Adobe
It rents out the tools people use to make documents, pictures and video: Acrobat for PDFs, Photoshop and Premiere for images and film, billed by the month.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↓
Double-digit revenue and recurring revenue, but the headline growth rate holds this year only because an acquisition replaced growth the company gave away.
Business quality3/4 ↓
Real switching cost and pricing it still sets, but the entrants are shipping now and the format underneath Acrobat is an open standard.
Financial position4/4 →
Net debt of about $1.0B against more than $10B of yearly operating cash, no covenants on the notes, and no outside money needed.
Execution record2/4 ↓
Eight straight earnings beats, but the recurring revenue target was held constant by an acquisition and the segment split that would show why was removed.
Per share capture4/4 →
Share count down 13.1% in three years, buybacks far exceeding stock pay, and both acquisitions paid in cash rather than in shares.
Potential2/4 →
The professional seat pond is already full, so the upside needs hundreds of millions of free users to start paying, and none has signed.
Risk profile3/4 ↓
No customer concentration and revenue spread across three regions, but neither the chief executive's nor the finance chief's job is permanently filled.
Valuation4/4 ↑
The price implies about zero growth for ever in cash after stock pay, against 10.5% revenue growth in fiscal 2025.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Every figure is filed or measured outside the company, but the claim the case turns on is management's own account of its own decision.
The Verdict
We rate Adobe attractive. It rents the software much of the world uses to make documents, images and video, almost all of it by subscription, and it is still growing, so the business is solid. The price assumes that growth has stopped for good, so it is cheap: a buyer pays for today's business and gets the growth close to free. The view hinges on growth holding, above all on the price rise Adobe put off arriving; signed future revenue growing slower than sales is the warning. Conviction is low because management will not say when that price rise comes.
The long caseBusinesses are moving work into AI tools, which threatens where tasks begin; Adobe wins if people still finish their documents, images and videos in its apps.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- The dollar has weakened through the year, and guidance struck in June may hold currency flat where the first half received a $169M net benefit; a further move would flatter the second half.
- Management describes the second half as skewed toward the fourth quarter for enterprise seasonality, so the shape within the half is not even.
- Cost of subscription revenue rose 16% in Q2 2026, driven by hosting and inference for artificial intelligence, so the cash figure may not hold as free products scale.
- Free cash flow benefits from customers paying in advance; deferred revenue fell $223M within Q2 2026, and a stalling book would take that support away.
- The required return is an assumption, not a fact: at 8% the implied growth is about -0.9% and at 10% about 0.9%.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck on the Q3 10-Q and the 2026-09-23 close: the price fell 12.6% since the thesis while trailing cash rose.
- Management's account is seasonal and partly fair. Steven Day said both measures 'step up in our fourth quarter, and then remain fairly flat over the next 3 quarters. And this year is no different to prior years in that shape.' A fall of 0.5% is a reasonable description of flat. What the filings do not support is the comparison to prior years on this particular step: last year's Q2-to-Q3 move was a rise of 3.8%, not a flat quarter.
- The deceleration is also partly the strategy working as described rather than failing. Day attributed it to 'our focus to accelerate new user acquisition through the freemium business model', and free users sign no contract, so a book of contracted revenue is exactly where that choice shows up first. The acquired Semrush book sits inside the FY2026 figure and flatters it, which makes the underlying deceleration larger rather than smaller.
- A company losing pricing power would describe it the same way, and the framing is unfalsifiable until the deferred increase is either taken or abandoned.
- The chief executive announced his departure three months earlier and the chief financial officer left four days after the call, so neither of the people describing a payoff in 2027 will be accountable for it.
- Sales and marketing spending rose 16% in the same quarter on advertising, which is what a company defending distribution does as well as what one expanding it does.
- Deferring a price rise is equally consistent with not being able to take one, and Adobe published no evidence that the increase remains available.
- The company's own risk factors name customer price sensitivity and limited barriers to entry as characteristics of its markets.
The company
Adobe sells three things on one bill. Acrobat makes, edits and signs PDF documents. Creative Cloud is the set of apps professionals use to edit photos, draw and cut video. A set of marketing systems holds a company's brand images and customer data.
The PDF format has been a free public standard since 2008, so buyers pay for the tools, not the format, and Adobe keeps 89.2 cents of each sales dollar after the cost of delivering them.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
How it makes money
It rents seats. A customer pays by the month, $69.99 for the main professional plan, and loses the software when the payments stop. Making images with its AI draws down credits, so heavy users pay more. What keeps customers renewing is the cost of leaving.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Design employment is almost certainly a smaller share of the labour force outside rich countries, so this over-counts the global base and makes the pond look larger than it is.
- List price is above realised price - Adobe discounts for education, teams and cheaper single-app plans - so the dollar figure is a ceiling.
- Enterprises buy more seats than the occupational count implies, since people outside these five job titles are given licences.
- Meeting the user inside somebody else's interface hands the customer relationship to the interface owner, who is also building the competing tool.
- Adobe published no revenue, usage or contract terms for these placements, so their scale is unknown.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q3 FY2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Creative and Marketing Professionals subscriptions | 68.8% | Creative Cloud apps such as Photoshop, Premiere and Illustrator, plus the marketing software and Semrush, rented by seat or by contract. |
| Business Professionals and Consumers subscriptions | 28.2% | Acrobat and Adobe Express subscriptions for document work and quick design, sold monthly or yearly to individuals and businesses. |
| Product, services and other subscriptions | 3.0% | Perpetual licences, consulting, training and support, mostly attached to the marketing software, plus a small residual subscription line. |
Who runs it
Shantanu Narayen has run Adobe since 2007 and hands the job to Anil Chakravarthy on 1 December 2026, staying on as executive chair. Chakravarthy ran the marketing software, not Creative Cloud, and the finance chief's seat is held by a stand-in. Directors and officers together own a tiny slice of the company. The yearly bonus rides on sales and adjusted earnings per share; the shares on the stock against other companies' and on recurring sales growth with acquisitions stripped out.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The succession is orderly and internal rather than a rupture: a named successor five years in the business, a founder-era chief executive staying as Executive Chair, and Chakravarthy already fielding the strategy questions on the Q3 call. Adobe has done long, planned handovers before.
- What is not routine is the combination. The claim this thesis rests on is that Creative Cloud pricing is taken again in fiscal 2027. The executive who ran that business leaves before fiscal 2027 begins, the incoming chief executive's career is on the customer-experience side, and the finance seat that would model the decision is unfilled. Three of the people who would own that call change in ninety days.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Leaving is expensive, and the employer pays, not the person clicking. A studio's archive of layered files will not open faithfully elsewhere, its staff are trained on these apps, and its colour settings are tuned to print correctly.
The sign the lock holds is price. Adobe had Creative Cloud price rises scheduled for the second half of this year and chose when to take them.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Deferring a price rise is equally consistent with not being able to take one, and Adobe published no evidence that the increase remains available.
- The company's own risk factors name customer price sensitivity and limited barriers to entry as characteristics of its markets.
The threat
Chat tools now do the easy end of image work. Google's Gemini and OpenAI's image model both edit an existing picture from a typed request, no Photoshop needed. Figma grew 48% to $370.1M in the quarter to June 2026, taking interface design. None of them opens a layered archive intact.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The rivals: GOOGL, FIG, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| GOOGL | Google Gemini image generationPriced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
| Private | OpenAI GPT Image (gpt-image-2)Priced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| FIG | FigmaPriced against it: Different product | On sale | Different product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
America employs 846,900 people in five design and media jobs. Scaled to the world, that is about 18 million workers, worth about $15.1B a year at Adobe's list price.
Adobe already takes $16.30B a year from creative and marketing customers, more than that whole pool, though the figure includes marketing software. So growth has to come from people who have never paid, and nobody counts how many would.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Design employment is almost certainly a smaller share of the labour force outside rich countries, so this over-counts the global base and makes the pond look larger than it is.
- List price is above realised price - Adobe discounts for education, teams and cheaper single-app plans - so the dollar figure is a ceiling.
- Enterprises buy more seats than the occupational count implies, since people outside these five job titles are given licences.
Who has signed
Customers had signed for $22.16B of future subscription revenue at the end of August, two-thirds of it due within a year. Only about 4% cannot be cancelled or refunded; the rest is subscriptions a customer can decline to renew.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Management's account is seasonal and partly fair. Steven Day said both measures 'step up in our fourth quarter, and then remain fairly flat over the next 3 quarters. And this year is no different to prior years in that shape.' A fall of 0.5% is a reasonable description of flat. What the filings do not support is the comparison to prior years on this particular step: last year's Q2-to-Q3 move was a rise of 3.8%, not a flat quarter.
- The deceleration is also partly the strategy working as described rather than failing. Day attributed it to 'our focus to accelerate new user acquisition through the freemium business model', and free users sign no contract, so a book of contracted revenue is exactly where that choice shows up first. The acquired Semrush book sits inside the FY2026 figure and flatters it, which makes the underlying deceleration larger rather than smaller.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 12% over the twelve months to Aug 2026, about the same pace as the 11% in the year to Nov 2025.
Operating margin is 36%, about where it was (34%) in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 54¢ of each sales dollar, up from 51¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 40% a year after tax, up from 27% in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 41% of sales into free cash, $10.6B over the last twelve months.
It owes $724M more than the cash it holds, about 0.1 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count fell 18% in 4.7 years, and pay in shares costs 8.0% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-10-04. Fiscal years end in November.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Nov 2024 | Nov 2025 | 12 mo to Aug 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $15.8B | $17.6B | $19.4B | $21.5B | $23.8B | $26.0B |
| Sales growth | +23% | +12% | +10% | +11% | +11% | +12% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 88% | 88% | 88% | 89% | 89% | 89% |
| Operating margin | 37% | 35% | 34% | 31% | 37% | 36% |
| Net margin | 31% | 27% | 28% | 26% | 30% | 28% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Sales and marketing | 27% | 28% | 28% | 27% | 27% | 28% |
| General and admin | 6.9% | 6.9% | 7.3% | 7.1% | 6.6% | 7.4% |
| Pay in shares | 6.8% | 8.2% | 8.9% | 8.5% | 8.2% | 8.0% |
| Capital spending | 2.2% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.8% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $7.23B | $7.84B | $7.30B | $8.06B | $10.0B | $10.8B |
| Free cash flow | $6.88B | $7.40B | $6.94B | $7.87B | $9.85B | $10.6B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $5.80B | $6.10B | $7.84B | $7.89B | $6.59B | $5.64B |
| Debt | $4.12B | $4.13B | $3.63B | $4.13B | $6.21B | $6.36B |
| Net cash | $1.68B | $1.97B | $4.21B | $3.76B | $385M | −$724M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 27% | 26% | 28% | 28% | 39% | 40% |
| Shares (diluted) | 481M | 471M | 459M | 450M | 427M | 396M |
What growth costs
Growing has not made Adobe more profitable lately. Each sales dollar carries about the same research, selling and admin cost as three years ago, and stock pay has eased only a little, so profit grows in step with sales rather than faster. This year a legal charge and a write-off pushed admin costs up.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The last report (10 Sep)
Quarter ended August 2026, filed figures.
The third quarter of fiscal 2026 was a record. Revenue grew 12.9% to $6.76B, both customer groups sped up by a point, and the full-year revenue and earnings targets went up.
The trouble was underneath. Signed future revenue grew 8.4%, slower than revenue, and fell $0.11B from May against a $0.75B rise a year earlier. New recurring revenue added in the quarter, $0.40B, was down 36% to 37% by an analyst's reckoning that management did not challenge.
What it did to the thesisIt backed the case that demand is intact, since both customer groups grew faster than before. It also raised the warning that keeps conviction low: signed future revenue and new recurring revenue slowed, the first sign the market's fear of decline could be right. The fourth quarter decides which.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $6.13 against $6.08 expected; $4.62 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- The dollar has weakened through the year, and guidance struck in June may hold currency flat where the first half received a $169M net benefit; a further move would flatter the second half.
- Management describes the second half as skewed toward the fourth quarter for enterprise seasonality, so the shape within the half is not even.
- Management's account is seasonal and partly fair. Steven Day said both measures 'step up in our fourth quarter, and then remain fairly flat over the next 3 quarters. And this year is no different to prior years in that shape.' A fall of 0.5% is a reasonable description of flat. What the filings do not support is the comparison to prior years on this particular step: last year's Q2-to-Q3 move was a rise of 3.8%, not a flat quarter.
- The deceleration is also partly the strategy working as described rather than failing. Day attributed it to 'our focus to accelerate new user acquisition through the freemium business model', and free users sign no contract, so a book of contracted revenue is exactly where that choice shows up first. The acquired Semrush book sits inside the FY2026 figure and flatters it, which makes the underlying deceleration larger rather than smaller.
What management did with the money
It bought back shares, heavily. In fiscal 2025 it spent $11.28B on them, more than the $10.03B its operations brought in, and the average share count fell from 459.1 million in fiscal 2023 to 427.0 million in fiscal 2025. That is why earnings per share rise about 7.5% this year while total profit is flat.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 54 purchases and 79 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Fiscal 2026 official profit carries a $70M goodwill write-off and legal settlement charges that fiscal 2025 did not, so the underlying comparison is better than flat.
- The official tax rate assumption rose about two points between the two guidance tables, which is a below-the-line effect rather than an operating one.
- On the adjusted basis the company reports, profit rises about 8.9% rather than being flat.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Cheap. The price assumes a business that has stopped growing for good. Adobe is still growing; the question is whether that lasts.
The shares have kept falling since this thesis was written in August, even as Adobe raised its targets.
The next test is 9 December, when Adobe reports its fourth quarter and sets targets for fiscal 2027, the first report under its incoming chief executive.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- 2026-09-24editedRestated at the 2026-09-23 close.
- The succession is orderly and internal rather than a rupture: a named successor five years in the business, a founder-era chief executive staying as Executive Chair, and Chakravarthy already fielding the strategy questions on the Q3 call. Adobe has done long, planned handovers before.
- What is not routine is the combination. The claim this thesis rests on is that Creative Cloud pricing is taken again in fiscal 2027. The executive who ran that business leaves before fiscal 2027 begins, the incoming chief executive's career is on the customer-experience side, and the finance seat that would model the decision is unfilled. Three of the people who would own that call change in ninety days.
How we read the multiple
Adobe grew sales 10.5% in fiscal 2025, a normal year, yet costs about 13 times last year's profit, against about 42 times over six years.
The 9% return is our assumption, not a filed fact, and the verdict hangs on it. For a buyer wanting 9% a year:
- The whole company, debt included, costs $94.4B.
- It produces about $8.52B a year of spare cash after paying staff in stock.
- That is 9% already, so the price works even if the cash never grows. Any growth makes it too low.
Against its own history. Far cheaper than its own normal on every measure. The business has slowed, but by nothing like as much as the price has fallen.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Cost of subscription revenue rose 16% in Q2 2026, driven by hosting and inference for artificial intelligence, so the cash figure may not hold as free products scale.
- Free cash flow benefits from customers paying in advance; deferred revenue fell $223M within Q2 2026, and a stalling book would take that support away.
- The required return is an assumption, not a fact: at 8% the implied growth is about -0.9% and at 10% about 0.9%.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck on the Q3 10-Q and the 2026-09-23 close: the price fell 12.6% since the thesis while trailing cash rose.
- A six-year median spans the period when the market paid growth multiples for every large software company, so the comparison measures a change in what buyers pay as much as a change in this business.
- Trailing profit carries the $70M write-off and the settlement charges, so the trailing multiple is slightly flattering the price.
- 2026-09-24editedRe-struck at the 2026-09-23 close on four filed quarters to 28 August 2026.
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Also checked and set aside: Salesforce (a substitute, not the same product); DocuSign (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Canva, Google (Gemini image generation), OpenAI.
Where we disagree with the market
Artificial intelligence is ending Adobe's franchise: growth slows for good as chat tools and cheaper rivals replace its apps.
So far the slowdown is a pricing choice, not lost demand: both customer groups still grew faster than 10% last quarter.
The doubt is visible: 6 of 63 analysts say sell and short selling rose 56% between February and July.
What the market may be missing sits in two releases six months apart. Adobe held its 10.2% growth target after buying 1.87 points of it, and says the missing growth is a price rise it chose not to take. The evidence against us is growing: signed future revenue grew slower than revenue last quarter.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- Semrush's own book will have grown between April and November, so the exit contribution is probably above $480M and the organic figure below the one computed here.
- Guidance issued in December is normally conservative, so part of the room the acquisition filled may have been genuine outperformance rather than a cut.
- A company losing pricing power would describe it the same way, and the framing is unfalsifiable until the deferred increase is either taken or abandoned.
- The chief executive announced his departure three months earlier and the chief financial officer left four days after the call, so neither of the people describing a payoff in 2027 will be accountable for it.
- Sales and marketing spending rose 16% in the same quarter on advertising, which is what a company defending distribution does as well as what one expanding it does.
- Deferring a price rise is equally consistent with not being able to take one, and Adobe published no evidence that the increase remains available.
- The company's own risk factors name customer price sensitivity and limited barriers to entry as characteristics of its markets.
- Management's account is seasonal and partly fair. Steven Day said both measures 'step up in our fourth quarter, and then remain fairly flat over the next 3 quarters. And this year is no different to prior years in that shape.' A fall of 0.5% is a reasonable description of flat. What the filings do not support is the comparison to prior years on this particular step: last year's Q2-to-Q3 move was a rise of 3.8%, not a flat quarter.
- The deceleration is also partly the strategy working as described rather than failing. Day attributed it to 'our focus to accelerate new user acquisition through the freemium business model', and free users sign no contract, so a book of contracted revenue is exactly where that choice shows up first. The acquired Semrush book sits inside the FY2026 figure and flatters it, which makes the underlying deceleration larger rather than smaller.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Signed revenue slowing. Signed future revenue grew 8.4% last quarter against revenue's 12.9%; a second such quarter would mean customers leaving, not pausing.
- A price rise with no date. Asked on 10 September when the put-off price rise returns, management did not answer, and the chief executive said not taking it was right.
- Leaders changing seats. A new chief executive starts on 1 December, the finance chief is interim, and the head of the creative business leaves on 27 September.
- The deciding number is hidden. Adobe stopped reporting the creative business's recurring revenue separately in 2026, so its own accounts cannot settle the argument.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- Management's account is seasonal and partly fair. Steven Day said both measures 'step up in our fourth quarter, and then remain fairly flat over the next 3 quarters. And this year is no different to prior years in that shape.' A fall of 0.5% is a reasonable description of flat. What the filings do not support is the comparison to prior years on this particular step: last year's Q2-to-Q3 move was a rise of 3.8%, not a flat quarter.
- The deceleration is also partly the strategy working as described rather than failing. Day attributed it to 'our focus to accelerate new user acquisition through the freemium business model', and free users sign no contract, so a book of contracted revenue is exactly where that choice shows up first. The acquired Semrush book sits inside the FY2026 figure and flatters it, which makes the underlying deceleration larger rather than smaller.
- A company losing pricing power would describe it the same way, and the framing is unfalsifiable until the deferred increase is either taken or abandoned.
- The chief executive announced his departure three months earlier and the chief financial officer left four days after the call, so neither of the people describing a payoff in 2027 will be accountable for it.
- Sales and marketing spending rose 16% in the same quarter on advertising, which is what a company defending distribution does as well as what one expanding it does.
- The succession is orderly and internal rather than a rupture: a named successor five years in the business, a founder-era chief executive staying as Executive Chair, and Chakravarthy already fielding the strategy questions on the Q3 call. Adobe has done long, planned handovers before.
- What is not routine is the combination. The claim this thesis rests on is that Creative Cloud pricing is taken again in fiscal 2027. The executive who ran that business leaves before fiscal 2027 begins, the incoming chief executive's career is on the customer-experience side, and the finance seat that would model the decision is unfilled. Three of the people who would own that call change in ninety days.
What we still do not know
- How big the AI business is. Management says its recurring revenue grew more than 150% but has never said from what base.
- How many of the free users will ever pay. Adobe counts a billion monthly users; nothing measures the share that converts.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- The category is Adobe's own and it publishes no definition of what is in it, so the figure cannot be reconciled to anything filed.
- At about 1.8% of recurring revenue it is far too small to offset the roughly $500M being given up elsewhere in the same year.
- Adobe publishes no definition of a monthly active user and no filing carries the figure, so neither the level nor the growth can be checked.
- A free user count rising while recurring revenue growth falls is the exact pattern that would appear whether the trade is working or whether paying customers are being replaced by free ones.
What would change our view
- Attractive→NeutralThe market stops pricing decline
It needs:
- ○The company's value rises to about 14 times its yearly cash after stock pay, where the price no longer assumes the business shrinks.about ≈$310.64 today, 29% above the last close
- Attractive→NeutralThe delivered growth falls to what the price assumes
It needs any of:
- ○Adobe promises recurring revenue growth below 8% for fiscal 2027, even counting companies it bought.checked at the next results, due by 9 Dec
- ○Cash after stock pay falls below $7B across four quarters in a row.checked at the next results, due by 9 Dec
We would also be wrong if
- Signed future revenue grows slower than revenue for a second quarter running.
- Creative and marketing subscriptions grow below 8%, leaving out currency swings and acquisitions.
- The put-off Creative Cloud price rise is dropped rather than taken in fiscal 2027.
What is coming
- 1 December 2026 Anil Chakravarthy becomes president and chief executive: Whether the first chief executive change in eighteen years arrives with a permanent finance chief and a named head for Creative Cloud, whose pricing the case awaits.
Every dated event ahead
- 1 December 2026 Anil Chakravarthy becomes president and chief executive: Whether the first chief executive change in eighteen years arrives with a permanent finance chief and a named head for Creative Cloud, whose pricing the case awaits.
- 9 December 2026 Q4 FY2026 results and fiscal 2027 targets: Whether remaining performance obligations grow faster than revenue again, and whether fiscal 2027 recurring revenue growth is guided at 9% or better.
- February 2027 2027 proxy statement: The new chief executive's pay, the fiscal 2026 bonus and performance-share payouts, and whether the recurring revenue goal still strips out what was bought.
- March 2027 Q1 FY2027 results: Whether the deferred Creative Cloud price increases are taken under the new chief executive or deferred again.
Since we wrote this
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictThe owner asked to pilot the long case on five theses without a bet before deciding on the rest.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 26 SepThesis reviewHeader caught up with the September results. View heldThe top of the page still said signed future revenue grew 13%. It grew 8.4% in the September quarter, slower than revenue, which is why conviction was already Low.
- 24 SepEarningsFiled cash figures: the price now assumes no growth. View heldThe quarterly filing lifted yearly cash after stock pay to about $8.52B while the shares fell, so the growth the price assumes dropped from about 1.5% a year to about zero.
- 15 SepThesis reviewOpen questions routed; September results still unread. View heldCanva's accounts turned out to be filed in Australia. The larger finding: Adobe had reported on 10 September, and this thesis had not yet read the results.
- 15 SepEarningsConviction cut from Medium to LowSigned future revenue grew slower than revenue for the first time, management would not say when the price rise returns, and the executive who would take it is leaving.
- 23 AugThesis writtenAttractive, medium convictionThe recurring revenue Adobe gave up in June looked like a pricing choice rather than lost demand, and the price already assumed a decline that had not started.
Also checked 4 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 36
Sources - 36
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-01-15Item 1 business and competition, the segment note and the fiscal-2026 segment change, FY2025 statements, share counts, stock compensation, buyback spend, remaining performance obligations and deferred revenue, and the absence of any customer concentration disclosurebacksC13C14C16C19C32C43C49C53C54C59C62C63
- S02primarycompany filing2026-06-15the single-segment recast, customer-group subscription revenue, the expense bridge, the tax discussion, the Semrush purchase accounting and goodwill impairment, the balance sheet, buyback authorities and the geographic splitbacksC01C02C17C18C19C20C21C23C32C38C50C52C63
- S03primarycompany release2026-06-11constant-currency growth, the raised fiscal-2026 targets, the unchanged 10.2% recurring-revenue growth target, the GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliation and the chief financial officer's departurebacksC01C02C07C20C21C23C33C38C50
- S04primarytranscript2026-06-11management's account of the deferred price increase and the freemium shift, the monthly-active-user and Firefly figures that appear in no filing, and six analyst questions on the pivot, one of which quantified the organic recurring-revenue reduction
In terms of the impact on ARR, you can think of roughly half the impact as a result of deferring those creative price line optimizations and the other half related to going full steam on the freemium experience.
backsC07C08C33C55 - S05primarycompany release2025-12-10the original fiscal-2026 targets issued before Semrush, the revalued opening recurring-revenue book, the fiscal-2025 segment and customer-group figures and the disclosure changes announced for fiscal 2026backsC13C32C41C49
- S06primarycompany release2026-03-12Q1 constant-currency growth by customer group and the reaffirmation of the December fiscal-2026 targetsread, but no claim rests on it
- S07primarycompany release2026-03-12the chief executive transition, the special committee and its remitbacksC30
- S08primarycompany filing2026-07-17that severance protections sunset twelve months after the new chief executive commences employment, which dates the vacancy as still open on 14 July 2026read, but no claim rests on it
- S09secondaryvendor data2026-08-23Research pack, frozen at content/ADBE/research-pack.jsoncontent/ADBE/research-pack.jsonprice, the 252-day range and returns, the measured price reaction to each news item, the analyst split, the Form 4 transcription and the vendor ratio historybacksC27C28C47
- S10primarycompany filing2026-08-05a listed design-software challenger's own revenue, operating margin and the growth of its artificial-intelligence hosting costsbacksC37
- S11primarycompany filing2026-02-18how the challenger describes its own product and market, and that it too names no competitor by nameread, but no claim rests on it
- S12primarygovernment data2025-08-29U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook - Graphic Designers U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisticsthe size and projected growth of the largest professional design occupation, measured by a statistical agency rather than by a vendor
Number of Jobs, 2024 265,900 Job Outlook, 2024-34 2% (Slower than average) Employment Change, 2024-34 5,700
backsC39 - S13primarygovernment data2025-08-29U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook - Art Directors U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisticsa second occupation in the professional seat base
Number of Jobs, 2024 135,000 Job Outlook, 2024-34 4% (As fast as average) Employment Change, 2024-34 5,700
backsC39 - S14primarygovernment data2025-08-29U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook - Photographers U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisticsa third occupation in the professional seat base
Number of Jobs, 2024 151,200 Job Outlook, 2024-34 2% (Slower than average)
backsC39 - S15primarygovernment data2025-08-29U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook - Film and Video Editors and Camera Operators U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisticsa fourth occupation in the professional seat base
Number of Jobs, 2024 79,900 Job Outlook, 2024-34 3% (As fast as average) Employment Change, 2024-34 2,200
backsC39 - S16primarygovernment data2025-08-29U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook - Web Developers and Digital Designers U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisticsthe fifth and fastest-growing occupation in the professional seat base
Number of Jobs, 2024 214,900 Job Outlook, 2024-34 7% (Much faster than average) Employment Change, 2024-34 15,500
backsC39 - S17primarygovernment data2026-07-13the world and United States labour force, so an occupational count in one country can be scaled to a global base
{"indicator":{"id":"SL.TLF.TOTL.IN","value":"Labor force, total"},"country":{"id":"1W","value":"World"},"countryiso3code":"WLD","date":"2024","value":3697172611}
read, but no claim rests on it - S18primarygovernment data2026-05-26U.S. Census Bureau, Business Trends and Outlook Survey - Large Firms With at Least 20 Employees Biggest AI Users U.S. Census Bureauhow fast businesses are actually adopting artificial intelligence, measured by a statistical agency rather than by a vendor or by Adobe
overall AI usage hovered between 17% and 20% ... between 20% and 23% of businesses expected to be using it in the next six months
backsC42 - S19primaryother2026-08-23the attacker's own description of a shipping product that does the create-and-edit job, in its own words
Gemini can generate and process images conversationally with text, images, or a combination of both. This lets you create, edit, and iterate on visuals with unprecedented control.
backsC35 - S20primaryother2026-08-23a second attacker's own description of a shipping generation-and-editing product
The OpenAI API lets you generate and edit images from text prompts using GPT Image models, including our latest, gpt-image-2.
backsC36 - S21primarygovernment data2019-03-01Library of Congress, Sustainability of Digital Formats - PDF, Version 1.7 (ISO 32000-1:2008) Library of Congressthat the document format underneath Acrobat is an open international standard rather than Adobe property, which bounds the moat from outside
PDF (Portable Document Format), developed by Adobe Systems Incorporated, is described by Adobe as a general document representation language. ... Version 1.7 was published as ISO 32000-1 in July 2008.
backsC34 - S22primaryother2026-08-11the semi-monthly short interest series, which is a regulatory disclosure and shows how positioning moved through the year
{"settlementDate":"07/31/2026","interest":"19,347,621","avgDailyShareVolume":"5,923,758","daysToCover":3.266106}
backsC29 - S23primaryother2026-08-23the list price per professional seat, reproduced across two independently phrased requests
Pay US$34.99/mo for the first 3 months and US$69.99/mo after that
read, but no claim rests on it - S24primarycompany filing2026-07-31the transaction code, read on EDGAR rather than from the vendor aggregate: code S, 416 shares at $264.33backsC47
- S25secondarynews2026-06-11the characterisation of the post-results price as a seven-year low, which the three years of price history in the pack cannot themselves establishbacksC27
- S26primarycompany filing2026-03-02how Salesforce describes itself, for the cohort testread, but no claim rests on it
- S27primarycompany filing2026-03-18how DocuSign describes itself, for the cohort testread, but no claim rests on it
- S28primarycompany filing2026-01-27that half of executive performance shares vest on recurring revenue growth, and that the calculation strips out material acquisitions and currency - the two things the published growth rate includesbacksC56
- S29primaryregulator2026ASIC media release 26-090MR, Canva Group pays $792,000 in infringement notices for failing to lodge financial reports on time Australian Securities and Investments Commissionthat the largest private rival does file audited consolidated accounts, with an Australian regulator, and the date of the most recent lodgement - the route this thesis recorded as non-existent after searching only Canva's own newsroom
Canva Pty Ltd, Canva Operations Pty Limited, Canva Trading Pty Ltd, and Fusion Books Pty Ltd each paid an infringement notice of $198,000 ... for the financial year ending 31 December 2024 by the required date ... Canva Pty Ltd lodged its FY24 consolidated report covering the four companies on 27 March 2026. ... Large proprietary companies are required to prepare and lodge annual financial reports. A proprietary company is classified as large if it meets at least two of the following criteria for a financial year: the consolidated revenue of the company and any entities it controls is $50 million or more; the consolidated gross assets ... is $25 million or more, and; the company and any entities it controls have 100 or more employees.
backsC57 - S30primarycompany release2026-09-10backsC03C04C05C08C09C10C11C15C31C44C45C46C48
- S31primarytranscript2026-09-10backsC04C07
- S32primarycompany filing2026-09-08backsC31
- S33primarycompany release2025-09-11backsC09C15
- S34primarycompany filing2026-09-22Nine-month operating cash flow, capital spending and stock compensation; the balance sheet's cash, investments and debt; the remaining repurchase authority; and the cover-page share count.backsC18C24C25C51C58C59C62C63
- S35secondaryvendor data2026-09-24ADBE research pack, refreshed 2026-09-24 (2026-09-23 close)Last completed-session close of $240.69 on 2026-09-23.backsC25C26C51
- S36primarycompany filing2026-02-27beneficial ownership at 17 February 2026, the fiscal 2025 cash incentive plan and its payout, the 2023 and 2025 performance share programs and their payouts, the chief executive's pay mix, and the directors' and officers' biographiesbacksC60C61C63