Net cash | −$153M | −$348M | −$368M | −$349M | −$262M | −$244M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 9.2% | 4.9% | 6.2% | 6.1% | 9.4% | 11% |
| Shares (diluted) | 58.9M | 58.7M | 58.3M | 58.3M | 58.0M | 56.8M |
What growth costs
Growing costs St. Joe little in overhead, but growth does not make it much more profitable by itself. Hotel costs rise with hotel sales, and the recent jump in profit came mostly from charging more for each homesite rather than from getting bigger.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Hospitality gross margin rose from 19.8% in 2023 to 31.1% in 2025 as new hotels matured, which is operating leverage from scale rather than from land prices.
- Depreciation rose 22% over the same years as the finished buildings came into service, so lower building spending is partly a cost moved below gross profit.
The last report (29 Jul)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
The September quarter sold 80 homesites against 189 a year earlier, and the Latitude Margaritaville venture closed 67 homes against 82. Operating profit still rose 16% to $61.5M, because St. Joe sold more land to the venture for $50.4M, paid as its homes sell.
That sale carries the venture's plan from about 3,700 homes to about 7,200 and booked a $31.4M gain at present value, $10.9M of it net after the venture's share. The estimated house-price top-ups that lifted the first half added only about $1.3M, the same as a year ago.
What it did to the thesisThe venture's extension is real and filed, but it adds years of runway and no profit yet, and one quarter's profit leaned on selling land to it. Homesite sales fell and the estimates went quiet, so the view stays Unattractive.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.71; $0.71 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The $31.4M booked is a present value of money that arrives only as homes sell, and $10.9M of that profit is held back against the venture's equity result until they do; the third quarter's operating income includes a net $10.9M from it.
- The venture completed 67 home sales in the quarter against 82 a year earlier, so the extension lengthens the runway without yet showing a faster pace.
The third quarter of 2025 included a $41.0M sale of the Watercrest senior-living property, so the revenue comparison is a harder one for 2026 than the homesite count alone suggests; the release calls the 2026 quarter organic growth.
- New contracts went the other way: 111 in the second quarter of 2026 against 89, the highest since the second quarter of 2024, so closings may be a timing trough rather than a trend.
- 183 homes were under contract at 30 June 2026 at an average $629,000, about $115.1M of sales value still to close.
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter's venture home sales were 67 against 82, and nine-month equity income from it was $13.6M against $26.0M
- The receivable is a contractual entitlement to a share of the completed home price, not a discretionary accrual, and $5.3M of earlier true-ups were collected in the same half.
- The filing says the estimates are recognised 'subject to constraints' and updated every reporting period, so an over-estimate reverses through revenue rather than sitting unrecognised.
- 2026-10-28editedthe nine-month homesite receivable roll-forward shows $15.9M recognised against $4.7M, so the third quarter added about $1.3M, the same as a year earlier
What management did with the money
It has bought back 37.8% of its shares since 2015, leaving the fewest since 1997. Operating cash rose in the first half, but almost entirely because it spent less on land to sell.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The offsetting components are individually large and cancel by coincidence, so the arithmetic is a fair description of the total and not a claim that nothing else moved.
- Development spending is lumpy by construction: the company says off-site utility extensions precede revenue by one to two years, and two new communities commence in early 2027, so a low half is not a trend.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The land is irreplaceable, but the price pays for more of it than St. Joe plans to sell in a generation.
The 3,500-home plan is now filed: in September St. Joe sold the venture the land for $50.4M, paid as each home sells, and the planned community is about 7,200 homes. What is still missing is the pace: the venture closed 67 homes in the quarter.
The next check is the full-year report in late February: whether 2026 homesite sales end above 911, and whether the second phase has started to close homes.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The $31.4M booked is a present value of money that arrives only as homes sell, and $10.9M of that profit is held back against the venture's equity result until they do; the third quarter's operating income includes a net $10.9M from it.
- The venture completed 67 home sales in the quarter against 82 a year earlier, so the extension lengthens the runway without yet showing a faster pace.
- 2026-10-28editedthe second phase adds about 3,500 homes to the venture, taking the plan from about 3,700 to about 7,200; 2,426 sales are complete and 222 homes are under contract
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter sold 80 homesites against 189, so the claim now runs to nine months
How we read the multiple
On profit the shares look cheaper than usual, but most of that profit is land sold once. Take away the recurring business and the debt, and the price pays:
- About $3.53B for the land, or about $148,000 for each planned homesite.
- That is more than the $137,000 of revenue one homesite brought in last year.
- At today's prices and margin, the whole plan earns about $1.67B before building costs.
- At 911 homesites a year it takes about 26 years. The rest of the price is land with no plan.
Against its own history. Cheaper than its own normal on profit and sales, but most of that profit is land sold once, so paying less for it is not the bargain it looks.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The 25-times multiple is chosen, not observed, and the recurring profit it is applied to is depressed by depreciation on assets still filling up; at 40 times the residual falls to about $3.32B and $139,000 a homesite, which does not change the conclusion.
- The pipeline is not the entitlement: the Sector Plan covers over 170,000 units, so the residual is being divided by 14% of what is legally permitted.
- Land carried at 1936-era cost is genuinely worth far more than its book value, so a residual above book proves nothing on its own.
- Prices rise: the average has gone from $108,000 to $137,000 in one year, and a pipeline sold over decades would not be sold at today's price.
- The 18,391 sites carrying only a concept plan are the cheap-to-hold part of the pipeline, so applying one average price across all three stages overstates the cost and understates the mix.
- It ignores the hospitality, leasing and commercial businesses and the entitlement beyond the pipeline, both of which are real value.
- Management plans two new communities, Teachee and Pigeon Creek, to commence in early 2027 and says it is in discussions with builders not yet in the market, so the run rate is not intended to hold.
- The joint venture sells homes on top of the homesite count - 2,542 contracts since 2021 - so the land is being converted faster than the homesite line alone shows.
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Minto Communities USA, the local and regional Northwest Florida developers St. Joe's filing alludes to.
Where we disagree with the market
Reported growth proves St. Joe is an operating company now, and the land beyond the plan comes free.
The land is irreplaceable, but it is not being sold fast enough: 911 homesites a year is 26 years of the current plan.
The company tells the market's story itself: it says it is not just a land bank, and leads its presentation with a 237% rise in homesites under contract.
Nobody publishes the split between land sales and recurring profit, and that is where we differ. We are wrong if homesite sales break above 1,200 a year as the new communities open, and recurring profit keeps roughly doubling.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The company's own July release strips out the bulk contracts and shows the comparable book down 8.7% in units and 10.3% in value, so the two presentations of backlog point opposite ways.
- Nothing in the presentation is inaccurate - the composition simply changed, and the headline does not say so.
- The $46.2M of depreciation is non-cash and falls on hotels, clubs and shops built in the last few years, so it overstates the economic decline of assets that are still filling up.
- The residual is improving fast: half a year of 2026 already carries more of it than the whole of 2025, because hospitality gross profit rose 22.5% on revenue up 9.7%.
- Corporate expense and interest are charged wholly against the recurring side here; part of both serves the land business, so the split flatters the land half.
- Management plans two new communities, Teachee and Pigeon Creek, to commence in early 2027 and says it is in discussions with builders not yet in the market, so the run rate is not intended to hold.
- The joint venture sells homes on top of the homesite count - 2,542 contracts since 2021 - so the land is being converted faster than the homesite line alone shows.
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter sold 80 homesites against 189, so the claim now runs to nine months
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Flat sales, shrinking market. Homesite sales have held near 911 for two years while new-home permits in its two counties fell 16.5% in 2025.
- Profit that is partly an estimate. $14.6M of future house-price sharing was booked in the first half and $5.3M collected.
- Its best earner is 64% built. The joint venture has made over a fifth of pre-tax profit every year since 2023, and its home sales halved in the first half of 2026.
- A large holder selling. The 36.2% shareholder sold 27 times in a year, into the company's own buyback.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter sold 80 homesites against 189, so the claim now runs to nine months
- The receivable is a contractual entitlement to a share of the completed home price, not a discretionary accrual, and $5.3M of earlier true-ups were collected in the same half.
- The filing says the estimates are recognised 'subject to constraints' and updated every reporting period, so an over-estimate reverses through revenue rather than sitting unrecognised.
- 2026-10-28editedthe nine-month homesite receivable roll-forward shows $15.9M recognised against $4.7M, so the third quarter added about $1.3M, the same as a year earlier
- New contracts went the other way: 111 in the second quarter of 2026 against 89, the highest since the second quarter of 2024, so closings may be a timing trough rather than a trend.
- 183 homes were under contract at 30 June 2026 at an average $629,000, about $115.1M of sales value still to close.
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter's venture home sales were 67 against 82, and nine-month equity income from it was $13.6M against $26.0M
- 2026-10-28editedthe second phase adds about 3,500 homes to the venture, taking the plan from about 3,700 to about 7,200; 2,426 sales are complete and 222 homes are under contract
- A concentrated holder reducing a position that dominates a fund is a portfolio decision, not necessarily a view on the security; nothing in the filings says why.
- The company itself has been the offsetting buyer, repurchasing 499,700 shares in the second quarter of 2026 alone, so the selling has been absorbed.
What we still do not know
- How fast the second phase's 3,500 homes sell, and whether the venture's profit per home matches the first phase's.
- Whether the two new communities opening in early 2027 lift homesite sales above the 911 a year they have held.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- 2026-10-28editedthe second phase adds about 3,500 homes to the venture, taking the plan from about 3,700 to about 7,200; 2,426 sales are complete and 222 homes are under contract
- The $31.4M booked is a present value of money that arrives only as homes sell, and $10.9M of that profit is held back against the venture's equity result until they do; the third quarter's operating income includes a net $10.9M from it.
- The venture completed 67 home sales in the quarter against 82 a year earlier, so the extension lengthens the runway without yet showing a faster pace.
- 2026-10-28editedthe third quarter sold 80 homesites against 189, so the claim now runs to nine months
What would change our view
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe recurring business carries the land
It needs all of:
- ○The hotels, club, shops and offices earn more than $60M a year before tax, so more of the value is a business.checked at the next results
- ○Homesite sales top 1,200 a year for two years running, with revenue per homesite still rising more than 20% a year.checked at the next results
- Reopens the researchThe local market turns
It needs any of:
- ○New-home permits in its two counties return above 5,300 a year.checked at the next results
- ○A new joint venture, or a real extension of the existing one, earns what Latitude Margaritaville does on a similarly small investment.watched as it happens
What is coming
- 28 October 2026 Q3 2026 results: Homesite volume against Q3 2025, how much revenue is estimated residuals, and whether Latitude Margaritaville closings recover above 130.
Every dated event ahead
- 28 October 2026 Q3 2026 results: Homesite volume against Q3 2025, how much revenue is estimated residuals, and whether Latitude Margaritaville closings recover above 130.
- February 2027 Q4 and full-year 2026 results and the 2026 10-K: Whether 2026 homesite sales break above the 911 to 912 of the last two years, and whether recurring hospitality and leasing profit nears $60 million.
- March 2027 First homesite sales at Teachee and Pigeon Creek: Whether the two new communities add to the yearly homesite rate or only replace communities that are finishing.
- April 2027 2027 proxy statement: Berkowitz's remaining stake, insiders' holdings and whether pay gains any stated target beyond the committee's discretion.
Since we wrote this
- 28 OctEarningsHomesite sales fell; the venture grew by 3,500 homesLand sold to the venture lifted profit once, but volume and venture sales fell, so the view holds.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 26 SepThesis reviewA joint-venture extension now counts toward reopening. View heldOne route still asked for a brand-new venture after an earlier review agreed an extension of the existing one would answer the same question. Both now say so; the land arithmetic behind the view did not move.
- 21 SepNewsPlans for 3,500 more joint-venture homes. View heldA bigger venture could extend its best profit stream, so one test was rewritten to count an extension. The land arithmetic is untouched until those homes are approved and sold.
- 7 SepThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionThe price pays about $3.53B for land whose whole current plan would earn about $1.67B, and homesite sales have been flat for two years.
Also checked 4 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 17
Sources - 17
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-25acreage, the Sector Plan entitlement, the 23,904-homesite pipeline table, homesites sold and average price, segment revenue and margins, the debt schedule and its fair value, the JV concentration risk factor, the income statementbacksC01C02C04C05C06C10C19C28C32C38C39C40C45
- S02primarycompany release2026-02-25average homesite price of $137,000 against $108,000 and homesite gross margin of 51% against 47%; the repurchase record since 2015; airport passenger count; management's 'not just a land bank' framingbacksC06C20C34C40
- S03primarycompany filing2026-07-29the balance sheet, the cash flow statement, the homesite sales receivable roll-forward, the Latitude Margaritaville equity income and closing counts, the revenue mix table showing the Other captionbacksC11C14C18C21C45
- S04primarycompany release2026-07-29segment revenue and margins, homesites under contract on a comparable basis, club members, hotel rooms, leasable square feet, the debt profile, shares outstandingbacksC12C16C18C20C28C29C34C36
- S05primarytranscript2026-07-31the CFO's figure for residual true-ups booked and collected in the first half; management's answers on capital allocation and migration. The questions are written shareholder submissions read aloud by the CFO, not analyst cross-examinationbacksC14C31C34
- S06primarycompany release2026-05-12the Latitude Margaritaville joint venture cash-flow table, the debt profile at 31 March 2026, the backlog headline, management's non-GAAP free cash flow definition, and the claim that most revenue comes from under 2% of the landbacksC13C17C32C33
- S07primaryregulator2026-09-07Florida Statutes s.163.3245, Sector plans (2026) Florida Legislaturethe legal mechanism behind the moat: within a detailed specific area plan the Development of Regional Impact review is waived
Sector planning encompasses two levels: adoption pursuant to s. 163.3184 of a long-term master plan for the entire planning area as part of the comprehensive plan, and adoption by local development order of two or more detailed specific area plans that implement the long-term master plan and within which s. 380.06 is waived.
backsC03 - S08primarygovernment data2026-09-07New Private Housing Structures Authorized by Building Permits, Bay County FL (BPPRIV012005) and Walton County FL (BPPRIV012131) U.S. Census Bureau, Building Permits Survey, retrieved via FREDBay County 2,473 units in 2024 and 2,072 in 2025; Walton County 2,883 and 2,399 - the demand series measured outside the company
New Private Housing Structures Authorized by Building Permits for Bay County, FL - annual observations as served: 2018 1520.0, 2019 1795.0, 2020 2846.0, 2021 2610.0, 2022 2288.0, 2023 2322.0, 2024 2473.0, 2025 2072. Walton County, FL: 2018 1525.0, 2019 2648.0, 2020 1762.0, 2021 2541.0, 2022 2648.0, 2023 2794.0, 2024 2883.0, 2025 2399.
backsC07 - S09primarygovernment data2026-09-07Resident Population in Bay County, FL (FLBAYC5POP) and Walton County, FL (FLWALT1POP) U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, retrieved via FREDBay County 174,551 in 2020 rising to 204,479 in 2025, and its fall from 186,555 in 2018 to 173,895 in 2019; Walton County 75,899 to 93,288
Data for "Resident Population" are estimates as of July 1. Resident Population in Bay County, FL, Thousands of Persons - 2018 186.555, 2019 173.895, 2020 174.551, 2021 179.552, 2022 186.079, 2023 192.941, 2024 200.142, 2025 204.479. Walton County, FL - 2020 75.899, 2021 79.771, 2022 83.240, 2023 86.622, 2024 90.096, 2025 93.288. United States total population - 2020 331,578,104 and 2025 341,784,857, a rise of 3.1%.
backsC08 - S10primarycompany filing2025-11-14a competitor's own description of the identical product and buyer, its Panama City, Pensacola and Tallahassee markets, 14,240 lots sold at an average $108,400, and that 83% of lot revenue goes to D.R. HortonbacksC23
- S11primarycompany filing2026-02-26a second listed supplier of finished homesites to homebuilders, spun out of Lennar on 7 February 2025, financing the same job through option contractsbacksC24
- S12primarycompany filing2024-10-2321,140,667 shares, 36.2% of the class, beneficially owned at 23 October 2024backsC30C43
- S13primaryvendor data2026-09-07Research pack, frozen at content/JOE/research-pack.jsoncontent/JOE/research-pack.jsonthe closing price, market value, enterprise value, trailing multiples, the volatility bucket, the analyst split, FINRA short interest, and the Form 4 summary of insider transactionsbacksC30C31
- S14primarycompany filing2026-03-31the directors and executive officers, their tenure and beneficial ownership at 18 March 2026, the principal holders table, and the CD&A: discretionary cash bonuses, time-based restricted stock, the 2025 payoutsbacksC41C42C43C44
- S15primarycompany filing2026-06-2318,182,367 shares, 31.7% of the class, beneficially owned by Bruce Berkowitz at 18 June 2026, every transaction since the prior amendment an open-market onebacksC43
- S16primarycompany filing2026-10-28homesites sold, base revenue per homesite, the homesite sales receivable roll-forward, the Latitude Margaritaville Watersound joint venture's home sales, contracts and planned size, and the additional land sale's accountingbacksC05C11C12C14C46C47
- S17primarycompany filing2026-10-28the terms of the additional land sale to the joint venture, homesites under contract excluding the two long-dated contracts, net new joint-venture contracts and the dividend increasebacksC12C16C46C47