Eos Energy Enterprises
A Pittsburgh maker of zinc batteries that store power for the grid over four to twelve hours, still selling them for less than they cost to make.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↓
Sales rose sevenfold in 2025 to outside buyers, but June's quarter was 80% related party and outside sales fell.
Business quality2/4 →
US content rules favour it, but US-made lithium-ion earns the same credits and already won four to eight hours.
Financial position1/4 ↓
Cash for about three quarters at June's burn, $948M of debt, and the margin turn not due until after that.
Execution record2/4 →
Missed 2025's revenue expectation, a late capacity milestone, a narrowed guide, and four finance chiefs in fifteen months.
Per share capture1/4 ↓
Shares up sevenfold since 2021, about 644M fully diluted, and growth shared with Cerberus through Frontier.
Potential2/4 →
A large US market, but the eight-hour slice is unmeasured and half the backlog is a related-party agreement nobody can read.
Risk profile2/4 ↓
Two customers were 97.7% of June's revenue, one controlled by the lender, with a class action pending.
Valuation1/4 →
Pays for 2028 consensus sales, valued like rivals' sales, from a maker that has never had a gross profit.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Cash, debt, buyers and Frontier's terms are filed; performance, backlog and the margin path are management's.
If it works 0.5× · if it fails you keep up to 0%.
The Verdict
We rate Eos Energy Unattractive. The business is weak: it makes a battery the US tax rules favour, but every one it sells costs more to make than it brings in, and in June most of its sales went to a venture its own lender controls. The price is stretched, already paying for sales near $1B a year. As a bet it is Fragile: even if the new factory runs full, valued like its cheaper rival it would be worth about half today's price, and if the promised turn in margins does not come before the cash runs short, the lenders come first and shareholders could be left with nothing.
The long caseIf US grids need storage running eight hours and more, and the rules keep Chinese cells out, a fireproof US-made battery wins those orders.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Counting the preferred and penny warrant as equity raises the figure to about $2.4B, and the cohort is two companies, one near insolvency, so the median is a thin yardstick (C07, C22, C25).
Customer deposits ran $51.0M in Q2, 45X credits come in as cash, and Cerberus's $105M revolver is available at its discretion, so the outflow could be smaller (S01).
Seven straight quarters of improvement still left adjusted gross margin at negative 62% in Q2; Line 2 was 1% of production, and Line 1 goes down for its move into early 2027 (S05, S14).
A zinc system needs no lithium, cobalt or Chinese cells at all, so it clears the 75% threshold of 2030 more easily than a lithium-ion supply chain still rebuilding (C28, C01).
The company
Eos Energy builds the Z3, a battery block that stores electricity in zinc and salt water instead of lithium. Utilities and developers place rows of them beside solar farms, charge them when power is cheap and release it over four to twelve hours.
The usual alternative is lithium-ion from Tesla or a Chinese maker. Eos builds near Pittsburgh, and its water-based design does not burn. The cost is efficiency: it returns roughly 78 cents of each unit of power stored, by its own count, against more for lithium-ion.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The DOE underwrote an 8 GWh four-line plan by 2027 in December 2024; the plan is now two lines and about 4 GWh, and Lines 3 and 4 need a new facility (S31, C34).
The only published test, written by Eos, averaged 75.2% on the earlier design, and no third party has published Z3 data (C31).
How it makes money
Eos earns money by selling battery systems, booked when they are delivered, plus a sliver of service. In the first half of 2026, 55% came from outside buyers and 44% from one project sold to a related party.
It also collects a US manufacturing tax credit on every battery it makes. Even counting that credit, each dollar of sales cost about $1.71 to produce in June, so more sales have so far meant bigger losses.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (H1 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Product sold to outside customers | 55.2% | Z3 storage systems for utilities and developers, booked when delivered. |
| Product sold to a related party | 43.8% | A project financed by a Cerberus affiliate and now owned by Frontier Power USA, booked in June. |
| Service | 1.0% | Maintenance and support on installed systems, booked over time. |
Who runs it
Joe Mastrangelo, who ran GE's gas-turbine business, has led Eos since 2019. Four people have held the finance job in about fifteen months, and the sales chief leaves on 20 October.
Insiders own under 2%; Cerberus controls about 35% through preferred shares and warrants. Bonuses pay on orders, batteries shipped and a profit measure, and paid nothing for 2025. The chief executive bought shares with his own money in March.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Eos's protection is the law, not the product. US tax rules cut off the main storage credit for projects with too many Chinese parts and pay extra for American content, and a zinc battery built in Pennsylvania passes easily. Safety helps too: a lithium-ion fire at Moss Landing in California damaged about 55% of some 100,000 battery modules.
The weakness is that the protection is shared. Fluence already sells American-made lithium-ion batteries that earn the same credits, so the rules mainly shield Eos from imports, not from rivals at home.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
A zinc system needs no lithium, cobalt or Chinese cells at all, so it clears the 75% threshold of 2030 more easily than a lithium-ion supply chain still rebuilding (C28, C01).
The threat
Lithium-ion is winning. Tesla installed 22.3 GWh of storage in six months, and Wood Mackenzie, an industry researcher, says lithium-ion has taken the four-to-eight-hour market Eos sells into and should keep 85% of all storage through 2034. The other listed non-lithium maker Eos names, ESS Tech, has warned it may not survive.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The rivals: TSLA, FLNC, GWH, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| TSLA | Tesla MegapackPriced against it: Shown, not counted | On sale | Shown, not counted |
| FLNC | Fluence, with US-made modules on Tennessee cellsPriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
| Private | Form Energy's iron-air batteryPriced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| GWH | ESS Tech's iron-flow Energy WarehousePriced against it: Yes | On sale | Yes |
How big it could get
How big this could get
American batteries are being added fast: 43.6 GW were running by the end of 2025, with 26 GW more planned for 2027, and about 500 GWh expected from 2026 to 2031. Eos's two Pennsylvania lines are built for about 4 GWh a year.
What nobody measures is the part Eos is built for: storage that runs eight hours or longer. Worldwide, that long-duration slice was only 6% of installations in 2025.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Management says over half its pipeline is eight hours or longer and cites Virginia's 10-hour carve-out (C12, C35), so the longer-duration market may be larger than the outside data show.
The DOE underwrote an 8 GWh four-line plan by 2027 in December 2024; the plan is now two lines and about 4 GWh, and Lines 3 and 4 need a new facility (S31, C34).
Who has signed
The biggest signed order is 2 GWh from Frontier Power USA, a venture Eos owns 36% of and Cerberus runs; its price and length are not public. Beyond it sit a 750 MWh supply deal in central Europe and a 100 MWh Google-linked project due online in 2030.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
None of the three counterparties' own filings or releases was found, and a master supply agreement fixes terms rather than volumes (S01).
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 534% over the twelve months to Jun 2026, slower than the 632% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −143%, up from −934% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 58¢ of each sales dollar, down from 2019¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from −8.6% to +20× over the last 5 years, with sales falling in 2 of them.
It used $420M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $305M it holds lasts about 0.7 years at that pace.
It owes $312M more than the cash it holds, and its operations bring in no cash to repay it.
The share count rose 168% in 2.5 years, and pay in shares costs 10% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-06. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Jun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $4.60M | $17.9M | $16.4M | $15.6M | $114M | $214M |
| Sales growth | +20× | +290% | −8.6% | −4.7% | +632% | +534% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | −911% | −755% | −448% | −534% | −126% | −85% |
| Operating margin | −29× | −12× | −934% | −11× | −227% | −143% |
| Net margin | −27× | −13× | −14× | −44× | −849% | −247% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 417% | 103% | 114% | 146% | 25% | 17% |
| General and admin | 935% | 338% | 328% | - | - | - |
| Pay in shares | 327% | 77% | 86% | 120% | 22% | 10% |
| Capital spending | 339% | 112% | 179% | 212% | 47% | 52% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$116M | −$197M | −$145M | −$154M | −$211M | −$308M |
| Free cash flow | −$132M | −$217M | −$174M | −$187M | −$265M | −$420M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $105M | $17.1M | $69.5M | $74.3M | $568M | $305M |
| Debt | $109M | $181M | $207M | $317M | $813M | $617M |
| Net cash | −$4.38M | −$164M | −$138M | −$243M | −$245M | −$312M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | - | - | 127M | 212M | 261M | 340M |
What growth costs
Running costs are being spread thinner: research, selling and office costs fell from about 99 cents per sales dollar in 2025 to 57 cents over the last year. That helps only once the batteries themselves sell for more than they cost, and they do not yet.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The last report (5 Aug)
Quarter ended June 2026, filed figures.
In Q2 2026 Eos reported record sales of $68.8M. The problem was where they came from: $55.0M was one project financed by Cerberus and then handed to Frontier, while sales to everyone else fell to $12.7M from about $57M in the first quarter.
It still lost 71 cents at the gross line on each sales dollar, and it narrowed its 2026 sales forecast to $300M to $350M, which needs the best half-year in its history. Orders on its books rose to $807M.
What it did to the thesisIt showed that the growth the case needs is not yet coming from outside buyers: the record quarter rested on the lender's venture, the battery was still sold below cost, and the forecast was trimmed. The promised margin turn remains open.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $-1.20 against $-0.19 expected; $-1.20 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
First-half revenue was $125.7M, so even the low end needs $174M in six months, more than any half-year Eos has reported, and Q4 2025 came in $35.8M under consensus (S01, C17).
Remaining performance obligations in the 10-Q were $34.0M at 30 June, down from $45.8M in December, and half the backlog's volume is the lender's venture (S01, C11).
What management did with the money
Eos has never paid a dividend or bought back shares. It funded losses by selling shares at prices from 87 cents to $12.78, by borrowing, and by paying $564.6M to retire $200M of notes early. The money it raised in July and August went straight into Frontier.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 41 purchases and 25 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Priced for perfection. The price already pays for sales near $1B, valued like its rivals' sales, from a company that has never made a gross profit.
The shares have fallen about three-quarters in a year, near their low, after two disappointing reports. Over 40% of the shares available to trade are sold short, a bet by others that they fall further.
Three dated tests are close. Third-quarter results on 4 November show whether outside sales and the margin recover. From late December Cerberus and Hudson Bay can sell shares they hold. And the line move into Thorn Hill runs into early 2027, when management's promised margin swing should start to show.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
First-half revenue was $125.7M, so even the low end needs $174M in six months, more than any half-year Eos has reported, and Q4 2025 came in $35.8M under consensus (S01, C17).
Seven straight quarters of improvement still left adjusted gross margin at negative 62% in Q2; Line 2 was 1% of production, and Line 1 goes down for its move into early 2027 (S05, S14).
How we read the multiple
Counting its debt at face value and every share in issue, Eos is valued at about $1.83B, against $214M of sales last year. It has never sold a battery for more than it cost to make.
For the price to work:
- Its listed rivals are valued at about 1.7 times their yearly sales.
- At that rate, $1.83B needs about $1.08B of yearly sales.
- That is what analysts expect for 2028.
- And the battery must first sell for more than it costs, which it has never done.
Against its own history. It has rarely had enough sales for its own past to be a yardstick, so a lower figure than before says the hope has shrunk, not that it is cheap.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Counting the preferred and penny warrant as equity raises the figure to about $2.4B, and the cohort is two companies, one near insolvency, so the median is a thin yardstick (C07, C22, C25).
Management's own 2026 range is $300M to $350M and the low end needs a record half (C14); 2028's figure is four times Eos's best annualised output.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of sales, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of sales |
|---|---|---|
| FLNC | Fluence Energy | 0.6× |
| GWH | ESS Tech | 2.8× |
| EOSE | Eos Energy Enterprises | 5.8× |
| TSLA | Tesla not in the median | 14.4× |
The middle of the other 2 is 1.7. Tesla, Inc. competes with it in one product line inside a much bigger company, so its price says little about this business and it is not counted in the middle. Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. is dearest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
The rivals are cheaper because they are a larger integrator and a struggling flow-battery maker; the higher price is Eos's own, not the group's.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Panasonic, Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., LG Chem Ltd., BYD, Sungrow, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited, Enervenue, Ambri, Form Energy.
The bet: what it pays if it works
This is a bet that Eos's new Pennsylvania factory runs full and sells its batteries at a profit. Even then, valued like its listed rivals, the company would be worth only a little more than today, and much less at the lower rival's rate.
If the margin never turns, the cash runs out and the lenders, owed far more than the company owns, take the plants. Shareholders would keep little or nothing.
| Revenue in two to three years | GWh delivered a year needed | Valued like its peers | Like the cheapest |
|---|---|---|---|
| $573.00M | about 2 at 100% kept | 0.8× | 0.3× |
| $950.00M (the big win) | about 4 at 100% kept | 1.3× | 0.5× |
| $1.07B | about 5 at 100% kept | 1.5× | 0.5× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $4.13B of revenue (about 17 GWh delivered a year); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $10.32B of revenue (about 44 GWh delivered a year), at the same multiple.
The steps it has to take
- Done Thorn Hill Line 2 in commercial production
- Done Frontier Power USA closed
- Done First DOE advance under Tranche 2
- Slipped 2025 capacity milestone due 2025-12-31
- In progress 2026 revenue of $300M to $350M due 2026-12-31
- Not started Line 1 moved to Thorn Hill due 2027-03-31
- In progress Adjusted gross margin positive due 2027-08-31
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The DOE underwrote an 8 GWh four-line plan by 2027 in December 2024; the plan is now two lines and about 4 GWh, and Lines 3 and 4 need a new facility (S31, C34).
Remaining performance obligations in the 10-Q were $34.0M at 30 June, down from $45.8M in December, and half the backlog's volume is the lender's venture (S01, C11).
Customer deposits ran $51.0M in Q2, 45X credits come in as cash, and Cerberus's $105M revolver is available at its discretion, so the outflow could be smaller (S01).
Where we disagree with the market
A US-made, fireproof battery maker about to scale, with orders up 25% in a quarter and margins about to turn as the new factory ramps.
Outside demand is thinner than the orders on its books suggest, and the margin turn is a promise, not yet a result.
The market reads the orders on Eos's books and the projects it is bidding for. The filings show half the order volume is the lender's venture, and the contracts Eos must report under accounting rules were $34.0M at June.
We would be wrong if third-quarter sales to outside buyers top $40M while the margin improves, or if Frontier's order is filed with a price and term. A large short position shows we are not alone.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Remaining performance obligations in the 10-Q were $34.0M at 30 June, down from $45.8M in December, and half the backlog's volume is the lender's venture (S01, C11).
Counting the preferred and penny warrant as equity raises the figure to about $2.4B, and the cohort is two companies, one near insolvency, so the median is a thin yardstick (C07, C22, C25).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- The margin never turns Seven quarters of improvement still leave each sales dollar losing 62 cents; the promised 72-point swing depends on a factory move that has not happened.
- The cash runs short At the first half's pace the cash lasts to about mid-2027, and only a $15M floor stands between it and the lenders.
- The lender is the customer Cerberus lends to Eos, owns about 35% of it, and controls the venture that bought most of June's output.
- More new shares Shares in issue rose sevenfold since 2021 and could near 644M if every warrant and preferred share converts.
- Lithium-ion keeps getting cheaper Outside forecasters expect lithium-ion to hold 85% of storage; any easing of the US rules on Chinese parts removes Eos's edge.
- A lawsuit Shareholders sued in March 2026, alleging misleading statements about the factory and the outlook.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Seven straight quarters of improvement still left adjusted gross margin at negative 62% in Q2; Line 2 was 1% of production, and Line 1 goes down for its move into early 2027 (S05, S14).
Customer deposits ran $51.0M in Q2, 45X credits come in as cash, and Cerberus's $105M revolver is available at its discretion, so the outflow could be smaller (S01).
What we still do not know
- What price and length Frontier's 2 GWh order carries, and whether Frontier can walk away.
- How the Z3 performs in a utility's own hands: Dominion's Virginia test has not reported.
- How much American storage is built to run eight hours or longer, the slice Eos is made for.
- How much cash was left after September's government loan advance and the third quarter's spending.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Management says over half its pipeline is eight hours or longer and cites Virginia's 10-hour carve-out (C12, C35), so the longer-duration market may be larger than the outside data show.
Customer deposits ran $51.0M in Q2, 45X credits come in as cash, and Cerberus's $105M revolver is available at its discretion, so the outflow could be smaller (S01).
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralOutside buyers at a positive margin, without a new raise
It needs all of:
- ○Sales to outside buyers pass $60M in a single quarter.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- ○The batteries sell for more than they cost to make, for a full quarter, before the one-off charges management excludes.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
- ○No new shares or convertible notes are sold in that quarter or the one before.watched as it happens
- Unattractive→NeutralA price that no longer pays for 2028
It needs all of:
- ○The shares fall until the company is valued like its listed rivals relative to its sales.about ≈$0.96 today, 71% below the last close
- ○The battery's loss narrows to under 30 cents per sales dollar for a quarter.checked at the next results, due by 4 Nov
We would also be wrong if
- Frontier's 2 GWh order is filed with its price, length and deposit.
- Dominion's Virginia test reports the battery returning under 70% of the power stored.
What is coming
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether outside product revenue recovers from $12.7M, whether adjusted gross margin moves from negative 62%, and the cash left after the DOE advance.
Every dated event ahead
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether outside product revenue recovers from $12.7M, whether adjusted gross margin moves from negative 62%, and the cash left after the DOE advance.
- 31 December 2026 Cerberus lock-up ends; Hudson Bay exchange opens: Whether Cerberus and Hudson Bay sell registered shares into a market already 42% short.
- March 2027 Line 1 moved to Thorn Hill: Whether output holds through the move and the 10% to 15% cost cut starts, or the move costs volume as the guide's top end did.
- 31 March 2027 Revenue and EBITDA covenants return: Whether the Cerberus and DOE loans need another amendment once the deferred tests apply.
Since we wrote this
- 19 OctNewsEos's preliminary quarter: sales up a fifth, losses narrower, backlog down, guide trimmed. View heldEos preliminary third-quarter 2026 results.
- 6 OctThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionWritten two months after the June-quarter print, with the Frontier venture closed, the shares near their 52-week low and Q3 results due on 4 November.
Also checked 4 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 34
Sources - 34
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-08-05the income statement with 45X credits inside cost of goods, revenue by type (related-party product) and by country, customer concentration, the balance sheet, cash flow, the debt table with principal and carrying value, covenants, the Series B preferred and warrant notes, remaining performance obligations, the class action, and subsequent events (the direct offering, the rights offering, the FPUSA contribution)backsC03C04C05C06C07C08C10C13C17C18C41C42C43C50C51
- S02primarycompany release2026-08-05the related-party project at about 80% of revenue and FPUSA at 49% of backlog volume, backlog of $807M and 3.4 GWh, the $24.6B pipeline, the guide narrowed to $300M to $350M, adjusted gross margin and adjusted EBITDA, the Blanquilla order, the CAPAC agreement and the Golden Dome awardbacksC03C04C11C12C14C44
- S03primarycompany filing2026-02-26Item 1 on the Z3 product, the Znyth chemistry and the two Pennsylvania plants, the Competition section naming lithium-ion and long-duration rivals, the 45X and DOE loan terms, customer concentration, employees, the going-concern conclusion lifted, the induced conversion and the maturity tablebacksC01C02C08C13C18C34C41C43C51
- S04primarycompany release2026-02-26Q4 revenue of $58.0M and the year's $114.2M, management's disappointment at missing its revenue expectation, the late capacity milestone, the 2026 guide of $300M to $400M and year-end backlog and cashbacksC02C17
- S05primarytranscript2026-08-07Eos Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)the 72-point margin path, Turtle Creek's 1.5 GWh annualised June rate and Line 2 at 1% of production, fleet round-trip efficiency, the pipeline's duration and data-centre mix, the 36% FPUSA stake, the CEO's case on PJM and Virginia's 10-hour carve-out, and the analysts' questions on margin timing and the guide
these initiatives provide what we believe is a clear path to over 72 points of adjusted gross margin improvement over the next 12 months
backsC12C14C15C16C32C35C44 - S06primarycompany filing2026-08-06the unit table (Eos 112.6M Class B, Cerberus 150.0M including 50.0M founder units, Hudson Bay 50.0M), four of seven managers to Cerberus, the liquidation waterfall, the 2 GWh purchase commitment and capacity reservation agreement dated 11 May 2026, Hudson Bay's exchange right and the DOE consent moving the lines to Thorn HillbacksC10C11C45
- S07primarycompany filing2026-05-13the venture's design, the roughly $150M rights-offering target and the firm 2 GWh capacity reservation as described at announcementbacksC10C11
- S08primarycompany filing2026-09-14the $87.0M advance funded on 10 September, about $178M drawn in total, and Thorn Hill at about 4 GWh with two linesbacksC16C34
- S09primarycompany filing2026-08-31Cerberus beneficially owning 195,847,758 shares, 35.0%, all through warrants and preferred, and the lock-up to 21 December 2026backsC07C45
- S10primarycompany filing2026-04-14officers and their histories, the beneficial ownership table, the summary compensation table, the 2025 bonus metrics and payout, the long-term award mix and the say-on-pay votebacksC08C37C38C39
- S11primarycompany filing2026-08-25Buczkowski appointed chief commercial officer and Kroeker leaving on 20 October 2026, with his separation termsbacksC37
- S12primarycompany filing2026-04-30Lagi named chief financial officer from 8 June 2026, after Javidi's termination in May 2025 and Kroeker's interim yearbacksC37
- S13primarycompany filing2026-09-16the chief executive's discretionary purchases of 60,000 and 23,900 shares in March 2026, the September sales under 10b5-1 plans to cover tax on vested performance shares, and a new director's purchase of 15,000 sharesbacksC40
- S14primarycompany release2026-08-27the line move from the fourth quarter of 2026 to early 2027, about 250 employees affected, a 10% to 15% cut in conversion cost from 2027 and Thorn Hill at about 4 GWh once both lines run
The move is expected to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026 and be completed in early 2027, subject to customary lender approvals.
backsC01C16 - S15primarycompany release2026-09-02the first project under the MN8 supply agreement: 100 MWh of Eos at ten hours beside 280 MWh of lithium-ion, the Eos part following in 2030
10 MW/100 MWh of Eos’ Z3™ zinc-based long-duration energy storage, and 70 MW/280 MWh of lithium-ion energy storage
backsC36 - S16primarycompany filing2026-07-236,885,218 units subscribed of 27,367,171 offered at $5.481backsC10
- S17secondaryvendor data2026-10-06Research pack (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest, filed competitor cohort)the $3.27 close of 5 October, the 52-week range and 252-day return with its decomposition, short interest at the 15 September settlement, the analyst split and revenue consensus, the reactions to each print, the company value and the EV/Sales cohort, and the next earnings datebacksC17C19C22
- S18primarygovernment data2026-08-0743.6 GW of US battery capacity at the end of 2025, 8.3 GW added in the first half of 2026 and the planned additions for 2026 to 2028, in power rather than energy
Operators currently plan to add 26 GW in 2027 and 14 GW in 2028.
backsC29 - S19primaryindustry data2026-03-2418.9 GW installed in the US in 2025, half a terawatt-hour forecast for 2026 to 2031, and utility-scale system prices up 23% in a year
The report projects that the U.S. will install half a TWh of storage between 2026-2031
backsC29 - S20primaryindustry data2026-03-09Wood Mackenzie, long-duration energy storage outlook release Wood Mackenzielithium-ion holding 85% share through 2034, long duration at 6% of 2025 installations, a 4-hour lithium-ion project at $107/kWh in China, and Eos among three long-duration firms to raise over $1B
Lithium-ion batteries have captured the economically critical four to eight-hour storage market through superior cost and supply chain advantages
backsC26 - S21primaryindustry data2026-07-01a US 100 MW, 4-hour standalone system at $270 to $365 per kWh of capital cost, and storage costs rising again on tariffs and foreign-entity rules
the materialization of tariffs on lithium-ion battery imports has curtailed access to the low-cost Chinese cell supply
backsC27 - S22primaryindustry data2025-12-19BloombergNEF, battery price survey: new record lows BloombergNEFthe stationary lithium-ion pack price and China's stationary-cell output at over double global installations
The average pack price for stationary storage systems dropped to $70/kWh, 45% lower than in 2024.
backsC27 - S23primaryregulator2025-09-29the scale of the Moss Landing fire and, in the September 2026 release, removal and demolition running to mid-2027
The facility contained approximately 100,000 lithium-ion battery modules, of which about 55 percent were damaged in the incident.
backsC33 - S24primaryregulator2025-07-04the non-prohibited-foreign-entity cost share an energy storage project needs, 55% in 2026 rising to 75% after 2029, and § 48E's exclusion of storage with prohibited-foreign-entity material assistance and its 10-point domestic content bonus
in the case of energy storage technology the construction of which begins- ... during calendar year 2026, 55 percent
backsC28 - S25primaryregulator2025-07-04$35 per kWh for a battery cell and $10 per kWh for a module, phasing down from 2030 to nothing after 2032
in the case of a battery cell , an amount equal to the product of- $35, multiplied by
backsC28 - S26primarycompany filing2025-11-256.8 GW and 17.8 GWh deployed, 9.1 GW of contracted backlog, and US-made modules in Utah using Tennessee cells for its domestic content offeringbacksC23
- S27primarycompany filing2026-07-2322.3 GWh of energy storage deployed in the first half of 2026backsC24
- S28primarycompany filing2026-08-11substantial doubt about continuing as a going concern, $10.8M of cash and the turn to sodium-ion productsbacksC25
- S29primaryregulator2024-05-06Dominion's Darbytown pilot approved, pairing Form Energy's 494 MWh iron-air system with Eos's 16 MWh zinc system, and the order's statement that a pilot guarantees no later approval
the Eos Energy Zinc Hybrid BESS is a 4 MW /16 MWh AC system
backsC31 - S30primarygovernment data2023-10-01California Energy Commission report CEC-500-2023-052, prepared by Eos California Energy Commissiona Gen 2.3 demonstration at San Diego Gas & Electric with 59% to 78% DC efficiency; written by Eos and not approved by the Commission
Out of the 27 data points, or cycles, depicted, the Average Round Trip Efficiency was found to be 75.2 percent
backsC31 - S31primaryregulator2024-12-03U.S. DOE Loan Programs Office: $303.5M loan guarantee to Eos U.S. Department of Energythe guarantee's closing, its purpose of financing production lines and the 8 GWh four-line plan the lender underwrote
All four lines of the project are expected to manufacture 8 GWh of storage capacity annually by 2027
backsC34 - S32primarygovernment data2023-07-27U.S. DOE, Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Long Duration Energy Storage (summit slides) U.S. Department of Energythe department's taxonomy, in which short duration runs up to 10 hours and long duration starts above it
10-15 GW Annual manufacturing & deployment capacity needed by 2035
backsC30 - S33primaryindustry data2025-12-11about $125/kWh of total capital cost for a 4-hour-plus system outside the US and China, and smaller savings per kWh beyond four hours
total equipment costs are 10-15% cheaper for four-hour projects
backsC27 - S34secondarynews2026-08-12Form Energy's $750M equity raise and its statement that backlog has quadrupled this year
securing $750 million in new equity investments
read, but no claim rests on it